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ABSTRACT 
The Look East Policy (LEP), which was officially launched in February 1982, came about 
as a result of the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamed's determination to 
encourage Malaysians to "learn from Japan". Despite the difficulties in transferring 
management ideas between countries, Mahathir was convinced that with the Look East 
Policy he could persuade management in Malaysia, and particularly in the manufacturing 
firms, to implement wholesale the Japanese model of management or Japanese 
management techniques. This is not only because he believed that Japanese management 
techniques were the prerequisites for Malaysia's drive for industrialisation, but also he 
believed that they were the solutions to the problems cojifronting the Malaysian workforce. 
However, the findings from this study seem to suggest that only certain elements of the 
Japanese management techniques have been implemented in or transferred to the 
manufacturing firms in Malaysia. Even then, our findings show that there are a number of 
problems being encountered, especially if these elements are not compatible with 
Malaysian cultural and religious beliefs. This could imply that certain elements of the 
Japanese management practices are culture-bound and therefore difficult to transfer to a 
different cultural environment. 
Our findings also seem to suggest that despite the strength of the state in Malaysia, it has 
not been very successful in promoting, through the Look East Policy, the Japanese style of 
management to manufacturing firms. Instead, it is suggested that the majority of the 
Malaysian workforce prefers the present management system that is pro-West, which 
suggests its profound influence in Malaysia. Hence, it can be argued that because of the 
multi-ethnic and multi-religious beliefs in Malaysia, and also because of the strong 
influence of the West, there is a limit to what the state can do or achieve. 
Based on our findings, it might be possible to suggest the following conclusions: (i) that 
the Look East Policy was never properly thought through in terms of the difficulty of 
transferring management techniques from one culture to another; (ii) a more limited 
objective with regard to learning from the Japanese might have been more successful. 
However, this would have demanded not only a long-term commitment but also greater 
involvement from Chinese community; and (iii) that the Look East Policy was always a 
political as well as an economic one. Perhaps its success should be judged not on a basis 
of whether it was adopted but on whether it achieved its political objectives. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the overall flow undertaken in this study. First, we highlight the 
reasons why the topic entitled "The Look East Policy: Its Impact in Promoting Japanese 
Management Techniques to Manufacturing Firms in Malaysia" has been chosen. Next, we 
present the research objectives. Shortly after that, we state the importance of this study 
before highlighting its limitations. Finally, we summarise the structure and contents of the 
whole thesis. By doing so, we hope the reader will be able follow the whole discussion 
presented in this study. 
1.2 The Reasons for Choosing the Research Topic 
"Dasar Pandang Ke Timur" or the Look East Policy (LEP) swept the nation like a storm in 
1982. During that time the author was still at secondary (high) school. Like many other 
students during that time, the author had no idea what this policy was all about, although it 
quickly became the subject of daily conversation of the "man on the street". The more the 
author listened closely to the conversation of the "man on the street", the more confused he 
became, as there were several versions of the LEP story. From then on curiosity began to 
develop in the author's mind. This first encounter with the "storm" of the Look East 
Policy was, of course, more than fifteen years ago. 
Then, on a "special" visit to a local library in 1996, the author came across a book called 
Paradoxes of Mahathirism by Khoo Boo Teik. Skimming through its pages, the author's 
attention was caught by a section on page 65 of the book, that says "Look Out and Look 
East". Just looking at that sentence reminded the author of his first encounter with the 
"storm" of the Look East Policy back in 1982, and since that "special" trip, the author has 
been determined to research the impact of the Look East Policy in promoting Japanese 
management techniques in manufacturing industry. Part of the reason is because there has 
not been any research carried out in this area, and partly out of curiosity, especially after 
reading the following statements by the Prime Minister, Mahathir. 
"The West have failed in the matter of economic competition. If we desire success, 
therefore, we must look East (to Japan) where the people are hard-working, to rid ourselves 
of the Western values that we have absorbed, to emulate the diligence in work, 
management techniques and other aspects found in the East (Japan). " (Mahathir as cited 
in Teik, 1995: 67). 
"We have all the basic ingredients that will make it possible for Malaysia to become an 
important industrialised country in Asia after Japan but `something more' is needed which 
is not found at home - the work ethic and management techniques which are the most 
important things that seem to have contributed to the rags to riches story of Japan. " 
(Mahathir as cited in Teik, 1995: 69). 
It was in searching for a foreign model which could offer that "something more" that 
Mahathir launched the Look East Policy - calling Malaysians, particularly in the 
manufacturing sector, to commit themselves to implementing and practising the Japanese 
management techniques and work ethic. Mahathir strongly believed that the Look East 
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Policy would have a strong impact and be effective because in his words, "Malaysia and 
Japan share a common economic destiny and there is sufficient commonality in terms of 
political philosophy" (Mahathir as cited in Teik, 1995: 68). 
As mentioned earlier, because of curiosity and because there has not been any research 
carried out in this area, the author chose the above-mentioned topic as the subject of his 
study. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
There are two main objectives of this research. First, or the specific objective, is to 
evaluate the success of the Look East Policy in transferring Japanese management 
techniques to manufacturing firms in Malaysia. In order to take that objective forward, we 
are going to look at the extent to which Japanese management techniques have been 
transferred; why they have or have not been transferred; and identify the nature of the 
problems that have been faced in implementing them. 
Second, and more generally, this research will contribute to debate in existing literature 
about the transferability of management techniques and factors that facilitate or inhibit 
such transfer. 
1.4 The Importance of the Study 
Based on the review of government publications, we know that the government, via its 
Look East Policy, was particularly keen to develop Japanese management techniques in 
the manufacturing industry. But the lack of research evaluating the success of the Look 
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East Policy in transferring Japanese management techniques to the manufacturing industry 
makes this study significant. 
This study is also important because it will shed some light on a number of fundamental 
issues, such as the feasibility of transferring wholesale Japanese management techniques to 
manufacturing firms, given the strength of the state in Malaysia, and what lesson(s) the 
government could learn from the outcomes of this study. 
1.5 The Limitations of the Study 
This study has a number of limitations. One of them is that it is confined mainly to the 
elements of the "classic" Japanese management techniques. Some topics like Japanese 
trade policies, sub-contracting system and lean production system will not be discussed 
because they are not considered central to the theme of this thesis. The discussion has 
instead concentrated on Japanese human resource management and production 
management techniques. 
The fact that this study is confined to the manufacturing firms also constitutes a limitation. 
However, there are two main reasons for doing this. First, since the elements of the 
"classic" Japanese management techniques have been successfully practised in the private 
sector in Japan, it would be appropriate to study the feasibility of implementing and/or 
transferring the same techniques to the manufacturing firms operating in Malaysia. 
Second, the Malaysian government, through its Look East Policy, has been striving to 
promote Japanese management systems among the manufacturing sector. 
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Another limitation of this study is that it is rather difficult to discuss the Look East Policy 
in detail, especially when such details are shrouded in secrecy and have never been fully 
revealed to the public. Besides that, relatively limited research has been carried out on the 
Look East Policy. As a result of these limitations, most of the discussions on the Look 
East Policy rely heavily on newspaper articles and books written in the 1980s. 
1.6 The Structure and Contents of the Thesis 
The thesis comprises ten chapters. Chapters one to six form the theoretical framework of 
the study, while Chapters seven to ten consist of research methodology, presentation of the 
survey findings, analysis of the survey findings and conclusion. 
In a more detailed breakdown, Chapter one elucidates the reasons for choosing the 
research topic and research objectives. It then discusses the importance and limitations of 
the study before it presenting the structure and contents of the thesis. 
Chapter two provides a literature review on the "classic" Japanese model of management 
or Japanese management techniques. It covers topics such as Japanese economic success, 
lifetime employment, seniority-based wage and promotion systems, hiring practices, 
training practices, enterprise unionism, the consensus decision-making/ringgi system, the 
just-in-time production system, total quality control, the quality control circle, and the 
suggestion system. In this chapter, the strengths and weaknesses of the "classic" elements 
of the Japanese management techniques are also analysed. 
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Chapter three discusses two major themes. They are: internationalisation of business and 
culture, and cross-cultural management. This chapter also examines some previous studies 
on the transferability of the Japanese model of management to countries, such as the UK, 
the USA, Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan. 
Chapter four moves on to examine the role of the state in the economy. Two important 
roles of the state are discussed. They are: as a driving force to economic development, and 
as a driver to change people's attitudes. In discussing the role of state in changing 
people's attitudes, Singapore, South Korea and China are taken as examples as they have 
launched powerful policies in this direction. 
Chapter five presents the Look East Policy, and starts with a brief introduction of the 
history of pre and post-war relations between Malaysia and Japan. Then it goes on to 
discuss the reasons why the Malaysian government launched the Look East Policy in 1982. 
Shortly after that, it demonstrates how Japanese management techniques and work ethic 
have been promoted in Malaysia. Next, it looks at some of the more significant 
managerial and economic ramifications of the increased Japanese presence in Malaysia 
since the advent of the Look East Policy. Finally, it presents the problems associated with 
the Look East Policy before ending with the general hypothesis of this study. 
Chapter six gives a review of the multi-racial and multi-cultural society in Malaysia. It 
also highlights the importance of the manufacturing sector in the Malaysian economy. 
6 
Chapter seven presents the research methodology and the rationale for applying it to this 
study. It also discusses the research sample, sample size, sampling techniques, 
development of a mail survey questionnaire and personal interview, administration of a 
mail survey questionnaire and an interview checklist, how the actual survey was 
conducted, methods of data analysis and the limitations of the research survey. 
Chapters eight and nine deal with the actual research survey. In Chapter eight, the survey 
findings are presented using a simple table format. Chapter nine analyses and interprets 
the survey findings. 
Chapter ten recaps what has been discussed so far. To do that, it briefly presents strands 
from earlier research, followed by a summary of the research findings. Then it discusses 
the research implications and highlights the contribution of this thesis. Finally, 
suggestions for future research are made and the conclusion is presented. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON THE 
JAPANESE MODEL OF MANAGEMENT 
2.1 Introduction 
Learning from Japan has been an important issue since the second oil crisis of 1978 to the 
start of "Heisei recession". Foreigners flocked to Tokyo, hundreds of books were written, 
and a consulting industry segment was created. Many scholars and researchers attribute 
Japanese success to the way they manage their enterprises (Vogel, 1979; Ouchi, 1981; 
Pascale and Athos, 1981). Thus, the implementation and adaptation of the Japanese model 
of management (JMM) overseas became the subject of several studies (see Section 2.2 for 
various terminologies) (Dunphy, 1985; Imaoka, 1985,1989; Lillrank, 1995). These 
focused on various cross-cultural aspects of Japanese management (Imaoka, 1985,1989; 
Levine and Ohtsu, 1991; Jain, 1990), as well as on management practices in Japan 
compared to indigenous firms in the host countries (Choy and Jain, 1987; Putti and Chong, 
1985; Thong and Jain, 1988; Rodgers and Wong, 1996). 
One of the reasons why the Japanese model of management became a subject of study was 
partly because the Japanese had demonstrated an ability to take a market share, established 
technology leadership and amassed trade surpluses. In addition, they provided tools, 
management models and case material, which stimulated imitation as well as new thinking 
and experimentation. Japanese manufacturers had also demonstrated that they could 
produce high quality products cheaply as well as proven that it was possible to break many 
established principles, like the inevitability of defects. 
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The Japanese stress that it is important to have quality products and at the same time to 
have an effective organisation by incorporating well-balanced management practices. 
However, they have not been very articulate about the reasons for their success. This 
could be attributed to the fact that there are no formal master plans up-front regarding their 
management strategy. Moreover, the complexities involved in building an efficient 
organisation are larger by several magnitudes than those involved in devising a clever 
portfolio strategy. 
This chapter starts by presenting various terminologies that have been used by different 
scholars to describe the management practices used by Japanese firms in Japan. Following 
this, it presents an overview of Japanese economic success. Next, it discusses the unique 
features of the Japanese model of management and it also presents some of the major 
forces that compelled the Japanese to make some changes in their management system. 
Finally, it discusses some of the "classic" Japanese management techniques that have been 
widely debated. 
The "classic" Japanese management techniques that are discussed in this chapter are 
divided into two categories: (i) human resource management techniques; and (ii) 
production management techniques. Included under the former are lifetime employment, 
seniority-based wage and promotion systems and enterprise unionism (usually known as 
"three devine treasures"); hiring practices; training practices; and a consensus decision- 
making/ringgi system. Under the latter category are just-in-time (JIT); total quality control 
(TQC); the quality control circle (QCC); and the suggestion system. 
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There are two main reasons for choosing these "classic" techniques. Firstly, in February 
1982, the Malaysian government officially announced a policy to "learn from Japan". This 
policy was called the "Look East Policy" and it was specifically intended to adopt the 
elements of the "classic" Japanese model of management or Japanese management 
techniques. Secondly, the unprecedented growth experienced by the Malaysian 
manufacturing sector since late 1970s resulted in a -number of problems, such as low 
labour productivity and efficiency, labour shortage, job hopping and other managerial 
problems. Because of the fact that the "classic" Japanese model of management proved to 
be very successful and effective among many large Japanese companies in Japan, as a 
result of its popularity, particularly among developed countries, the Malaysian government 
strongly believed that by adopting the elements of the "classic" Japanese management 
techniques and emulating their work ethic, it could solve the problems faced by 
management in Malaysia. 
2.2 Definition 
Various terminologies such as the Japanese model of management; Japanese management 
techniques; Japanese management practices; Japanese-style management; and the Japanese 
management system have been used by different scholars to describe the management 
practices used by Japanese firms, especially in Japan. Some scholars tend to use these 
terms indiscriminately as well as interchangeably. 
Despite the fact that there is confusion about the way in which scholars use these terms, 
they do have distinguishing characteristics. Firstly, we might argue that the Japanese 
management could be about the system, which refers to the ecological, cultural and 
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institutional environments in which Japanese organisations operate (see Yasin, 1990). 
Secondly, we might assert that the Japanese model of management could basically refer to 
a particular approach to management or the specific strategic and administrative processes 
that Japanese organisations in Japan have adopted in the course of their activities. Thirdly, 
we might also argue that Japanese management techniques could refer to individual 
elements or techniques or practices which are taking forward the Japanese model of 
management. Thus, looking at the three terms as explained above, they are indeed quite 
distinct from one another. 
In this study, what we are looking at are the elements of the Japanese management 
techniques which are based on the overall philosophy of management, that is, the Japanese 
model of management. The JMM, on the other hand, is part of the system that has 
included both internal and external management itself. What the Malaysian government 
wanted to promote in Malaysia via its Look East Policy are these elements, which, as 
already mentioned, are based on the overall philosophy of management - the Japanese 
model of management. Therefore, we will briefly examine the JMM and its particular 
elements or techniques that the Malaysian government has an interest in. 
It is important to note that most of the sources of references are obtained from scholars of 
Japanese management whose articles or writings date back from the mid 1970s to 1980s, 
although we have also referred to some articles available after this period. Thus, the 
Japanese model of management referred to in this study will be that of the early period, 
commonly known as the "classic" Japanese model of management. 
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2.3 Japanese Economic Success - An Overview 
Japanese economic success rests upon its strength in manufacturing, mainly because the 
country's agriculture, distribution, services and utilities. are not internationally competitive. 
Moreover, they are sheltered by law, custom and agreement, and in fact, are relatively 
inefficient (Abe and Fitzgerald, 1995). However, there is a further aspect to the debated 
legacy of the pre-war Japanese economy, i. e. to what extent was management and 
organisation developed in the pre-war period, only to be extended in the post-war years? 
In seeking to outline and explain the transformation of Japanese manufacturing, its 
structure, management, and the specific historical circumstances that moulded them 
require description. 
Japan's rapid economic growth after 1945 was undoubtedly assisted by the economic base 
that it had established before the Second World War. However, the core question is: what 
is the extent of the contribution of this economic base to Japan's rapid economic growth. 
Various debates exist over the timing of "modem economic growth" in Japan. Some 
scholars argue that the importance of long-term development, trade and "proto- 
industrialisation" under the Tokugawa shogunate meant that the country was 
commercialised before it was industrialised (see Abe and Fitzgerald, 1995). According to 
Abe and Fitzgerald, after the Meiji Restoration, Japan was assisted by the commitment of 
successive political factions to economic growth, and by the increasing centralisation of 
executive power. They also mention that there was a strong motivation for rapid growth 
because of the fear of colonisation and nationalism. As a result, industry became the 
fastest growing sector of the economy between 1887-1939, expanding at an average of 
over 6 percent per annum. At that time, cotton textiles emerged as the country's leading 
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manufacturing sector, although heavy industry had established its presence by the 1890s 
(Abe and Fitzgerald, 1995). 
The silk industry continued to dominate the manufacturing sector. By the 1920s, it had 
become internationally competitive through the use of modem technology, vertical 
integration, and investment in human resources, and its managerial hierarchies were staffed 
by indigenous personnel (Yonekawa, 1984). Although cotton and silk were the twin 
pillars of the Japanese inter-war economy, there were large and managerially complex 
concerns in heavy industry, chemicals, materials, and mining, many of which were 
members of the zaibatsu conglomerates. According to Abe and Fitzgerald (1995), by 
1940, economic growth and military requirements had established a heavy industry sector 
that accounted for 59 percent of all manufacturing output; while food products and textiles 
were responsible for 12 and 17 percent respectively. 
The question here is what are the factors that have contributed to the rapid economic 
growth of Japan? Abe and Fitzgerald (1995) argue that its strategic outlook was one of the 
factors which led to the creation of organisational capabilities that placed an emphasis 
upon co-operative alliances and competitive rivalry, on long-term investment and rapid 
growth, and on organisational adaptation and human capital, in addition to focused 
production, productivity, and the techniques of operations management. 
Abe and Fitzgerald further argue that with relatively few natural factor endowments in raw 
materials, energy supplies, or land, Japan's success rested on the creation and maintenance 
of competitive advantages in technology as well as management. Although there is no 
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simple explanation which might account for the rise of Japan, one certainty is that the 
achievements of its economy do rest upon the competitive strengths of its manufacturing 
companies; strengths which are internal and, in the institutional relationships formed with 
banks, affiliated firms and governments, are often external (McMillan, 1996). 
It is also important to point out that to operate effectively, many key Japanese companies 
before the Second World War, notably those in steel, engineering, and shipbuilding, were 
obliged to internalise activities within enterprises or conglomerates. These concerns 
became sizeable compared to many British and European counterparts. However, unlike 
the British or American firms, the Japanese ones could not draw on a ready pool of well- 
trained, adaptable labour nor could they rely on market mechanisms for purchasing and 
marketing. Capital was scarce and hard to obtain and production systems were often 
rudimentary (Suzuki, 1986). As a result, they had to depend heavily upon foreign 
technology, knowledge and expertise in order to be effective (Suzuki, 1986). 
Realising these weaknesses, Japanese attention was initially paid to the management of 
human resources as well as to the flow of raw materials and finished goods that shaped the 
objectives and structure of their companies. Western corporate structures, managerial 
procedures, and product and production technology had to be adapted to the different 
circumstances and requirements, and essentially had to give priority to the development of 
human skills and resources (Suzuki, 1986). Above all, success depended on the creation of 
organisational capabilities in the hiring, training and utilisation of managers and workers. 
The Japanese firms made sure that there was a simplification of tasks, a clear hierarchy, 
and an inculcated sense of purpose and co-operation among workers and management 
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(Suzuki, 1986). Consequently, this view of companies as a collection of people is seen by 
many commentators as the defining elements of Japanese management which has its roots 
in the period before the Second World War, but subsequently went through many stages of 
development and adaptation (see Whitehill, 1991: 3-33). 
The self-reliance of Japanese companies, their sense of internal loyalty and their vigorous 
competitiveness were always combined with the establishment of networked alliances that 
encompassed suppliers, buyers, fellow manufacturers, and banks. Within many companies 
and state agencies, crucial decisions in government-business relations, strategy, vertical 
and horizontal integration, managerial organisation, bank-industry linkages, labour 
relations, and production systems had to be made (Suzuki, 1986). According to Suzuki 
(1986), it is the sum of these changes in internal organisation and external connections that 
have been endowed the title of "Japanese model of management", and they have, in many 
instances, been given a mistakenly long pedigree, often stemming back to the nineteenth 
century. 
However, we must be wary, too, of generalising the Japanese experience, especially when 
the organisational objectives of industries and companies have undergone constant change. 
For example, despite nominal membership, the majority of large enterprises are not to any 
substantial degree members of the kigyo shudan, which was formed during the 1950s; 
while many firms do have close links with banks and do carry high debt-equity ratios. 
Two examples are Toyota, which has a proud history of independence and self-financing 
and Sony. While Matsushita has tended to import technology, its rival Sony has always 
invested heavily in innovation. Although the Japanese have been characterised as 
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technological imitators as opposed to innovative adapters, a study by Abe and Fitzgerald 
(1995) reveals that the Japanese have responded to industrial maturity by currently 
spending more on research and development than their competitors. 
It is also important to note that it is their factory-level organisation that has been the 
driving force behind Japanese competitiveness. For example, the well-known cases of the 
vehicle manufacturers Toyota and Nissan indicate how technology acquisition, scarce 
resources and the nature of indigenous market demand stimulated "lean production" 
methods and quality control programmes (Womack et al., 1990). Womack et al. also point 
out that during the 1950s and 1960s, Japanese companies developed methods and systems 
which proved more efficient and productive than the mass manufacturing approaches of 
world leaders in the USA and Europe. They also mention that a system originally 
conceived as a means of minimising inventory and land usage soon offered the economy 
and quality advantages of flexible manufacturing. According to Womack et al. (1990), 
this system eventually became popular and many countries have tried to copy it but with 
little success. 
The following discussion is intended to provide some insight into the unique features of 
Japanese model of management and the issues surrounding it as a result of economic 
changes in Japan. 
2.4 The Unique Features of Japanese Model of Management 
Since the 1960s, Japan has emerged as the economic powerhouse of Asia, the industrial 
leader of the electronics revolution and the world's largest creditor nation (McMillan, 
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1996: 25). Since then, much has been said about the outstanding success of the "classic" 
Japanese model of management. However, it must be emphasised that the "classic" model 
is only commonly practised in large Japanese companies, as small and medium ones 
cannot afford it. 
Why is the "classic" Japanese model said to be unique? Its features, such as lifetime 
employment, decision-making by consensus, seniority-based promotion system, seniority- 
based wage system, paternalism and in-house unionism, and their emergence, have been 
the focus of a number of studies by researchers such as Abegglen (1958), Whitehill (1964), 
Whitehill and Takezawa (1968; 1981), Sirota and Greenwood (1971), Pascale (1978b), 
Ouchi and Jaeger (1978), Ouchi (1981), Sethi (1975), Sethi et al. (1984) and Alston 
(1986). These studies suggest that the JMM is distinctive in that it is tied up in Japanese 
society, and its unique characteristics are not only the main reasons behind Japan's success 
but also enable the Japanese to remain competitive. 
Other researchers, for example, Keys et al. (1994) claim that the "classic" Japanese model 
of management was strongly influenced by culture, industrial organisation (primarily the 
keiretsu), and government (the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)). 
Authors such as Ezra Vogel (Japan as No. 1) and William Ouchi (Theory Z) further 
reinforce the belief that Japanese companies enjoy a culturally unique system. The 
stereotype view starts by emphasising the common social values of Japanese society, 
which is said to be so homogenous that its people share the same culture, ideologies, 
tastes, historical traditions, and even behavioural patterns, leading to harmony, groupism, 
17 
and consensus. These Japanese social characteristics in turn are used to explain the unique 
nature of Japanese industrial relations. ' 
When the JMM was first introduced to the United States and Europe in the early 1980s, it 
attracted a great deal of attention (Chen, 1995). According to Chen, techniques such as 
QCCs were widely introduced in American and European companies during the "learn 
from Japan" boom in the early 1980s. However, after a few hectic years, the boom busted 
and critics disparaged the Japanese model of management as being unsustainable, 
particularly in the West. Thus, many of its techniques such as QCCs and TQC disappeared 
from management vocabulary (Chen, 1995). 
Even in its native Japan, the "classic" JMM has begun to lose ground. According to Keys 
et al. (1994), one of the reasons, as mentioned earlier, is because of the internal as well as 
external forces that compelled the Japanese to modify their management system (see 
Exhibit 2.1). Keys et al. (1994) point out that this transformation has been driven by four 
major forces: (i) over the past decade the number of Japanese companies with Western 
operations and joint ventures has increased rapidly, challenging Japanese managers in their 
attempts to implement traditional techniques in new cultures and within different legal 
systems; (ii) attitudinal change is taking place among the younger Japanese who are re- 
thinking their priorities and goals in life. Young professionals and managers, especially 
women, seem to be showing a preference for a more Western style of management. This 
shift is also influenced by the domestic price structure in Japan, which allows a nation with 
the largest gross per capita national product in the world to force its citizens to live far 
' Haruo Shimada, Economics Professor at Keio University in Japan, writing in The Management Challenge: 
Japanese Views, edited by Lester C. Thurow (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. ) 
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below the standards of the rest of the industrial world; (iii) demographic, structural and 
economic changes are occurring in Japan, including a rapidly ageing work force and a 
rising hourly wage which are now beyond parity with the Western industrial world; and 
(iv) the passion of the Japanese for learning, both personal and organisational, has 
highlighted for its managers many of the weaknesses of the present Japanese system, and 
is stimulating change. 
Exhibit 2.1 
Paths through the Japanese Management Theory Jungle 
MANAGEMENT 
EXTERNAL FORCES PRACTICES LEARNING EFFECTIVENESS 
Culture Overlapping Managerial Productivity 
Organization Learning 
Structure 
Long Tent 
Planning 
Horizon 
Consensus 
Decision 
Making 
Implicit 
Control 
Systems 
Government Manufacturing Quality 
System, 
.J IT 
TQC 
QC l 
Continuous 
Improccmcnt 
R&D 
- Human 
Resource 
Development 
Lifetime 
Employment 
Seniority 
Based 
Es aluation 
+ Industrial 
Company 
Organizational Employee 
Organization 
I! nions I cumin, Satisfaction Women as Commitment I A Support Groups 
-- 
FOR CES OF CHANGE 
Notes: + Increasing in strength or accelerating growth trend 
Decreasing in strength or declining growth trend 
No change trend discovered 
Source: Keys et al., 1994. 
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As already mentioned, the elements of the "classic" Japanese model of management 
discussed in this study are divided into two categories. The first comprises human 
resource management techniques, which include lifetime employment, seniority-based 
wages and promotion systems, hiring and training practices and enterprise unionism. The 
other technique that is usually added to this category is consensus decision-making. The 
second category encompasses production management techniques which include total 
quality control (TQC), kanban/just-in-time (JIT), and continuous improvement through the 
use of suggestion systems and quality control circles (QCCs). The discussion begins with 
lifetime employment. 
2.5 Human Resource Management Techniques 
2.5.1 Lifetime Employment 
The term "lifetime employment" was used by Abegglen (1958) to explain one of the most 
distinct characteristics of the Japanese employment system. According to this concept, 
employees are recruited directly from school or university rather than from an open job- 
market. These employees are expected to stay with the company for life and in return for 
their loyalty, they are assured of job security. 
The origin of lifetime employment can be traced back to the days of the zaibatsu, where 
huge family-owned and family-controlled conglomerates dominated Japanese industry 
until the 1930s (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992: 43-44), and it is a concept which has had far- 
reaching consequences for Japanese management. A number of studies have noted that 
lifetime employment is not a legal contract but more of a moral or psychological one 
between the core employee and the employer, entered into at the time of recruitment (Cole, 
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1981; Dore, 1973). Hence, when recruiting a new employee, a company has to be 
extremely cautious because a mistake in recruitment can be expensive, and difficult to 
correct. In addition, Chen (1995: 188) points out the complications of the recruitment 
process. He describes how a company has to investigate or verify detailed information, 
ranging from the academic qualifications of the candidate to his or her family background 
and individual history. This is followed by in-depth personal interviews, as described in 
Section 2.5.4. On the other hand, the potential employee also has to carry out 
comprehensive research into the company that he or she wants to join (Chen, 1995). 
Based on the principles of "exchanging commitment", under lifetime employment the 
candidate promises to be loyal to the company and at the same time takes a significant risk 
in committing his/her future to a particular firm (Chen, 1995: 188). On the other hand, by 
recruiting someone, the company assumes the obligation of family care for the employee's 
entire career, which means that the company must be prepared to make sacrifices. Since 
the lifetime employment system guarantees that an employee will be kept at the company 
in some capacity, the company does not dismiss anyone, even if he or she becomes 
redundant or if the company is experiencing a business downturn (Fukuda, 1988: 72; 
Harumi, 1993). 
Why does lifetime employment exist in Japan? There are a number of different views 
regarding this question. For example, Abegglen (1958) perceives the practice as growing 
out of traditional social relations. However, a number of other researchers have criticised 
Abegglen's assumption as incorrect, and claim that lifetime employment was 
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institutionalised only during and after World War I as a result of the employers' desire to 
reduce high labour turnover (Okochi, 1965; Tiara, 1962). 
Despite these different views regarding lifetime employment, it does in fact have some 
advantages. For example, some authors claim that the lifetime employment system not 
only enhances the relationship between management and employees, but also ties 
employees to the company for which they work (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992; Fukuda, 
1988). Other authors, for instance, Tung (1982), claim that lifetime employment has 
contributed to low job mobility among employees. Maher (1985a: 24) mentions that the 
most important social aspects of lifetime employment are demonstrated by the fact that the 
practice is frequently cited as an example of the respect and consideration the Japanese 
have for each other. 
Similarly, Chen (1995) argues that another important aspect of the lifetime employment 
system is that when it is combined with enterprise unionism and seniority wages, it results 
in less mobility among Japanese employees but a relatively higher labour commitment to 
their companies. A study by Matsumoto (1991: 12-26) reveals that the major advantage of 
the system is a shift of the burden of corporate risk to the side of labour by restricting the 
ability of workers to move from one company to another. Matsumoto also maintains that 
perhaps the most profound merit of the system is that it helps to stabilise the Japanese 
economy in times of recession. He believes that individual employers may regard the no- 
firing rule as undesirable but from the nation's point of view, the rule pays off in reducing 
the downswing in the business cycle. 
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However, despite its advantages, the lifetime employment system has also been severely 
criticised. Major criticisms include the fact that it covers only about 35 to 40 per cent of 
the total workforce in Japan (Muzaffar, 1983; Modic, 1987; Jain, 1990), and about 40 to 60 
per cent of these employees are employed by large corporations (Sethi et al., 1984). Those 
employed in small and medium enterprises are never granted this benefit (Modic, 1987). 
Meanwhile, those employees who enjoy lifetime employment are usually the core 
employees, comprising an elite group that has been specially selected (Muzaffar, 1983). 
Maher (1985a: 23) claims that this elite group is given substantial additional benefits, such 
as a better basic salary, more bonuses, subsidised housing, etc. and he believes that this is 
one of the reasons why they stay with the company until retirement. Another reason is that 
since they receive so many privileges, they are under their company's control and therefore 
cannot easily leave it (Maher, 1985a: 23). 
Another criticism directed at the lifetime employment system is that it does not include 
peripheral, temporary, part-time or seasonal workers; day labourers, sub-contracted 
workers or women (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992: 44). Oliver and Wilkinson further argue 
that lifetime employment is only made possible because (i) eligibility for welfare pensions 
did not begin until the age of 60 and this has been raised to 67 (Japan Times, 25`h May 
1997); (ii) pensions tend to be meagre; (iii) about 80 percent of Japanese men aged 60 and 
above are still in the labour force; (iv) women are virtually excluded from the system; and 
(v) Japanese companies are surrounded by temporary workers. 
It is said that even the Japanese, for example, Akio Morita, Sony's Chairman, are 
consistently criticising the lifetime employment system (Hazama, 1993; Chen, 1995). Mr. 
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Joji Arai, The International Director of the Japan Productivity Centre (as cited in Modic, 
1987), claims that "the practice of keeping the ageing workforce and paying higher wages 
for deteriorating physical performance, as opposed to putting more reliance on the younger 
generation, which has more sophisticated knowledge and better physical capabilities, is 
becoming a heavy financial burden on companies. " Managers in Japanese corporations, 
according to Brown (1987: 23), have also expressed unhappiness with the system's 
inability to terminate employees whose performance is below the company's acceptable 
standard. Brown further explains that since a company is unable to terminate 
"unsatisfactory" employees, this has resulted in "unemployment within the company". 
Authors such as Soong (1983) and Fukuda (1988) also point at the drawbacks of the 
lifetime employment system. Soong (1983), for example, argues that the system is nothing 
more than a managerial strategy adopted by Japanese companies to buy loyalty. He also 
claims that the impression that Japanese workers are happy under the system is far from 
the truth. Fukuda (1988: 96), on the other hand, maintains that employees stay in the 
company not because of cultural values, as most scholars have suggested, but because of 
economic incentives, such as job and income security. Chen (1995) shares this view. He 
states that "owing to cultural and historical factors, most Japanese prefer security over 
risk" (p. 190). 
A number of other researchers also criticise the complexity and inefficiency of lifetime 
employment. For example, Keys et al. (1994) point out that lifetime employment is, in 
fact, more complex and produces negative job satisfaction effects among younger 
employees. Similarly, Tung (1984) claims that young, talented employees who want faster 
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promotion and salary rises become frustrated because they have no choice but to acquiesce 
to the system. A study by Cole (1981) found that Japanese workers were discontented 
with the system because they viewed it a form of imprisonment. Modic (1987) maintains 
that as a result of being frustrated and worried about the prospect of promotion in the 
lifetime employment system, only 22.6 percent of university graduates who joined their 
first company did it with the intention of staying permanently. However, after a few years 
with the company, out of the original 22.6 percent of the university graduates 11.3 percent 
said that they were willing to change companies to get a better opportunity. A study by 
Imaoka (1989) found that only 9.8 percent of male employees in the 50-54 age group who 
had been hired immediately after graduation from school continued with the same 
corporation, while the remaining 90.2 percent changed employers. Imaoka also mentions 
that the younger the employees' age group, the greater the proportion of job-changes. He 
adds that the trend shows an unlikelihood that Japanese employees will continue working 
for the same corporation until they retire. 
In fact, Morishima's (1992) study has shown that as early as the late 1960s there has been 
a moderate increase in mid-career job changes in large Japanese corporations. His findings 
further reveal that the number of Japanese employees covered by lifetime employment 
actually declined from 33 percent to 23 percent between 1972 and 1989. His study 
suggests that towards the end of 1980s, the lifetime employment system became less 
popular, particularly among some large Japanese corporations. 
Rohlen (1979) mentions that since the early 1970s, the lifetime employment system has 
been modified and many large Japanese firms have developed "voluntary retirement 
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programmes" for their older employees. A number of other studies (for instance, 
Mroczkowski and Hanaoka, 1989) indicate that in the 1980s, lifetime employment 
continued to lose its popularity. According to Mroczkowski and Hanaoka (1989), this was 
partly due to changes in the labour market, such as the increased number of women in the 
workforce, an ageing work force, the increasing cost of labour and the over-zealous 
recruiting of white collar employees in the boom of 1980s, as well as Western modes of 
thinking being adopted by young Japanese managers. 
Salmon (1992) points out that the unprecedented increase in labour turnover among young 
workers further increases doubts surrounding the durability of lifetime employment 
practices. According to Salmon, between 15 and 20 percent of new recruits leave the 
company within twelve months, while only 28 percent of workers in their 20s expressed a 
hope that they would stay until retirement. 
A more recent study by Debroux (1997) reveals that it is unlikely that the Japanese are 
willing to sacrifice themselves for the good of the company. Debroux (1997) argues that 
because access to middle management is more difficult, younger employees are not keen to 
stay long with one company. Moreover, according to Debroux, if there are positions in the 
company, older employees will usually occupy them. Consequently, younger employees 
now leave companies in larger numbers than before, thus the company cannot expect the 
same sacrifice from the younger generations. Acceptance of being dispatched alone used 
to be taken for granted and was assumed to possibly lead to reward later. However, now it 
is considered by young people to be an infringement on their rights to a decent private and 
family life (Debroux, 1997). The same author also points out that karoshi, or death from 
26 
overwork, is no longer taken as a fact of life and symbolic of a high organisational 
commitment, but it is something for which the family gathers evidence in order to sue a 
company for which a family member worked. 
The prolonged economic slowdown in Japan further undermined the lifetime employment 
system. Since 1992 the economy has experienced a severe downturn with corporate profits 
falling ever since. The value of the yen has escalated sharply since 1985 and produced the 
greatest impact ever experienced by Japanese companies, particularly electronics firms. 
Such firms as Toshiba Corp., NEC Corp. and Mitsubishi Electric Corp. have been struck 
hard by slumping sales of memory chips, personal computers, home electronics and audio- 
visual equipment (Asahi Shimbun, 5"' February 1988). Moreover, Japanese companies 
have not only suffered from huge losses due to the increase in operational costs but have 
also lost international competitiveness (Asahi Shimbun, 5"' February 1988). 
Amid the economic slowdown and the recent Asian financial crisis, more Japanese 
companies find that they have no choice but to cut operational costs by offering early 
retirement to older workers, as there are few promotion prospects for them. Some large 
Japanese corporations have already reduced this so-called "financial burden". For 
example, Pioneer Electronic Corp. announced in early January 1993 that 35 managers in 
their 50s would have to take "early retirement" and those who failed to accept the offer by 
January 31 were to be summarily dismissed (Tokyo Business, August 1993). Other 
employers, such as Nissan Motor Co. Ltd, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, 
and Toshiba Corporation, that once offered job security for life were also announcing 
employment cutbacks (Takeuchi, 1992; Harumi, 1993). 
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After years of believing that they faced a labour shortage, Japanese companies have 
belatedly woken up to the opposite reality; too many people are unemployed. For 
example, in 1997 about 2.3 million Japanese were made jobless when the unemployment 
rate in Japan reached a record high of 3.4 percent, the worst since 1953.2 By July 1999 
about 3.19 million Japanese were out of work as the unemployment rate in Japan reached 
yet another record high of 4.9 percent. ' 
The changes in the labour market indeed have had a great impact on the employment 
system in Japan. Critics claimed that this could then presage the complete and sudden 
collapse of Japan's lifetime employment system (Harumi, 1993; Takeuchi, 1992). Imaoka 
(1989) was right in saying: "it is impossible to generalise about the employment system in 
contemporary Japanese corporations as being one of lifetime employment. " Perhaps this is 
because the lifetime employment system increasingly looks like a barrier that has to be 
removed if Japanese society is to gain a more diversified workforce. Nevertheless, some 
believe that Japanese companies are unable to abandon lifetime employment all at once as 
the system is culture-bound, but they are searching for ways to phase it out gradually 
(Harumi, 1993; Morishima, 1992). 
2.5.2 The Seniority-Based Wage System 
Another element of the "classic" Japanese model of management is the seniority-based 
wage system, which is closely related to lifetime employment. The former system 
emerged at the same time as the latter, when the oyakata was incorporated into the 
2 The Nikkei Weekly, 2nd February 1998: Unemployment Rate in Japan. 
' Japan's Jobless rate stuck at record high 4.9% in July-The Star Online [WWW document]. URL 
Iittn:,, thestar. com. myionlinelnews.. ss/08ma 
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zaibatsu (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992: 47). This practice is also culture-bound and 
presumes that employees will develop skills valuable to the company by remaining with 
the same firm for most of their lifetime (Beatty et al., 1988). 
In a seniority-based wage system, the salary of an individual employee is determined by 
the length of service and his or her age. This system is most common in large Japanese 
corporations, i. e., those with 1,000 or more employees (Morishima, 1992). Based on the 
data gathered from the Ministry of Labour in 1987, Morishima (1992) claims that 62.4 
percent of 253 large Japanese firms in 1986 cited the seniority-based wage system as the 
most important determinant of pay. Small and medium firms, however, cannot afford this 
system because it is not piecemeal but part of other "pillars" such as lifetime employment, 
company welfarism and seniority-promotion system (Fukuda, 1988: 94). 
There are several merits of this system. First, theoretically, it removes destructive 
competition between employees and promotes harmony for the benefit of the company. 
This is because young and inexperienced employees will not bypass more senior and 
experienced colleagues as they might in the West. Second, this system helps to develop 
skills amongst employees by virtue of their length of service, as well as promoting a sense 
of security and a reduction in turnover (Dickens and Savage, 1988). Finally, it reduces 
labour cost since turnover is very low (Keys et at., 1994). 
Despite its merits, drawbacks of the seniority-based wage system have also been pointed 
out by both Japanese and Western commentators. For example, Salmon (1992) criticises 
the system as a form of deferred wage payment in order to buy employees' loyalty. 
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Similarly, Burawoy (1983) criticises the seniority-based wage system because to him it 
amounts to a form of despotism. Also, Chen (1995) mentions that Akio Morita, Sony's 
Chairman constantly disagrees with the seniority-based wage system. According to Long 
and Seo (1977: 85), even as early as the 1960s, Sony's and Hitachi's presidents were more 
interested in results than in ritual as they gradually shifted from pay based on seniority to a 
merit system. In 1987, Sony further revised its salary system. Under the new system, 
Sony employees' yearly incomes are divided into a basic salary and a performance bonus 
based on individual results (Focus Japan, 1996). Other Japanese companies, for example, 
Yamaichi Securities has introduced an annual salary system called "Special System for 
Specialist Employees" in April 1995. Under this system, increments are based on 
performance and specialised capabilities of each employee rather than on seniority (Focus 
Japan, 1996). 
According to Fukuda (1988: 96), the seniority-based wage system is no longer attractive to 
young employees because they feel that the system actually demoralises young talent. 
Perhaps because of that, more Japanese firms have emphasised a move toward merit-based 
pay specifically for junior employees. In fact, according to Mroczkowski and Hanaoka 
(1989), between 1978 and 1987 the seniority portion of pay raises declined from an 
average of 57.9 percent to 46 percent in Japanese companies, while pay on the basis of 
performance increased from 42.1 percent to 54 percent. 
A number of authors also claim that because of changes in Japan, particularly pertaining to 
the increases in labour cost and an ageing population, the seniority-based wage system is 
further losing its popularity (Mroczkowski and Hanaoka, 1989; Oliver and Wilkinson, 
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1992). According to these authors, the importance of merit as a determinant of pay has 
been increasing since the 1970s. A report published by the Japan Productivity Centre in 
1993, further shows that about 15 percent of the 400 leading Japanese companies have 
already adopted the Western-style of salary negotiation, while another 14 percent plan to 
do so in the future. Another study conducted by the Institute of Labour Administration, as 
cited in Focus Japan (1996), reveals that about 60 percent of workers welcome the 
introduction of an annual salary system as a positive move. Findings from a more recent 
study by Debroux (1997) show that an increasing number of Japanese companies have 
turned away from strict seniority-based wage system and have adopted compensation 
practices based on individual merit. Among some of the Japanese companies that have 
instituted merit-based system are Honda Motor Co., Ltd., who adopted it in June 1992 for 
all its managerial employees from the rank of section chief up; and Fujitsu Ltd. for its 
managerial employees in April 1993 (Harumi, 1993). However, as far as wage 
determination is concerned, Brown and Reich (1997) have a slightly different view. Based 
on their recent study of three Japanese companies, they argue that all of them have actually 
used years of experience (nenko), job-grade and performance (satei) in determining wages 
for their employees. 
From the foregoing review, it can be concluded that there is no doubt that a seniority-based 
wage system has its advantages. However, as economic growth rates in Japan slow down, 
findings of previous studies have also shown that a seniority-based wage system has its 
disadvantages too. In fact, many large Japanese firms are thinking of ending the seniority- 
based wage system and stepping up their introduction of an annual salary system, 
particularly in the area of sales, where results are immediately evident (Harumi, 1993). 
31 
2.5.3 The Seniority-Based Promotion System 
Seniority-based promotion is also closely related to the lifetime employment system. In 
the former, employees are promoted based on a rigid seniority system (Long and Seo, 
1977; Keys et al., 1994). This system functions to cross-cut and hence dilute other 
hierarchical distinctions within the employment system, such as educational status, which 
form the justifications of the manager-worker hierarchy in Western enterprises, and hence 
validate their relative class positions, based on individual merit (Smith, 1983). 
This system is also said to be based on the principles of conformity and harmony with 
others (wa), and is dominant until about age 35 (Suzuki, 1986). Beyond the age of 35, 
employees' evaluations are based largely on the principle of merit and performance 
(Suzuki, 1986). At junior levels, however, promotion is largely a matter of advancement 
by age (Smith, 1984: 122). 
Promotion by seniority rather than competence is, to Western eyes, one of the strangest 
aspects of the Japanese employment system. But it has a number of advantages, such as it 
providing a powerful force for co-operation between employees and management. 
Although critics argue that competent young employees are blocked from realising their 
potential in such a system, the truth is generally the opposite, writes Fingleton in Fortune, 
20`h March 1995. Fingleton further mentions that because senior managers are fully 
protected against being leap-frogged in the promotion race, they are much more likely than 
senior managers in the West to mentor their staff. 
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Another advantage of this system is that it encourages employees to stay in one company 
for a long time (Chen, 1995). According to Chen, in this way the longer the employee 
stays with the company, the more experience and higher skill levels he has accumulated. 
In turn, the end results will benefit the company. Chen. also points out that even though the 
system never guarantees everyone a title, many have a good chance to become the head of 
a section head or department. Another benefit of the system, according to Chen, is that 
fast-growing companies have the advantage over pay due to the lower average age of their 
workforce. 
Clearly, corporate Japan is finding that although the seniority-promotion system has served 
well in the past, the rapidly changing and highly competitive business environment, 
coupled with emerging new values of the workforce, is forcing a change. Critics argue that 
the competitive advantages of the system have declined (Chen, 1995; Mroczkowski and 
Hanaoka, 1989). Morishima (1992) also points out that senior promotions in a number of 
Japanese firms are almost exclusively based on individual performance. 
An EPA survey4 covering large companies shows that the weight given on individual 
performance in the determination of promotion and status in the years 1996 to 1998 will 
rise from 55 percent to about 70 percent. The same survey reveals that there is an 
emerging consensus to reconsider automatic promotion, and yearly wage rises and 
allowances, and to link them more directly to individual performance. Similarly, 
according to Debroux (1997), in many firms, managerial promotion is linked to internal 
examinations based on strict merit criteria. Debrouxexplicates further that at Fujisawa 
' Economic Planning Agency, White Paper on the Economy, Tokyo, 1995. 
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Pharmaceuticals, a system of merit and demerit points can lead to differences from three to 
eight years in the hierarchy. Honda, for instance, has been by-passing the hierarchy to 
promote talented employees (Debroux, 1997). 
Japanese companies have realised that the automatic pay increases with each additional 
year of service have indeed become increasingly burdensome as seniority grows. Hence, 
as the company cannot afford to pay higher salary to the "unproductive" senior managers, 
they are asked to take "voluntary" retirement (Focus Japan, 1993). It has been reported 
that kata-tataki or "tapping on the shoulder" is now a common practice in Japanese firms 
(Focus Japan, 1993). Even then, a number of companies are still under pressure as the 
younger generation is becoming increasingly impatient with the seniority-based promotion 
system that still exists (Chen, 1995). 
The seniority-based promotion system has also been criticised for creating a promotion 
gridlock for middle management as well as the younger outstanding employees 
(Mroczkowshi and Hanaoka, 1989). It is reported that the system inevitably results in too 
many mid-level managers, many of whom have little real work to do, and just become 
"window gazers" (Tokyo Business, August 1993). However, as employees have devoted 
themselves to their companies, the companies have no choice but to reciprocate with 
promotion. As a result, a number of managers are then dumped into unnecessary or 
meaningless posts (Tokyo Business, August 1993). 
Debroux (1997) mentions that most large companies still pursue a policy of giving a 
"dummy" title to the employees who have not made the grade. However, there is growing 
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opposition to such titles that do not lead to higher management. Thus, some companies are 
removing formal titles up to the level of middle management and replacing them by others 
not given on a permanent basis but according to ad hoc responsibility given for a specific 
project. According to Debroux, in these more quantitatively-oriented systems, connections 
and personality will be less important. As a result, a number of older employees, for 
instance, in Seiyu Department Stores, are having their pay reduced by more than one 
million yen after the introduction of the merit and performance scheme (Debroux, 1997). 
It is reported that like the lifetime employment system, the future of the seniority-based 
promotion system is also uncertain and its attractiveness to employees is wearing thin as 
job-hopping and freelancing have become a fad among the younger generation (Focus 
Japan, 1993). 
2.5.4 Hiring Practices 
There are substantial differences as to how Japanese and Western employees enter a 
company. In large Japanese companies, recruitment is usually carried out once a year, 
when fresh high school, college and university graduates without any relevant work 
experience are hired. Rapid technological change induces employers to look for young, 
inexperienced workers who are more adaptable and can adopt new methods and techniques 
more easily than older workers. Synchronised action, mostly by the large companies, to 
recruit fresh graduates from high schools, junior colleges and universities attracts a lot of 
attention since this is taken once a year. Up-coming university graduates and companies 
begin courting each other with professors or teachers often acting as go-betweens at the 
start of each new school year, which begins in April. 
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After an employer-employee match occurs, which in many cases happens before the 
summer vacation begins, some companies immediately begin to exert claims on their 
incoming cohort by sponsoring group activities, like camping trips, and providing pre- 
employment training. During such training, the university students may visit the company, 
study its manuals, and participate in company-sponsored events. In some instances, a 
company will also send promising candidates its newsletter, which may provide customer 
performance and satisfaction data (Hannon and Sano, 1994). By 1t October, the official 
signing day, the university market has cleared for the most part, and the junior college and 
high school labour markets begin (Hannon and Sano, 1994). 
Around the first of April in the following year, all of the firm's new employees usually 
begin their employment together, consummating the recruiting and entry process, which 
some liken to a pre-arranged marriage. Thereafter, in spite of the fact that some of the 
group members will be more successful than others; they remain together as a cohort for 
the remainder of their careers. According to Hannon and Sano (1994), in sectors like the 
retail industry where turnover is higher than average, some companies have to bring new 
cohorts into the firm more than once a year. 
Before the actual selection process, the first official contact a company has with its 
potential recruits in any given year is through a mass mailing strategy. Usually, the 
centrepiece of the company campaigns are high quality, glossy booklets that are mailed to 
as many as 50,000 graduating university students each year (Hannon and Sano, 1994). 
These publications often focus on the company's explicit intentions and also feature 
testimonials from recent recruits. However, this method is now less used due to its high 
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cost, i. e. ranging from US$5.00 per book (US$250,000 per year) to as high as US$20.00 
per book (US$1 million per year) (Hannon and Sano, 1994). As the cost of producing 
these books can be extremely high, companies like Dai Ichi Kanyo Bank have decided to 
issue them upon special request only (Hannon and Sano, 1994). 
The actual selection process for the new cohort depends on the student's areas of 
specialisation. Students who major in the social sciences, law or the humanities are usually 
considered for administrative jobs, while students majoring in engineering and other 
technical disciplines will be considered for technical positions. Before a candidate is 
invited for interview and to sit for company exams, the basic criteria for hiring include 
employee potential, abilities and "balanced" personality (Wong, 1996). Usually the 
companies rely on testimonials from teachers and professors for these important aspects 
(Dahlem et al., 1995). In addition, private investigators are hired to carry out thorough 
background checks on candidates, as well as interview the candidate's family members, 
neighbours and acquaintances (Hannon and Sano, 1994). Perhaps the main reason why 
there is so much care taken during selection is because it is a lifetime decision that the 
company has to make. Hence, it is only logical that if the company has a lifetime 
employment system then selection should be very critical (Dahlem et al., 1995), and only 
those who meet the basic criteria will be invited for interview. Moreover, given the fact 
that the employment relationship in large Japanese companies often spans up to forty years, 
it is very important that the personal interview phase in the applicant evaluation process is 
lengthy and rigorous. For example, to join the Imperial Hotel, qualified candidates have to 
undergo four days of interviews with top executives, department heads, and various 
37 
members of the personnel department before they can be considered suitable for 
employment (Hannon and Sano, 1994). 
Some companies, such as the Prince Hotel, are also said to rely on role-playing scenarios in 
the interview process (Hannon and Sano, 1994). According to the same authors, besides 
role-playing, candidates are invited to sit for the personality and achievement tests that 
allegedly predict a candidate's competency and performance in jobs that require special 
skills, like customer contact. 
Once the candidates are shortlisted, the socialisation process begins. In some cases, 
companies require the new employees to complete company-developed correspondence 
courses. For example, Yamato Transport requires its new employees to complete five such 
courses. In addition, the new employees have to attend at least one seminar that spans four 
days and three nights before they can officially begin training (Hannon and Sano, 1994). 
The work itself generally starts in April with a stay of three to four days at a camp where 
all new employees learn more about the company's culture and how they are expected to 
interact with colleagues, customers and suppliers. Thereafter, a three-month period begins 
in which the new employees practise basic work training. After the first three months, an 
employment test is given and those who pass it will become members of the company's 
trade union. After the employment test, another four months on-the-job training (OJT) 
remains before the new worker is given a regular assignment (Hannon and Sano, 1994). 
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The hiring techniques that are practised in large Japanese companies have a number of 
advantages. First, it is economical to conduct interviews and recruit many employees at 
one time, which, for obvious reasons, saves cost and time. Second, it is easier to train all 
new employees at the same time rather than having to train a handful of them who join at 
different times of the year. A once-a-year recruitment exercise makes it possible for the 
employer to choose the best possible candidates from the pool of applicants who must 
compete to join the company. Moreover, the hiring of newly graduates from schools and 
universities enables the company to develop their workers more easily because with no 
previous experience, these new recruits can be readily assimilated into the company's 
culture and environment. Finally, the special ties between the company and the university 
also have their own advantages. This is because the company not only saves time and 
money searching for candidates, but the recommendation from professors will ensure that 
they get a suitable employee with the right attitude and personality (Dahlem et al., 1995). 
According to Dahlem et al., most professors will recommend only the best candidates in 
order to protect the university's reputation as well as to safeguard the relationship between 
the university and the company. In this way, the company is not hesitant in providing the 
university with needed funds. 
Despite its advantages, the system also has a number of drawbacks. For example, since 
large companies tend to head-hunt candidates from prestigious schools and universities, 
this system results in an unnecessary tendency for students to enrol at such elite 
institutions. Meanwhile, this has resulted in a number of other problems, such as students 
committing suicide because of entrance exam stress (Hannon and Sano, 1994). 
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Another disadvantage of the system is that a company cannot readily obtain the skilled and 
specialised workers that it needs. As training for new employees usually takes more than a 
year, training costs can be substantial (Wong, 1996). Sometimes a company has to accept 
the consequences of some new employees having to leave as is happening now in Japan. 
As Japanese companies are facing a severe economic downturn, firms realise that no longer 
can they become a "community of fate". Some argue that Japanese firms are now looking 
for specialised workforces rather than fresh graduates (Debroux, 1997). Others, like 
Sumitomo Electric, have cut graduate recruitment from 300 a year to about 200 (Turner, 
1994). 
Having said this, wholesale recruitment for new graduates should become a practice of the 
past, while educational credentials must give way to more open recruitment practices. 
Sony, for example, has introduced a new way of recruiting employees in which they stress 
the importance of a consumer-oriented mentality among individual candidates (Fortune, 91h 
March 1992). However, some argue that once a company breaks its hiring practices, it can 
end up being unable to recruit first class employees in years to come (Debroux, 1997). 
2.5.5 Training Practices 
The practice of recruiting fresh, inexperienced graduates by large companies has to be 
accompanied by an increased emphasis on internalised training procedures. Large 
Japanese companies are known to pay a lot of attention to training, with the allocation of 
the necessary financial and human resources to perform this function effectively. It is 
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therefore logical to allege that the training function has to be operationalised as a follow-up 
to the practice of hiring new recruits who possess no previous work experience. 
The most prominent types of training conducted include on-the-job training (OJT) and job 
rotation. Other types of training include advanced training abroad in institutes of higher 
learning and off-the-job training (OffJT). In most large Japanese companies, most training, 
whether technical or managerial, is on-the-job. OJT is carried out through systematic and 
planned instruction from supervisors. It consists of educational guidance provided at the 
workplace to enhance the workers' skills and the knowledge needed for their posts. As far 
as OJT in Japan is concerned, a newly-hired university graduate has to spend up to a year 
performing a job far below his or her level of education and social standing (Hannon and 
Sano, 1994). 
For example, at Nippon Express it is said that new employees work for an average of two 
to three years in the field before obtaining their first managerial position (Hannon and 
Sano, 1994). Also, in Japan Railways new employees have to stand at a ticket wicket, 
punching commuter's rail tickets as part of their rite of passage. By doing so, the new 
employees are said to have paid their dues and at the same time to have gained a better 
understanding of Japan Railway's role in society and the customers they will serve for the 
next 35 years (Hannon and Sano, 1994). 
A recent study conducted by Wong (1996) reveals that soon after induction, the new 
employees in large Japanese companies are assigned to different departments for on-the- 
job training for a total period of 11 months. During this time, they stay in the same 
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company dormitory and each trainee is assigned to a section head mentor to learn the store 
operating skills and knowledge, problem-solving techniques, proper behaviour and 
organisational culture (Wong, 1996). 
According to Wong (1996), three months after the induction, a follow-up session is held to 
check whether the new employees have managed to gain a reasonable amount of 
knowledge. This follow-up session also allows them to review and evaluate their own 
performance, and to take the opportunity to set targets and plan their work and self- 
development. Later, the new employees are given a series of progressively more difficult 
and demanding tasks requiring a lot of overtime, and their performance will be 
continuously monitored and regularly evaluated. Wong (1996) also claims that they did 
not complaint however, as they understood that their hard work would be rewarded by 
long-term career advancement up to managerial level. 
Hence, in most large Japanese companies, a key element of on-the-job training (OJT) is job 
rotation, which is itself a key component in the Japanese system for human resource 
development. Typically, workers are moved from one department to another to gain new 
work experience and skills as well as to facilitate uniformity, communication, and 
personnel development among employees. Moreover, as multi-skilling is an important 
factor when pursuing a career in a Japanese company, workers must be familiar with as 
many tasks as possible in order to be able to replace absent employees or join the 
production line if volume has to be raised. 
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On-the-job training (OJT) and job rotation have a number of advantages. For example, 
these techniques or practices have resulted in a more flexible, multi-skilled workforce as 
workers are better able to handle tasks within the organisation. These training systems are 
also beneficial because they maximise the use of human resources and above all, alleviate 
burnout. 
Another advantage of these training systems, particularly OJT, is that even though they 
require more resources for training, the payoff is that they increase the possibility of 
finding a suitable job for each employee. Some authors (for instance, Klein, 1992) claim 
that rather than lay off workers during slow times, Japanese companies put employees 
through additional training to enhance their skills 
Despite their merits, these training techniques also have some drawbacks. For example, 
they are said to have created a financial burden on companies as they have to invest a lot of 
money and resources in the training of the employees (Filipczak, 1992). This is illustrated 
by the Disney theme park in Japan, which, for the purpose of on-the-job training, 
dismantled a backup projector costing US$1 million, into a zillion pieces. This was a 
rather expensive training aid even for a big company like Disney (Filipczak, 1992). 
On the question of job rotation, Filipczak also claims that the system practises double 
standards. According to him, the Japanese companies operating in America are reluctant to 
include American managers in a job rotation system. He argues that those who are included 
in this system are only blue-collar workers. When the Japanese managers were asked 
about this, they argued that it was because blue-collar workers were less likely to job-hop 
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than managers and other professionals. The Japanese managers also said that they believed 
that blue-collar workers were more committed and loyal to the company compared to 
managers and other professionals. Because of that, they did not hesitate to invest in the 
former's training (Filipczak, 1992). 
In Japan, however, there is a different scenario. Professor Haruo Shimada reports that 
white-collar workers who show management potential are given greater opportunity to 
experience regular and broad rotations. On the other hand, the scope for job rotation for 
manual workers is limited by technological factors and by the autonomy of the team of 
workers on the workshop floor in allocating work among themselves (Modic, 1987). 
As recession has caught up with Japan, prompting Japanese companies to change their 
"classic" management techniques, some large Japanese companies are already changing the 
content of training for managers and supervisors as well as modifying the training methods. 
A study by Umeshima and Dalesio (1993), for instance, reveals that some large Japanese 
companies have already altered the training method from on-the-job training (OJT) to off- 
the job training (OffJT) for their managers and supervisors. The reason is partly because 
cultural training is on the rise in most large Japanese companies, especially for managers 
who are sent abroad or who must work with other foreigners, for example, Korean, 
Chinese, Iranian, and other immigrants who have joined the Japanese workforce. As a 
result of a stronger emphasis on off-the-job training, there is no doubt that Japanese 
companies have to increase their annual expenditures for employee training. In fact, 
according to Umeshima and Dalesio, in 1980, Japanese companies spent an average of 
US$200 per person per year for off-the-job training purposes. By 1990, the average spent 
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by medium companies for the same purpose was US$400 per person per year, while large 
Japanese companies spent as much as US$1,200 per person per year. 
Thus, the foregoing review has illustrated that despite the economic downturn, some large 
Japanese companies are still emphasising both on-the-job as well as off-the-job training as 
a ritual for employee personal development. 
2.5.6 Enterprise Trade Unions 
Since the early 1970s, certain elements of the Japanese model of management, such as 
lifetime employment, the seniority-based wage system, and enterprise unionism were 
credited for having made a major contribution to Japan's post-war economic growth 
(Kawanishi, 1992: 1). An evaluation of industrial relations in Japan highlights several 
common features of how Japan's labour unions are organised. According to Kawanishi, 
the Japanese labour union is an enterprise union, and has facilitated the implementation of 
company policies designed to promote a firm's expansion and the growth of the national 
economy. In addition, this form of union is seen as having contributed significantly to the 
improvement of the working conditions and the standard of living of the ordinary 
employee (Kawanishi, 1992: 1). 
An enterprise union, according to Kawanishi, is a union of all employees within a 
particular firm, who become members of the union regardless of their status. In defining 
the membership of an enterprise union, Brown and Reich (1997) mention that "all newly 
hired regular workers, both high school and university graduates, belong to the union until 
they reach managerial ranks which is usually ten years for university graduates and twenty- 
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two years for high school graduates. " Chen (1995: 192) points out that part-timers, 
temporary and subcontract workers are typically excluded from the unions. Since 
enterprise unions are the property of all enterprise participants, union members have the 
opportunity to participate in union governance, while management maintains its influence 
by sponsoring union activities and inculcating attitudes that support the firm's goals 
(Benson, 1996). 
There are two general categories of theory that help to explain the emergence of the 
enterprise union in Japan. The first is called the "cultural approach" and its strongest 
advocate is Hazama (1964). According to Kawanishi (1992: 129), although Hazama "did 
not write about the formation of enterprise unions per se, nevertheless, it is easy to see 
from his research how Japan's paternalistic style of management could facilitate the 
emergence of a strong sense of identity with their firm on the part of Japan's employees. " 
The same author argues that "Once the existence of such a consciousness is established, it 
might be argued there would be a logical basis for concluding that a class-based unionism 
cutting across the firm would have a difficult time developing.... under such circumstance 
activists in the labour movement would have to settle for a form of company unionism 
which rested primarily on the maintenance of interpersonal relationships within the 
paternalistic framework of the firm" (p. 129). 
The second category is called the "labour-market approach". The advocates of this 
approach are divided into two subgroups: one subgroup follows the lines of Okochi (1972) 
while the other includes Shirai (1980), Tiara (1977) and Koike (1977). Under the former, 
Okochi's argument was based on the fact that Japan's enterprise union was formed because 
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of the peculiarities of the Japanese labour market, which emerged during the Meiji period. 
Central to this approach was Okochi's theory of the migrant wage labourer and the 
vertically-structured labour market, which resulted from that type of labour (see 
Kawanishi, 1992). 
In the latter subgroup, advocates such as Shirai (1980), Tiara (1977) and Koike (1977) 
point to more universal phenomena in explaining the emergence of the enterprise union. 
They argue that the maturation of capitalism is accompanied by the growing importance of 
labour markets in Japan. The internationalisation of labour markets brings with it career 
employment and seniority-based wage systems. The result, they argue, is a form of 
enterprise-oriented unionism in which all employees have a mutually interdependent stake 
in the organisation by which they are employed. 
Despite the valuable insights offered by these two approaches, they are criticised by 
Kawanishi (1992) who claims that neither explains directly how or why the enterprise 
union was established at a given firm. Kawanishi explicates further that the two groups of 
writers did provide explanations for the existence of the enterprise union, but what they did 
not specify was the mechanism or actual procedures by which the enterprise was 
established. He further argues that these writers tend to provide explanations that are 
historical and devoid of human actors. According to the same author, there is a need to go 
beyond the basic precondition described by these writers because the enterprise union 
which developed in Japan is the product of two conflicting forces and the outcome of 
decisions made by major actors, namely, the human individuals who have shaped the 
conflict. On the one hand, there is management whose interests are not served by the 
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development of horizontal unionism which supersedes each enterprise's organisation. On 
the other, there are the unionists, who see their interests being promoted by such unionism. 
Hence, since both the management and the employees would like to protect their interests, 
a consensus was made to develop enterprise union (Kawanishi, 1992: 131). 
From a Western point of view, Japanese unions are characterised by enterprise unionism as 
opposed to craft or industry-wide unions (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992: 53). As shown in 
Table 2.1 the majority of union members in Japan belong to enterprise unions. 
Table 2.1 
Union Membership by Industry and Union Type (%, 1994) 
Sector Total Enterprise 
Unions 
Occupational 
unions 
Industrial 
unions 
Other 
Agriculture 100 82.7 15.5 0.1 1.3 
Forestry 100 75.4 12.9 10.5 1.2 
Fishing 100 32.2 67.3 0.5 - 
Mining 100 97.1 0.5 2.1 0.5 
Construction 100 29.9 32.8 23.0 14.4 
Manufacturing 100 98.5 0.1 1.0 0.4 
Electricity, gas, water 100 99.8 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Transport & Communics. 100 94.4 1.0 4.4 0.1 
Wholesale, retail, cater. 100 97.9 0.1 1.4 0.6 
Finance, insurance 100 99.9 0.1 0.1 0.0 
Real estate 100 99.3 -- 0.7 0.0 
Services 100 95.1 2.4 1.0 1.5 
Public sector 100 99.3 0.2 0.0 0.4 
Unclassified 100 8.3 0.9 5.6 85.2 
Total 100 91.7 3.3 3.1 1.9 
Source: Whittaker, 199& 
When compared to a European labour philosophy which emphasises government 
initiatives for workers, Japanese unions are said to be primarily concerned with lifetime 
employment security (McMillan, 1996). Wage increases, for instance, are determined as a 
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function of enterprise productivity and national wage norms, which are decided each year 
in the spring's offensive, or "Shunto" (McMillan, 1996: 225). However, the enterprise 
union influences management and decision-making within the company in several ways. 
Because the unions are company-wide, rather than industry-wide, as in America, or 
occupation-wide, as in British craft unions, management's approach to unions is more co- 
operative than adversarial (McMillan, 1996: 226). 
There are a number of advantages of enterprise unionism. One of them is that it gives both 
management and workers a sense of purpose and provides an environment in which there 
is greater co-operation for the achievement of common goals (Sethi et al., 1984). 
Moreover, in theory, enterprise unions together with the "three divine treasures" discussed 
earlier, not only function to increase employees' identification with their companies but 
also restrict employees' mobility between firms. Since mobility across firms is minimal as 
a result of lifetime employment, enterprise unionism increases the conformity of 
employees to both the union and the company (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992: 55). 
Another advantage of enterprise unionism is that it creates stability within the Japanese 
labour market. Chen (1995) points out that the intimate relationship between union 
members and the company helps to safeguard the interests of both parties. While the union 
is viewed as a protection against potential abuses by management, the union members are 
also keenly aware of the fact that damage to the company may also be detrimental to their 
own interests. Therefore, serious, long-term strikes in Japanese firms are rare (Chen, 
1995). Benson (1996), however, rejects this argument by saying that perhaps Japanese 
workers are already attuned to the belief that their well-being is tied to the company's 
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economic success. Therefore, any interruption to work would mean a loss of revenue to 
the company, which would in turn adversely affect the members financially. 
Depending on how one looks at it, such a philosophy can be either beneficial or 
destructive. It has been argued that one of several benefits of an enterprise unionism is 
that it results in the development of a positive relationship between the employer and the 
employees (Long and Seo, 1977: 85). Long and Seo further argue that an enterprise union 
has been partly responsible for maintaining close co-operation between management and 
labour: a positive factor in the rapid and continuous technological upgrading of Japanese 
industry, especially in the 1970s. 
Despite these positive aspects, the main disadvantage of enterprise unionism is that its 
members can become over-dependent on the fortunes of the company (Chen, 1995). The 
company may be able to accommodate this when the economy is growing and the future of 
the company is assured, but when the economy slows down, as it has now in Japan, the 
organisation cannot afford to accommodate many of the employees' demands, especially 
financial ones. This will indeed undermine the consensus nature of the enterprise union. 
Moreover, this strong identification with the interests of the company will make union 
members susceptible to company manipulations, especially in times of economic crisis. 
Therefore, these disadvantages have further eroded the influence of enterprise unionism. 
As the influences of the trade union movement in Japan continue to be eroded, criticisms 
against it and particularly against enterprise unions have increased. For example, 
Whittaker (1998) claims that enterprise unions have been condemned on the grounds that 
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union membership is overwhelmingly concentrated in large Japanese firms. According to 
the same author, "almost 60 percent of employees in private sector 1000+ (employee) 
companies are union members, compared to less than 2 percent in companies with fewer 
than 100 employees. " (Table 2.2). 
Table 2.2 
Unions and Members in Japan by Size of Enterprise (%, 1997) 
Enterprise 
size 
(employees) 
No. of union 
Members 
(x 1000) 
Member 
Composition 
No. of 
employees 
(x 1000) 
Estimated 
Organisation 
Rate 
1,000+ 5,697 59.3 975 58.4 
300-999 1,484 15.4 1197 20.1 
100-299 923 9.6 - - 
30-99 348 3.6 2,663 1.5 
-29 52 0.5 - - 
Other 1,105 11.5 - - 
Total 9,610 100.0 4,855 19.8 
Source: Whittaker, 1998. 
Not only has the union itself been condemned but also its representatives have been 
criticised for using their authority for personal gain (Tokyo Business, August 1993). Some 
authors claim that union leaders have been criticised for not doing enough for their 
members and have used their position as a route to senior management (Benson, 1996; 
Chen, 1995). A survey of large Japanese firms by the Japan Federation of Employers' 
Association (as cited in Ballon, 1992: 42) found that more that 15 percent of directors were 
former union officials. This suggested that union officials were usually not very vocal 
because as far as individual interests were concerned, being vocal would not enhance the 
chances of promotion. 
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Enterprise unionism is also criticised for its failure to negotiate for wage rises and shorter 
working hours for its members (Akira, 1987), and also for its inability to defend their 
interests (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992: 55). Other researchers also criticise the enterprise 
union because it functions merely as a third arm of management (Cole, 1971; Kawanishi, 
1992; Matsuzaki, 1992). These weaknesses have led many Western commentators (for 
instance, Benson, 1996) to claim that the only unions that are capable of looking after 
workers' interests are craft, industrial and general unions. This perspective was promoted 
by Galenson and Odaka (1976: 670-671), who argued that the only way the Japanese 
labour movement would be able to secure a democratic and representative role in industry 
would be by distancing themselves from management and restructuring themselves as 
industrial unions. 
Benson (1995; 1996) mentions that, in fact, some unions have already implemented 
strategies to distance themselves from management. He suggests two possible ways in 
which unions can achieve independence from management: first, through structural 
independence in which unions can enhance member participation and restrict managerial 
influence; and second, through functional independence, which relates to the level of 
operational autonomy from management, and involves the rejection of management's 
sponsorship of the day-to-day activities of the union. 
Despite this, and as a result of restructuring, the Japanese trade unions have in fact changed 
substantially. In 1976, for instance, the Labour Union Council for Policy Promotion 
(LUCPP) was formed. As the name suggests, one feature of this movement was its 
attempt to participate in national policy formulation. Thus, at its formation, the LUCPP 
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declared that "it would emphasise economic policy, employment, prices and tax reform. 
Wider policy objectives covering social security, housing, education and medicine were 
also articulated, based on a `life cycle model'. " (as cited in Whittaker, 1998). 
The 1980s saw another formation, that of Rengo (JTUC). According to Whittaker (1998), 
"The appearance of `New Rengo' in 1989 did not literally unify the labour front - it was 
soon opposed by Zenroren and Zenrokyo (which derive much of their support from the 
public and service sectors) - but with over 60 industrial federation members and around 20 
affiliated federations representing over 60 percent of organised labour, `8 million Rengo' 
could rightly claim to be the majority voice of organised labour. " Since its formation, 
Rengo has launched a number of proposals. Some of these have been taken up and have 
been incorporated into the legal system, while its views have been reflected in other laws, 
for example, the Child Rearing Leave Law, the Labour Standards Law revision, Land tax 
Law, etc., nevertheless, Rengo has also been criticised (Whittaker, 1998). For example, (i) 
there is a question of whose interests Rengo represents; and (ii) although Rengo says that it 
represents "working people", this is a vague term, and federations organising small-firm 
workers have also criticised Rengo for being dominated by large private sector unions 
(Whittaker, 1998). 
A number of other authors also claim that not only have trade unions been criticised but in 
fact the influence of the trade union movement in Japan has been declining (Tsuru and 
Rebitzer, 1995). According to Tsuru and Rebitzer, in spite of the establishment of the 
National Federation of Private Sector Unions in the late 1980s to co-ordinate union 
activities, between 1975 and 1993 aggregate union density declined from 34.4 to 24.2 
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percent. Chen (1995) also points out that this trend might continue to erode union 
influence as more and more Japanese companies are moving into service sectors and an 
increasing number of employees (about two-thirds according to Chen) in small and 
medium-sized companies are not unionised. 
From the above review, it can be seen that enterprise unionism has been both popular and 
important to some large Japanese companies. But despite its popularity, the proportion of 
employees in trade unions, particularly enterprise unions, has been declining for many 
years. Findings of more recent studies further reveal that the influence of enterprise 
unionism has been diminishing rapidly, which suggests that enterprise unionism has 
become less popular among some large Japanese companies in recent years. 
2.5.7 Consensus Decision-Making/The Ringgi System 
Decision-making by consensus or the ringgi system was first interpreted as one of the most 
important elements of the Japanese model of management by a group of Japanese scholars 
during their visit to the US in the late 1950s (Fukuda, 1988: 65). Like many of the 
elements of the "classic" Japanese model of management, it appears that decision-making 
techniques or styles were also influenced by culture; in this case, by the preference for 
collective responsibility and accountability (Keys et al., 1994). In this regard, scholars 
typically describe Japanese decision-making as a consensus decision in which emphasis is 
placed on building agreement (Fukuda, 1988; McMillan, 1996). 
Among the most extensively discussed methods of consensus decision-making or the 
ringgi system are nemawashi and ringgi seido. Nemawashi is a process of meeting 
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individually or in very small groups with others to prepare the way for a decision. It is an 
important Japanese business concept that literally refers to dealing with the roots of trees. 
This means that business decision-making requires careful attention at every stage of the 
process. This is quite similar to how the Japanese deal with the transplanting of a tree, 
which requires much skill and meticulous effort. According to McMillan (1996: 229), 
"nemawashi is very important in the sense that it is used to test the climate of opinion, 
checking the broader implications and learning the potential grounds for conflict. " The 
main purpose is to obtain informal understanding before implementation is made (Keys et 
al., 1994). 
The actual decision process is Ringgi Seido, a commonly-used, formal procedure of 
management by group consensus. A ringisho, on the other hand, is a proposal that 
originates in one section, and is forwarded to all relevant sections on the same level, the 
section heads, the managers, the directors, and eventually the president of the company. It 
is normally used as an example of the consensual decision-making process and the strong 
Japanese cultural norm of building harmony. Upon receiving the ringisho, each participant 
makes comments on a sheet attached to the back of the proposal. The decision is then 
made by top management based on the comments from all the people involved in the 
process. The purpose of this is to eliminate dissension, as many are given a chance to 
change a decision before it is actually made (Chen, 1995: 186) (see Exhibit 2.2). 
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Exhibit 2.2 
Ringgi system of decision-making 
Upper Middle Lower 
management management management 
and staff 
Step 1l ( Define Receive 
l problems nstructions 
Step 2I Analyze 
problems 
Step 3 
Step 4 
Work out 
alternatives 
Choose one 
"Ringgi" process 
Authorization Inter-unit Intra-unit 
i consensus !'I consensus 
Step 5 
Implement 
the choice 
Source: Fukuda, 1988, p. 64. 
Viewed from the traditional paradigm of top down decision-making, ringgi does not make 
sense to most Western managers. However, to the Japanese managers, ringgi has many 
advantages. One of them is that by using this system, issues are thoroughly discussed by 
all concerned and an attempt is made to accommodate all the views of all the parties 
involved (Long and Seo, 1977: 61-63). Thus, according to Long and Seo, conflicts, 
hostility and loss of face can be avoided as no decision is made by one particular person. 
Furthermore, this form of decision-making has an element of democracy as employees at 
lower levels can initiate proposals or work out plans, which will then be transferred 
upward to higher levels of management (Chen, 1995: 187). Chen also points out that since 
many people are involved in the decision-making process, there is usually greater 
participation. Hence, any decision adopted on the basis of extensive discussions will more 
likely meet with general acceptance. 
56 
Another advantage of ringgi decision-making is that since so many people are involved in 
the decision process, the danger of a decision being manipulated by certain individuals is 
reduced. Furthermore, since the decision is generally accepted, its implementation will be 
easier and more efficient (Chen, 1995: 187). 
There are, however, a number of flaws as well as criticisms associated with ringgi 
decision-making. Japanese firms using this form of decision-making are often criticised 
for being too ambiguous and slow in their decision-making, incorporating little creativity, 
and being plagued with "group think" (Mroczkowski and Hanaoka, 1989). Often the 
involvement of too many people and sections results in decisions being made slowly 
(Chen, 1995). According to Chen, to make things worse, too many meetings are held and 
this, too, can delay the decision process. Based on a report conducted by the Japan 
Management Association, as cited in Chen (1995), managers spend around 40 percent of 
their time in meetings. According to the same report, this might significantly delay 
business decisions, which often required a swift response. Thus, by the time a decision is 
made, the deal might have already gone. Hence, it is not surprising that many Japanese 
organisations have not adopted this process for the more important decisions 
(Mroczkowshi and Hanaoka, 1989). 
It is also claimed that suggestions made by other managers involved are often ignored 
(Chen, 1995: 187). According to Chen, this is because many Japanese top executives can 
be very autocratic. Chen also mentions that this form of decision-making can be viewed 
merely as "a confirmation-authorisation process. " A study by Steward et al. (1986) 
reveals that Japanese employees do not prefer ringgi decision-making, but rather prefer 
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consultative or even persuasive decision-making. They argue that this is because the 
ringgi decision-making process might often end up being nothing more than the record of 
a decision already made or an instrument of distributing responsibility for decisions 
throughout the entire company. 
2.6 Production Management Techniques 
2.6.1 Just-In-Time (JIT) 
The interest in just-in-time (JIT) was originally sparked off by the achievements of 
Japanese manufacturers in the late seventies and early eighties. Sohal et al. (1989) provide 
an interesting literature review of JIT, and suggest that "JIT is essentially more of a 
philosophy than a series of techniques, the basic tenet of which is to minimise cost by 
restricting the commitment to expenditure in any form, including manufacturing or 
ordering materials, components, etc., until the last possible moment. " 
Taiichi Ohno, Toyota's vice president, originally developed the basic idea of JIT when the 
company was facing major problems with parts shortages and delivery (McMillan, 1996: 
283). The Toyota team then formalised the idea into a management system when the 
company sought to meet the precise demand of customers for different models and colours 
with minimum delay. At this time, the approach was called the "Toyota Manufacturing 
System" (Sohal et al., 1989). This approach had attracted wide attention in Japan since the 
early 1970s, and by the mid 1970s, many Japanese companies had adopted this approach. 
Towards the late 1970s, the JIT philosophy began to attract significant attention from the 
West under the name of the Kanban system. 
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What is JIT? Taiichi Ohno, the "founding father" of JIT describes JIT as a production 
flow process where "the right parts needed in assembly reach the assembly line at the time 
they are needed and only in the amount needed" (Ohno, 1988: 4). Wallace (1990) gave a 
much later version of JIT definition, describing it as "an approach to achieving excellence 
in a manufacturing company based on continuing elimination of waste and consistent 
improvement in productivity. " According to Zhu and Meredith (1995), waste occurs when 
the activities that are performed do not add value to products. These non-value-adding 
operations typically could account for as much as 90 percent of the total operations in a 
non-JIT process (Zhu and Meredith, 1995). 
A main element of JIT is that of kaizen, or continuous improvement, a multi-sided never- 
ending programme for cutting out all forms of waste. Waste could be identified physically 
in many forms such as scrap, rework, equipment downtime, excess lead-time, 
overproduction, and lower space utilisation (Zhu and Meredith, 1995). The ethos of 
production improvement means questioning everything as parts move through a 
production sequence. The aim is to improve the throughput of work, focusing exclusively 
on operations that add value and eliminating forms of time-wasting that add cost but not 
value. 
JIT is also often used synonymously with kanban (Schonberger, 1982). "Kanban is the 
operating method of Toyota production system - it is a piece of paper contained in a 
rectangular vinyl envelope. This piece of paper carries three categories of information, 
namely, pickup information, transfer information and production information" (Ohno, 
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1988: 27). In the dual-card kanban system, they are classified into withdrawal kanban and 
production-ordering kunhan, also known as production kunhan (Exhibit 2.3). 
The withdrawal kanbans are attached to the buffer stock at the inventory point before each 
production process. When the part is used for production, the withdrawal kanban attached 
to the part is removed and used to order the transportation of the part to the inventory point 
after the immediately preceding production process. Production-ordering kanbans, on the 
other hand, are attached to the buffer stock at the inventory point after each production 
process. When the product or part is used for transportation, the production-ordering 
kanban attached to the product or part is removed and used to order the movement of the 
product or part to the production process. By sequentially connecting the orders of the 
withdrawal kanban and the production-ordering kanban, the consumption of a product at 
the final production process becomes a trigger to produce the product and its parts at each 
production process. 
Exhibit 2.3 
A Two-card Kanban System in a Flow-shop. 
Ordering Receiving 
U 
11 ithdravval Kanban 
El 
Production Kanban M I'ru. luctiun hill 
source: Price et a.. 1994. 
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UPSTREAM Withdrawal DOWNSTREAM 
(machining) post (assembly) 
The essence of kanban is that the manufacturer does not keep many inventories on hand 
but relies on suppliers to furnish parts in time for them to be assembled. In the Toyota 
production system, kanban is used to operate the just-in-time and automation with a 
human touch which are the two pillars of its production system. The objectives of using 
these tools are to prevent over production as well as the elimination of waste. 
Kanban goes hand in hand with JIT. While JIT is an approach in production management 
that emphasises the manufacturer's proximity to customers, Kanban is a device for moving 
toward JIT production. Kanban is the reverse of what is practised in the West, where there 
exists the "Just-in-Case" system in which fat inventories are stored by manufacturers to 
ensure production is not interrupted. By using kanban, Japanese manufacturers run their 
machines only at the market rate of what is demanded rather than at the machine's 
capacity. The system is aimed at achieving greater flexibility and efficiency in 
manufacturing by reducing size lot and hence eliminating waste. As a result, a variety of 
customers' manufacturing needs are better served. How the JIT/Kanban system operates 
is clearly explained by McMillan (1996) as follows: 
"Instead of projecting material requirements from the beginning stage of 
production to each subsequent stage, Toyota do the reverse. Toyota start 
from the final stage of output and work backwards; instead of `push out', it 
uses `pull out'. Information flows in a reverse order, with workers in the 
final stage dictating the flow of parts needed from the prior stage, right 
through to the initial production point. In this way, each step in production is 
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carefully synchronised and parts flow from one step to the next just-in-time" 
(p. 285). 
There is a significant difference between a JIT system and a traditional system such as a 
material requirement planning (MRP) system. JIT is based on a pull system which means 
production is initiated by present needs. MRP, on the other hand, initiates production in 
anticipation of future needs. The key principle of a JIT system is to define, control, and 
reduce the lead-time from initial entry of parts and raw materials to their actual use. Under 
a JIT system suppliers are selected on the basis of the best price at a given level of quality 
as opposed to a low-cost bidder selection criterion. Quality of product is ensured when 
JIT-oriented Japanese companies find it easy to establish the "co-producer relationship" 
with their suppliers if single-source suppliers are used. This relationship make suppliers 
seem like the "next level below" the start of production (Zhu and Meredith, 1995). 
There are a number of factors responsible for the success of JIT/Kanban in Japan. First, 
the JIT system became very popular among Japanese manufacturers in the late 1970s 
because of growing manufacturing costs stemming from increasing labour as well as 
material costs. 
Second, looking at the situation in which Japanese manufacturers found themselves at the 
end of 1945, it is not difficult to understand the emphasis placed upon scarcity. According 
to Harber et al. (1990), raw materials were almost as non-existent as the money required 
for rebuilding during this period. About all that was available in any quantity was labour 
and the Japanese were determined to succeed by developing their skills and technology 
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(Harber et al., 1990). Harber et al. (1990) also mention that the Japanese realise that 
multi-skilling and the possibility of job rotation are important for increasing both 
flexibility and stability because multi-skilled employees can be assigned to carry out a 
number of different tasks. For example, flexible labourers can be moved as required 
around the production system to eliminate balancing losses. Consequently, multi-skilling 
enables the workforce to be kept to a minimum, as the small breaks that the unbalanced 
production system generates disappear. Therefore, labour stability and flexibility in the 
form of highly motivated, multi-skilled employees accepting flexible working hours, are 
often said to be essential conditions for attaining JIT in Japan (Harber et al., 1990). 
Third, looking at the economic difficulties in 1945, it was obvious that it would not have 
been sensible for Japanese industry to concentrate on the production of high-cost goods 
since the domestic market would not have been able to afford to buy them. However, 
despite limited resources, the Japanese manufacturers examined all the possible ways of 
achieving maximum productivity in the production of low-cost consumer goods. Toyota, 
for example, realises that consumers will simply turn away if a high price is set due to high 
manufacturing cost. Therefore, instead of setting high price for its cars, Toyota is 
determined to use JIT as a tool focused on the continual elimination of waste in all forms 
(Ohno, 1988: 9). 
Fourth, since JIT production requires high quality, small lot sizes, and the frequent 
delivery of raw materials, a good relationship with suppliers is crucial to achieve these 
requirements. The Japanese, for example, make their vendors seem like the next level 
below the start of production. In fact, the linkages between suppliers and the parent 
63 
company go far beyond a simple buyer-seller relationship (McMillan, 1996). The parent 
company is not just a buyer of parts and components but it also provides credit, equipment, 
machinery, technological know-how and managerial experience to its suppliers (McMillan, 
1996: 289). According to McMillan, Toyota, for instance, has to take responsibility to 
teach the co-operating firms outside Toyota in using kanban. Since the linkage between 
Toyota and its suppliers is very close and reliable, Toyota can contract out more of its 
components to its suppliers. In addition, the proximity of suppliers to manufacturers is 
also an important contributing factor (McMillan, 1996). The same author states that 
Japanese suppliers tend to be located much closer physically to manufacturers, making 
daily deliveries possible. He argues that there are two advantages resulting from this 
proximity: (i) it reduces the cost of transportation and storage; and (ii) it reduces the 
manufacturing lead-times. 
Finally, it is argued that implementation of JIT cannot be successful without top 
management commitment (McMillan, 1996). McMillan maintains that management must 
be willing to devote the resources which are necessary to support an implementation such 
as JIT education and training. In Japan, for example, managers are very concerned about 
JIT implementation (McMillan, 1996). They also make sure that their employees' 
commitment to the implementation process is reinforced by (i) education, for instance, 
understanding what JIT is all about and why it has to be JIT; and (ii) by responsibility, for 
example, what their contributions are to successful JIT implementation (McMillan, 1996). 
JIT/Kanban also has a number of merits, the most important being the reduction in cost of 
the manufacturing of products as a result of effective inventory management. An earlier 
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study conducted by Aggarwal (1985) reveals that Japanese firms which have used JIT for 5 
years reported a 30 percent increase in productivity, a 60 percent reduction in inventories, 
a 90 percent improvement in quality rejection rates and a 15 percent reduction in 
floorspace use. 
Besides the benefit of cost reduction, JIT/kanban is also alleged to improve stock turnover 
and increase profit margin (Boyd, 1995). In his study on the performance of companies in 
the USA, Europe and Japan, Boyd claims that the best performers are the Japanese 
companies. According to the same author, one of the strategies that the Japanese 
companies have mastered is the JIT approach. He argues that most of the Japanese 
companies in his survey have recorded their best performance in the stock turnover, profit 
per employee, and the profit margin because they have used the JIT approach. 
Among other advantages of a JIT system, according to Yasin and Wafa (1996), are: (i) it 
helps to eliminate waste in production and material; (ii) it improves communication 
internally and externally; (iii) it helps to reduce purchasing cost; (iv) it reduces lead-time, 
throughput time, improved production quality, increased productivity and enhanced 
customer responsiveness; (v) it tends to foster organisational discipline and managerial 
involvement; and (vi) it helps to integrate the different functional areas of the organisation 
and helps to bridge the gap between production and accounting. Besides these, Yasin and 
Wafa also list some other benefits of JIT, such as quality improvement; cost reduction; 
problem solving; enhancement of productivity; manufacturing flexibility for fast response 
to market/customers; better control of engineering change; worker enhancement; 
simplified scheduling; and improved communication between operations. 
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Finally, the other merits of a JIT system are said to be (i) a company using JIT has the 
ability to operate at market pace without holding excess inventory, particularly in a highly 
repetitive manufacturing environment (Harber et al., 1990); and (ii) management can use 
less skilled workers since supervisory personnel can localise specific knowledge 
requirements especially when "decoupling" the various work stages (McMillan, 1996: 
284). 
However, there are negative aspects of the JIT/kanban system, such as the vulnerability on 
the part of the manufacturers with regard to the supply of inventories. For example, what 
happens if the supplier cannot supply on time due to geographical dispersal and adverse 
weather conditions? Or what happens if the supplier sabotages the manufacturer by giving 
an inferior inventory in order to demand a high delivery price? Several authors (for 
instance, Wilson, 1985; O'Neal, 1985; Manoochehri, 1984) have highlighted this point as 
the main obstacle to the success of JIT. Secondly, since automation in a JIT system forces 
the immediate correction of quality problems, in the short run, frequent line stops will 
incur substantial financial loss for the firms. Thirdly, the implementation of a JIT system 
under short-term, profit-oriented management is not only very costly but also more likely 
to fail than in the case where a long-term view is taken (Manoochehri, 1984). For 
instance, in the case of General Electric, one GE plant has to relocate "a machine a day" 
for a couple of months as part of its JIT effort (Manbochehri, 1984). According to the 
same author, in this case the productivity of the plant could be adversely affected in the 
short run. Finally, a JIT system serves to increase the dependency of employer on 
employee. This could have a devastating effect if the employees went on strike. 
66 
The JIT system has met with a series of criticisms, as pointed out by Key et al. (1994) who 
argue that JIT requires selective implementation. This view is shared by Harber et al. 
(1990) who state that "small firms supplying to larger firms feel that they are being 
coerced into a JIT type programme. " It is also claimed that suppliers are dissatisfied with 
a delivery schedule where they are required to make multiple deliveries each day, resulting 
in massive implications (Harber et al., 1990). For example, problems are often caused for 
suppliers where vehicles currently used for normal deliveries are too large for the smaller- 
sized JIT deliveries. This could lead to a need for capital outlay on new vehicles, 
according to Harber et al. (1990). To make matter worse, suppliers are often told to 
relocate their business close to the main purchaser (Harber et al., 1990). The construction 
of Toyota City in Japan is a fine example of the extent to which all aspects of production 
(including geographical location) need to be reconsidered when a full-scale JIT programme 
is implemented (Harber et al., 1990). 
To sum up, the positive cultural factors of JIT as implemented by the Japanese, cannot be 
denied. JIT thrives on a culture of co-operation and collaboration and the organisational 
structure must support this. Successful JIT requires more planning, because the objective 
is to do more with less. There also has to be sufficient flexibility within the planning 
function to allow changes to be handled with ease. This can be achieved by allowing for 
suppliers' redundancy in the planning function. Good supplier relations are also important 
and this can come about if both parties understand that there must be a symbiotic 
relationship between them. This implies that collaboration and contact should also be 
maintained not only at the operational level but also at-the managerial level. If there is an 
active effort to develop and sustain the relationship at all levels, then suppliers are likely to 
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respond with co-operation and loyalty. One method of achieving this is by rating suppliers 
based on their future plans and their potential, as well as on their past performance record. 
The suppliers who have demonstrated their willingness to change in tandem with their 
parent company should not only be rewarded but should also feel confident about 
receiving support from the parent company during times of difficulty. It goes without 
saying that the effort required to judge the potential of a supplier is considerable. 
However, the benefits are also substantial and these are key factors in a JIT system 
implementation. 
2.6.2 Total Quality Control (TQC) 
The Japanese realised that during the post-war period, and with limited raw materials, they 
would have to go for value-added manufacturing exports. However, one major barrier to 
this was the pre-war image of Japanese goods as being cheap and of poor quality. 
Therefore, the Japanese manufacturers were very enthusiastic to develop goods of low 
price with high quality. This was part of a domestically inspired revolution in quality 
control management. 
The modern concept of statistical quality control was introduced in Japan before the 
Second World War. The Americans were effectively responsible for making possible the 
miraculous turn-around of Japanese industry and for putting Japan on the road to quality 
leadership. Much of this transformation was associated with the introduction of statistical 
quality control into Japan by the US army over the period 1946 to 1950, and with the visits 
by three key, American quality gurus in the early 1950s. They were Dr W Edwards 
Deming, Dr Joseph M Juran, and Dr Armand V Feigenbaum, the latter being the originator 
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of total quality control (TQC). The Japanese discovered his work on quality control in the 
1950s at about the same time as Dr Juran visited Japan. Dr Feigenbaum argues for a 
systematic or total approach to quality, requiring the involvement of all functions in the 
quality process, not just manufacturing. The idea is to build quality at an early stage, 
rather than inspecting and controlling quality after the fact. 
The Japanese then adopted, developed and adapted the system that the Americans 
introduced and by the late 1950s, they had begun to develop clearly distinct approaches 
suitable for their own culture and use. However, one significant difference between the 
Japanese gurus and their American counterparts was that the former emphasised mass 
education, the use of simple tools, and teamwork, and had a background in an educational 
role. The famous three Japanese gurus were Professor Kaoru Ishikawa, Dr Genichi 
Taguchi, and Shigeo Shingo. 
To further encourage the development of quality control activities, the Union of Japanese 
Scientists and Engineers (JUSE) was formed in 1946. Dr Deming was the first American 
to become involved with JUSE since after its formation. At about the same time, a 
delegation from Bell Telephone Laboratories in America visited Japan and demonstrated 
Deming's quality control techniques. As a result, his name became known and JUSE 
invited him to lecture to the Japanese on statistical methods. In 1951, JUSE took the 
initiative in instituting the Deming Prize in Japan, and since this development, there have 
been two important concepts of quality control system widely used in Japan; they are: total 
quality control (TQC) and quality control circles (QCCs). 
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What is total quality control (TQC)? Schonberger (1982: 187) defines it as a fundamental 
production function. Feigenbaum (1983), on the other hand, defines TQC as a 
management approach which regards the quality of products and services as a primary 
business strategy and a fundamental determinant for business health, growth and economic 
viability. Total quality control (TQC) is also seen primarily as a management-led 
approach in which top management commitment is essential (Feigenbaum, 1983). The 
emphasis is on quality in all aspects and functions of the company operation, company- 
wide, not just on the manufacturing function or on the provision of a major service to the 
external end-customer. It is here that employee awareness and motivation are essential. 
Everyone in the company is responsible for ensuring quality in terms of "satisfying the 
customer" in all they do, and the approach is one of prevention of errors and faults rather 
than detection and correction. 
Although there may be some disagreement between the two authors regarding the 
definition of TQC, Deming (1982) has made it clear that the word "quality" in TQC is not 
only about enhancing quality but it is also about improving productivity. In fact, 
according to Shetty and Buehler (1988), Deming's point did bear some truth because they 
also believe that as quality improves, costs decrease and productivity improves. 
Unlike in the West, in Japanese manufacturing methods "total quality control is a 
fundamental production function, along with other functions such as quality control 
circles, just-in-time production and tight in-process control" (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992: 
23). On that basis, the goal has been to broaden TQC into upstream and downstream 
quality control of the enterprise. In the upstream direction, TQC involves the parts and 
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component suppliers, who, in close co-operation with the assembler, are expected to 
deliver their goods "just-in-time" and thus without inspection upon delivery. In the 
downstream approach, TQC involves the distribution channels on an equal basis of 
interdependence. 
As far as the Japanese are concerned, the concept of TQC is based on the fact that quality 
is everybody's business, and ideally, everybody should help in making their company the 
best in its particular field. This, of course, involves-the management, especially in the 
development of clearly defined procedures, the monitoring of performance, and the 
motivation as well as participation of the workforce (Reilker, 1983). According to the 
same author, the main themes of TQC are: (i) it involves all functions that deal with the 
product; (ii) it involves everyone's job from the office boy to the president of the 
company; (iii) the responsibility for quality is to be shared by all workers; and (iv) it 
requires that top management understands and supports the concept, especially when it 
comes to the implementation processes. 
The use of TQC has a number of strengths. One of them is that it complements JIT by 
making sure that every unit meets all the quality specifications. This occurs when TQC 
delegates quality responsibilities to the worker at the source or point of production, so that 
through the close coupling of workers and processes provided by the JIT structure, any 
defective item is detected quickly and the cause of such defects is identified and resolved. 
In this way, waste can be avoided and quality maintained. Therefore, in a TQC 
programme "quality at the source" is the slogan with which all employees are inculcated 
(Harber et al., 1990). This means that if there are any errors, they should be identified and 
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corrected where the work is performed and not passed to the next workstation. As far as 
the Japanese production system is concerned, with TQC, quality is considered to be the 
responsibility of the worker performing the actual job (Harber et al., 1990). 
Another advantage of TQC is in terms of production costs. According to Harber et al 
(1990), lower production costs can be maintained because the TQC system makes sure that 
(i) process control procedures are implemented at every stage rather than at selected points 
only; (ii) every unit produced is inspected rather than randomly sampled; (iii) workers are 
given the authority to stop the production line when there is a quality problem; (iv) each 
worker must self-correct errors and rework bad items instead of sending them to a 
separately-staffed rework line. - 
The other merit of TQC is that it creates not only a price/value advantage over competitors 
but also enables a firm to charge a higher sale price per unit through differentiation (Harber 
et al., 1990). In fact, according to Harber et al. (1990), the strategy of ensuring high 
quality through proper total quality control management leads to a sustainable competitive 
advantage. Moreover, firms competing on quality pursue an operational strategy that 
controls the quality of the product and service, and seeks continuous improvement. 
Despite these strengths, TQC has also been criticised. There is a myth that Japanese high 
quality products result from unique cultural factors, which are, therefore, not transferable. 
This is perhaps exaggerated. In fact, it has been argued that Japanese management 
techniques such as TQC and QCCs were derived out of necessity rather than being part of 
the culture (Toone, 1994). Toone also points out that it is important not to confuse 
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company and national culture. He claims that Japanese companies starting up operations in 
the United Kingdom have not attempted to impose Japanese culture on the British 
workforce, but instead have attempted to alter their behaviour and habits. 
Japan, like the rest of the world, has been greatly hit by recession since 1990. Although 
many Japanese industrial leaders do not openly say so, they are now experiencing many 
problems familiar in the West. As a result, some of the basic tenets of Japanese quality 
systems are being questioned. However, with government guidance and the leadership of 
such organisations as the Japan Productivity Centre, the Japanese have always proved to be 
most resilient, as they were after the 1973 oil crisis. They also seem to perform at their 
best in times of crisis. One example is Nissan's intention to fight back by improving the 
quality of its cars and its readiness to compete with a 10 percent annual improvement in 
factory labour productivity, coupled with a more efficient use of corporate human 
resources (Stainer, 1995). 
It is also very clear that to overcome today's challenges, Japan is turning its attention to 
known poor quality areas, such as the service industries, logistics and agriculture, where 
the Japanese realise that they are lagging behind other countries and that there is a need to 
improve quality. 
From the above discussion, it can be argued that despite serious criticisms of TQC, one 
thing that can be learnt from the Japanese total quality control technique is that attention to 
detail, commitment, mutual respect and co-operative spirit, as well as discipline are 
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fundamental. This is because of all the industrialised nations, Japan understands and 
appreciates the close link between productivity and quality. 
2.6.3 Quality Control Circle (QCC) 
The quality control system is defined as "an effective system for co-ordinating the quality 
maintenance and quality improvement effort of the various groups in an organisation so as 
to enable production at the most economical levels which allow for full customer 
satisfaction. "5 Dr Feigenbaum further stresses that quality does not mean "best" but "best 
for the customer use and selling price". He points out that the word "control" in quality 
control represents a four-step management tool: (i) Setting quality standards; (ii) 
Appraising conformity to these standards; (iii) Acting when standards are exceeded; and 
(iv) Planning for improvements in the standards. 
Quality is seen as having become the single most important force leading to organisational 
success and company growth in national and international markets. ' Hence, it is 
essentially a way of managing the organisation and, like finance and marketing, quality has 
now become a key element of modem management. 
What is a quality control circle (QCC)? A quality control circle (QCC) is a Japanese 
innovation that formally mobilises a small group of workers to voluntarily carry out 
analysis of job-related quality problems (McMillan, 1996: 233). According to McMillan 
(1996), this small group usually consists of six to ten workers engaged in the same type of 
work and often at the same hierarchical level. Generally, the groups are very problem 
5 Dr Armand Feigenbaum as quoted in Professor Bendell's booklet on The Quality Gurus. 
6 Ibid. 
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focused, meeting once a week, usually after working hours (although meetings during 
office hours are not unusual). 
What is critical to the concept of QCC as a practical tool is the set of techniques available 
for analysis, discussion and feedback. There are seven statistical tools employed in QCC 
and these include Pareto analysis, cause and effect (fishbone) diagrams, stratification, tally 
cards, histograms, scatter diagrams and Shewhart control charts (Oliver and Wilkinson, 
1992: 23). In addition to these tools, members in the circle are assisted by specialised staff 
groups, such as from engineering, accounting, and production control to help work groups 
solve problems. 
During the early 1980s, the QCC system was widely copied in Western industries 
(Lillrank, 1995). However, as an organisational form it failed to become rooted in 
Western business environment (Lillrank, 1995). Nevertheless, the abstract principle of 
continuous improvement survived and is currently applied in ways different from the 
original model. Elementary statistical methods popularised by the Japanese for shop-floor 
use have also been generally applied (Lillrank, 1995). 
The Japanese QCC movement officially started in 1962, after some ten years of 
experimentation with statistical tools and quality management concepts transferred from 
the United States (Lillrank, 1995). The Japanese Union of Scientists and Engineers 
(JUSE) established the QCC Headquarters, published a monthly magazine, and developed 
training methods to support the movement. The circle concept was applied in a few 
leading companies, such as Komatsu, Toyota and Nissan, who were experimenting with 
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many other management innovations as well. Following this, the QCC breakthrough came 
only some 15 years later in the aftermath of the first oil crisis, and reached its peak during 
the early 1980s. 
In Japan, the QCC has a practical and an ideological base. During the late 1950s and 
1960s, the Japanese manufacturing industry was growing fast. Uniform quality was a top 
priority for two reasons: first, the quality of contemporary manufacturing output was low 
and needed to be improved for it to be exportable. Second, quality was not a high priority 
in the dominant American mass manufacturing paradigm. Therefore, quality provided a 
competitive advantage to the Japanese manufacturers. 
Unlike in the United States, where highly skilled specialist and inspectors took care of 
quality, the Japanese did not have the time and money to train cadres of QC experts and 
therefore opted for another solution, which involved the training of foremen who were then 
required to train their own people. Furthermore, quality by inspection meant that a 
substantial amount of output had to be scrapped. For the frugal Japanese of the post-war 
era this was unacceptable, especially since most raw materials were imported and paid for 
by hard-earned exports (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992). Therefore, it was opportune to take 
quality management to the source, and have each operator himself or herself inspect the 
output and devise methods for preventing errors. To do this, however, required training 
and the QCC was the perfect training-tool for the dissemination of skills. 
The main part of the application effort in QCC is concerned with how an organisation 
deploys the tools to achieve the QCC and the firms' objectives. Professor Kaoru Ishikawa, 
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one of the founding fathers of the movement, formulated the ideology behind Japanese QC 
circles. To Ishikawa, the QC circle was a break from the "feudal spirit" of treating 
workers as mindless automa (Ishikawa, 1990). He maintains that, as circle members, 
workers could apply their creativity and experience to solve common problems. Doing it 
together with their peers, in fact, provided an opportunity for socialising in a constructive 
way. From the start, Professor Ishikawa emphasised that the QCC was a voluntary 
activity, that is, it was not part of ordinary work and could not be subject to ordinary 
command and control. He pointed out that people should be motivated to work actively in 
QC circles in various informal ways, such as the enthusiasm generated by superiors, the 
pressure of competition, the unity of fate within the company and the intrinsic joy arising 
from solving problems together. Professor Ishikawa, however, cautioned that voluntarism 
never meant that an individual could freely choose whether to participate or not, but rather 
it was an expression of the informal, free atmosphere that should prevail in the circle. 
It is important to note that voluntary participation is important for two reasons. First, 
Japanese companies are traditionally very hierarchically organised. Social rules prevent a 
junior member from making suggestions or criticising the ways of a senior. Under such 
circumstances, bottom-up, creative problem solving could not work. Second, asking 
workers to suggest new ways to organise work is potentially disruptive. From a manager's 
point of view, this may lead to unreasonable demands. Therefore, creating QC circles as a 
parallel structure outside the ordinary line organisation could encourage creativity and 
spontaneity without compromising operating prerogatives. 
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Thus, by using QCC, workers can pick up improvement objects from their work 
environment, and streamline them into well-defined problems that are analysed, solved and 
tested using statistical tools. This work results in an improvement suggestion that is 
handed over to the line manager in charge, who makes the decision of incorporating the 
suggestion into a standard operating procedure. In fact, the QC circle is a sophisticated 
management method that requires a top management-supported quality strategy, 
organisational vehicles for support, guidance and evaluation, and practical tools for solving 
workshop problems. In Japan, because quality is so important, top management is always 
willing to work together with its workers (Lillrank, 1995). 
With the rising popularity of QCC in post-war Japan, by January 1980, there were about 
100,000 registered circles at JUSE, with another estimated one million non-registered (Ho, 
1993). Since then, about 13 million Japanese have participated in QCCs (Ho, 1993). 
According to McMillan (1996: 232), one in eight Japanese workers is currently engaged in 
QCC activities and there are literally hundreds of thousands of quality control circles that 
have sprung up in Japanese firms, involving millions of workers. The Kansai Electric 
Power Company, for example, had 2,300 circles in 1991 with between six and nine people 
in each circle (Westbrook, 1995). Nippondenso have had QC circle activities since 1964, 
two years after QCC was introduced to Japan. In 1983, Nippondenso launched a "TQC by 
everybody" campaign to create "the world's No. 1 products and the world's best corporate 
quality system" (Westbrook, 1995). - 
It is claimed that QC programmes in Japan require a high level of technical training on the 
part of production workers and a substantial commitment of resources on the part of the 
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firm (Lincoln, 1989). However, to ensure the success of QC circles, QC members need to 
be trained in order to acquire the necessary problem-solving techniques. According to 
Shenkar (1988), there are four major factors responsible for the success of QC circles in 
Japan: (i) the scarcity of natural resources, contributing to a greater concern with waste; (ii) 
the Confucian culture which calls for harmony; (iii) the emphasis on groupism; and (iv) 
the importance of the role of education, since the QCC technique requires expertise in 
quantitative analysis. 
The QCC system has a number of advantages, such as affording employees the opportunity 
to assume greater responsibility. Since the entire concept of QCC is based on trust, respect 
and care, Japanese firms recognise the individual worker as a human being with the 
intellect and desire to participate in solving work-related problems. From this baseline, the 
employer provides the employees an opportunity to utilise their capabilities more fully as 
well as perform interesting and challenging tasks (McMillan, 1996). This view was put 
forward earlier by Harber et al. (1990) who state that "firms using QC give employees the 
opportunity to share with management the responsibility for locating and solving problems 
of co-ordination and productivity. " 
Another advantage of QCCs is that in Japan, they have resulted in better management of 
quality control, a reduction in defects, cost savings, safety improvement, pollution control 
and energy savings (McMillan, 1996: 233). Besides that, QC participants feel a sense of 
achievement as they have been given the autonomy and responsibility to tackle such 
problems. In addition, QC circles indirectly provide the mechanism and motivation for 
involving everyone in an organisation in continuous improvement (McMillan, 1996: 233). 
79 
The other merit of QC circles is that such activities help to develop a better working 
environment and closer relationships among workers (Torrington and Huat, 1994). 
According to Torrington and Huat (1994), as problems are handled in a rational manner, 
there is less friction among workers. They also point out that supporters of QC circles 
claim that QC activities enhance the quality of their work-life, as employees enjoy better 
control over their own environment. Torrington and Huat stress that with QC activities, 
employees are motivated by being able to implement solutions to work-related problems. 
Moreover, they add that by participating in QC activities, employees gain recognition for 
their contribution, and this is an important criterion of quality of work-life. Furthermore, 
after acquiring additional problem-solving skills, employees are more confident and feel 
that they are part of the decision-making process. All these have resulted in an improved 
work-life for employees and have increased their productivity (Torrington and Huat, 
1994). Similarly, Lawler et al. (1992) in their study claim that the main advantages of 
QCCs are quality, customer service, and competitiveness. 
On the other hand, the negative aspects of QCCs are also apparent. For example, Shenkar 
(1988) points out that from a critical perspective, workers in Japanese corporations are 
under pressure as they are forced to participate in quality control activities. Cole (1979) 
also noticed falling morale in Toyota's QCs, which, he claims, was due to increasing 
physical and mental strains on QC members. Similarly, Blyton and Turnbull (1993) argue 
that the concept of workplace participation as stressed by QCs, along with other methods 
such as TQM, have in fact been used by the Japanese as a disguise to cloak the reality of 
worker exploitation. Sillince et al. (1996) assert that the disadvantages of QCC from the 
middle managers' point of view is that they see QCC as a threat to their managerial 
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position. Because of that there is an additional drawback for the company as middle 
managers are able to hinder the QCC by denying it time, information, people and finance 
(Sillince et a!., 1996). 
Thus, based on the above arguments one can argue that in reality QC activities could not 
guarantee a better quality of work-life. Perhaps the logic of this in Japan may soon come 
under pressure, particularly when the recession is forcing Japanese companies not only to 
halt recruitment but also to contemplate redundancies. The employee commitment to the 
company that underpinned much of Japanese quality philosophy and which the West so 
envied, may begin to erode. But whether or not the recession effects will produce a more 
level playing-field in terms of cultural attitudes among the Japanese workforce in general 
and towards quality in particular, it is much too soon to-tell at this time. 
2.6.4 The Suggestion System 
The suggestion system in Japan dates back to before World War II, and became 
widespread in Japanese firms in the latter half of the 1950s (Takeshi, 1983). In fact, the 
importance of the system was recognised as early as 1958 when the Nihon Teian Seido 
Kenkyukai (The Japanese Association for Suggestion Systems) was formally established to 
co-ordinate suggestion system activities. Today, this system is the cornerstone of 
innovative work methods in many Japanese production plants. 
Like QCCs, the suggestion system provides the mechanism and motivation for involving 
all employees in an organisation in continuous improvement. In fact, considerable 
importance is attached to these two activities (QCCs and suggestion systems) And they are 
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seen as complementary. As suggestions, particularly from employees, are very important 
for a company's continuous improvement, a variety of award schemes, contests and prizes 
are used to recognise employee's efforts as well as to provide direct rewards to the 
employee concerned. In a Japanese company, for example, the quantity and quality of 
suggestions are seen as important and reflect the department manager's ability to create an 
environment conducive to improvement (Takeshi, 1983). 
According to Dale and Cooper (1992: 159), the typical objectives of a suggestion system 
in a Japanese organisation are (i) to improve the power to work and individual abilities; (ii) 
to promote friendly and healthy human relations among all employees as well as to vitalise 
activities; and (iii) to improve the company structure and operations. 
The Japanese approach to suggestions differs considerably from most Western practice. 
Unlike in most Western practice, especially in the USA, where the emphasis is based on 
the importance of each suggestion, in Japan, the emphasis is on maximising the number of 
suggestions rather than their importance (Dale and Cooper, 1992). The same authors also 
point out that in a typical Japanese suggestion system, a suggestion is submitted and 
evaluated the same day by the foreman of the section. The person making the suggestion 
is usually awarded from 100 to 300 yen. If the suggestion is considered to have potential, 
it is written up in more detail. At this stage it is evaluated by the section manager and his 
or her assistant, or the QC committee, and can qualify for a reward of 1,000 to 10,000 yen. 
On the other hand, if the suggestion is considered of special merit, it can be put forward for 
annual evaluation when the President's Prize of between 10,000 to 20,000 yen is given and 
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at this stage the TQC promotion and QC committees evaluate the suggestion (Dale and 
Cooper, 1992). 
Despite the low monetary rewards, the number of suggestions that can be used is much 
higher in Japan than in the USA (Verespej, 1992). According to Employee Involvement 
Association (EIA) data, as cited in Verespej (1992), each employee in Japan submits an 
average of 32 suggestions per year compared with 0.17 in the USA. The same data also 
shows that an average of 28 suggestions per employee is adopted each year in Japan. In 
contrast, the American worker is lucky to have one out of 20 suggestions adopted. The 
EIA data further shows that more than 87 percent of all suggestions in Japan are accepted, 
versus 33 percent in the USA. It can therefore be concluded that the average savings from 
suggestions, on per-employee basis, are nearly 10 times higher in Japan, i. e. US$3,612 
versus US$398 in the USA (Verespej, 1992). 
To emphasise the point made earlier, one report claims that General Motors of Detroit 
received an average of 0.84 suggestions per eligible employee per year and adopted 23 
percent. In contrast, Toyota received 17.9 suggestions per employee and adopted close to 
90 percent. This therefore resulted in tremendous amount of savings for Toyota (Focus 
Japan, 1981). 
The suggestion system is significant as far as Japanese managers are concerned. 
According to McMillan (1996), this is because they see the suggestion system as much 
more than a special bonus for good ideas. In Japan, the suggestion system is part of a 
general organisational climate to develop trust and communications across departments and 
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between workers and managers (McMillan, 1996). Norms are cultivated not only to offer 
creative ideas but also to accept improvements, and training programmes are conducted to 
improve the way suggestions are made (McMillan, 1996). 
There are two major associations responsible for developing as well as improving 
employee suggestion systems: (i) the Japanese Association of Suggestion Systems (JASS); 
and (ii) the Japan Human Relations Association (JHRA). These associations conduct 
conferences associated with improving suggestions, and conduct company visits as well as 
field trips. A survey of these two associations found that in 1980, out of more than 25 
million suggestions made, total benefits to the companies amounted to about ten billion 
dollars, while the monetary rewards for the workers were about four billion dollars 
(McMillan, 1996: 236-237). According to McMillan (1996), even though the monetary 
reward is very small, an individual who makes a suggestion is highly commended by his 
company. 
Despite a number of benefits/advantages derived from the suggestion system, it has also 
been criticised. For example, Linda Topolsky, Nippondenso's senior human-resources 
specialist, as cited in Verespej (1992), argues that in the suggestion system "there are too 
many disadvantages to using dollars as a reward. " According to Topolsky, "First, the 
amount of the reward is usually so small it is not a reinforcing mechanism. Second, the 
reward is usually used by employees to pay for things they must have, rather than things 
they would like to have. Third, once the money is spent, there is no visible reminder of the 
reward. " Because of these disadvantages, Nippondenso prefers to reward an employee 
(who makes suggestion) in points which can then be accumulated and redeemed for gifts. 
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The suggestion system has also been criticised for creating internal competition that can 
create artificial barriers between and among employees and management. For example, 
Polzin (1998) points out that excessive degrees of competition that result from installing 
individual incentive systems can, in fact, lead to a high degree of dysfunction. He further 
points out that "if the challenge appears to be to win as much as one can, then individuals 
and groups may act in ways that advance their interests at the expense of the interests of 
others. Within an organisation, that can be a very destructive mix - improvements 
achieved by employees in one area at the expense of employees in another with, perhaps, a 
net performance loss. " 
Another criticism of the system comes from Cynthia McCabe, president of the Employee 
Involvement Association (EIA) (as cited in Matthes, 1992). According to McCabe, very 
often an employee feels that he or she has been let down not only because he or she did not 
feel valued for his or her suggestions, but also because the response time to suggestions is 
too long and, worse still, there exists inconsistency in the reward programme. 
From the above review, it can be inferred that the suggestion system has indeed been very 
useful as far as the Japanese production management system in Japan is concerned. This is 
because it has been used to solicit ideas for improvement and innovation at the plants. 
However, it is important to note that the system is not confined to production line and 
quality purposes only. In fact, the majority of Japanese companies are encouraging their 
employees to use the suggestion system to propose the nature of the professional training 
that they wish to undertake. This again implies that the Japanese firmly believe that better 
education makes for an improved employee. 
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2.7 Conclusion 
The review of the literature has shown that the elements of the "classic" Japanese model of 
management, such as lifetime employment, seniority-based systems, enterprise unionism, 
hiring and training practices, consensus decision-making, just-in-time, quality control 
circles and the suggestion system, all of which have been commonly practised in large 
Japanese companies have proven very popular, especially in the late 1970s and 1980s. The 
literature has also shown that these techniques are among many other factors that have 
contributed to the rapid economic growth of Japan, particularly in the 1980s. The 
literature has further demonstrated that because of the popularity of the "classic" Japanese 
management techniques in the 1980s, learning from Japan was then the `in-thing' 
especially amongst Western nations. 
More recent literature, however, has drawn attention to the fact that lately certain "classic" 
Japanese management techniques have begun to crumble and have been severely criticised, 
owing to a number of major forces including the change in economy; demographic, 
structural, ageing work force, the increase in the number of Japanese companies' joint 
ventures with Western companies; and the changes in the Japanese workplace resulting 
from Japan's increased exposure to Western cultures and the preference of younger 
Japanese for Western style of management. The related literature has also shown that not 
only has recession caught up with Japan, prompting far-reaching changes in an economy 
that is entwined with an ancient society, but also a new generation of well-travelled, 
educated Japanese has discovered how the rest of the world lives, and recognises the 
importance that industrialised nations place on leisure time and the quality of work-life. It 
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is argued that such attitudes are starting to affect the Japanese workplace as well as its 
"classic" model of management. 
In addition, the related literature has drawn attention to the fact that because of the 
economic difficulties in Japan, companies are forced to abandon a number of their 
"classic" management techniques, such as the lifetime employment system and hiring 
practices. It is also argued that other "classic" management techniques, such as seniority- 
based systems and enterprise unionism are weaker than in the past. The literature has 
further refuted the perception that the Japanese businesses operate on a system of 
consensus building. In fact, some recent studies reveal that the most important decisions 
were made by selected groups of privileged managers and were taken to work groups only 
for their stamps of approval. It is also argued that in the past, very few workers would 
challenge such a decision because they did not want to appear disloyal or cause someone 
to lose face, while younger, more vocal workers of the new generations are more apt to 
question and challenge their managers. 
Thus, from the review of the literature it can be said that Japanese management techniques 
in the 1990s were geared more towards blending of human values, organisational learning, 
and continuous adaptation. Perhaps this was necessary because the Japanese management 
system is constantly under pressure from both internal as well as the external forces. By 
internal forces, it means that workers demand leisure time and a more balanced life, while 
external forces, means that Japanese investors investing in foreign soils have to modify 
their "classic" management techniques to suit the local business environment. Thus, it can 
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also be said that the new blend of the Japanese model of management is not been purely 
"classic" when compared to the 1980s. 
Despite the fact that the "classic" Japanese model of management is changing in Japan, if 
people outside Japan are asked what they know about the Japanese model of management, 
they often still refer to the "classic" model, and this reflects a common misconception. 
In the next chapter (Chapter 3) the literature on the internationalisation of business, culture 
and cross-cultural management, and the Japanese model of management in foreign 
countries is reviewed. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON INTERNATIONALISATION OF BUSINESS, 
CULTURE AND CROSS-CULTURAL MANAGEMENT, AND THE JAPANESE 
MODEL OF MANAGEMENT IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES 
3.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to present a review of the literature on the 
internationalisation of business, culture and cross-cultural management, and the Japanese 
model of management in foreign countries. In order to do that, this chapter is divided into 
two parts. 
The first part deals with the review of the literature on the internationalisation or 
globalisation of business, and culture and cross-cultural management. The second part, 
drawing upon the arguments surrounding both the theory of the internationalisation of 
business, and culture and cross-cultural management, discusses the transfer of the Japanese 
model of management to foreign countries. First, we start with the transfer of the Japanese 
model of management in the UK, then in the USA, and finally, in the four newly 
industrialising countries (NICs) of Singapore, Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan. The reason 
for selecting these six countries is because since the early 1990s, leading Japanese 
manufacturing firms have established their operations in these three major regions, namely, 
North America, Europe and Asia (see Abo, 1995). 
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Part I 
3.2 A Review of the Literature on the Internationalisation/Globalisation of Business 
The term "internationalisation or globalisation" refers to the processes that reduce barriers 
between countries, thereby encouraging not only closer integration of business/economic, 
political, and social activity, but also the spread of management ideas across national 
borders (Frenkel and Peetz, 1998). Kutschker and Baurle (1997), however, point out that 
the internationalisation of a firm can be interpreted as incremental "planned evolution" 
interrupted by episodes of rapid internationalisation of business. According to them, the 
concept of "planned evolution" implies that internationalisation is a result of both emergent 
processes and intended strategy. 
Kutschker and Baurle (1997) also state that on the one hand, internationalisation is the 
outcome of a number of small decisions which are taken every day in a company and 
which are often based on trial and error procedures. They further state that unforeseen 
internal and external disturbances and incidents, which require ad-hoc decisions and do not 
allow up-front strategic planning, trigger many internationalisation steps. They conclude 
that if major competitors undertake strategic moves or one of the host countries introduces 
new regulations, this can force the company to respond quickly without having a plan or a 
strategy. On the other hand, the concept of "planned evolution" implies that 
internationalisation cannot be sufficiently explained by emergent processes (Kutschker and 
Baurle, 1997). Thus, they argue that it is more realistic to say that top management can up 
to a certain point control internationalisation and this is the point when the strategic issue 
becomes relevant. _ 
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Although there are disagreements regarding the term internationalisation, both authors 
seem to agree that it is not only about expanding business across national boundaries but it 
is also about the spreading of management ideas or techniques from home to host 
countries. 
The internationalisation of business is not a new phenomenon. According to Hirst and 
Thompson (1996), the history of the globalisation of business is a long one and not 
something confined just to the period since 1960. They point out that although trading 
activities dated from the earliest civilisations, it was the Middle Ages of Europe that saw 
the initiation of systematic, cross-border trading operations carried out by institutions of a 
private corporate nature, though often with strong state backing and support. 
The early approach to examining internationalisation from a process perspective goes back 
to Johanson and Vahlne (1977), who developed a dynamic model of internationalisation 
based on empirical work done by Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975). Their 
"Uppsala-model of internationalisation" views internationalisation as an incremental 
learning process, leading to a stepwise increase in the commitment to foreign markets. 
According to Johanson and Vahlne (1977), due to knowledge and experience deficits at the 
beginning of the internationalisation process, a company first enters markets similar to the 
home market before proceeding to unfamiliar ones. 
Macharzina and Engelhard (1991) also propound a more recent approach to the process of 
internationalisation. Their "GAINS"-Paradigm is based on the "Gestalt" approach of 
organisation theory postulated by Miller and Friesen (1980). In contrast to Johanson and 
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Vahlne's approach, Macharzina and Engelhard suppose that changes in the internationality 
of corporation take the form of revolutionary "Gestalt" switches. These "quantum 
changes" which affect the whole corporation occur only if a misfit between organisational, 
strategic, managerial and environmental variables of the firm leads to inefficient behaviour 
(Macharzina and Engelhard, 1991). 
Both approaches, however, have been criticised for being too deterministic, i. e. for not 
sufficiently including managerial intention in their theorising. Some authors (for instance, 
Kutschker and Baurle, 1997) also argue that both approaches seem to capture only part of 
the complex reality of internationalising. 
It has also been contended that since the last decade, the business world has been 
increasingly globalised (Doney et al., 1998). Similarly, Schell and Solomon (1997) 
mention that "international business and trade are growing at breakneck speed. " Kish and 
Vasconcellos (1993) report that the internationalisation of business and management ideas 
has taken place at an unabated pace since the end of World War II. In terms of its general 
order of entry, Yip et al. (1997) argue that "national history has affected the general order 
of entry into international markets: Western European first, Americans second, Japanese 
third, and other Asian countries and some Latin American ones going international most 
recently. " 
It has also been argued that the internationalisation process is frequently represented as a 
gradual progression from exporting to ultimate foreign direct investment (FDI) (Johanson 
and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975). The same authors mention that firms appear to move in a 
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series of more or less well-defined stages from exporting to foreign direct investment, in 
the course of which they increase their involvement and commitment of resources in each 
particular foreign market. Similarly, Hallen and Wiedersheim-Paul (1979) postulate that in 
entering subsequent foreign markets, firms then move in an orderly stepwise fashion from 
those which are closest, not necessarily in terms of geography but of "psychic" or socio- 
cultural distance, to markets that are more "foreign" and difficult. 
Before we look at the different arguments pertaining to why businesses cross national 
boundaries, it is important to highlight the difference between the terms "multinational 
corporation" (MNC) and "transnational corporation" (TNC), in order to avoid confusion 
when the terms are used in the subsequent discussion. "Multinational corporation" is 
defined as a business operating in several countries and is controlled or constrained by the 
policies of a particular country in which it operates (English Dictionary, 1996). 
"Transnational corporation", on the other hand, is defined as a firm "without specific 
national identification and with an internationalised management, and at least potentially 
willing to locate and relocate anywhere in the globe to obtain either the most secure or the 
highest returns. . no longer controlled or even constrained by the policies of particular 
national states" (Hirst and Thompson, 1996: 11). 
There are a number of different arguments pertaining to why businesses internationalise. 
Barlett and Ghoshal (1995), for example, argue that there are two traditional motives for 
doing so. One is a resource-seeking motive, while the other is a market-seeking motive. 
According to Barlett and Ghoshal (1995), firms that resort to the former motive are driven 
by a desire either to access key supplies such as minerals, energy and scarce natural 
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resources, or even to lower labour and other production costs. They further point out that 
there are two types of industries that resort to resource-seeking motivation. One is 
commodity-based industry, where competitive advantage is based on access to control key 
resources such as steel or coal. The other is mass-manufacturing industry where 
competitive advantage is enhanced by driving down the costs of a large pool of unskilled 
labour. According to Barlett and Ghoshal (1995), firms that resort to market-seeking 
motives aim to exploit economies of scale and scope in production in order to generate a 
source of competitive advantage over domestic rivals. - An example of the type of firm or 
industry that takes advantage of such motives is the mass-manufacturing industry (Barlett 
and Ghoshal, 1995). 
Besides the two traditional motives, as postulated by Barlett and Ghoshal (1995), there are 
also other arguments pertaining to why businesses internationalise. Joynt and Warner 
(1996), for example, argue that there are two main reasons for doing so. One of these 
relates to the different stages of economic development in different parts of the world. The 
other results from unevenly distributed global resources as assumed by divergency theory. 
In fact, it could be maintained that because of the former reason we can see different eras 
or "waves" of multinational expansion. For example, during the First World War there 
were European multinational corporations (MNCs) such as British, German, Dutch, etc. 
and their expansion was partly a result of their developing empires. After the Second 
World War, we then see the American MNCs, followed by the 1970s and the growth of the 
South East Asian MNCs, and particularly the Japanese MNCs. Looking at this, it is clear 
that there was a wave of multinational interest from different parts of the world. 
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Similarly, Yip et al. (1997) argue that there are a number of reasons why businesses cross 
national boundaries. For example, they state that it could be due to the international 
division of labour or to certain legislation (for instance, anti-trust or anti-monopoly 
legislation) being imposed by the government concerned, or it could also be due to the fact 
that the local market becomes saturated or cost pressures and trade friction are increased. 
To illustrate this, they point out that one of the reasons why American firms in the late 
1940s and early 1950s crossed national boundaries was because of anti-trust or anti- 
monopoly legislation. 
In the case of Japanese firms, Yip et al. (1997) explain that they crossed national borders 
and move into American soil in particular, in large numbers from the mid 1970s because of 
the fear that their products would be subject to tariff and other trade restrictions in the 
American market. This view was suggested earlier by Kish and Vasconcellos (1993) who 
state that "the establishment of subsidiaries of major Japanese automobile manufacturers in 
the U. S. during the 1980s is a visible example of a strategy designed to fend off 
protectionist threats. " Yoshida (1987), however, has a different argument and believes that 
the reasons behind the Japanese manufacturing investment in the U. S. is its political 
stability, special tax incentives and other state and local government incentives. 
Despite the fact that there are disagreements among some authors with regard to why 
businesses cross national borders, it is generally agreed that one of the main reasons is to 
expand the business internationally in order to minimise costs and maximise profits or to 
secure the highest returns (Frenkel and Peetz, 1998; Hirst and Thompson, 1996). In doing 
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so, it has brought along a number of important aspects, such as the economic effects of the 
rapidly expanding international trade and financial flows (Frenkel and Peetz, 1998). 
According to the World Bank 1997 Report, international trade grew from 25 percent of the 
world gross domestic product (GDP) in 1970 to 45 _ percent 
in 1990, and there was a 
doubling of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows between 1980 and 1994 relative to both 
global gross fixed capital formation and world GDP. Similarly, according to UNCTAD 
(1995: xxii), "the number of parent firms headquartered in 15 major developed home 
countries nearly quadrupled between 1968-1969 and 1993, from 7000 to 27,000. " Many 
countries have moved to deregulate markets, privatise state enterprises, and strengthen 
measures such as bilateral investment treaties to prevent discrimination against foreign 
investment (UNCTAD, 1995: xxvii). 
In East Asia, for example, between 1980 and 1995, merchandise exports and imports of the 
seven main ASEAN nations increased by 17 percent a year compared with a corresponding 
figure of 8 percent for the world (WTO, 1996: 22). According to the same report, East 
Asia (excluding Japan) accounted for nearly a quarter of the total world FDI inflows in 
1994, compared with an annual average of around 9 percent over the 1984-1989 period. 
This again suggests that the globalisation of business and the flow of international trade 
have dramatically increased. 
Another important aspect within the context of the internationalisation of business that this 
study is concerned with is the transfer of management ideas or techniques from home to 
host countries. A study on globalisation and industrial relations in East Asia: a three 
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country comparison by Frenkel and Peetz (1998), shows that "globalisation permits the 
transfer of effective management techniques from subsidiaries in the advanced countries to 
Asia. " Similarly, Schell and Solomon (1997) state that when businesses cross national 
borders, management ideas or techniques are being transferred from home to the host 
countnes. 
Many other studies also acknowledge the fact that management ideas or techniques from 
home countries are being transferred to host countries when businesses cross national 
borders (Hendry, 1996; Xing, 1995). A review of empirical studies on the transferability of 
management ideas or techniques, and in particular those of the Japanese, reveals that such 
practices have been transferred from large Japanese firms in Japan into the operations of 
overseas Japanese subsidiaries (Dedoussis, 1995). 
Although it has been argued that globalisation permits the transfer of management ideas or 
techniques from home to host countries (Frenkel and Peetz, 1998; Schell and Solomon, 
1997; Hendry, 1996; Xing, 1995), only part of the home country's management ideas or 
techniques are transferred when businesses cross national borders. According to Frenkel 
and Peetz (1998), the main reason is because there are barriers to transfer which include 
limited contact between subsidiaries, product and labour market differences, and cultural 
variations between home and host countries. Similarly, in the case of the Japanese firms 
operating abroad, the dominant explanation for the fragmented transfer of management 
ideas or techniques from parent companies in Japan into overseas subsidiaries has been 
built on the notion of the socio-cultural uniqueness of Japanese management and its 
irreconcilability with the alien environment of the host countries (Fukuda, 1988; Kono, 
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1984/1985). A study by Xing (1995) reveals that because of these cultural variations, it is 
difficult to achieve the wholesale transfer of management ideas. Moreover, he states that 
because of the cultural variations, firms that cross national boundaries are under pressure to 
develop cross-cultural management abilities and skills. For example, U. S. and Chinese 
businessmen who meet to conduct transactions or joint ventures are keenly aware that 
cultural factors heavily influence their management styles and practices (Xing, 1995). 
It is clear from the above discussion that management ideas or techniques do spread as a 
result of the internationalisation of business. However, it is incorrect to suggest that the 
spread of such ideas has taken place entirely because of the fact that businesses cross 
national borders. In fact, a number of commentators (for instance, Gopinath, 1998; Fong, 
1992) argue that there are other means of spreading management ideas, either directly or 
indirectly, such as through political influence, education, industrial or vocational training 
abroad, etc. Gopinath (1998), for instance, claims that since the British came to India in 
the late 16th century, their presence has been felt everywhere. According to the same 
author, the British have not only influenced India's political system but also they paved the 
way for the establishment of Western management practices within the Indian 
environment. 
With regard to education, it has been argued that the influence of Western education on the 
spread of management ideas has been very profound in many developing countries (Fong, 
1992). How is this possible? According to Fong (1992), many people, particularly from 
the developing countries, are being educated abroad. He then goes on to explain that by 
being educated abroad, these people are being exposed to a number of influences, for 
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example, foreign culture, foreign life-style, foreign management ideas, etc. and these are 
experienced either by direct contact, such as friendship, or through indirect means, i. e. by 
reading books and journals. Hence, when these people come back from abroad, it is 
obvious that they can also indirectly influence the spread of management ideas when they 
hold managerial positions or even become involved in politics (see Yasin, 1990). 
However, it can also be argued that the spread of management ideas is not only being 
influenced or encouraged by people who have been educated abroad. In fact, even the 
school curriculum, for example, in Malaysia, which has long been based on the British 
system, can influence the spread of such ideas, particularly British management ideas in 
Malaysia (SOPL, 1991-2000). It is therefore logical to argue that the spread of 
management ideas might have actually taken place long before the internationalisation of 
business. 
Based on the above review, it is obvious that there are a number of reasons why businesses 
cross national boundaries, such as to expand their marketing base; to take advantage of 
cheap labour, abundant raw material, technology, managerial expertise, and investment 
incentives; to avoid trade friction; and to avoid certain legislation such as anti-trust or anti- 
monopoly legislation, etc. By operating in several countries, management ideas or 
techniques are spread or transferred from home to host countries. However, the important 
question here is would it be fairly easily to transfer wholesale management techniques 
given the fact that there exist cultural barriers between home and host countries? Later on 
we will be looking at the extent to which ideas or techniques can be effectively diffused or 
transferred. 
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3.3 A Review of the Literature on Culture and Cross-Cultural Management 
The role of culture in management theories has been studied by a number of researchers 
(Kelley and Worthley, 1981; Child and Kieser, 1977; Ajiferuke and Boddewyn, 1970; 
Hofsede, 1980; 1984; 1991; 1993; Lammers and Hickson, 1979a). In the study carried out 
by Kelley and Worthley (1981) on the various conflicting positions in the cross-cultural 
management literature concerning the relationship between culture and management 
techniques, they argue that most cross-cultural studies are actually cross-national studies 
which compare socio-cultural, political, and economic systems and not just culture. 
Despite the fact that a number of studies on cross-cultural management have been carried 
out, the role of culture in terms of management attitudes is still not generally agreed upon. 
The main problem arises not only from the many different definitions of culture, but also 
because of the vagueness of these definitions (Kelley and Worthley, 1981), as highlighted 
below. 
The term "culture" has been defined in a variety of ways by various researchers and 
scholars. Among the earliest definitions is Mead's (1951) who defines it as "a body of 
learned behaviour, a collection of beliefs, habits and traditions, shared by a group of people 
and successively learned by people who enter the society. " Another definition of culture is 
offered by Child and Kieser (1977), who describe it as patterns of thought and manners 
which are widely shared. Child and Kieser further state that the boundaries of the social 
collectivity within which this sharing takes place are problematic so that it may make as 
much sense to refer to a class or regional culture as to a national culture. 
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Ajiferuke and Boddewyn (1970), in their survey of comparative management studies, say 
this about culture: "Culture is one of those terms that defy a single all-purpose definition, 
and there are almost as many meanings of `culture' as people using the term. Therefore, we 
find among the studies using a cultural explanation for managerial differences, a varied and 
widely divergent array of conceptions. " 
Hofstede (1984) identifies it as the shared characteristics, such as religion, heritage, 
language and values, that distinguish one group of people from another. In his more recent 
study on cultural constraints in management theories, Hofstede (1993) defines culture as 
"the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes one group or category of 
people from another. " He also points out that it is a construct, meaning that it is "not 
directly accessible to observation but inferable from verbal statements and other behaviours 
and useful in predicting still other observable and measurable verbal and non-verbal 
behaviour. " 
Tung (1996) interprets culture as "an evolving set of shared beliefs, values, attitudes and 
logical processes which provide cognitive maps for people within a given societal group to 
perceive, think, reason, act, react and interact. " According to Tung, this definition implies 
that culture is not static; rather, it evolves over time. Abdullah (1996) also points out that 
the word "culture" has many meanings. She states that it is most commonly used to 
describe a way of life of members of a society. She also states that for a culture to exist, its 
members need to have shared meanings, shared understanding and shared sense-making. 
The same author concludes by saying that "culture is therefore a collection of behaviour 
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patterns relating to thoughts, manners and actions which members of a society have shared, 
learned and passed on to succeeding generations. " 
Thus, it can be seen that "culture" cannot be defined precisely nor is there a common 
definition accepted by all researchers, as highlighted by the 164 definitions of culture 
documented by Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1985). It might be argued that although an all- 
embracing definition of culture may not be possible, for the purpose of this study we may 
consider the definition in the popular study by Hofstede (1980,1991). 
Hofstede's study (1980,1991) has provided a framework that links the culture variable to 
the organisational context. From his analysis of data collected from subsidiaries of large 
multinational business organisations in forty nations, Hofstede concluded that national 
culture had a major impact on employees' work-related attitudes. He argues that, in fact, 
culture explained more of the differences than did sex, age, or position in the organisation. 
In differentiating employees in forty nations, Hofstede (1991) highlights four dimensions 
of culture, i. e. "power distance", "uncertainty avoidance", "individualism/collectivism", 
and "femininity/masculinity". According to the same author, "power distance" represents 
the way a society handles inequality - inequality that is inevitable in every society. 
Hofstede further stresses that it is the "extent to which the less powerful members of 
institutions and organisations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed 
unequally" (p. 28). "Uncertainty avoidance" is related to the amount of tolerance the 
members of a society have for ambiguity and uncertainty. "Individualism" exists in 
societies in which the ties between individuals are loose, whereas in "collectivist" societies, 
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people are born into and maintain with great loyalty strong and cohesive in-groups 
throughout their lives. The "masculinity/femininity" dimension relates to work goals. The 
same author points out that as a dimension of societal culture, masculine cultures are those 
in which gender roles are clearly distinct and feminine cultures are those in which gender 
roles overlap. He further argues that in organisational settings in masculine societies 
managers are expected to be decisive and assertive and there is an emphasis on equity, 
performance and competition among colleagues. In feminine societies, however, managers 
strive for consensus; equality, solidarity, and quality of work is emphasised, while conflicts 
are resolved by negotiation and compromise. 
Although Hofstede's study has been very popular and has aroused intense interest, 
nevertheless his samples, while controlling for organisational characteristics, do not lead to 
generalisations (Wasti, 1998). As such, his study has received its share of criticism (Hunt, 
1981; Watson, 1987; Hollinshead and Leat, 1995). For example, Hunt (1981) has 
questioned the generalisations that could be drawn from Hofstede's samples, which were 
collected from one multinational organisation. He also argues that the results from 
Hofstede's study could be contaminated through selection processes that sought individuals 
with predetermined personalities and values. Watson (1987) also contends that the results 
from Hofstede's study could also be distorted as a result of subsequent acculturation, 
formal development and training that might lead to a typical set of norms and values in 
every respect of the corporate culture. Similarly, Hollinshead and Leat (1995) criticise 
Hofstede's study by saying that his model is methodologically imperfect. According to 
them, Hofstede's sample was not only limited but "the four dimensions are too heavily 
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drawn from Western concepts as he suggests that the `uncertainty avoidance' dimension 
may not be relevant in Eastern cultures" (p. 14). 
Despite the criticism, "Hofstede's work continues to be the only study that, on an empirical 
basis, successfully ties cultural orientation and observable institutional differences between 
countries in a parsimonious framework" (McGrath et al., 1992, as cited in Wasti, 1998). 
Triandis (1982) also states that Hofstede's study will no doubt stand as one of the major 
landmarks of cross-cultural research for many years to come. In fact, a number of studies 
have drawn on Hofstede's findings, for example, a study on team training (Kirkbride et al., 
1990), learning styles of managers (Hayes and Allinson, 1988), and cultural barriers 
(Wasti, 1998). 
Similar to the culture of a society, an organisation also has its own culture. An 
organisational culture consists of its structured systems of policies and procedures and the 
hidden aspects of its underlying assumptions and values. Deal and Kennedy (1982) in their 
book on Corporate Culture, state that it is the "way we do things around here", and it is the 
key to growth, success and excellence achieved by the organisation or a corporation in the 
competitive business environment. Similarly, Abdullah (1996) states that an organisational 
culture is the face a company presents to the world, and over a period of time it will evolve 
a distinct identity and character. 
The study of organisations and their culture have been well-documented in numerous 
management literatures (Wasti, 1998; Kelley and Worthley, 1981; Child and Kieser, 1977; 
Hofsede, 1980; 1991). Most of the research carried out on corporate cultures tends to 
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describe what they are, how to build them and what leaders must do to help create and 
sustain them. For example, to the Japanese, the culture of an organisation is based on a 
collective orientation of its employees (Abdullah, 1996). According to Abdullah (1996), 
rather than just a workplace comprising separate individuals, the collaborative spirit of the 
village pervades Japanese work experience. There is considerable emphasis on 
interdependence, shared concerns and mutual help. Employees frequently make life-long 
commitments to their organisation, which they see as an extension of their family. 
Authority relations are often paternalistic and highly traditional and deferential. Strong 
links exist between the welfare of the individual, the corporation and the nation. In fact, in 
Japanese organisations it is fairly obvious that they have been able to combine the cultural 
values of a farming cultivation of their rice fields with the spirit of service of the samurai at 
the workplace (Abdullah, 1996). 
Indeed, in many other foreign-based organisations, their business-oriented values are 
derived consciously and unconsciously from the culture of their founding fathers, 
shareholders and key players. For example, American cultural values have profoundly 
affected Mobil, IBM, Dupont and Exxon, while Japanese cultural values pervade Mitsui, 
Hitachi, Sony and Nissan (Abdullah, 1996). According to Abdullah, these organisations 
bring along their culture in the form of systems, procedures, techniques and ways of 
developing human resources to countries wherever they do business. However, these same 
systems, procedures or techniques do not necessarily work effectively in another country, 
primarily because of different socio-cultural systems (Wasti, 1996; Smith et al., 1995). 
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Thus, it is obvious that management ideas or techniques practised in a particular country 
(be they in Japan, the USA, the UK, Germany, France, etc. ) have been shaped not only by 
managerial ideology, business strategy, organisational structure, political and economic 
variables but also by the culture of that country (see Poole and Jenkins, 1997). Because of 
the extent of the cultural variations, a number of researchers conclude that it is indeed very 
difficult to transfer management ideas or techniques, especially in their pure form, from 
one culture to another (Hofstede, 1991,1993; Hu and Warner, 1996; Wasti, 1998; Frenkel 
and Peetz, 1998; Tung, 1996). For example, Hu and Warner (1996) state that because of 
culture differences, "what works" in one specific culture may not work in another. 
Similarly, Hofstede (1993) states that the way people see, perceive and understand 
management and organisations is conditioned by culture. As a result of that, Hofstede 
says; "if already the word `management' may mean so many different things, how can we 
expect one country's theories of management to apply abroad? " Clark and Mallory (1996) 
also argue that it is difficult to apply management techniques from one culture to another 
because of cultural constraints. Also, Hodgetts and Luthans (1990) point out that the 
greater the cultural diversity between one country and another, the more likely it is that 
management techniques cannot be literally transferred. 
A number of authors also mention that partly owing to cultural diversity, there is a 
significant difference between human resource management (HRM) techniques between 
one country and another. For example, in the USA the HRM techniques have primarily 
emphasised the implementation of employment legislation around issues of discrimination 
and equal opportunities; the development of flexible employment contracts; and the efforts 
to increase employee participation (Strauss, 1992). Concerns in the UK, on the other hand, 
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have focused around the reduction in the power of the trade unions and the linkages of 
HRM with corporate strategy (Storey, 1992). It has been argued that "because of the 
decline in trade union power, the role of personnel managers is in terminal decline and is 
being replaced by the line management function" (Poole and Jenkins, 1997: 843). Unlike 
in the USA and the UK, HRM techniques in France have more of an emphasis on language 
tuition and on meeting minimum levels of expenditure on training which have been 
established by national legislation (Smith et al. 1995). In Japan, there is even more of a 
difference where the dominant features are generally held to be high levels of 
employer/employee commitment and a strong emphasis on training and development in the 
workplace (Smith et al., 1995). 
Having said that, it is quite obvious that management ideas or techniques that are practised 
in one country have to be modified when transferred to another because the way HRM 
techniques have been practised in the former will not suit the political, economic and 
cultural practices of the latter. Clack and Mallory (1996), for example, point out that 
management techniques or theories such as MBO and HRM developed in the USA may 
have to be considerably modified to become acceptable in countries of different political, 
economic and cultural practices. Similarly, Ichimura (1981) argues that the Japanese have 
to modify their techniques when transferring to countries in South East Asia in order to 
become consistent with the local environment and the local practices. Francesco (1981) 
also indicates that the success in using Western management techniques in Hong Kong 
depends very much on the skill of local managers in -adapting the techniques to fit local 
conditions, which are obviously very different from Western conditions. DiBella (1993), 
in his study across three different countries, namely, the Philippines, India and Uganda, 
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argues that when cultural differences exist, management techniques need to be adapted to 
achieve the outcome that is desired. 
All the above studies seem to support Hofstede's (1991) general assertion that what applies 
in one specific culture may not apply in another culture and therefore the original ideas or 
techniques need to be modified in order to suit the latter. Hence, from the above discussion 
it can be suggested that one's own culture cannot be easily replaced or changed by any 
external force. This is because culture is a set of values, perceptions, beliefs, habits, basic 
assumptions or the way of life of a group of people. 
Thus, in the context of Japanese management techniques, for example, it might be argued 
that in so far as they are themselves an expression of Japanese culture, their maximum 
effectiveness by the same token may be limited to the Japanese setting. Perhaps because of 
that, Hamzah et al. (1989) argue that what works for the Japanese in Japan may not work 
for others. 
Based on the foregoing review, what we have actually seen here is a debate between two 
different views. In this respect, there is a marked disparity between one view which says 
that globalisation means that management ideas spread, and the other which says that 
management ideas actually do not spread very far because of cultural variations. What 
arises from this debate is an interchange between these two views and not surprisingly, 
neither extreme is sufficient on its own. What the issue actually concerns is the extent to 
which ideas spread and the extent to which culture acts as a barrier to this spread. 
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Part II 
This part discusses the transferability of the Japanese model of management or Japanese 
management techniques to other countries. Transfer is used as a general term to 
encompass the efforts made by both the Japanese firms and indigenous firms in each 
country in this process. The related issues that are discussed include: (i) the strategy used 
in the process of transplanting Japanese management and production techniques in host 
countries; (ii) the experience of local plants in implementing Japanese management 
techniques; and (iii) the barriers that inhibit the transferring of Japanese management 
techniques to firms in host countries. 
Some authors found that Japanese management techniques have been widely emulated in 
North America, Europe, and Asia (McMillan, 1996; Abo, 1994; Oliver and Wilkinson, 
1992). According to McMillan (1996: 354), Japanese multinationals were among the first 
to transfer their management techniques abroad. Firms such as Sony, Hitachi, Panasonic, 
Sharp and Mitsubishi, in places as diverse as California, Ontario, Wales, and Tennessee 
have become testing grounds for Japanese management techniques using non-Japanese 
workers. Later, leading Japanese auto firms such as Toyota, Honda, and Nissan also 
established their worldwide network of local production activities and introduced Japanese 
management techniques (McMillan, 1996: 354). 
In the last two decades, the transfer of Japanese management techniques to other countries 
has been made via three modes (Ackroyd et al., 1988). According to Ackroyd et al., the 
first mode is called direct Japanisation, by which, Japanese firms operating abroad try to 
introduce some techniques or practices of their parent companies. In the second mode, 
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which Ackroyd et al. call mediated Japanisation, locally owned firms endeavour to run 
their operations alongside Japanese management techniques. The third mode is called 
permeated or full Japanisation. According to the same authors, it is the mode in which the 
economy itself would actually reproduce Japanese forms of economic structure as well as 
production procedures and employment relations. However, it is argued that only the 
second mode has gained popularity in recent years because of the fact that Japanese 
management success both at home and abroad has been widely documented (Ackroyd et 
al., 1988). For the purpose of this study, only the first and second modes will be discussed, 
beginning with the transfer of Japanese model of management to the United Kingdom. 
3.4 The Japanese Model of Management in the United Kingdom 
3.4.1 Japanese Subsidiaries 
The interest of Japanese business in European markets was particularly limited in the 
1970s, because (i) Japanese corporations had always thought of European markets as 
difficult to penetrate; and (ii) Japanese corporations were focusing their attention on the 
growing trade friction with the United States (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992). During the 
early 1980s, the rising export competitiveness of Japanese manufacturers increased the 
Japanese balance of trade surplus with the EC countries and this surplus created trade 
friction between the Japanese and EC countries, particularly in electronics-related sectors. 
The Japanese were further pressured when they were subjected to EC protective measures, 
such as anti-dumping duties and quantitative restraints. But with the introduction of the 
Single Market programme in the middle of the 1980s, the Japanese perception of the EC 
market has changed (see McMillan, 1996). 
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It has been argued, however, that it is not only the introduction of the Single Market 
programme that is responsible for the sudden surge in Japanese direct investment in Europe, 
but there are some other factors too. According to Oliver and Wilkinson (1992), these 
include (i) the desire to take advantage of the overseas markets; (ii) the wish to prevent 
further economic friction between Japan and its export-destination countries; (iii) an attempt 
to avoid a generally tight labour market with high wages; and (iv) an attempt to avoid high 
production costs at home due to the high-yen. The same authors further argue that it is the 
combination of all these factors that is responsible for the dramatic increase in the level of 
Japanese manufacturing investment in Europe. 
In terms of the number of Japanese investments in Europe, McMillan (1996) points out that 
in 1983, there were 157 Japanese companies with manufacturing facilities in Europe. Since 
then they have been increasing rapidly and have reached 676 by 1991. In terms of sectors, 
the electronics and electrical appliances sectors account for a fourth of Japanese 
manufacturing activity in Europe, with chemicals and vehicle production sectors also 
contributing a substantial amount of Japanese investment activity. 
According to McMillan (1996), Britain is the principal beneficiary of Japanese 
manufacturing investment in Europe, receiving more than 40 percent of the total volume. 
Other beneficiaries include France, Germany and Netherlands (Table 3.1). 
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Table 3.1 
Overseas Japanese Companies and Employees in Europe 
Country 
All Industry 
Companies Employees Expatriate 
Manufacturing 
Companies Employees Expatriate 
U. K. 871 82,519 3,349 180 40,355 765 
Netherlands 370 16,235 883 39 10,000 99 
France 333 28,254 757 89 13,929 231 
Germany 598 53,837 2,438 105 28,179 381 
Other 987 85,035 2,056 209 48,956 680 
Source: McMillan, 1996, p. 358. 
There are a number of reasons why the Japanese favour the UK. According to McMillan 
(1996), first, it is because of Britain's status as a leading European economy with a 
substantial internal market. Second, it is because of Britain's long-established tradition in 
engineering, while the third reason is due to its skilled and relatively low-cost labour. A 
fourth reason is attributed to the co-operative stance of both the national and local 
governments, while the final reason is because English is regarded as the International 
business language. 
As far as the investment site in the UK is concerned, the principal considerations in 
choosing a site for Japanese companies are the quality of the labour pool, distribution 
logistics and good infrastructure (McMillan, 1996). Perhaps because of these 
considerations, it can be seen that Japanese manufacturing companies have established their 
operations in Southeast, Wales, Scotland, South-East England and North-East England (Hill 
and Munday, 1992). 
What are the impacts of Japanese investment in the UK? The impacts of Japanese 
investment in the UK lie in the job-creation, technology, knowledge and/or skills transfer, 
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and reduced UK trade imbalances with Japan. In terms of job-creation, it is said that the 
Japanese carmakers have created more than 11,000 manufacturing jobs in the UK (Palmer, 
1996). The "spillover" effect on local companies from the higher standards of incoming 
Japanese companies could also be more substantial, because any transfer of knowledge or 
skills from Japanese management techniques, which are often more sophisticated than in the 
West, is bound to benefit the host country. This could happen either when British managers 
go to work for Japanese corporations and then move on to local companies, taking their new 
skills with them, or when Japanese manufacturers raise the standards of UK suppliers or 
manufacturers by working closely with them. Indeed, there is evidence that the process is 
working. Lynn (1992), for instance, points out that the influence of Japanese manufacturing 
methods on the British car industry is quite profound and in fact, in the 1980s, there was a 
massive change to automation in the UK when its car industry copied Japanese automation 
methods and ideas. 
Besides technology transfer and lifting-up standards, some authors point out that the 
Japanese companies operating in the UK have also introduced their brand of management 
techniques while dealing with local workers. For example, an earlier study by Thurley 
(1982) indicates that Japanese firms in the UK have employed certain policies and 
techniques in the process of implementing their brand of management practices. According 
to Thurley, the most common technique used is called task-pairing, by which Japanese 
managers will work closely with their Western counterparts in a given task. It is believed 
that by doing so, some elements of the Japanese management techniques can be transferred 
(Thurley, 1982). 
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Another technique used, which is more forceful and usually used in the manufacturing 
practices, is through a flexible deployment of labour. In the Japanese manufacturing 
environment, deployment of labour is a pre-requisite in order to operate efficiently and 
effectively. Therefore to ensure that employees move from one department to another, 
Japanese managers usually utilise the power of a single union. According to Wilkinson et 
al. (1993), Japanese managers use the power of a single union to establish management's 
right to deploy labour as they see fit. _ 
It is also said that the parent company in Japan usually dispatches their experienced 
managers to function as team leaders when they introduce their own brand of management 
(Rodgers and Wong, 1996). The same authors point out that for the start, the team leaders 
normally introduce selective practices, such as loyalty (wearing of company's uniforms); 
bottom-up decision-making (ringgi); and groupism (suggestion box and QCC). Perhaps the 
Japanese have realised that they have to test the "playing field" before technical practices 
can be introduced. To speed up the transfer process, key line-managers and supervisors, the 
majority of whom are British, are sent to Japan for induction and training in the parent 
companies (Rodgers and Wong, 1996). 
A number of other studies found that despite numerous obstacles, some elements of the 
Japanese management techniques that are used by a parent company in Japan have been 
successfully transferred to their UK subsidiaries. Among such techniques are QCCs, the 
suggestion system, zero defect movement, consensus decision-making, flexible working, 
open-office, on-the-job training, job rotation, no-lay off policies, and just-in-time (Munday, 
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1990; Oliver and Wilkinson, 1989,1992; Jones, 1991; Grint, 1993; Evans, 1993; Heller, 
1994; Palmer, 1996; McMillan, 1996). 
According to McMillan (1996: 352), Sony and scores of Japanese firms in Wales have also 
been applying the Japanese management techniques such as total quality management, 
identical management-worker uniforms, consensus decision-making and permanent 
employment, although this region has been the traditional centre of domestic labour- 
management conflict in UK industrial relations. 
In addition, it is said that Japanese manufacturing firms in the UK have introduced their own 
brand of personnel policies in dealing with local staff (Evans, 1993). In her 1993 study of 
two Japanese firms in the UK, Evans's findings suggest that some Japanese personnel 
practices or techniques, particularly with regard to selection procedures, training and 
company culture have been utilised extensively. However, according to Evans, Japanese 
firms follow a dual employment structure for expatriates and local staff. Similarly, it is 
argued that other personnel practices or techniques such as single status, in-company 
communications, job security, company representative bodies and the use of temporary 
workers have also been introduced (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992). However, Oliver and 
Wilkinson are of the opinion that the Japanese managers have often had to modify these 
techniques to suit the local requirements. These modified techniques are known as the 
Anglo-Japanese hybrid management model: the blend of two distinctively different cultures 
(Abo, 1995). 
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What are some of the factors that might contribute to the success of Japanese management 
techniques abroad? A study by White and Trevor (1983) reveals that the extent of the 
implementation success depends greatly on expatriate personnel. Their finding is consistent 
with the evidence presented in Womack et al. (1990:. 273). According to Womack et al. 
(1990), the Japanese affiliates in the auto industry that are successful in replicating the 
Japanese lean production system are the ones with a strong Japanese management presence 
in the early years, whereas in those plants where the key management positions are turned 
over to nationals too quickly, the performance is not much better than the host country 
average. 
Similarly, Milkman (1991: 92) found a positive relationship between the presence of 
expatriates actively engaged in running the organisation on a daily basis and the successful 
implementation of Japanese production techniques. Perhaps the strongest expression of 
this idea comes from Kono (1984: 156), whose research led him to assert that it is 
absolutely essential to have Japanese managers stationed at the subsidiary for the smooth 
transfer of Japanese management techniques. 
Despite a certain degree of success achieved by Japanese firms in the UK, the 
implementation process has not been without its problems. Studies such as Abo (1995); 
Broad (1994); and Palmer (1996) reveal that Japanese managers have encountered some 
difficulties while in the process of implementing their management model to local staff. 
The level of resistance was much higher from white-collar and managerial staff when 
compared to the blue-collar workforce, according t0 White and Trevor (1983). They 
further argued that this was partly because British white-collar staff were more interested in 
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personal competition, job mobility for career development and their own individual career 
path, rather than in the organisation as a whole. Broad (1994) shares this view, 
maintaining that lack of teamwork among British workers remains a persistent problem for 
their Japanese colleagues. 
Among some companies that have experienced problems are Denkico, Sony and a few 
others. Denkico, for example, soon after they introduced QCC, ran into problems because 
of some resistance from both workers and supervisors (Broad, 1994). According to Broad, 
workers have complained that the quality circle idea was simply an attempt to keep some 
form of work effort going during the quality periods of "down-time". In the case of Sony, 
they have been plagued by supplier problems since the implementation of JIT (Moms and 
Imrie, 1993). Other Japanese companies like "SpeedCo", "CopyCo", and "CommuniCo" 
also experienced similar problems when they introduced Japanese personnel policies 
(Palmer, 1996). According to Palmer, the problems that the Japanese managers 
encountered with the local workers were diverse: from a lack of work discipline, poor 
attendance, a high level of absenteeism, and a high labour turnover to a low level of 
commitment. 
Even though, some studies have shown that the Japanese have been quite successful in 
transplanting other techniques or practices, there is little evidence that shows the "three 
divine treasures" have been successfully implemented by Japanese companies in the UK. 
One of the reasons might be because the "three divine treasures", i. e. lifetime employment, 
seniority systems and the ringgi system are culture-bound and not compatible with Western 
culture. According to Jones (1991), even the system of consensus management in Japan, 
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which achieves employee support and loyalty, appears to be alien to a typical British 
management style. Hence, one can conclude that the Japanese model of management, 
which is believed to be tied up to the Japanese culture, is not always easily transferable and 
does not work as well in another cultures as typically thought by Japanese as well as 
Western managers. 
3.4.2 British Firms 
Another effort in transplanting the Japanese model of management to the UK has been 
made by British firms. In the 1970s, following a further deterioration of the UK economy 
the interest in learning from Japan was fast becoming the hallmark of the decade, as 
reflected in the European literature on Japanese management (Gordon, 1988). Large 
numbers of young British managers were gazing across the Pacific Ocean to Japan in the 
belief that they could somehow ferret out Japan's secret of success (Gordon, 1988). The 
Japanese model of management is therefore seen as a way to revive the UK economy and 
restore its competitive edge once again (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992: 98). As a result, 
companies like Lucas Industries, Ford UK and Southern Components have made an 
attempt to implement what they perceive as the best of Japanese techniques or practices. 
It is said that British investors have recently collaborated with Japanese investors with the 
aims of not only to learn about Japanese management techniques but also for other reasons 
such as to minimise culture and language complications, trade barriers, etc. (McMillan, 
1996). In fact, according to McMillan (1996), factors such as the Japanese culture and 
language complications, the distribution system as well as formidable entry barriers have 
indeed restricted British investment in Japan. Therefore, to avoid all these complications, 
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some British companies such as Merck and Company have joined-venture with Banyu 
Pharmaceuticals (McMillan, 1996: 356). British manufacturers are of the opinion that 
collaboration with the Japanese is a suitable strategy as they are highly committed to high 
technology. Furthermore, the need for change, as mentioned by Ackroyd et al. (1988), as 
well as the need to link-up with the Japanese technology (McMillan, 1996), has encouraged 
British managers to integrate the best of Japanese techniques into their existing system. 
In the process of "learning from Japan", British manufacturers have adopted the best of the 
Japanese manufacturing techniques such as JIT, kanban, TQC, flexible work and the 
suggestion system (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992) (see Table 3.2 & 3.3). The domination of 
Japanese organisations and products in the world due to their superior quality is well- 
documented and has led to the quest for a way that provides a "Holy Grail" of quality. 
British manufacturers were not to be left behind and soon, QCC became the common 
buzzword. 
Since the late 1980s QCC has been growing steadily in the UK and has being used in 
organisations including banks and the Civil Service (Ho, 1993). By the early 1990s, there 
were around 120 organisations registered with the National Society of Quality Circles 
(NSQC) (Ho, 1993). 
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Table 3.2 
Japanese Production Methods and Practices in UK Companies 
Practice 
Never used 
(%) 
In use 
(%) 
Planned or being 
Implemented 
(%) 
Operator responsibility for quality 5 77 18 
Continuos improvement 8 72 20 
JIT production 18 68 14 
Quality circles 18 68 14 
Set-up time reductions 24 65 11 
SPC 15 59 26 
Total quality control 8 56 36 
Cellular manufacture 43 50 7 
Design for manufacture 39 51 10 
Kanban materials control 48 42 10 
Source: Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992, p. 138. 
Table 3.3 
Personnel Practices in UK Companies 
Practice 
Never used 
(%) 
In use 
(%) 
Planned or being 
Implemented 
(%) 
Team briefings 5 89 6 
Use of temporary workers 38 59 3 
Single-status facilities 36 49 15 
Performance-related pay 28 64 8 
Company council 41 58 1 
Profit sharing 39 53 8 
Performance appraisal 25 48 27 
Source: Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992, p. 181. 
It has also been well-documented that there are some advantages derived from the adoption 
of the best Japanese techniques. A study by Oliver and Wilkinson (1992), for example, 
reveals that Rolls Royce saved hundreds of thousand of pounds from its circle programme, 
as did Jaguar when the company decided to implement QCC and JIT. Moreover, Lucas, 
another British company, was able to develop "a family-type" relationship with suppliers 
after implementing JIT (Morris and Imrie, 1993). British companies supplying parts and 
components to NMUK also benefited from the cross-cultural technology transfer. Their 
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company engineers have worked closely with the Japanese engineers to meet the quality 
standards, as demanded by NMUK (Thompson and Rehder, 1995). 
Despite the advantages, as mentioned earlier, some British companies who have adopted 
some elements of the Japanese management techniques have also experienced some 
problems. For example, Morris and Imrie (1993) claim that some British manufacturers as 
well as suppliers have encountered some difficulties while implementing the so-called 
"best" Japanese management techniques. According to them, the inability of British firms 
to meet the demands of the new system, as required by JIT (for instance, frequent and 
consistent but small batch delivery) has caused the main problem. They also claim that 
problems also lie in the fact that the supply infrastructures, in some cases, were relatively 
weak along a number of dimensions: technically, developmentally, and managerially. 
More profound setbacks, according to them, were that the suppliers had too wide a 
customer base, unlike their Japanese counterpart, and this has caused failure in JIT 
implementation. This clearly suggests that there are great difficulties of piecemeal 
implementation as far as JIT is concerned. 
Besides the difficulty of its piecemeal implementation in the British economic system, 
another cause of the failure of the JIT system in British industry can be attributed to the 
attitudes of suppliers. According to Oliver and Wilkinson (1992: 100), when Rover 
introduced JIT, many suppliers were not satisfied because they considered this practice as 
an excuse to pass stockholding costs on to them. Oliver and Wilkinson further mentioned 
that Rover's workers saw it as a "slow and laboured" process. 
121 
The fact that most British workers are still too used to the British way of doing things has 
also hindered the success of transplanting the best Japanese techniques to British firms. 
For example, Palmer (1996) mentions that when quality control is introduced, quality 
problems still exist due to the lack of the required level of discipline and commitment from 
British operators, who are said to be more interested iri pursuing their own objectives than 
those of the company. Oliver and Wilkinson (1992) earlier share this view, and state that 
the workers' union in Ford UK rejected outright the practice of "signing off the the work after 
self-inspection when the company introduced the quality inspection method based on 
Japanese styles. "CommuniCo" (UK) Ltd faced the same problem when its 
comprehensive checking system (operators sign off their own work as quality checked) 
had to be abandoned when the system did not work and the operators made a joke out of it 
(Palmer, 1996). 
The other obstacle that has hindered the implementation process is related to the fact that 
many Japanese management techniques depend on an appropriate set of supporting 
conditions in order to be successful in foreign settings (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992: 173). 
This again suggests that it is difficult to implement Japanese techniques piecemeal. 
According to their study, Oliver and Wilkinson (1992) claim that "existing culture" is the 
single most frequently cited obstacle to change (Table 3.4). 
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Table 3.4 
Obstacles to Change in UK Companies 
Number of citations as: 
First Second Third Percentage 
obstacle obstacle obstacle of total 
Existing culture 
Unions/demarcation 
Lack of support at senior levels 
None 
Attitudes of middle management 
Attitudes of labour 
Lack of resources/investment 
Technical constraints 
17 - - 27 
6 3 - 14 
7 2 - 14 
8 - - 13 
4 2 1 11 
- _3 28 3 2 -8 
2 1 -5 
(47) (13) (3) (100) 
Source: Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992, p. 174. 
Other main barriers to the implementation of the best Japanese techniques include the 
attitudes of Western managers. Jones (1992) points out that it has been hard enough for 
Western managers to identify, let alone adopt, the operational techniques or practices such 
as JIT, which have served Japanese companies so well. Since mastering the skills was one 
of the factors that help to ensure the implementation success, according to Jones, it is 
always hard for Westerners to recognise the most salient lessons from their Japanese 
counterparts. The main reason is partly because of the fact that these salient lessons or the 
most important skills from the Japanese are hidden in behaviours that are difficult to 
reconcile with Western beliefs (Jones, 1992). One may agree that fundamentally, many of 
the most valuable things to learn lie in the fact that Japanese management is not simply a 
different way of doing the same thing, rather, it is a way of doing something differently and 
so differently that, in fact, to Western eyes, it is heresy. 
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Thus, despite the vigorous efforts by Japanese as well as British managers to implement 
the Japanese model of management in the UK, the degree of success has been very limited. 
It has been well-documented that the extent of change in British industry, in fact, appears 
to be not as extensive as previously perceived, as far as the Japanese model of management 
is concerned (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992). Perhaps it is because of major obstacles, such 
as culture, and since the two culture are very different most British firms do not implement 
the Japanese management techniques such as seniority-based wage and promotion systems 
and consensus decision-making (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992). In fact, it has been argued 
that most British firms still favour individual merit rather than a seniority-based system 
when wages and promotion are concerned (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992). 
Although open discussion and teamworking have been implemented in some British firms, 
it has been argued that these techniques have also failed, not only because they do not suit 
the British culture of individualism but also because British managers are reluctant to 
delegate as a result of a tendency to protect one's territory (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992: 
100). This again suggests that some of the Japanese management techniques do not work 
well outside a Japanese cultural setting. Nevertheless, as a result of application and 
adaptation, a hybrid model has emerged in the UK with many of the characteristics of the 
Japanese model. 
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3.5 The Japanese Model of Management in the United States 
3.5.1 Japanese Subsidiaries 
The increasing number of Japanese companies in the U. S. since the mid 70's can be 
attributed to the fear that their products in the American market would be subject to tariff 
and other restrictions. In order to mitigate the prevailing tense trade relations with the 
Americans, the Japanese began direct investment by setting up manufacturing plants as 
well as forming joint ventures with established American companies. Some of the most 
notable examples of joint ventures are NUMMI, the joint GM/Toyota venture in California, 
Diamond-Star, the joint Chrysler/Mitsubishi venture in Illinois and Ford-Nissan joint 
venture. Apart from joint ventures with American companies, Japanese auto giants have 
also set up their assembly plants in the U. S. These include Honda in Ohio, Toyota in 
Kentucky, Nissan in Tennessee, and Suburu-Isuzu in Indiana. Since the initial success of 
these joint ventures, Japanese direct investment in the U. S. increased dramatically from 
$10 billion to $84 billion between 1982 to 1992 (Rao and Hashimoto, 1996). 
Why were the Japanese investors keen to invest in the U. S.? It was claimed that this was 
because any forms of technological and production agreement with overseas partners 
would provide the Japanese with a strong blocking strategy to retain a market share 
(McMillan, 1996). According to McMillan (1996: 346), the formidable forces in the 
1990s, such as the high value of the yen and the need to contract out, have also forced 
Japanese investors to invest overseas. In Table 3.5, which shows the Japanese investment 
in North America, it is interesting to note that the number of Japanese expatriates increases 
with their investment. These expatriates have influenced the management structure of the 
Japanese companies in the U. S. where Japanese expatriates have filled most of the top 
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management positions as well as assumed ultimate responsibilities for all vital functions 
(McMillan, 1996). In fact, according to Rao and Hashimoto (1996), about seventy percent 
of senior and middle managers employed in Japanese firms in the U. S. are Japanese, and 
they say that these groups of Japanese managers have been responsible for introducing 
Japanese management techniques to the local staff. 
Table 3.5 
Overseas Japanese Companies and Employees in North America 
Country 
All Industry 
Companies Employees Expatriate 
Manufacturing 
Companies Employees Expatriate 
Canada 332 39,490 866 93 23,367 275 
USA 3,558 541,245 17,276 1,141 319,164 6,273 
Mexico 113 39,178 337 68 36,318 247 
Source: McMillan, 1996, p. 358. 
Since the publication of Theory Z and The Art of Japanese Management, the literature on 
the Japanese model of management or Japanese management techniques and the feasibility 
of adopting such techniques/practices in the U. S. has been very extensive. The quality of 
these accounts, however, is wide-ranging. Too many are perhaps ill-informed and 
opportunistic efforts to capitalise on the explosive demand for information on Japan and 
Japanese business. Nevertheless, despite these varied and divided views, one view seems 
to unite them all, i. e. some Japanese management techniques are suitable and therefore can 
be implemented (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992; Thompson and Rehder, 1995; McMillan, 
1996), while other techniques are not compatible with the American system and culture 
and therefore cannot be adopted (Cole, 1983; Sethi et al., 1984; Dore, 1973). 
In implementing their brand of management techniques/practices in the U. S., the Japanese 
managers have employed certain strategies. A common strategy used is to "sandwich" 
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local managers with a Japanese assistant (normally of managerial rank). It is believed that 
in this way, management skills can be transferred as the Japanese managers worked closely 
with local managers. Another strategy used is to send local managers to Japan for 
induction and training with the parent companies. According to McMillan (1996: 352), 
this is the most effective way to promote Japanese management techniques among the local 
managers who may need to be familiarised with the style of working of their Japanese 
counterparts. Some argue that Japanese managers influence the local staff both through a 
larger organisational control system (Ouchi, 1981), and through interpersonal interactions 
with their subordinates (Rao and Hashimoto, 1996). According to Rao and Hashimoto 
(1996), the strategies employed in interpersonal influence consist of multiple tactics, such 
as setting deadlines, or offering an exchange of favours. 
Another common strategy used by the Japanese concerns the locality of their plants. It is 
well-documented that the Japanese are particularly keen on greenfield settings, such as the 
Nissan plant in Tennessee and Honda's facility in Ohio (Mahoney and Deckop, 1993). In 
fact, there is a reason for this and it is argued that greenfield settings provide access to a 
workforce lacking both labour union affiliation and familiarity with industry traditions. As 
a result, Japanese management techniques are being applied successfully in these so-called 
"fertile grounds" (Mahoney and Deckop, 1993). 
The Japanese management techniques that are transferable to the U. S. are easy to identify, 
the most popular being the total quality control (TQC) and quality control circles (QCCs). 
In fact, the importance of quality control has been illustrated in the book The Machine that 
Changed the World (Womack et al., 1990), which describes how Japan's auto industry has 
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established plants in North America and Europe that exceed productivity (hours to produce 
a car, and quality levels) exceeding U. S. and European standards. 
Other Japanese management techniques that are said to have been successfully 
implemented in the Japanese subsidiaries in the U. S. are suggestion systems (Verespej, 
1992), consensus decision-making, job rotation and just-in-time (JIT) (Yasin and Wafa, 
1996). A study by Florida and Kenney (1991) also reveals that Japanese transplants have 
successfully transferred core elements of the Japanese techniques/practices, such as wage 
determination, personnel practices, job security and union relations, but with some 
modifications. A classic example is the New United Motors Manufacturing Incorporated 
(NUMMI) plant, where Japanese techniques/practices such as no-layoff and teamwork 
have been implemented successfully (Mahoney and Deckop, 1993). Mahoney and Deckop 
further mention that since the Japanese took over, the employees' morale at NUMMI has 
been high. 
However, there is no evidence that lifetime employment and seniority-based systems are 
being implemented. In fact, a study by Rodgers and Wong (1996) reveals that Japanese 
firms have made little attempt to transfer such systems to their foreign affiliates including 
the U. S. because of the difference in cultural environment. There is also no evidence to 
show that enterprise unionism has been implemented in the U. S. For example, Abo (1994) 
in his study found no unions at all among the sample of firms in the automobile 
components and semi-conductor industries. However, according to his study, in several 
joint ventures between Japanese automobile assemblers and American companies in which 
labour unions were well established, managers did not resist granting recognition to unions 
128 
that had agreed to maintain a co-operative stance in accordance with the principles of 
Japanese management. 
The American experience with Japanese transplants has been both highly beneficial and 
also costly. The Japanese quality system, for example, has indisputably established New 
World standards for quality and productivity. A study conducted by McKinsey's Global 
Institute (1993) found that Japanese transplants have played a fundamental role in 
improving U. S. productivity by putting competitive pressure on domestic producers and 
transferring knowledge of the best practices through normal personnel transfers. 
One classic case can be noted here. In the late 1970s, an American firm - Firestone had 
serious quality problems which resulted in massive recalls and, subsequently, a steep 
decline in product reputation and demand. But since the Japanese firm - Bridgestone took 
over, some aspects of teamwork and TQC have been introduced (Mahoney and Deckop, 
1993). According to the same authors, employees from operators through to managers 
were extensively trained in quality control and problem analysis. Between 1983 and 1987, 
Bridgestone provided a total number of 67,496 hours of training for its workforce, which 
grew from 522 to 954 (Mahoney and Deckop, 1993). As a result, the rate of accident 
incidences (the number of accidents resulting in lost time or an ability to perform the job 
per 100 employees) dropped from 9.8 percent in 1983 to 3.6 percent in 1987. Productivity, 
on the other hand, increased 46 percent compared with 1981, a rate that almost doubled the 
industry's increase. Between 1983 and 1986, the ratio of tyres scrapped also declined from 
5.1 to 1.3 percent; of tyres repaired, from 3.5 to 1.86 percent; and of production blemishes, 
from 2.8 to 0.04 percent (Mahoney and Deckop, 1993). 
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Despite some degree of success, the transfer of the Japanese management techniques such 
as consensus decision-making, teamworking and lean-system to the U. S. has not been 
without significant problems. Indeed, following the transplants' initial "honeymoon" 
period, there have been a growing number of studies and publications revealing many areas 
of emerging sociotechnical problems. It is reported that the problems have centred in three 
major areas: (i) work stress, discipline, and management control of employees and the role 
of unions; (ii) employee discrimination within Japanese transplants; and (iii) the social, 
political, and economic relationships and impact of the transplants (Rehder and Thompson, 
1994). Cole and Deskins (1988) earlier share this view in their study on racial factors in 
side locations and employment patterns of Japanese firms in America. They found that the 
three Japanese transplants of Mazda, Honda, and Nissan and 51 Japanese auto-parts 
manufacturers in the US have hired significantly fewer African-American workers than 
eight new GM plants opened since 1980 in greenfield sites. 
Other Japanese companies have also been condemned for discriminating against minorities 
and American women. One landmark case involved Sumitomo Shoji American, Inc., 
where some former and current secretarial employees brought a class action lawsuit against 
this wholly-owned Japanese subsidiary. The suit alleged that the company's practice of 
hiring only male Japanese nationals for management positions discriminated against 
women on the basis of sex and national origin (Rehder and Thompson, 1994). 
However, despite these criticisms, it is hard to deny that the Japanese model of 
management has indisputably influenced the American management system. Abo (1994) 
presents an international transfer model of the Japanese management production system 
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that provides an analytical framework for measuring the degree of direct application of the 
Japanese system and its adaptation to local conditions, or the degree of hybridisation. 
Based on field research on the application-adaptation evaluation ratings of 34 Japanese 
transplants in the U. S., ten types of typical Japanese transplants have been identified and 
analysed. The findings are outlined below. 
Japanese companies undertaking local production in the U. S., where the management 
environment differs radically from that in Japan, continue to favour the application of 
Japanese human resource and production practices. However, due to the need to adapt to 
local conditions in the U. S. as a result of the cultural differences, Japanese companies have 
to implement a type of hybrid system that differs from that of the U. S. companies as well 
as from that of their own parent companies in Japan. Hence, one can conclude that even 
though it may be difficult for the Japanese to practice their "original" version of 
management techniques, nevertheless, they have been quite successful in terms of 
transplanting their "hybrid" model to the U. S. The following discussion looks at the effort 
made by American firms. 
3.5.2 American Firms 
Studies have shown that the Japanese management system has turned around many failing 
American businesses (Lee and Schwendiman, 1982). The success stories are evident in the 
auto industry. For example, General Motors has formed a joint venture with Toyota; 
Chrysler has teamed up with Mitsubishi; and Ford with Mazda. According to Rehder 
(1990), these Japanese transplants have introduced their American Big Three partners and 
suppliers to their high-performance management and organisational systems. 
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Thus, the American companies have not hesitated in attempting to adopt the Japanese 
management, organisation, and labour-relations systems. This is because they believe that 
collaboration with the Japanese is important, as the Japanese are highly committed to 
quality as well as to technology. Moreover, the competition created by Japanese 
transplants has forced some local firms to abandon their traditional approach and adopt the 
Japanese approach. For example, Alcan has improved its production processes by working 
with its Japanese affiliate, Nippon Light Metal. Hewlett-Packard drew part of its planning 
process, "Hoshin", from its Japanese affiliate, Yokogawa Hewlett-Packard. Olin made 
process improvements in the U. S. based on what it had-learned in its joint venture in Japan. 
Caterpillar transferred product improvement ideas from its affiliate Shin caterpillar- 
Mitsubishi to its home base, and Texas Instruments has done the same with manufacturing 
skills (Jones, 1992). 
As in the UK, there are also a number of success stories among American companies trying to 
adopt the Japanese model of management, although the degree of success is confined to 
limited firms, i. e. the type Z organisations (Fukuda, 1986). Ouchi (1981) refers to type Z 
organisations as successful American companies that have many characteristics similar to 
companies in Japan. Among such firms that have used Japanese management techniques 
with considerable success are General Motors and Westinghouse Electric Corporation. 
Another American firm that has produced positive results by adopting Japanese management 
techniques is the Dallas-based company, Dresser. Since incorporating such techniques, 
Dresser has completely rebuilt itself and has accomplished many of its goals (Preston, 1994: 
7). 
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It is well-documented that the Japanese management technique that is commonly practised by 
American companies is the QCC system (Lillrank, 1995). Its popularity among American 
companies is attributed to the success of high-quality Japanese products at competitive prices, 
and the Americans see this concept of management as a way for their companies to achieve 
competitiveness. Under the American mass production paradigm, quality problems are 
usually caused by sloppy workmanship, and the Americans believe that by implementing 
QCCs, it should instil some discipline and motivation among their workers. Hence, in the 
early 1980s, QCCs were widely introduced into American companies. 
A study conducted by the New York Exchange (as cited in Lawler and Mohrman, 1985: 66) 
shows that 44 percent of all companies with more than 500 employees have quality circle 
programmes. The same study also reveals that over 90 percent of the Fortune 500 companies 
have such programmes in their structure. A more recent study, by Yavas (1995), found that 
many U. S. firms such as the Ford Motor Company, Motorola, Xerox, and Hughes Aerospace 
have now established quality-related programmes. It has also been argued that the American 
companies that have implemented QCCs have progressed to the point at which they could 
deliver the quality levels required by their customers and meet the competitive standards set 
by the Japanese. 
Another Japanese management technique that is widely used by American firms is just-in- 
time (JIT). It has been pointed out that the success of Japanese JIT in the U. S. has also been 
widely-documented (O'Grady, 1988; Yasin and Wafa, 1996). According to Yasin and Wafa 
(1996), JIT has the potential for increasing a firm's efficiency and effectiveness. They point 
out that about 75 percent of American firms in their study reported monetary savings through 
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JIT. Moreover, they stated that JIT's participants have reported other benefits from using JIT 
and these include: (i) improved relationships with suppliers; (ii) improved customer service; 
and (iii) improved incoming and outgoing quality standards. An earlier study by Philipoom 
(1986) indicated that since implementing the JIT system, Harley Davidson has reduced its 
break-even point by 32 percent and in-progress inventory from US$23 million to just over 
US$8.5 million. 
Despite the popularity of QCCs among some American companies, a number of authors have 
argued that this technique has often failed when it is actually being applied. For example, 
Lillrank (1995) argues that the main cause of the failure of QCCs among some American 
firms is that management did not see much reason to get deeply involved in the 
implementation process. As a result, it became natural for management to hire consultants. 
The QCC concept was then rapidly commercialised by the cottage segment of the consulting 
industry. According to Lillrank, unlike in Japan, the parallel support structure was run by 
line-managers anxious to see their quality problems solved, in many Western firms especially 
American firms, the QCC activities were run by outsiders who had no clout in operations. 
The other cause of the failure of QCCs among some American firms is attributed to the fact 
that most American employees are not interested in them (Lincoln, 1989). Cole (1983) 
earlier shares this view, stating that American workers have resisted the QCC system because 
they do not think it is likely to change the way things have always been. Cole also claims 
that the resistance towards the QCC system has to do with the educational level of workers 
concerned. These workers, according to Cole, did not have the required mental framework to 
do it in terms of the ability on mathematics. 
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Like the QCC system, despite its popularity, some American firms also faced a number of 
problems when trying to implement the JIT system. These problems include, among others, 
the need to change work procedures and attitudes, which demanded both extra time and 
money (Harber et al., 1990). Harber et al., further explain that because JIT programmes 
require a significant change in work procedures and attitudes, there is a need for large scale 
re-education of the workforce. However, they also argue that this was not the only problem. 
Where an American company concentrates on the training of shopfloor employees but omits 
to give senior management the necessary grounding in JIT concepts, conflicting messages 
about the company's attitude towards JIT programme will soon sabotage shopfloor 
enthusiasm. 
As mentioned earlier, Japanese management techniques such as lifetime employment, 
seniority-based wage and promotion systems and enterprise unions which are inextricably 
embedded in Japanese society and culture are not being implemented by most American 
firms because of the difference in cultural settings (Florida and Kenney, 1991). Similarly, 
Weinshall (1986) argues that lifetime employment is "anachronistic to Western habits and 
practices. " Maher (1985a) earlier states that lifetime employment could not be 
indiscriminately transplanted to the U. S. culture which is ego-oriented, individualistic and 
competitive. 
It is also argued that the Japanese ringgi system and paternalistic orientation are not 
transferable to a typical U. S. company where values of individualism and privacy prevail 
(Culpan and Kucukemiroglu, 1993). Similarly, Weinshall (1986) earlier states that the 
American management structure is not used to the luxury of time that the ringgi system 
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requires in decision-making. Nor do most American companies think that they have the 
required formal and informal structure for such a time-consuming process of politicking and 
manoeuvring behind the scene at every level of the organisation to achieve consensus 
(Weinshall, 1986). 
Lorriman and Kenjo (1994), however, have different views regarding the problem faced by 
most American companies in the process of implementing Japanese management techniques. 
According to them, the problem is not so much related to the cultural factor but stems from a 
lack of preparations and thorough understanding of the cohesive approach of Japanese 
management that cause the failure of most attempts by Western companies, particularly the 
American companies, to emulate the Japanese model of management. This view was earlier 
put forward by Johnson (1982: 6-11), who states that "any American entrepreneurs who 
attempted to institute some of the Japanese approaches without careful analysis and 
preparation would soon find themselves failing. " 
Thus, it is obvious from the above discussion that the adoption of Japanese management 
techniques is not a straightforward process for the American emulators. It appears that the 
Americans have been selective about which elements they could adopt and apply in their 
corporations, given their understanding of the Japanese model of management and the 
constraints imposed by the different ecological, cultural and institutional environments. Peter 
Drucker (1971) warned earlier that it would be folly for managers in the West to imitate the 
Japanese model of management blindly. However, the one thing that the Japanese have 
taught American managers is how to manage in today's business environment. American 
managers, on the other hand, have realised that if they are to compete with the Japanese, they 
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must change their traditional role of command, conform, and control to one of co-ordination, 
commitment, and communication, as shown by their Japanese counterparts. 
3.6 The Japanese Model of Management in the Newly Industrialising Countries 
(NICs) 
The West often wrongly assumes that Oriental people from a neo-Confucian realm share 
common cultural traditions which make them similar in orientation and action. If this were 
true, the implementation and adaptation of the Japanese model of management would not 
encounter as many problems in other Oriental countries, such as Singapore, South Korea, 
Hong Kong, and Taiwan, commonly known as the four Newly Industrialising Countries 
(NICs), as these countries are believed to share common oriental values and cultural 
traditions with Japan. However, this is far from being the case, as can be seen from the 
following discussion of the related literature. 
3.6.1 The Japanese Model of Management in Singapore 
In the late 1980s, the Singaporean government launched its "Look East" campaign for two 
main reasons. Firstly, they wanted to modify the existing management system by 
emphasising value formation or cultural change in an effort to increase productivity. 
According to Jain (1990), this was essential because the Singaporean management system 
was considered to be the most progressive and Westernised in South-East Asia. Secondly, 
the government wanted to introduce Japanese management techniques to speed up the 
industrialisation process (Hayashi, 1988: 35). 
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In their effort to "Look East", the Singaporean government has welcomed Japanese 
investment. Since their initial campaign, Japanese direct investment in Singapore has 
increased from US$494 million in 1987 to US$8,481 million in 1993 (Graham and Anzai, 
1994). Moreover, according to a report by JETRO (1997), it further increased from 83,728 
million yen in 1991 to 114,329 million yen in 1995. However, in 1998, Japan's FDI in 
Singapore, as well as in other ASEAN Countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia 
and the Philippines, fell, mainly due to the recession in Japan, reduced demand in Asia as a 
result of the economic crisis, and the depreciation of the yen. ' 
There are a number of reasons why Japanese firms are keen to invest in Singapore. Firstly, 
the country has a minimally intrusive regulatory environment. Secondly, it has almost no 
legal restrictions on the use of expatriate personnel, and no requirement that certain 
positions, or a certain proportion of management positions, should be filled by local 
personnel (Rodgers and Wong, 1996). Finally, Singapore offers a highly-educated 
workforce and a large number of well-qualified and experienced professionals (Rodgers 
and Wong, 1996). Thus, because of the flexibilities mentioned above, the management 
style and the specific bundle of techniques that Japanese firms in Singapore have adopted 
reflect their own choice in responding to local environmental conditions (Jain, 1990; 
Rodgers and Wong, 1996). - 
Some of the managerial techniques that have been adopted by these firms include 
consensus decision-making, QCCs, the suggestion system (Jain, 1990; Ek, 1987), JIT and 
TQC (Hum, 1991). According to Hum, the JIT and TQC systems have played a strategic 
I [WWW document]. URL http: //www. jetro. go. jp\WHITEPAPER/Invest99/inv2-5. html. 
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role within the Singaporean Local Industries Upgrading Programmes (LIUP). A study by 
Putti and Chong (1985) found that some Japanese firms also practise lifetime employment 
if one were to interpret this as meaning no dismissal for non-performance or because of 
general retrenchment policy. 
It is also claimed that some Japanese firms based in Singapore have introduced Japanese 
recruitment styles where fresh graduates from universities and polytechnics are recruited 
and training is given according to Japanese methods of on-the-job (OJT) as well as off-the- 
job training (Off-OJT) (Thomson, 1984). A study by Rodgers and Wong (1996), however, 
found that there was no realistic chance for Japanese firms to implement a full-fledged 
Japanese-style (nenko) compensation system in the Singaporean environment, where 
workers still prefer the old system. In fact, a recent study by Gill and Wong (1998) found 
that seniority systems were the least favoured of the five Japanese management techniques 
(lifetime employment, seniority-based wage and promotion, enterprise unions, consensual 
decision making, and quality control circles) in Singapore. 
Unlike in the U. S. and the UK, the Japanisation of Singapore has been encouraged by the 
Singaporean government and supported by the National Trade Union Congress (Jain, 
1990). As a result, it can be seen that industry-wide unions exist side by side with in- 
house unions in almost every industry and trade in Singapore. The Singaporean 
government is also said to encourage consultation and harmony between labour and 
management, based on Japanese principles of consensus (Jain, 1990). Other Japanese 
management techniques, such as bottom-up communications and the provision of training 
to upgrade skills and productivity are also encouraged (Choy and Jain, 1987). 
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Although Singapore welcomes Japanese investors, some authors argue that Singapore is 
not a place where the Japanese model of management could be easily implemented and 
transferred (Gill and Wong, 1998; Rodgers and Wong, 1996; Choy and Jain, 1987). Putti 
and Chong (1985) earlier share this view. According to them, "the management practices 
of Japanese companies in Singapore are not necessarily the same as those of their parent 
organisations in Japan.... and the Japanese companies believe that they cannot transfer their 
home country practices without drastic modifications because of the differences in 
language and the diverse education levels of Singapore's cosmopolitan population" (Putti 
and Chong, 1985: 107). 
A study conducted by the government of Singapore on the possibility of introducing the 
Japanese managerial system to large firms in the republic found that it would be necessary 
to make substantial modifications to the Japanese system before it could be applied, even 
within Japanese-affiliated companies, let alone within indigenous firms (Rodgers and 
Wong, 1996). This view clearly supports an earlier argument by Choy and Jain (1987), 
who state that Japanese firms have to modify their management techniques in their 
Singaporean subsidiaries. Also, Ichimura found in a 1981 study that a majority of the 
Japanese firms with operations in South-East Asia considered the implementation of the 
Japanese model of management to be practicable, but only after modifications. 
The Japanese firms, according to Jain (1990), as far as possible have to adapt to the 
Singaporean economic environment. The fact that most Japanese firms in Singapore have 
not laid off workers is merely a reflection of the tight labour market in Singapore before 
the 1985 economic downturn (Jain, 1990). Jain further mentions that the Japanese 
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preference for internal promotion and their policy of promoting all deserving personnel 
also reflects the tight labour supply. 
There are a number of factors that have hindered the process of implementing Japanese 
management techniques in Singapore. A study by Ek (1987) found that different 
environmental conditions have hindered the Japanisation of the Singaporean workforce. 
He states that the difficulty in introducing Japanese management techniques to Singapore 
was due to the fact that Singaporean workers are too self-centred and individualistic, and 
the majority are inadequately educated when compared to other Asian counterparts, such 
as in Korea, Taiwan and Japan. Because of the inadequate educational background of the 
production workers, their lack of problem-solving skills, and their low participation rates, 
the Japanese managers were forced to abandon quality control circles (Rodgers and Wong, 
1996). 
While it has been observed that certain Japanese management techniques have been easily 
acceptable to the local workforce, several studies have found that affiliates of American 
multinational corporations (MNCs) had an easier time of transferring their home country 
management techniques to Singapore than their Japanese counterparts (EK, 1987; Choy 
and Jain, 1987; Putti and Chong, 1985). 
Based on earlier studies and their own observations, Rodgers and Wong (1996) conclude 
that the local norms and institutions, as well as the personal values of most Singaporean 
employees, are much more similar to those found in a Western country such as the U. S. 
than to those in Japan. Perhaps this is part of the reason why the local workforce is more 
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open to Western as opposed to Japanese management techniques. As far as the Japanese 
model of management as a whole is concerned, there has been a great deal of uncertainty 
among the Japanese managers in Singapore about the transferability of Japanese 
management techniques to Singapore (Fukuda, 1988)' Similarly, Gill and Wong (1998) 
state that in-house unions and seniority-based systems are virtually non-existent among the 
Japanese firms in their study. They also mention that in general, Japanese firms, appear to 
have a lower propensity to adopt their own home practices in Singapore because of cultural 
differences, than do other firms, e. g. American firms. This clearly suggests that cultural 
constraints are one of the major barriers that has made it difficult to transfer the Japanese 
model of management to Singapore. 
3.6.2 The Japanese Model of Management in South Korea 
A review of the literature on the Japanese model of management in South Korea suggests 
that there is limited current research on this subject. As a result of this limitation, a 
discussion on the Japanese model of management/Japanese management techniques in 
South Korea will draw heavily on the earlier literature by Yoshihara (1985). Like in 
Singapore, the implementation of the Japanese model of management in South Korea has 
been strongly supported by the South Korean government. 
In 1975, the South Korean government began to voice their concerns over the industrial 
development in South Korea. They believed that a lack of dynamic change from labour- 
intensive industry to heavy industry was responsible for South Korea lagging behind other 
developed countries. Hence, in an attempt to develop their heavy industry, South Korea 
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turned to Japan for a model. As a result, the 1970s brought a fervent government 
programme that swept across every aspect of Korean lives (Sayer, 1983). 
This nation-wide programme or movement was called "Saemaul Undong" or the New 
Community Movement. One of its objectives was to bring about attitudinal change, i. e. to 
train both rural and urban Koreans to inculcate diligence, self-help and co-operative spirit 
(Sayer, 1983). Under this movement, one of the most widespread campaigns was to 
replace the old style straw roofs on farmhouses with tiles or metal. By doing so, the South 
Korean government sought to force the farmers into creating a superficial impression that 
South Korea is developed like Japan, which still serves as a measure for many South 
Korean development goals. 
According to Chen (1995: 213), the South Korean government was confident that it could 
replicate Japanese success and it also believed that most Koreans should have no problem 
accepting Japanese management techniques because (i) they share a common cultural and 
religious tradition with Japan; (ii) their work ethics are similar to the Japanese; and (iii) 
even the existing features of the Korean management system are similar to those of the 
Japanese. These features include top-down decision-making, paternalistic leadership, clan 
management, inhwa (harmony-oriented cultural values), flexible lifetime employment, 
personal loyalty, compensation based on seniority and merit rating, and a high mobility of 
workers (Chen, 1995). Lee & Yoo (1987: 74-76) earlier share this view, stating that the 
elements of paternalism; loyalty to organisation, family and friends; and respect for those 
in authority and seniority that are normally found in the Japanese management system are 
also found in the existing Korean management system. Because of these similarities, it is 
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said that the Koreans should not find it difficult to accept Japanese management techniques 
(Lee and Yoo, 1987). 
A study by Yoshihara (1985) reveals that Japanese firms in South Korea have introduced 
their own brand of management techniques or practices to the local workforce. According 
to Yoshihara, about 90 percent of Japanese firms in South Korea practise a suggestion 
system; about 80 percent practise quality control circles; and about 70 percent of Japanese 
subsidiaries in South Korea promote their workers based on a combination of seniority and 
merit. However, the same study also reveals that about 80 percent of Japanese firms in 
South Korea have to modify their management techniques to suit local conditions. 
Yoshihara (1985) further mentions that a significant number of Japanese firms in South 
Korea have tried to stabilise employment through the careful recruitment of employees as 
well as by providing continuous education and training. Chen (1995: 231), however, 
argues that the Japanese have had no choice because labour turnover in South Korea is 
high, and job-hopping is common, even at senior levels. Furthermore, Korean employees, 
though loyal to their companies, prefer to switch jobs when they are offered a better salary 
by other companies (Chen, 1995: 231). 
Some earlier studies, however, have shown that Japanese firms in South Korea have been 
quite successful in transferring their own brand of management techniques to Korea 
(Yoshihara, 1985; Lee and Yoo, 1987). Perhaps one of the reasons is because Japan and 
South Korea share a similar historical legacy of heavy governmental involvement in 
business which has been justified on the grounds that, in order to catch up with the 
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advanced nations, the government should assume responsibility for defining industrial 
policies and for using whatever means available to achieve identified goals (Chen, 1995: 
155). This is exactly what the South Korean government have done in welcoming the 
Japanese to their soil (Chen, 1995). 
Another reason is because of the similarity in values and culture between the two 
countries. According to Chen (1995: 228), both countries practise Confucianism and 
Buddhism and both share common key values, such as the emphasis on family, 
hierarchical order, interpersonal relations, the importance of education, hard work, and 
tolerance. This is believed to be the driving force behind the implementation process 
(Chen, 1995: 228). 
It is also argued that the mentality of Korean managers is another influential factor 
(Yoshihara, 1985). According to Yoshihara, like Japanese managers, Korean managers 
prefer an open-office system. Besides that, they prefer to mix with their subordinates and 
eat in the same canteen as any other workers of lower rank. This mentality and attitude has 
made the transfer process much easier (Yoshihara, 1985). 
Despite some degree of success, it has also been argued that the process of transferring the 
Japanese model of management to Korean soil has not been very smooth (Lee and Yoo, 
1987; Yoshihara, 1985; Chen, 1995). Lee and Yoo (1987) assert that since the Koreans are 
so attached to their existing management style, Japanese management techniques have 
failed to fully penetrate some Korean organisations. Lee and Yoo further mention that 
unlike the Japanese, Koreans prefer to be given specific individual responsibilities 
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assigned to them. Japanese employers, on the other hand, find it very difficult to implant 
teamwork and open communication among the individualistic Koreans (Lee and Yoo, 
1987). Chen (1995: 219) also argues that the failure of teamwork and open 
communication among Koreans is due to the fact that they are not culturally encouraged to 
share information openly with others except in close personal relationships. 
It is further argued that Koreans do not like the ringgi decision-making process of the 
Japanese (Lee and Yoo, 1987). Instead, they would rather prefer a top-down decision- 
making style in which 80 percent of the authority lies in the upper management level, with 
middle or lower level management having limited authority (Lee and Yoo, 1987: 106). 
Where most of the important decisions are made by top management, the lower rank 
employees, in turn, accept the decision without complaint, as this is in conformity with 
their Confucian ethics where respect for elders and seniors is a way of life (Lee and Yoo, 
1987: 106). 
From the foregoing review, it can be concluded that despite the similarity between South 
Korean culture and that of the Japanese, it could not guarantee the Japanese managers the 
successful transfer of their brand of managerial technique in its pure form to Korea. Like 
in Singapore, Japanese management techniques have to be modified in order to suit the 
Korean cultural setting. Even then, it is argued that the indigenous workers do not easily 
accept the Japanese management techniques because of their culture-bound nature. What 
is obvious, however, is that the Koreans have accepted some Japanese management 
techniques that have been successfully practised in other countries. 
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3.6.3 The Japanese Model of Management in Hong Kong 
As with Korea, very few studies on the transferability of the Japanese model of 
management to Hong Kong have been carried out. Because of this limitation, the 
discussion here draws heavily on major studies by Tomita (1985) and Fukuda (1988). 
While there are no incentives for foreign investors, they are entirely free from any extra 
legal constraints specifically levied on foreign capital in terms of personnel assignment, 
taxation, and procurement and remittance of capital. Thus, foreign business enterprises in 
Hong Kong are in a position to determine and shape industrial relations practices along 
with their business objectives in their own way. However, given this freedom and despite 
the similarity in cultural and religious tradition, i. e. Confucianism, earlier studies have 
shown that it is misleading to assume that the Japanese model of management could be 
transferred easily to Hong Kong (Fukuda, 1988). 
A study by Tomita (1985) on Japanese management in Hong Kong reveals that some 
Japanese management techniques have been used, and particularly the system of stable 
employment fortified by annual pay rises. This emphasis indicates that the stabilisation of 
employment has been a pressing issue for Japanese management faced with mobile labour 
in Hong Kong (Tomita, 1985). However, it is argued that even though it is given priority 
by Japanese managers, this is not necessarily aimed at building a Japanese-style labour 
market where the quality of the labour force is skilfully associated with specific corporate 
culture in terms of their skills and aptitudes, or sense of belonging to the organisation 
(Tomita, 1985). 
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Other Japanese management techniques that are said to have been transferred to and used 
in Hong Kong are internal promotion, ringgi decision-making, and teamworking (Fukuda, 
1988; Tomita, 1985). According to Tomita (1985), a vacancy in a Japanese firm is usually 
filled internally, except in rapidly-expanding, hi-technology fields where needs could not 
readily be met from the existing workforce. Tomita further mentions that as a rule, new 
recruits are first placed at the bottom of the corporate hierarchy, in accordance with 
educational attainment, and after a certain period (usually from five to ten years), start to 
be promoted on the basis of merit, job function and length of service within a moderate 
range on a set schedule. It is said that a big jump to senior position is extremely rare for 
about the first 20 years, since it is believed that such treatment will jeopardise corporate 
"harmony" (Tomita, 1985: 69). 
It is also mentioned that similar in-house promotion policies, though deemed to be 
sufficiently different in philosophy, have been adopted by Japanese firms in Hong Kong, 
though the length of service is less emphasised and merit is said to be given more weight 
(Tomita, 1985). But like in any other Asian country, such promotion policies have invited 
dissatisfaction among ambitious employees and have induced them to leave for better 
opportunities (Tomita, 1985). Japanese managers, however, have considered employees 
quitting as unavoidable and see little rationality in altering a wage structure and a 
promotion system that they have introduced in their firms in Hong Kong (Tomita, 1985: 
69). 
Training, according to Japanese practices, is not heavily emphasised due to the fact that 
job-hopping among Hong Kong employees is common. Fukuda (1988) mentions that 
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workers in Hong Kong like to move from one job to another in search of more money as 
well as prestige. Tomita (1985) also mentions that about 88.9 percent of local managers 
have gained job experience from other organisations and that they have changed their job 
an average of 2.6 times with the highest being 7 times. Perhaps this explains why 
Japanese firms in Hong Kong have not provided training for their workers as they have 
usually done in Japan. Tomita (1985) also points out that training is very basic and is 
aimed at preventing quick labour turnover to facilitate smooth operations. Tomita (1985: 
68) concludes, "probably because of such attitudes on the part of the Japanese staff, not 
many local middle managers... appreciated the `Japanese willingness to transfer new 
technology and management know-how' or consider `good learning chance for technology 
and know-how' a satisfactory feature of Japanese management. " 
As in many other foreign countries, one can see that modifications have been made within 
the range of the existing components of Japanese management techniques in order to 
conform to the realities of Hong Kong communities. In this regard, Tomita infers that the 
Japanese model of management in Hong Kong is not a cultural extension of a parent 
corporation as the "ethnocentric" hypothesis asserts, but rather is more associated with the 
"community-influence" hypothesis. The "ethnocentric" hypothesis asserts that the 
management of corporations, which are wholly owned by foreign nationals, is, in effect, a 
cultural as well as an economic extension of the parent corporation (Perlmutter, 1972: 21- 
50). On the other hand, the "community-influence" hypothesis suggests that management 
has to adjust its practices to the social and cultural realities of the communities in which it 
operates (Parker, 1967: 65). 
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Even then, some techniques or practices that Japanese managers in Hong Kong have 
introduced have been severely criticised. For example, ringgi decision-making is 
disparaged because its purpose is not to make decisions but to give employees the 
necessary information regarding decisions that have been made earlier (Chen, 1995). 
Tomita (1985) also mentions that local middle managers are less inclined to use such a 
technique, as the Chinese will not easily foster the feeling of participation in the firm 
unless they are the executives or owners of the company. 
Hence, it can be concluded that certain barriers that have hampered the implementation 
process of the Japanese model of management in Hong Kong derive from cultural and 
linguistic issues. For example, Tomita (1985) concludes that because of the difference in 
customs Japanese staff tend to form a closed and exclusive circle among themselves. Local 
middle managers, on the other hand, like to justify status differences in the corporate 
community. As a result, as many as 50 percent of local managers' thought they needed a 
private office, and 43.8 percent did not have lunch with the workers. These attitudes, 
together with the exclusive Japanese attitude, imply that "we-group" feeling within the 
firm encompassing all employees, is little fostered and is perhaps an unrealistic aim, 
according to Tomita. 
3.6.4 The Japanese Model of Management in Taiwan 
An extensive study on Japanese management in Taiwan carried out by Ito (1985) is heavily 
drawn on for the purpose of this discussion. According to Ito (1985: 94), the Japanese 
management techniques that have been practised by Japanese managers in their 
subsidiaries in Taiwan are ranked as follows: emphasis on management philosophy and 
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objectives (83%); employment stabilisation (81%); emphasis on smooth human relations 
(71%); seniority-based wage system (45%); ringgi decision-making (43%); job rotation 
(39%); little dependence on job manuals (38%); the minimisation of status difference 
between workers and managers (30%); one big office (29%); and group responsibility 
(22%). 
It is also reported that about 56.8 percent of labour unions in Japanese subsidiaries take the 
form of enterprise unions (Ito, 1985: 100). Other Japanese management techniques that 
have been emphasised by Japanese managers are continuous training, suggestion schemes, 
QC circles, and retirement and pension schemes. 
In the area of training, Japanese subsidiaries in Taiwan have sent a higher percentage of 
local managers to parent companies in Japan than have Japanese companies in other 
ASEAN countries (Ito, 1985). Japanese managers in Taiwan, however, have not relied 
heavily on a seniority-based system as far as promotion is concerned. Ito points out that 
the majority of Japanese subsidiaries in Taiwan have used a combination of seniority and 
merit system. This is partly a strategy to reduce the number of workers leaving the 
company because of a higher percentage of job-hopping in Taiwan. In addition, Japanese 
managers have also adopted other strategies to stop job-hopping, such as commendations 
for long service, internal promotion, smooth human relations between workers and 
managers, high productivity-high wage policy, job rotation and a scheme to encourage 
workers to buy houses (Ito, 1985). 
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Compared with the other three NICs, the degree of implementation success is much higher 
in Taiwan (Ito, 1985). According to Ito (1985: 96), one of the reasons is that Taiwan is 
more similar to Japan in terms of economic development. Another reason often cited is 
that Taiwan is much closer both geographically and culturally to Japan and that more local 
employees in Taiwan can speak Japanese (Ito, 1985). Ito also mentions that many local 
Chinese in their late 40s and 50s working for Japanese subsidiaries can read and speak 
Japanese and these are the groups of workers that have favoured the ringgi decision- 
making system. The fact that the educational standards in Taiwan are much higher have 
also contributed to the openness of the Taiwanese towards the Japanese model of 
management (Ito, 1985). 
However, it has been argued that the implementation of some Japanese management 
techniques in Taiwan has not exactly been smooth sailing (Ito, 1985; Chen, 1982). 
According to Ito (1985), unlike in Japan where managers practise paternalistic roles, 
managers in Taiwan are very practical and individualistic, making it difficult for a Japanese 
management technique such as the paternal leadership style to succeed there. Similarly, 
Chen (1982) points out that there is a sense of distrust and dissatisfaction among the 
Chinese in Taiwan towards the Japanese and such a sentiment is an obstacle to the 
Japanisation of the Taiwanese industry. 
Chen (1982) mentions that Taiwan's manufacturers are angry and distrustful of the 
Japanese, whom they regard as lacking in sincerity, especially concerning technology 
transfer into Taiwan. Chen further claims that the Taiwanese blame the Japanese because 
they are reluctant to do business with them. Instead, they would prefer to do business with 
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their own people. According to the same author, the Investment Commission officials in 
Taiwan also complain that the painful experience with Japanese firms in the past two 
decades has created ill-feeling towards them. Naturally, this has affected the efforts to 
disseminate certain Japanese management techniques in Taiwan. 
3.7 Conclusion 
Firstly, the foregoing literature review has not only demonstrated the extent of 
internationalisation or globalisation of business but it has also drawn attention to some of 
the difficulties in transferring managerial ideas or techniques between countries, 
particularly because of the question of culture. Specific studies on the transfer of Japanese 
approaches to management, either direct or indirect, have reinforced and exemplified this 
message. Therefore, as a result, there are few if any examples of simple complete 
translation of the Japanese model of management. More commonly, it is modified, 
selected items have been transferred or a hybrid system has been created. 
Secondly, the literature has also shown that some elements are more often transferred than 
others, for example, QCCs, the suggestion system, and just-in-time (JIT) (see USA). On 
the other hand, lifetime employment, the ringgi system, and the seniority system (but see 
South Korea) are less commonly transferred. This suggests that cultural variations are a 
major barrier to the transfer of Japanese management techniques to other countries. 
Because of such cultural factors there is no exact match in terms of elements transferred 
between countries studied in these list, but there are many similarities. 
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Finally, the literature also draws attention to some of the factors that make transfer easier. 
For example, apart from the modification of the techniques, the kind of factors mentioned 
include the use of expatriates (e. g., in the UK and the USA), visits to Japan (e. g. UK), 
"sandwich" (e. g. USA), and government support (e. g. in the four NICs, and particularly, in 
Singapore). However, none of these necessarily lead to wholesale, simple transfer, but are 
associated with some of the more successful attempts or partial transfer. 
In the next chapter (Chapter 4) the role of the state in the economy is discussed. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE ECONOMY 
4.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to discuss the role of the state in the economy. In order to 
do that, first, we will briefly look at the different theories on the role of the state. This is 
important because with these discussions laid down we will be able to determine which 
theory or theories can be applied to the role of the state in the developing economies that 
we will discuss later. Following this, we will then examine the evidence on the role of the 
state as a driver to both the economic development and, as part of that, as a driving force in 
changing people's attitudes. Such analysis is necessary because in some countries, such as 
Korea and Singapore, these two roles cannot be separated and often the state has to 
intervene to change people's attitudes in order to accelerate economic development. In 
discussing the state's role as a driver to economic development, we will examine Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, also known as the newly industrialising countries 
(NICs), while in analysing the state's role as a driving force in changing people's attitudes 
we will discuss Korea, Singapore and China. The reason for taking these countries as 
examples will be highlighted later. The discussion in this chapter lays the foundation for 
future discussion on the Look East Policy which will be presented in Chapter 5. 
4.2 Theories on the Role of the State in Economic Development 
In this section, we will briefly look at three different theories of state intervention. They 
are: welfare economics, political-economy and rent-seeking. Theories on the role of the 
state in economic development are vast and can give rise to endless discussions. However, 
our objective here is not to review them in great detail but just to recognise the different 
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traditions within the theories of the role of the state. It is therefore important to note that 
the discussion in this section is simply a background. 
4.2.1 The Welfare Economics Theory 
The welfare economics theory is said to be concerned with the social desirability of 
alternative economic states (Gough, 1979; Roberts, 1998; Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1992). 
One of the most important debates in this theory is on market failure and a role for state 
intervention. That is, in real world economies, competition may not hold and not all 
markets may exist. Hence, the market-determined allocation of resources is not likely to 
be efficient (Katz and Rosen, 1994) or there is failure in the market mechanism in equating 
private and social costs and benefits (Chang, 1996). Because of that, there are 
opportunities for the state to intervene and enhance economic efficiency. There are three 
groups of arguments to this tradition; they are: public goods, non-competitive markets and 
externalities, as briefly discussed below. 
Public goods is defined as a commodity that is nonrival' in consumption (Katz and Rosen, 
1994: 630). As public goods can be consumed by both groups of consumers (those who 
are paying as well as those who are not paying for its consumption), they are likely to be 
underprovided due to the "free-rider" problem (Elster, 1989). Therefore, in order to 
provide the optimal amount of public goods (so as to minimise the underprovision 
problem), the state has to intervene by taxing working people and businesses. 
Similarly, it is argued that the existence of scale economies can result in non-competitive 
market structures (for instance, monopoly-type market) and a decision made by an 
1 Katz and Rosen state that `nonrival' means when one household partakes of the commodity's benefits, it 
does not diminish the benefits received by all other consumers of the commodity. 
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individual producer can affect the quantity and price in the market. As a result, some 
consumer surplus will be transferred to firms in the form of "monopoly profit", and such a 
transfer can impose a "deadweight loss" to a society (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1992). 
Therefore, in order to guarantee an optimal output, the state needs to intervene. One such 
interventionist measure is anti-trust or anti-monopoly legislation to break up existing 
monopolies. Another measure that the state can use is the taking over of a private 
company and converts it into public ownership (Chang, 1996). 
There is also the need for state intervention on externality grounds. Externalities exist 
where there are some spill-over effects from an individual's activities to those of others, 
leading to a discrepancy between the private and the social cost/benefit structures (Segal, 
1999). It may be possible to overcome externality problems by defining property rights 
more precisely and by establishing negotiations between the parties involved. However, in 
many cases, it is economically impossible to do so because of the massive transaction costs 
involved. Therefore, as a result of the absence of a "property-rights" solution, it is 
justifiable for the state to intervene. State intervention can take the form of providing a 
subsidy to those who create positive externalities like research and development (R & D), 
or it can take the form of imposing tax (for example, pollution tax) on those who create 
negative externalities like pollution (Dahlman, 1979; Schob, 1996). 
To recap, all three arguments seem to agree that state intervention is needed for reasons 
such as to provide the optimal amount of public goods, to guarantee the optimal output, 
and as a result of the absence of a "property-rights" solution. 
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The welfare economics theory, however, is not free from criticism. First of all, it allegedly 
makes a naive set of assumptions about the nature and ability of the state (Chang, 1996). 
Secondly, it has been criticised for its concern with result, i. e. situations are evaluated in 
terms of the allocation of resources, rather than in terms of how the allocation was 
determined. A number of scholars (for instance, Katz and Rosen, 1994) have argued that a 
society should be judged by the processes used at the allocation, and not by the end results. 
These scholars also question whether people are free to enter contracts and whether public 
processes are democratic. To the extent that this view is valid, welfare economics lack any 
normative significance, according to these scholars. Finally, it is claimed that this theory 
lacks a moral basis. It is argued that in the real world, people's attitudes towards markets 
are heavily influenced by factors that have little to do with welfare economics. For 
example, the Roman Catholic tradition has long been hostile to capitalism; a hostility based 
in the Roman Catholic concern not about the allocation of resources, but about the effect of 
the system on people's spiritual well-being. They believe that a selfish spirit pervades 
market economies, and such selfishness is corrosive to the human soul (Rooney, 1989). 
4.2.2 The Political Economy Theory 
This theory traditionally refers to the school of classical British economists, notably Adam 
Smith and David Ricardo. In their major works, i. e. The Wealth of Nations (1776) and 
Principles of Political Economy (1817), Smith and Ricardo developed an analysis of the 
burgeoning economic system of their day, i. e. capitalism. This is characterised, in part, by 
the generalisation of commodity production, i. e. the production of almost all goods and 
services for sale rather than for the consumption of the producer (Gough, 1979). 
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It is said that the political economy advocates have long criticised the welfare economics 
theory "for too readily assuming that the state will act like Plato's Philosopher King. That 
is, is it the intention, or the objective, of the state to serve the public? " (Chang, 1996: 18). 
There are three groups of arguments that question such assumptions; they are: the 
autonomous-state approach, the interest-group approach and the self-seeking-bureaucrats 
approach; as briefly discussed below. 
The autonomous-state approach is one of the groups of arguments that question the 
intention of the state. In this approach, the state is regarded as "a dynamic independent 
force with its own objective function that is distinct from that of the society" (Findlay, 
1990). Being a dynamic independent force, the state may formulate and pursue goals that 
are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of particular social groups, classes, or 
society (Skocpol, 1985). Some historical examples are Japan's Meiji restoration, Turkey's 
Ataturk revolution, Egypt's Nasser revolution, and Peru's 1968 coup, in which "dynamic 
autonomous" bureaucrats, including military official, seized and reorganised state power. 
These so-called "dynamic autonomous" bureaucrats then used the state to destroy an 
existing dominant class, a landed upper-class or aristocracy, and to reorient national 
economic development (Trimberger, 1978). 
The interest-group approach is another group of arguments that questions the intention of 
the state. In this approach, the state is seen as "an arena within which economic interest 
groups or normative social movements contended or allied with one another to shape the 
making of public policy decisions about the allocations of benefits among demanding 
groups" (Skocpol, 1985: 4). The argument states that since the most powerful groups in 
159 
society are the ones that will be most able to affect the decisions of the state, therefore the 
economic policies will lean more in their favour (Skocpol, 1985). 
In the self-seeking-bureaucrats approach, it is assumed that bureaucrats are budget- 
maximisers. Salary, public reputation, power, patronage, output of the bureau, ease of 
making changes and ease of managing the bureau are among the several variables that may 
enter a bureaucrat's motives. All except the last two are a positive function of the total 
budget of the bureau during a bureaucrat's tenure. Because bureaucrats derive utility from 
a higher salary and the greater power of their bureau, therefore it is rational for them to 
maximise the budget rather than to optimise the social output (Niskanen, 1973). 
Based on the above discussion, clearly the political economy advocates seem to reject the 
welfare economics theory's assumption that the state will act in the public interest. But 
like the welfare economics theory, the political economy theory has also been criticised. 
This is because, firstly, although the competitive constraint on the state is recognised, there 
is a strong presumption that the outcome will be in its favour as a "predator". Secondly, 
although the interest-group approach of the political-economy theory concentrates on 
whose objectives are imposed on the state, it, however, does not properly discuss whether 
the state can achieve such objectives. Finally, the same applies to the theory of self- 
seeking bureaucrats, where it is assumed that bureaucrats can assert their own objectives 
without too many difficulties (Chang, 1996). 
4.2.3 The Rent-Seeking Theory 
Unlike the welfare economics theory and the political economy theory, the rent-seeking 
theory is a very different approach. In this theory, it is argued that state intervention incurs 
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not only traditional dead-weight losses but also costs when private agents divert resources 
into unproductive activities in order to capture rents generated by state intervention (Parkin 
et al., 1997). 
What is rent-seeking? It refers to activities aimed at obtaining or keeping economic rent 
(Katz and Rosen, 1994), which is defined as "that part of the payment to an owner of 
resources over and above that which those resources could command in any alternative 
use" (Buchanan, 1980a). 
Why is rent-seeking said to be the driving force behind the demand for political favours? 
This is because incumbents in an industry with existing entry restrictions typically are 
willing to spend money to maintain their favoured position. In the same way, firms that 
see an opportunity to obtain rents if certain government actions are taken will devote 
resources to convincing politicians and regulators to take such actions (Katz and Rosen, 
1994). 
The rent-seeking argument also provides some interesting insights concerning the 
interaction between individual behaviour and the institutional setting. For example, it 
raises the important point that the combined results of individual maximisations can differ 
sharply according to the institutional setting. However, despite such insight, the rent- 
seeking theory also has a number of less apparent flaws. 
Firstly, the nature of rent-seeking costs is not clearly defined in the literature, resulting in 
conceptual confusions (Samuels and Mercuro, 1984). Secondly, the problem of rent- 
seeking costs which are often of a once-and-for-all nature (because once a rent is granted, 
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an entry barrier into the rent market is likely to be created which will discourage potential 
entrants from spending resources to dislodge the incumbent), is not explicitly discussed in 
the rent-seeking literature (Littlechild, 1981). Finally, there is a strongly biased view in the 
rent-seeking literature which assumes that restrictions on entry will be created only by state 
intervention. In fact, it is argued that firms are frequently anxious to deter potential 
entrants (Katz and Rosen, 1994). 
To conclude, it is obvious that there are a number of disagreements between different 
theories with regard to the role of the state in the market. For example, the advocates of 
the welfare economic theory argue that there is a need for the state to intervene in the 
market because of its inefficiency. They continue to explain that by intervening in the 
market, the state will be able to move markets towards the ideal. The advocates of the 
political economy theory, however, do not agree with this argument because, according to 
them, there is no clear explanation with regard to what is the real intention that drives the 
state to intervene in the market or, in other words, is state intervention warranted or not? 
Unlike the former, the latter (i. e. the advocates of the political economic theory) argue that 
because the state can be regarded as a dynamic independent force where its objective 
function can be different from that of the society, it can therefore formulate and pursue 
goals that are not simply reflective of the demands of the society. They also argue that the 
most powerful groups in the society can, in fact, influence the state to intervene and when 
this happens, the economic policies that the state introduces will be more in their favour. 
The advocates of the rent-seeking theory, on the other hand, seem to agree that there is a 
need for the state to intervene in the market, particularly the monopoly-type market, in 
order to prevent market failure. In other words, a market fails when monopoly power 
exists, because it is usually possible to increase profit by restricting output and increasing 
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price. Therefore, in order to move markets towards the ideal, the state has to intervene by 
regulating monopoly and enforcing laws that prevent cartels and other restrictions on 
competition. 
Perhaps it is partly because of the above disagreements that state intervention in industry 
has been looked at with suspicion, and accused of opening the window of opportunity for 
business interests to loot the state exchequer (see Chang, 1996). This suspicion seems 
more than natural when state intervention in industry or industrial policy does not make 
theoretical sense according to the conventional framework (see, for example, Deane, 1989; 
Buchanan, 1980a; Reinert, 1999). Nevertheless, the rise of the East Asian economies prior 
to the 1998 economic crisis, where the state has implemented strong economic and 
industrial policy measures with great success, has aroused further interest in the roles of 
the state. 
Having said this, we will now examine the role of the state, particularly in the economic 
development of the four newly industrialising countries (NICs) and see how the above 
theories can be applied. 
4.3 The Evidence on the Role of the State 
As mentioned earlier, in this part of the discussion we will examine the evidence on the 
role of the state as a driver to both economic development and as part of that, as a driving 
force in changing people's attitudes. In discussing the role of the state in spear-heading 
economic development, we will look at the four newly industrialising countries (NICs), i. e. 
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong. The reason why they have been chosen is 
because they are among the few good examples where the role of the state has been very 
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vital, especially in initiating the process of economic development - making them the 
fastest growing economies in East Asia. On the other hand, in examining the role of the 
state as a driving force in changing people's attitudes in order to facilitate economic 
development we will look at Korea, Singapore and China. The reason for analysing these 
countries is because not only do they have quite powerful and determined governments but 
these governments have been striving to change their people's attitudes by launching 
powerful policies and campaigns. 
4.3.1 The Role of the State as a Driving Force in the Economic Development of the 
Four NICs 
To begin our discussion in this subsection, we will briefly highlight some of the reasons 
why state intervention is viewed as important in generating economic development. 
Following this, we will outline some of the roles played by the state. Next, we will 
examine the pattern of economic growth in Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong (the 
four NICs). With this discussion laid down, we will then look at the kind of role the state 
in these countries is playing in generating economic development. It should be noted that 
we are not producing a full discussion but simply acknowledging that there are different 
views in this tradition. 
In discussing the state's role in developing countries, in particular in the four NICs, one 
can consider the extent of state commitment to economic development and the methods of 
state intervention in the private sector. State commitment can be discussed in terms of the 
commitment of the political leadership to economic development and functional 
realignment through the restructuring of organisations and institutions, and can also be 
examined in terms of financial mobilisation, which is reflected in national budgeting and 
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public ownership of business, and in terms of the means of exercising power in influencing 
economic behaviour. 
In discussing the role of state in the economic development of the four NICs and in many 
other countries in South East Asia, there are two important questions to ask: firstly, why is 
state intervention viewed as very important? and secondly, what are some of its roles? A 
number of commentators (for instance, Soon, 1994; Okuku, 1997) view the role of the state 
in these countries as vital because there is a need: (i) to create domestic supplies of factors 
of production when the private sector is unable or unwilling to create them; (ii) to preserve 
a competitive market structure through the regulation of large private enterprises; (iii) to 
adjust for the failure of markets to achieve a desired allocation of resources; and (iv) to 
achieve a more desirable distribution of income. 
Having mentioned all of that, we will now highlight some of the roles played by the state. 
These include setting the legal rules; buying goods and services from paper clips to aircraft 
carriers; producing services, such as defence; making payments, such as pensions (Rosen, 
1992); exerting a major influence on prices, interest rates and production (executed 
through taxation and borrowing) (Begg et al., 1997); determining the legal framework that 
sets the basic rules for ownership of property and the operation of markets (Dutts and 
Heininger, 1999); regulating economic behaviour; setting detailed rules for the operation of 
businesses and also formulating acts, among others, the investment act to encourage 
foreign direct investment (FDI) (Reinert, 1999; Wade, 1990); engaging in the mobilisation 
and allocation of resources; stabilising the national economy; promoting technological 
innovation; as the guardian of political stability, which is a prerequisite for economic 
growth; as the instrument for law and order; as the major investor; as a source of 
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development financing; as a powerful agent of social change; as a motivating force behind 
investment decisions by private business and as a safeguard of social security (Joung, 
1987). This list demonstrates that in order to expedite economic development there are a 
number of significant roles that the state has to play. 
We will now examine the pattern of economic growth in Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and 
Hong Kong. Following this, we will discuss some of the factors (for instance, state 
commitment) that contribute to their impressive growth rates. Although these countries 
have experienced rapid economic growth in recent decades, their prospects at the end of 
the Second World War were hardly promising (Midgley, 1986). Singapore and Hong 
Kong, for example, had been centres of entrepot trade but the war had shut down their 
traditional mercantile pursuits and had seriously damaged their infrastructure (Jones, 
1990). On the other hand, Taiwan was devastated by American bombing and following the 
victory of the communist forces on the mainland in 1947, the economy suffered further 
strain when some 1.5 million nationalists fled to the island (Amsden, 1985). Although 
Korea, which was one of the most backward Third World nations, had not sustained great 
damage during the Second World War, the conflict preceding the division of the country in 
1953 was devastating. Whatever industries had been established were destroyed and the 
traditional agricultural economy atrophied as millions of rural people were killed or fled 
their lands (Jones, 1990). It would have been surprising if economists in the 1950s could 
have predicted the subsequent industrial metamorphosis of these societies. Indeed, most 
economists (for instance, Rosenstein-Roden, 1961) thought they had limited prospects of 
economic success. 
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However, during the 1950s, economists were surprised by the performance of the four 
NICs. The reason was because their growth rates were impressive not only by Third 
World standards but also by those of the industrial nations. While GNP increases by about 
4 percent per annum were evident in the industrial countries between 1960 and 1980, they 
averaged 10 percent in Taiwan, 9.5 percent in Hong Kong, 9 percent in Korea and 8.5 
percent in Singapore. Since then, their per capita incomes have also increased in line with 
growth rates and are now among the highest in the developing world (Midgley, 1986). The 
gains recorded in Singapore are illustrative. Little (1979) asserts that Singapore's per 
capita income increased from about US$400 in 1960 to US$1,830 in 1973 (at constant 
1973 prices) making Singapore the richest country in the developing world. By 1980, its 
per capita income was US$4,400 - higher than Greece, Portugal and Yugoslavia, and only 
slightly lower than Ireland (World Bank Development Report (WBDR) 1982). 
What are the factors that contribute to the impressive growth rates in these countries? A 
number of scholars (for instance, Little, 1979; Beng, 1980) claim that all four nations 
experienced a substantive degree of structural transformation as manufacturing industry 
replaced agriculture as the dominant economic sector. In Korea, for example, the share of 
agriculture in gross domestic product (GDP) fell froni 37 percent to 16 percent between 
1960 and 1980, while that of the manufacturing industry increased from 20 percent to 41 
percent during the same period (WBDR 1982). A similar transposition of the respective 
shares of manufacturing industry and agriculture occurred in Taiwan (Kuznets, 1979). In 
Singapore, entrepot trade ceased to be the primary economic sector in 1974, when 
domestic exports exceeded re-exports for the first time (Beng, 1980). Similarly, in Hong 
Kong, domestic exports exceeded re-exports (Geiger and Geiger, 1973). 
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Looking at these claims, it is apparent that the state has played an important role in the 
economic development of these countries. Indeed, a" number of authors (Lewis, 1955; 
Johnson, 1982; Kono, 1984; Yamawaki, 1988; Soon, 1994; Okuku, 1997) support this 
view. They also claim that economic development of the four NICs is engineered by 
paternalistic governments or, in other words, by the "developmental state" -a state which 
offers subsidies and protection to offset the disadvantages faced by national firms and 
industries. 
In Taiwan, for example, it is claimed that its nationalists not only carried out extensive 
land reform and agricultural modernisation programmes but they also nationalised key 
industries and imposed strict import controls. Instead of promoting a free market, a kind of 
dual economy has been created in which exports and önly exports could be manufactured 
under virtually free trade conditions (Little, 1979). Similarly, it is reported that the state 
has also intervened to ensure that the prices of foreign exchange and of the financial 
market are kept near scarcity values and that monetary stability is maintained (World Bank 
Policy Research Report 1993). In addition, it is alleged that the state has actively played a 
crucial role in linking cheap Taiwanese labour to foreign capital (Bello and Rosenfeld, 
1992). The same authors also argue that in the 1960s, state policy was guided by the need 
to sustain economic growth after the exhaustion of the import-substitution industrialisation 
of the 1950s. However, in the 1970s and 1980s, a major concern of the state became the 
expansion of the infrastructure for growth and facilitating the transfer of technology from 
foreign to Taiwanese firms, especially as development technocrats achieved a strong 
influence within the Ministry of Economic Affairs (Bello and Rosenfeld, 1992). 
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The Korean government adopted an even more rigorous form of interventionism that not 
only created incentives for foreign investment but mobilised, screened and regulated 
capital flows. Consequently, the country has became "one of the free world's most tightly 
supervised economies with the state initiating almost every major investment by the private 
sector and wielding enough power to ensure that companies that make investments also 
make a profit" (Neurath, 1980). In addition, it is claimed that because of the state's strong 
involvement in economic development, Korea has become one of the most rapidly growing 
economies in the world (Joung, 1987). The same author states that with the successful 
implementation of a series of Five-Year Development Plans that have been carried out by 
the Korean government since 1962, Korea has been transformed from a largely agrarian, 
subsistence economy into a newly industrialising one. Joung further states that by 1986, 
the economy had achieved a record performance in many respects, for example, gross 
national product (GNP) reached the US$100 billion level and Korea became the world's 
twelfth largest trading country. 
Similarly, Westphal et al. (1988) suggest that the state in Korea has been playing a 
significant role in industrial development and especially in encouraging the development 
of heavy and chemical industries by setting targets and offering a variety of financial 
incentives to the industries involved. In fact, few can deny that the incredible economic 
growth of Korea has been initiated and steered by the state. Lee and Yoo (1987: 80) argue 
that "many Korean enterprises entirely owe their success to government support. Thus, a 
close relationship between the government and business has been inevitable. In fact, such 
relationship with the government has been essential in order to receive benefits, such as 
preferential disposal of government-vested properties; preferential allotment of foreign 
aids and grants during the period of reconstruction; preference for obtaining loans during 
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the period of development; designation of general trading company (GTC) and export 
financing during the take-off period; preference for taxation and financing; and inclusion in 
the five-year economic development plans of the government. " In addition, the 
government's control of the banking system since the early 1960s has made it possible to 
steer large enterprises into the industries the government want to develop. Consequently, 
business groups cannot help but maintain a close relationship with the government, thus 
this relationship in Korea is often referred to "Korea Inc. " (Lee and Yoo, 1987). 
Singapore's drive towards industrialisation has also been characterised by interventionism. 
Although more flexible than Korea and Taiwan, the state has adopted a variety of measures 
designed to accelerate economic development. These measures include a plan to upgrade 
Singapore from a centre of entrepot trade to an industrial metropolis. In order to do so, the 
former Prime Minister, Lee Kwan Yew, and the leadership of the People's Action party 
(PAP) envisioned The Malaysian Federation as the protected market for Singapore's 
industrial goods. However, with the loss of this market, PAP technocrats dumped the 
accompanying strategy of import-substitution industrialisation and in desperation adopted 
the new approach of export-oriented industrialisation (Bello and Rosenfeld, 1992). 
Similarly, it is claimed that export markets, foreign capital and cheap labour were the 
essential ingredients of the new approach, and the PAP government pioneered among third 
world governments in devising packages of incentives that would attract the multinationals 
(Beng, 1980). The same author asserts that the main attraction was low-cost labour, the 
supply of which the government ensured by decapitating and thus destroying the 
independent labour movement. Also, it is argued that Singapore has developed rapidly in 
part because of the strong role played by the state (Hirst and Thompson, 1996). According 
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to them, the state in Singapore has used its control of political power to promote public 
investment in education, housing and infrastructure. It is also claimed that the state has 
established programmes typically with more moderate incentives to accelerate the 
development of advanced industries (Gill and Wong, 1998). According to the same 
authors, investment incentives given by the state encouraged the rapid growth of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in Singapore. 
Although Hong Kong can be regarded as the most laissez faire of the four countries, it is 
incorrect to suggest that the state has been entirely non-interventionist. In fact, the state 
has intervened in the economic development and the extent of its involvement can be 
assessed by looking at the overall contribution of the public sector to GDP and its growth, 
and its contribution to specific industries. For example, when compared with Taiwan and 
Korea, the government's expenditure (including capital expenditure) in Hong Kong for 
1992 was about 15 percent of GDP, while in Taiwan and Korea it was 16.3 percent and 
17.4 percent respectively. 2 Looking at these percentages, although lower in Hong Kong, 
the differences are not great. This suggests that the state did play a role in the economy. 
Besides the above, there are several areas where state intervention is needed. These 
include the provision of industrial land, the establishment of productivity as well as 
standard and testing centres, the take-over of several banks in the 1983-85 period, setting 
up the infrastructure, and giving product development support and trade promotion. With 
regard to industrial land, the state provides land at concession prices for manufacturing 
2 [WWW document]. URL http: //www. library. unsw. edu. au/-jazerby/econ3ll2lhtml 
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enterprises. This represents a direct state intervention into the market by altering the price 
of land for manufacturers. With respect to productivity and standard and testing centres, 
the state intervenes by providing funding and support in production techniques and in the 
transfer of technology. In terms of the take-over of several banks in the 1983-85 period, 
the state has intervened when it has noticed that a collapse of the banks might result in an 
even greater drop in confidence in the Hong Kong economy. 
With regard to infrastructure, although it could be argued that the state did not finance 
much of the Hong Kong infrastructure from public funds, it did take the responsibility of 
ensuring that the finance from the private sector was adequate. As in the other three 
countries discussed earlier, the state in Hong Kong currently intervenes and provides 
assistance that helps to improve Hong Kong's productivity growth, improvement in the 
quality of the product or service and industrial design. In addition, the state has been a 
major contributor to trade promotion. During the 1998 economic crisis, the state began to 
involve itself in the stockmarket by buying shares. In all, the state spent about HK$118 
billion and became the largest shareholder in some of the territory's biggest blue-chips 
companies (The Economist, 9`h October 1999). 
The question here is, compared with the other three countries mentioned earlier, can the 
state role in Hong Kong be considered a fully "hands-off' policy? Based on the above 
discussion, it is clear that it has participated in each of the support activities mentioned 
above, and that this participation has ranged from the minor regulatory functions of 
examining the private sector suppliers of infrastructure facilities (for instance, bus 
companies) for fitness and adequacy of service, to supply a large part of the required 
funding for support activities. Vocational education is a good example of a support 
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activity for which the state in Hong Kong is the principal source of finance. According to 
some authors (for instance, Chen, 1979), there are no significant private sector suppliers of 
vocational training in Hong Kong as a result of the substantial amount of state funding. In 
fact, generally the public sector dominates education and training in Hong Kong and the 
funding comprises a large share of recurrent expenditure. Having said this, it is apparent 
that the state in Hong Kong is not entirely "hands-off', but its role differs from that of the 
state in the other three countries. 
From the foregoing review, except for Hong Kong, one might say that the development of 
the newly industrialising countries has not been characterised by a laissez faire policy but 
by extensive government intervention and the deliberate adoption of policies that would 
promote industrialisation. Although that might be the case, when we look closely at the 
role of the state in these countries, there is no justification in saying that the state is mainly 
of an interventionist and/or corporatist type. In fact, it might be more appropriate to say 
that their economic development is driven by the combined forces of corporatism, 
monopoly capitalism and the spirit of free enterprise. This can be explained by the fact 
that although the state intervenes in the market, it does have a strong commitment to a free 
market. In other words, state intervention is not aimed at constraining private enterprise 
but is very much there to support and develop the private market by setting its boundaries. 
Therefore, one may conclude that there is a freedom of private enterprise but within state 
direction. In fact, looking at the economy of the newly industrialising countries, this 
strategy has proved effective. 
Thus, it is incorrect to conclude that the states in the four NICs only fit into the theory of 
the welfare economic state. In fact, based on the above discussion we can say that the 
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roles of the states in these countries involve a combination of all the three theories 
mentioned earlier. This is because when the private sector cannot provide the goods and 
services for the general public, the state has to intervene. In this regard, the state is said to 
play its welfare role. At other times, the state has to play a role within the sphere of both 
the political economy and rent-seeking, partly because of strong pressure from the most 
powerful groups in society. In fact, this is not something new even in some developed 
countries. For example, in the case of rent-seeking, in aggregate, firms spend millions of 
pounds lobbying Parliament in the pursuit of licences and laws that create barriers to entry 
and establish a monopoly right. Once that right is acquired, the same firms hope to make 
an economic profit in the long run. However, monopoly profit is not desirable from the 
consumers' point of view and if left unchecked it can, in fact, lead to market inefficiency. 
Therefore, to move markets towards the ideal, state intervention is necessary i. e. the state 
must regulate these firms to ensure that their monopoly status does not lead to market 
inefficiency. 
It is clear from the above discussion that the state in the developing countries has an 
important role to play in their economic development, and very often it has to change the 
attitudes and mind-sets of its people in order to make sure that they can achieve the level of 
economic success that it aims at. In the following discussion, we will look at how 
successful the state can be in changing the attitude of its people in order to facilitate 
economic development. 
4.3.2 The Role of the State as a Driver to Change People's Attitudes 
Having discussed the role of the state as a driving force in economic development, in this 
subsection, we are going to look at the role of the state in influencing people's attitudes, 
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taking Singapore, Korea and China as examples. It is important to note that these are 
clearly not typical examples if one wished to examine a cross-section of the world as a 
whole. But these are the more popular examples when we consider the Malaysian 
situation. The reason is because the circumstances in these countries, while not exactly the 
same as in Malaysia, have a number of similarities, such as the implementation of 
programmes to change people's minds and attitudes. To some extent such programmes 
have been quite successful, as we will discuss shortly. 
In today's world, no country is untouched by the forces-of globalisation (see Chapter 3). In 
fact, the economies of individual countries have now become "the economy of the world". 
Computer technology has increased the speed of interaction between producers and 
markets. The lowering of tariffs has removed many of the obstacles which previously 
affected the location of production facilities. Moreover, the relative saturation of old 
markets has forced entrepreneurs to look towards markets abroad for survival, while labour 
costs in industrialised markets have compelled foreign companies to relocate to, or to 
establish facilities in developing countries where production costs are lower, in order 
prosper. 
Globalisation brings benefits as well as challenges to the states in developing countries. 
On the benefits side, globalisation introduces new management ideas and fosters 
unprecedented opportunities for wealth creation and perhaps for the betterment of the 
human condition (see Hirst and Thompson, 1996). But one of the greatest challenges 
facing the state in developing countries is how to react to the forces of globalisation and 
also how to benefit from new management ideas which can be "alien" to the local people. 
It is generally believed that in order to benefit from new management ideas or, in other 
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words, to promote new management ideas among their people, the states in developing 
countries have launched a number of policies or campaigns to influence people's attitudes. 
We will now examine the role of the state in changing people's attitudes by taking 
Singapore as our first example. A review of the related literature reveals that the 
Singaporean government has made a number of attempts to achieve this. For example, the 
former Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew, first tried to change the way the Singaporeans 
behave. In doing so, he launched a number of powerful campaigns, such as the "keep 
Singapore clean" campaign, the "annual clean public toilets" campaign, the "no smoking in 
public places" campaign, the "keep public facilities free from damages" campaign, "drug- 
free Singapore", etc. Lee's efforts were then continued by his successor, the present Prime 
Minister Goh Chok Tong. 
In the late 1980s, the Singaporean government launched its "Look East" campaign, which 
was founded on a belief that the Japanese "role model" was culturally compatible with 
Singapore's values and inspirations. Throughout this campaign, the Singaporean 
government strongly believed that it could change work attitudes, labour turnover, 
productivity, efficiency and labour-management relations among Singaporeans by 
encouraging them to adopt Japanese work culture and management techniques (Jain, 
1990). Also, by introducing Japanese management ideas or techniques and work ethics 
among the local workforce, the government believed that these would not only help to 
change attitudes to work but would also speed up the industrialisation process (Hayashi, 
1988: 35). 
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As in Singapore, there is evidence from Korea that the state has played a crucial role in 
trying to alter people's attitudes and mind-sets and to achieve this, the government has 
launched one of its most powerful campaigns. The nationwide campaign, which was 
officially proposed by former President Park Chung Hee in 1970, is called the "Saemaul 
Undong" and its basic foundation is the training of rural and urban people in diligence, 
hard work, self-help and cooperative spirit. It is basically a national movement aimed at 
cultivating people's morale for economic development and is based on Japanese ideology. 
Later, in 1972, the directors of the Saemaul Undong divided the programme into three 
elements. They are: spiritual enlightenment or attitudinal change; improvement in the 
living environment or social and cultural change; and income increase or modernisation of 
agriculture. These elements are also referred to as human development, social 
development and economic development. The South Korean government strongly 
believed that if the South Koreans were able to acquire all the qualities as outlined in the 
Saemaul Undong, not only could they adopt the Japanese management techniques but they 
could also replicate their success (see Sayer, 1983). 
Unlike in Singapore and South Korea where both governments have tried to replicate 
Japanese achievements, and in the process have launched policies related to changing 
culture, the Cultural Revolution in China was not about changing culture in order to copy 
Japanese success as it emerged much earlier, i. e. in the spring of 1966. A number of 
commentators (for example, Chen, 1975; Schram, 1989) have in fact suggested that the 
Cultural Revolution had two objectives which were interrelated: (i) to change moral values 
and attitude; and (ii) to promote both modernisation and economic development. 
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According to Schram (1989: 200), "the origins of the Cultural Revolution can be traced to 
two trends which emerged in 1958-1959: the new high tide of the Mao cult, and the leftist 
political and ideological climate, manifested above all in the ever shriller emphasis on class 
struggle. " Looking at the ideologies that Chairman Mao forwarded to his people, the 
Cultural Revolution is indeed of a complex nature that has raised a number of questions 
and involved differences of emphasis among Chinese leaders over basic directional choices 
for the society at large (Gurtov, 1971). According to Gurtov (1971: 315-317), the choices 
were: "whether Maoist-style politics (or ideology) could continue to `take command' or 
would have to yield at least equal place to the practical problems and limitations involved 
in fixing priorities and setting goals; whether radical Maoism befit a China in transition or 
would have to be modified if China is to realise its historically based claim to great power 
status; and whether China would inevitably `change colour' or could remain ideologically 
`pure red' even in the thrones of modernisation. " As these questions came to the surface in 
the summer of 1966, the foreign affairs bureaucracy, like the party apparatus as a whole, 
was suddenly forced to defend itself against the unleashed frenzy of young radicals out to 
"make revolution" (Gurtov, 1971). 
However, from its advent in the spring of 1966 until the mid-autumn of 1968, China's 
Cultural Revolution was primarily an urban phenomenon (Baum, 1971). Baum argues that 
"a substantial majority of China's rural villages not oply failed to experience significant 
Red Guard agitation, `power seizures', or internecine factional struggles, but also 
remained, throughout much of this two and a half year period, effectively insulated from 
all but the most cursory information concerning the occurrence of such events elsewhere. 
For most of China's 550 million or more rural peasants and basic-level cadres, most of the 
time, the Cultural Revolution was simply not a particularly salient fact of everyday life" (p. 
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370). It was only with the nationwide intensification of a rural "struggle-criticism- 
transformation" campaign in the autumn and winter of 1968-1969 that the Cultural 
Revolution became a concrete reality for the majority of China's peasantry (Baum, 1971). 
Having briefly examined the policies or campaigns adopted by these governments, we will 
now look at whether or not they have been successful in terms of changing their people's 
attitudes. 
In Singapore, it has been reported that the government has been quite successful in 
influencing the minds and attitudes of its people. This is because the majority (if not all) of 
the Singaporeans responded positively to most of the government's campaigns as listed 
earlier (Whiting, 1996). Even the "Look East" campaign can be said to have been quite 
successful despite the fact that it was abandoned fairly quickly and it was partly as a result 
of this campaign that some elements of the Japanese management techniques, such as 
QCCs, the suggestion system, TQC and JIT have been successfully transferred to 
Singapore (Jain, 1990; Ek, 1987; Hum, 1991). It could be argued that if the "Look East" 
campaign has not been abandoned so quickly, perhaps its impact in changing the 
Singaporean's attitudes could have been even more substantial. 
The question here is why has the Singaporean government been so successful in most of its 
campaigns? There could be a number of reasons for this. One of them could be because of 
the government's strong, long-term commitment to ensure a favourable outcome. For 
example, in continuing the work of the former prime minister in the "Clean Public Toilets 
Education Campaign", in 1996, the present Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong called the 
Public Education Department requesting that it continue to plan and organise educational 
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campaigns to persuade the public to adopt good toilet habits and to help keep public toilets 
clean and dry. 
Then, in August 1998, a month-long campaign was held. Mass participation activities, 
such as the People's Choice Awards; a Model Public Toilet poster contest; a public event 
at the Jurong Bird Park comprising activities such as a scavenger hunt and a children's 
spot-art competition; radio contests; and a public toilet feedback hotline were organised for 
the campaign. Radio information capsules were aired to publicise these activities while 
schools, town councils and grassroots organisations were also encouraged to organise in- 
house events in conjunction with this campaign. Moreover, the Public Education 
Department continues to carry out annual surveys to gauge the public's behaviour in using 
public toilets. 3 But such massive involvement is not only restricted to the "clean public 
toilets" education campaign. In fact, the Public Education Department also executes 
programmes to educate the public on the importance of keeping Singapore clean. 
Educational materials, such as posters, pamphlets and anti-littering counselling videos are 
distributed and exhibitions and talks are conducted in schools to reinforce the message of 
the importance of keeping public places clean. 4 
In addition to the above, the government has also enforced a number of laws, some more 
stringently than others. For example, Singapore is renowned as a country with tough anti- 
drug legislation, and penalties ranging from 5 years to 30 years, canning by the rotan, life 
imprisonment and the death penalty for drug trafficking offences. 
3 [WWW document]. URL http: //www. gov. sg/env/info/campaigns/toilet. html 
4 [WWW document]. URL http: //www. gov. sg/env/info/campaigns/litter. html 
180 
Another reason could be because many other parties, especially from the private sector 
have become involved. For example, the advertising and media industries have joined 
forces to apply their creativity and expertise in campaign, such as in promoting a drug-free 
Singapore. Batey Ads Pte Ltd, for instance, has donated a significant amount of its 
creative resources to develop dramatic, and powerful TV and print ads, while a range of 
media owners have contributed advertising space. It is reported that such contributions 
currently total S$1.1 million. 5 
Unlike in Singapore, where certain government campaigns, and particularly the "Look 
East" campaign, have been launched in order to introduce the Japanese management 
techniques and work ethics, in Korea the Saemaul Undong Movement is aimed at three 
things. As mentioned earlier, they are spiritual change; social and cultural changes as well 
as improving the overall standard of living by encouraging people, especially farmers, to 
use modern ways of production in order to increase their income. Thus, despite the fact 
that the Saemaul Undong Movement has been heavily criticised, the government has been 
relatively successful especially in persuading farmers to change their attitudes and 
lifestyles (Sayer, 1983). 
As in Singapore, the success of this movement has also been due to factors such as a strong 
government commitment. For example, to ensure that this movement will continue to 
produce positive results, first of all, President Park needs to mobilise the campaign 
countrywide. To do this, he has demanded active pärticipation from many government 
departments and agencies. A Centralised National Council is then formed to formulate the 
overall plans and to make all the ultimate decisions. The plans are then passed down 
through the Provincial Councils and Country Councils to Township Councils which are 
5 [WWW document]. URL http: //www. drugfree. org. sg/frame_campaign. html 
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then responsible for implementing the plans in the surrounding villages. The membership 
of the National Council reflects the strength of the National administrative effort. The 
council is chaired by the Minister of Home Affairs, but also includes assistant ministers 
from the ministries of Home Affairs, Finance, National Defence, Education, Agriculture 
and Fisheries, Commerce and Industry, Health and Social Affairs, etc. However, it does 
not stop at this level. In fact, even at village level, the government has set up a Village 
Development Committee consisting of fifteen representatives and it has established a 
Saemaul Leader in each village (Sayer, 1983). 
In addition to the above, the government has also been actively involved in certain aspects 
of Saemaul education. For example, by 1977,197,259 village leaders had received 
Saemaul training; 35,057 non-farmers, such as students, business leaders, etc. and 218,997 
civil servants had taken a shorter, seven-day course; and over 19 million villages had 
received some kind of local instruction (Ban, 1983). Apart from such government effort, 
many private organisations have also become involved with the common objective of 
making this movement successful (Kim, 1983). 
Unlike in Singapore and Korea, the Cultural Revolution in China has encountered a 
number of problems and has also been strongly criticised. Chen (1975), for instance, 
claims that Mao faced a hard time with his Cultural Revolution because almost 
immediately after it was launched there was a stubborn resistance from the vested interests 
in power, the "capitalist roaders", and particularly from Liu Shao-Chi, leader of the 
revisionist establishment. Similarly, Schram (1989) argues that although Mao's goals of 
promoting moral values, combating bureaucracy, encouraging popular participation and 
stressing China's self-reliance were generally laudable, the methods he used were largely 
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self-defeating. Schram also directs his criticism towards Mao by pointing out that he was 
in fact much better at conquering power that at ruling the country and bringing about 
attitudinal changes among his people. But despite the fact that Mao Tse-Tung faced a 
great deal of difficulty with his Cultural Revolution, it achieved two main goals; the 
violent upheaval of an old social order; and complete and fundamental change (Chen, 
1975; Schram, 1989). 
It is argued that the reason for the success of the Cultural Revolution was in part because 
of Mao's popularity. His revolution had strong support from the great mass of the people, 
i. e. workers, peasants and the vast majority of cadres and intellectuals (Chen, 1975: 436). 
In fact, Mao proved so popular and influential that from the summer of 1966 to 1969, 
factories, work units and army units across the country produced badges carrying his image 
and stamped out several billion badges in tens of thousands of varieties (Meisner, 1986). 
Even to this day, Mao is still very popular among the Chinese, while within the 
Communist party's creed, Maoism remains strong (The Economist, December 25,1993). 
The same magazine reports that to reinforce Mao's popularity, in November 1993, the 
Communist Party published a list of films to be shown to children across the country, 34 of 
which are compulsory and 66 optional. For seven-year-olds, "The Young Mao" is 
compulsory, whereas eight-year-olds have to watch "A Revolutionary Household". 
We now turn to the question of why Mao was so popular especially among the peasants. 
Firstly, it was because having close ties with rural China (Mao was born in 1893 in Shao 
Shan, Hunan Province, where for years his world consisted of the rice field and the village 
school) he and his associates became passionately concerned with rural development, and 
especially in upgrading the livelihood of the peasants. In fact, it was argued that after 
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Mao, peasants were no longer mere statistics, and no longer people who could be written 
off as a social force (Gray, 1988). 
Secondly, the majority of the Chinese, especially Mao supporters, believe that without him, 
a strong communist movement would not have existed and that he was also partly 
responsible for China's unification (Terrill, 1993). 
Finally, it was because of Mao's strength of character. Some authors (for instance, Terrill, 
1993) believe that there was a "personal fire" in him. This was possibly derived from the 
self-assurance and belief in his cause that Mao demonstrated from his late 20s through to 
his 50s. As he grew up in dislocated times and when millions were ready to support an 
iconoclast, he proved that he was willing to use force and he thrived by keeping relatively 
distant from Moscow. 
Based on the foregoing review, it can be concluded that it is possible for the state, 
particularly in developing countries, to influence a change in people's attitudes. This is 
because it is not only very determined but also quite powerful and is able to introduce and 
impose policies and laws which, for example, in the West people might regard as 
draconian. Moreover, unlike in the West, the states in developing countries have more 
control and influence over the media to the extent that they can do more compared to the 
states in the West. As a result, they are able to effect more radical changes. But of course, 
none of them are 100 percent successful. What is interesting, however, is the fact that they 
have a higher degree of success when compared with the states in the West. 
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However, it is important to point out that although it is difficult to gauge the level at which 
success has been achieved in the developing countries, a number of commentators have in 
fact pointed out that there are some changes in terms of attitudes that have been brought 
about in these countries. The case of Singapore is the most interesting one, not only 
because of the real efforts that were made to alter behaviour in order to facilitate economic 
development, but also because Singapore is clearly geographically and historically close to 
Malaysia, and while the two governments are different, they have many points of contact 
between them. Our next task therefore is to examine whether or not Malaysia's Look East 
Policy has been successful in changing the Malaysians' attitudes in order to facilitate the 
transfer of Japanese management techniques. 
4.4 Conclusion 
Having reviewed the related literature, we can conclude the following: firstly, the literature 
shows that despite a number of disagreements between different economic theories with 
regard to whether state intervention is warranted or not, a number of commentators (for 
instance, Skocpol, 1985; Deane, 1989; Katz and Rosen, 1994; Chang, 1996) seem to agree 
that state intervention is necessary in order to move markets towards the ideal. 
Secondly, the literature suggests that all four countries have governments that have acted 
decisively to promote economic development and with the possible exception of Hong 
Kong, they are characterised by authoritarian and corporate styles of political management. 
Thirdly, the literature reveals that the newly industrialising countries, particularly Korea, 
Taiwan and Singapore, have relied on public policies to promote the economy that are very 
different from the strategies of financial rectitude, avoidance of state intervention, and 
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openness to international competition preached by Western countries and international 
agencies pari passu with their advocacy of "good government". 
Finally, the review of the related literature suggests that it is difficult to assess how 
successful the state has been in changing people's attitudes, and clearly no government has 
achieved entirely what it set out to achieve. Nevertheless, a number of commentators (for 
instance, Sayer, 1983; Terrill, 1993; Whiting, 1996) have claimed that there is some 
evidence of changes taking place pertaining to attitudes as a result of the state's role in this 
area. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE LOOK EAST POLICY 
5.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to present the Look East Policy (LEP), which was officially 
launched in February 1982. The chapter starts by discussing the history of pre and post- 
war relations between Malaysia and Japan. It then goes on to examine the reasons why the 
Malaysian government launched the Look East Policy. Next it analyses how the Japanese 
model of management or Japanese management techniques and work ethics have been 
promoted in Malaysia. Included in this part of the discussion are the promotion of in- 
house unions and Malaysian sogoshosha. It then goes on to discuss some of the more 
significant managerial and economic ramifications of the increased Japanese presence 
(particularly Japanese investors) in Malaysia since the advent of the LEP. Finally, the 
chapter presents the problems associated with the LEP, ending with the general hypothesis 
of the study. 
It is important to note that because of limited current literature and restrictions on public 
access to most of the information related to the LEP, the discussions in this chapter are 
heavily based on literature written and studies conducted in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
5.2 The History of Pre and Post-War Relations between Malaysia and Japan 
5.2.1 Pre-War Cultural Images of the Japanese 
In the pre-war era, the Japanese community in Malaysia was made up of migrant petty 
traders such as barbers, photographers, bicycle shop owners, prostitutes or karayuki-san 
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(Leng, 1983), and businessmen in primary and plantation sectors such as iron ore and 
rubber (Smith, 1994). During this era, the Japanese were attracted to Malaysia (at that time 
called Malaya, Sarawak and North Borneo) by two main factors; first, by the rubber 
plantation industry, which had become lucrative by 1910 and second, by the economic 
opportunities made available by the British in Malaysia. However, the British restricted 
Japanese economic involvement in Malaya when they passed the Rubber Restriction Act of 
1917, and later the quota system on cotton imports in the late 1930s. It was these two 
measures that indeed provided strategic military reasons for the Japanese to invade Malaya, 
which they did in 1941, when they took control of Malaya and the Borneo Territories for 
three years, i. e. from 1941 to 1945. During this period, ethnic relations were put under 
great stress because of the differential treatment accorded to races by the Japanese (Smith, 
1994). On the one hand, the Japanese sought the collaboration of the Malays in achieving 
the aims of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. On the other hand, the Japanese 
treated the Chinese brutally because of the war experience they had experienced in 
mainland China (Smith, 1994). 
Despite its brief military rule, Japan has never had a good image among the Malaysians 
(Kheng, 1983). According to Kheng (1983), this was because of the notorious behaviour 
of the Japanese soldiers, and the atrocities that occurred during their occupation. Similarly, 
Smith (1994) claims that the Malaysians were mercilessly manipulated and maltreated as 
the Japanese were brutal in dealing with those who disobeyed them. The Japanese 
Occupation has also been blamed for the disruption of the economy and of the pre-existing 
social order (Kheng, 1983). Kheng also claims that the occupying forces requisitioned 
food supplies and the normal patterns of subsistence agriculture were disrupted. Smith 
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(1994) claims that families lived in fear of their daughters being raped or sexually 
exploited by the Japanese soldiers while men were rounded up to work on the Death 
Railway; many of whom never returned. According to Kheng (1983), the Japanese 
Occupation was also responsible for causing the ethnic divide between the Malays and the 
Chinese. 
Because of these bitter experiences, it is said that even to this day the older generation of 
the Malaysians who lived under the brief Japanese Occupation bear an animosity towards 
the Japanese (Smith, 1994). This is partly because Japanese aggression has caused the 
Malaysians not only physical damage, but also "moral trauma". However, despite the 
chaos that it created, the Japanese Occupation brought several important changes for 
Malaysia's administration. For example, it was the first time in the country's history that 
an integrated government was imposed on the whole of Malaysia, with a central authority 
based in Singapore (Singapore was expelled from Malaysia in 1965 due to political 
differences (see Chapter 6), and this was a marked contrast with the pre-war dual system of 
direct and indirect rule (Kheng, 1983). 
5.2.2 Post-War Cultural Images of the Japanese 
Smith (1994) argues that the contemporary Japanese community in Malaysia is still 
influenced by the Japanese military stereotype of the Occupation years. Most Malaysians, 
and particularly the Chinese families can recall at least one relative killed by the Japanese 
during this time (FEER, 30" October 1991). The Japanese, on the other hand, did not try to 
establish a social and business relationship with Malaysians, especially in the early years of 
Malaysia Independence. One of the reasons for the low profile adopted by the Japanese 
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and their slow contact in Malaysia prior to 1970 was because they were busy 
reconstructing their war-torn economy. However, the scenario changed in the early 1970s 
when Malaysia's hatred towards the Japanese was pushed into the background by 
economic factors. For example, from the start of that decade, Japanese cars and consumer 
products were in high demand because they were considered to be good value for money 
before the rising yen, or endaka. This was a period when the Japanese again invaded 
Malaysia in great numbers, but this time as civilians. They came as investors, signing 
contracts for mineral and timber concessions, and creating joint ventures in car assemblies 
and electronics. As a result, Japanese products began to flood the Malaysian markets. 
As the relationship between Malaysia and Japan improved during this time, the Malaysian 
government also invited Japanese investors to expand their investment in the Malaysian 
service sector, hotels, restaurants, clubs and bars, departments stores, travels and 
advertising agencies, and to support the Japanese business community members, the 
Japanese Chamber of Commerce and JETRO (Japan External Trade Organisation) were 
established in Kuala Lumpur. 
At present, with regard to the Japanese cultural influences upon Malaysian society, Smith 
(1994) claims that they can be felt everywhere as a result of the "spill-over" effect of the 
closer ties between Malaysia and Japan. Japanese influence, for instance, can be observed 
in television programmes, where there have been a number of long-running Japanese daily 
serials shown on the Malaysian television channels, dubbed in Bahasa Malaysia (Malaysia 
National Language). There are also several exclusive Japanese-style clubs now open in 
Kuala Lumpur, while Japanese restaurants and karaoke bars have sprung all over its 
190 
business district in order to cater for their needs. Smith (1994) mentions that there has 
never been a period that has witnessed such a close relationship between Japan and 
Malaysia as the present one. 
5.3 The Look East Policy (LEP) 
Despite the bitter experiences during the Japanese Occupation, the Mahathir administration 
is keen to "Look East". Thus, shortly after his inaugurätion in 1981, Mahathir launched the 
Look East Policy. A brief chronology of the start of the policy is presented in Table 5.1 
Table 5.1 
A Chronology of the Start of the Look East Policy 
Date Events 
July 16th, 1981 Mahathir was inaugurated as fourth Prime Minister 
End of 1981 Mahathir announced a `Buy British Last' directive 
January 1982 Mahathir launched the Look East Policy 
February 8th, 1982 Mahathir officially made known the LEP to the 
Japanese when he announced the policy at the 5th 
Joint Annual Conference of the Malaysia-Japan and 
the Japan-Malaysia Economic Association in Kuala 
Lumpur 
5.3.1 What is the Look East Policy? 
According to Mahathir', "The Look East Policy is a policy that is aimed to encourage all 
Malaysian to look towards Japan. The main objective is to acquire the kind of policies, 
management systems, and work ethic that the Japanese have. " 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 11` June 1982. 
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According to Lim (1984), the Look East Policy is aimed at introducing Japanese work 
ethic and management techniques to Malaysia in order to improve productivity and overall 
economic performance, and, hence enhance Malaysia's industrialisation with Japanese 
technology and capital. Jomo (1994: 6), however, puts a slightly different slant on what 
the Look East Policy is all about. According to him, the LEP is "a campaign to boost 
productivity by inducing hard work, loyalty and promoting greater output and quality, and 
more effective modes of labour organisation and management practices. " Jomo further 
points out that what the policy means is a reference to Japan in three main areas, i. e. work 
ethic, management techniques and the transfer of technology from Japan to Malaysia. 
Jomo also mentions that to some extent the LEP does refer to South Korea in the areas of 
work ethic, construction and rural development. 
Based on the above, it seems that the two authors have different interpretations of what the 
LEP is all about. For example, Lim argues that the aim of the LEP is to introduce Japanese 
policies in order to accelerate the industrialisation process in Malaysia. Jomo, however, 
goes further by arguing that the LEP is not only aimed at introducing the Japanese policies 
but it is also aimed at introducing effective modes of labour organisation based on the 
Japanese model. 
Despite different interpretations of the nature of the LES', most commentators agree that its 
main objective is to stimulate value and behaviour change among Malaysians, improve 
management practices, and to capitalise on Japanese technology and economic practice in 
order to prepare the country to become a developed nation by the year 2020. 
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In support of the Look East Policy are concrete proposals in two areas: first, in human 
resource development; to train large numbers of Malaysian students in Japanese 
undergraduate courses, to set up a Japanese language training centre at the University of 
Malaya to prepare students for this, and to send more workers to Japan for on-the-job 
training through the Association for Overseas Technical Scholarship (AOTS) scheme 
already established; second, to set up economic institutions new to Malaysia and already 
existing in Japan, for example, general trading companies (sogoshosha), and to expand the 
incidence of in-house unions (each of these will be discussed in detail later). These can be 
seen as directly inspired by the Japanese model. 
The Look East Policy was officially announced on 8 `h February 1982 at the 5 `h Joint Annual 
Conference of the Malaysia-Japan and the Japan-Malaysia Economic Associations in 
Kuala Lumpur, emerging right in the middle of Malaysia's twenty-year project of 
economic and social restructuring: the New Economic Policy (NEP). 
Briefly, the NEP was introduced in May 1970 and was given a 20-year time frame. The 
two main objectives of the NEP were (i) the eradication of poverty irrespective of race; and 
(ii) the restructuring of society to correct racial economic imbalance. What it meant was 
that non-Bumiputras would no longer be allowed to carry out their economic pursuits as 
freely as before, i. e. without regard to the economic position of the Bumiputras (see 
Chapter 6 for the definition of Bumiputra and non-Bumiputra). As the NEP almost came 
to an end (it expired in 1990) the government soon found ways to "reincarnate" it. Hence 
came the LEP, which, unlike the NEP, has a wider focus. 
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The structure of the LEP is as follows: The Look East Committee, the policy body, is 
chaired by one of two ministers in the Prime Minister's Department and its members are 
the Chief Secretary of Government, the directors of the Economic Planning Unit and the 
Public Services Department, and the secretaries general of the Treasury and the Ministry of 
Education. The Look East Technical Committee, the operational body, is chaired by the 
deputy director general of the Economic Planning Unit and staffed by members of the 
Public Services Department, particularly its training division. The location of the 
Technical Committee reflects the centrality to the LEP of education and training 
programmes, as the division has substantial experience in the supervision of training 
programmes and in arranging and administering overseas education and training. As 
Mahathir is very much the architect of the policy, he is able to keep close supervision on 
policy development and its implementation. This became evident when he institutionalised 
responsibility for the policy in his own department. 
5.3.2 The Reasons for the Implementation of the Look East Policy 
There are a number of reasons why the LEP has been introduced and implemented, but the 
best place to begin such an explanation is with Mahathir's goals for and thinking on 
national development. Firstly, it is believed that Mahathir intends to use the LEP to 
transform Malaysia into an industrialised country with the help of the Japanese. As such, 
in his notable speech on 8`h February 1982 at the 5"' Joint Annual Conference (JAC) of the 
Malaysian-Japan and the Japan-Malaysian Association in Kuala Lumpur he said, 
"Malaysia has all the basic ingredients to become an important industrialised country in 
Asia after Japan and South Korea. " In fact, even before he became Prime Minister, 
Mahathir was concerned with the Malaysian economy, ever since the country gained 
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independence from Great Britain in 1957. This was because the economy had relied 
mainly on rubber and tin, which provided two-thirds of all export earnings, and even 
though other commodities such as pineapple, pepper, tobacco, cocoa, timber, petroleum 
and palm oil later took shares of the export market, Mahathir realised that Malaysia could 
not depend on these primary commodities much longer because their prices had been 
volatile since the late 1970s. Thus, with the launching of the LEP, Mahathir now expects 
that the Japanese will help Malaysia expand its manufacturing activities. 
Secondly, being a purposeful, nationalistic leader who has set a course to restructure 
Malaysia's political economy, Mahathir has decided to emulate the two East Asian 
"models" of development rather than the Western model, which he feels is no longer 
adequate for Malaysia's development purposes. It ig also argued that Malaysia should 
emulate the East Asian "model" rather than the Western "model", and particularly the 
British one, not only because its former master is currently subject to many economical and 
socio-political problems but also because Great Britain is no longer a superpower 
(Rajendran, 1993). It is further argued that "Looking West" is common in the ASEAN 
countries and the Malaysian government has realised that ethical and moral values in the 
West are no longer compatible with those in Malaysia. Therefore, it would be more 
appropriate to emulate some of the countries in the East because of the common oriental 
culture and ethical values (Rajendran, 1993: 91). Similarly, it is argued that a shift of this 
nature will benefit Malaysia as its people can relate more easily to the values of the East 
(Soong, 1983). 
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Coincidentally, in the early 1980s Malaysia's relationship with Britain was at its lowest 
ebb (Jomo, 1990). The strained relations between the two countries at that time were 
caused by a series of events. The first of these was triggered by the British media's and the 
London Stock Exchange's hostile reception to the Malaysian government's take-over of 
the Guthrie Corporation, one of the oldest British plantation companies in Malaysia. The 
take-over was mounted by a major government investment agency, Permodalan Nasional 
Berhad (PNB, or the National Equity Corporation) and it was conducted so swiftly on the 
morning of 7"' September 1981 that it surprised both Guthrie's management and the 
London Stock Exchange. As a result, certain leading British newspapers chose to describe 
the take-over as an act of nationalisation, a comment which badly stung Mahathir - who is 
known as a strong critic of nationalisation (Teik, 1995: 55). The second event concerned 
the severe financial losses suffered by the Malaysian government when the London Metal 
Exchange abruptly amended its rule to limit the premiums payable by short-sellers who 
were unable to deliver on tin futures at a time when the Malaysian government quietly but 
actively supported tin prices. The third event that generated further frustration was the 
issue of landing rights. According to Teik (1995: 55), Britain had refused to give two 
additional landing slots at Heathrow airport for Malaysia Airlines System Berhad (MAS), 
which wanted to operate a new route between Kuala Lumpur, London and Mexico City. 
What actually happened was that Britain had advised Malaysia to purchase four additional 
units of Boeing 747 before the additional landing slots could be considered. But when 
MAS did purchase four units of Boeing 747, Malaysia was disappointed to find out that 
Britain did not approve the landing slots (Teik, 1995: 55). The last straw was over a 
dramatic increase in student tuition fees for all foreign students in Britain. Because there 
were more than 50,000 Malaysians studying in Britain at that time, including Mahathir's 
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son, these actions increased the tensions that were already escalating between the two 
nations (Jomo, 1994; Means, 1991: 92). Hence, as the disputes intensified, Mahathir 
announced the "Buy British Last" directive, and by the end of 1981 there was a total 
boycott of British goods. 
Thirdly, Malaysia wanted to capitalise on Japanese technology to develop its 
manufacturing sector. Mahathir's desire to develop Malaysia into an industrialised country 
was cultivated while acting as Trade and Industry Minister (1978-1981). It was during this 
time that the Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM) was formed. Since then, 
HICOM has been central to the public promotiob of large industrial projects in 
automobiles, iron and steel, small engines and cement. As Japan had been Malaysia's most 
important trading partner since the late 1970s, Mahathir believed that the LEP would be 
able to attract more Japanese investors to Malaysia, and that these (Japanese) investors 
would then transfer their technology to Malaysia (Mahathir, 1983). It is also claimed that 
because of the LEP the joint venture company called Proton or National Automobile 
Enterprise was established which involved two main parties, namely, HICOM and 
Mitsubishi with a shareholding of 70% and 30% respectively (Jomo, 1983). 
Fourthly, Mahathir strongly believes that the adoption of Japanese management techniques 
and work ethic to be one of the best remedies for corporate ills diagnosed among both 
Malaysian private firms and public enterprises. He maintains that the only way to 
successfully promote the adoption of Japanese management techniques and work ethic 
among Malaysians is through a nation-wide campaign, and that this can be achieved 
through the launching of a powerful policy, such as the LEP (Mahathir, 1983). 
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Finally, the personality and political style of Mahathir plays a significant role in the "birth" 
of the LEP. Compared with the three previous Prime Ministers who had studied law in the 
UK and had maintained closed connections with the Malay aristocracy and accepted 
traditional Malay political styles involving indirection and compromise, Mahathir 
represents a new breed of locally-educated Malaysian nationalists who are impatient with 
social and political factors which frustrate certain reformist objectives. Being locally- 
educated, he is more inclined to adopt an Eastern model of development especially after 
being criticised by the British press (see Jomo, 1994). 
5.4 Promotion of Japanese Management Systems in Malaysia 
A key element in the Look East Policy is the promotion of the Japanese management 
systems, i. e. Japanese management techniques and work ethic, and this has been given 
priority by the Mahathir administration since the launch of the LEP. In doing so, Mahathir 
has encouraged both Japanese firms in Malaysia and Malaysian organisations to become 
involved. 
The review of the literature on Japanese management systems in Malaysia before the LEP 
reveals that Japanese managerial techniques and work ethic were almost unknown among 
local managers, even though in the late 1970s, some Japanese management techniques had 
been used by Japanese managers in their subsidiaries in Malaysia in dealing with the local 
workforce (Smith, 1984). However since its inception, some Japanese management 
techniques have become "popular", particularly among government agencies and public 
sector enterprises. 2 It is claimed that the popularity 6f such techniques among the latter 
z Yasin (1990) found that most government agencies and public sector enterprises had implemented QCC, 
TQC, open-office system, on-the-job training and suggestion system. 
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was due to a strong push by the government (Yasin, 1990). However, it is beyond the 
scope of this study to discuss this in further detail as it is intended to look at the 
manufacturing sector. 
The following discussion (Section 5.4.1 and Section 5.4.2) highlights the efforts made by 
Japanese firms in Malaysia and Malaysian organisations3 in promoting Japanese 
management techniques and work ethic in Malaysia. 
5.4.1 Japanese Firms 
The number of Japanese firms or joint ventures in Malaysia has significantly increased in 
the past decade. By the end of 1968, there were 48 Japanese firms in Malaysia with total 
investments of RM32.2 million. Of the 54 Japanese firms established during 1957-1969, 
33 were in the manufacturing sector and of these, there were 8 firms in petroleum and 
chemicals, 12 companies in steel and other metals, 4 in wood products, 2 in food, 1 in 
textiles, 3 in electrical and electronics, and 3 in transport machinery (Denker, 1994). In 
fact, during this period (1957-1969), Japanese investments in Malaysia were a response to 
Malaysia's import-substitution policy. 
During the following decade (1970-1980), Japanese investment was further welcomed 
when the second and third Prime Ministers, Tun Abdul Razak and Tun Hussein 
Onn respectively, provided incentives and other infrastructural facilities to attract foreign 
' Malaysian organisations refer to government agencies, public enterprises and private enterprises. 
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investors. ' Thus, between 1970 and 1974 there were 124 Japanese firms established in 
Malaysia, and as of 1975, there were over 200 Japanese companies, with a total investment 
of RM625 million (Denker, 1994). In the mid-1970s Japanese investments in Malaysia 
dropped sharply due to the oil crisis which was felt strongly in Japan at that time. 
The Malaysian government's attitude towards Japanese investment became even more 
indulgent with the LEP. In the period 1980 to 1993, there were 457 new Japanese firms 
established in the manufacturing sector, while in the non-manufacturing sector there were 
234 new firms (Denker, 1994). The sudden increase in Japanese investment in Malaysia 
since the launch of the LEP has triggered a vigorous debate among the locals as to whether 
the Japanese have actively promoted their managerial practices in Malaysia. And, the 
debate goes, if they have, how did implementation actually occur? How extensive has the 
practice been? And has the implementation or transplanting process been smooth? To 
answer these questions, we will review some of the literature in this area. 
Even before the LEP was launched in 1982, evidence showed that the Japanese firms 
operating in Malaysia were introducing their own brand of management practices among 
their Malaysian workers. For example, according to an earlier study by Lim and Ping 
(1979) on Japanese firms operating in Malaysia, some Japanese practices had been used, 
for example, by Japanese managers in Nippon Electric Company (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd who 
had been actively promoting their management practices among the local workforce. 
According to the same authors, they had placed a lot of weight on the quality of their 
One of the incentives was the more liberal Investment Incentives Act of 1968. This act, besides 
incorporating tax holidays to companies granted pioneer status, gave additional tax holidays depending on 
the nature of the product, the location of the company and the local raw material content. Infrastructural 
facilities were free-trade zones and licensed manufacturing warehouses. 
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product and they had also encouraged their Malaysian workers to get involve in QCCs and 
to give their views on how to handle each task. To some extent, this study suggests that 
such firms have been instrumental in introducing Japanese management practices even 
before the LEP was launched. 
However, it could also be argued that the Japanese firms operating in Malaysia might have 
been even more active in promoting their techniques especially when encouraged to do so 
by the Malaysian government via its LEP. 
One of the earliest studies on the operations of these firms soon after the launch of the 
LEP, was conducted by Wendy Smith (1983), who points out that they (Japanese) have 
been actively implementing techniques such as QCCs, TQC and the suggestion system and 
have achieved this implementation through several methods. One is to send a group of 
selected local managers whom they could trust to carry out their policies to Japan for 
training, which is usually over a one-year period. These managers are selected primarily 
for their weaknesses, i. e. their lack of bargaining power, and they are trained in a way to 
make them familiar with Japanese values (Smith, 1983). 
Another strategy is to give a personnel manager position to a local Malay. Smith (1983) 
points out that through this strategy, the Japanese minimise misunderstanding between 
them and the local staff, as the Malay Personnel Manager could play a key role as cultural 
interpreter as well as the main channel for worker-management communication. 
According to the same author, this strategy seems to work well for the Japanese. 
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Another early study on Japanese firms operating in Malaysia was conducted by Imaoka 
(1985). In this study, Imaoka surveyed the Malaysian subsidiaries or joint ventures of 
Japanese origin in 1982, which covered all those companies in the manufacturing sector of 
the JETRO Kuala Lumpur Representative Office list; a total of 49 companies. Three 
sheets of his questionnaire schedule were sent to each firm, one for the Japanese top 
manager (in Japanese) and two for local middle managers or supervisors (in English). The 
date of his study reveals that it was conducted in the summer of 1982; the earliest stage of 
the LEP. As such, it could be argued that the impact of the LEP on Imaoka's study could 
be minimal. Nevertheless, it is worth highlighting Irnaoka's findings as they are quite 
relevant to our research. 
Unlike Smith's study, Imaoka's study did not specifically mention the techniques used by 
the Japanese in Malaysia in implementing their brand of management practices. Based on 
his findings, Imaoka (1985) claims that some Japanese top executives seem to consciously 
apply the Japanese model of management to their Malaysian subsidiaries or joint ventures 
within the sphere of their authority, and this model can be categorised into two major 
management policies. According to Imaoka, the first is associated with a long-term 
remuneration policy where emphasis is given to stability of employment, a seniority-merit 
wage system, a seniority-merit promotion system, as well as job rotation and multi-skilled 
workman schemes (Table 5.2). The second is related to an organisational policy where 
there is an emphasis on collective decision-making, indoctrination of management 
philosophy, human relations policy, collective responsibility, the ringgi system, and the 
minimisation of status differentiation between labour and management (Table 5.2). 
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Imaoka has stressed that these two categories or types of policies are jointly considered by 
most Japanese top executives to constitute the Japanese model of management. 
Table 5.2 
Management Policies which Japanese Top Management Executives 
Advocate and Implement as Japanese Style Management 
Percentage of Total 
Responses l 
Securing stable employment 16.5 
Stressing the philosophy and aims of management 10.7 
Giving emphasis to human relation policy 8.3 
Seniority-merit wage system 7.8 
Collective of team decision-making system 14.1 
Seniority-merit promotion system 5.3 
Job-rotation and multi-skill system 9.2 
Minimisation of status difference between 
management and workers 
3.4 
Elastic management system 12.1 
Application of the ringgi system 3.9 
Collective or team responsibility system 6.8 
Others 1.9 
Total 100.0 
Note to t able 5.2 -I Since the multiple answer system is used in the Questionnaire, 
total answers are more than the number of respondents. 
Source: Imaoka, 1985, p. 19. 
Imaoka also asserts that to implement the Japanese style of personnel management, it is 
essential to keep the local workers and staff for as long as possible. According to Imaoka, 
for this purpose Japanese firms in Malaysia have emphasised in-firm promotion systems, 
seniority-merit wage systems, emphasis on the human relations between workers and 
management, commendations for long service, long-term oriented on-the-job training, and 
personnel welfare policies (Table 5.3). In contrast, the short-sighted, high-wage policy has 
not been emphasised. Imaoka also claims that to maximise on the organisational policy, as 
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mentioned earlier, many Malaysian subsidiaries or joint ventures of Japanese origin utilise 
small group activity systems, such as bottom-up suggestion schemes, QCCs and zero 
defect (ZD) movements. 
Table 5.3 
Personnel Policies to Retain Personnel 
Percentage of Total 
Responses 1 
In-company promotion system 18.1 
Seniority-merit promotion system 12.2 
Reconciling human relations between the 
management and workers 
11.8 
Officially commending long service 10.9 
Continuous training system 10.4 
Building up personnel welfare facilities 10.0 
Retirement benefit system 6.3 
Wage incentive scheme 5.9 
Job rotation 5.0 
Small group activities 5.0 
Housing scheme 2.3 
Others 2.1 
Total 100.0 
Note to Table 5.3 -I Since the multiple answer system is used in the 
Questionnaire, total answers are more than the number of respondents. 
Source: Imaoka, 1985, p. 19. 
As far as a remuneration system is concerned, it is claimed that Malaysian subsidiaries or 
joint ventures of Japanese origin closely follow the practice of their parent companies in 
Japan (Imaoka, 1985). Although the amount of remuneration is not always the same as 
that paid to workers in Japan, Imaoka points out that most Malaysian subsidiaries or joint 
ventures of Japanese origin are quite consistent in giving bonuses of 1.8 months' wages 
per year for administrative and supervisory staff and 1.5 months' wages per year for other 
workers. He also mentions that apart from giving bonuses, they also provide welfare 
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facilities to their workers, such as the provision of staff cafeterias, company housing and 
dormitories, commuter buses, medical treatment, sport facilities, locker rooms and 
company uniforms. 
Other Japanese management practices such as on-the-job training (OJT) (Koike and Inoki, 
1990), groupism, human relations, welfare benefits within the company (Nakano, 1985), 
promotion from within and the preference for hiring new graduates (Lim and Ping, 1979), 
are also used by Japanese firms in Malaysia. But according to Smith (1983), the degree of 
training involved in OJT that is given to local workers is much less compared to that given 
in Japan. However, as far as human relations are concerned Nakano (1985) claims that 
contact between managers and subordinates in Japanese firms operating in Malaysia is very 
frequent. He points out that about 78.2 percent of the managers in Japanese firms have had 
their lunch together with lower level employees in a single-status canteen. 
A more recent study on the old and new competition and Malaysian manufacturing firms 
carried out by Abdullah (1995) reveals that about 57 percent of Japanese firms in Malaysia 
practise QC circles where employees are encouraged to participate in QC meetings. 
Abdullah also claims that the suggestion system has been used extensively by such firms, 
and mentions that Sony and Matsushita have introduced the "suggestion box" approach, 
where employees are encouraged to write in and suggest work improvements. Moreover, 
he describes how some Japanese firms hold competitions for the best suggestion of the 
month as part of the suggestion system promotion programmes. 
205 
Nevertheless, despite the efforts made by the Japanese to promote their brand of 
management, it is claimed that the process has not been very smooth (Imaoka, 1985; Jain, 
1990). Numerous studies (lmaoka, 1985; Smith 1983; Jain, 1990; Koike and Inoki, 1990; 
Chen, 1995) have analysed the nature of the obstacles. One such problem, according to 
these authors, is that the Japanese and Malaysian have different cultural backgrounds and 
religious beliefs. While the Japanese practice Confucianism and Buddhism (Japan's 
official religion is Shintoism), the majority of Malaysians practise Islam. Thus, according 
to these authors, the majority of Malaysian Muslim workers and particularly female 
employees working for the Japanese firms in Malaysia are not keen to share a single-status 
canteen, as they believe it is against their religion to mix with male workers. Soong (1983) 
also claims that most of these Malaysian employees believe that the Japanese model is not 
compatible with the basic tenets of the Islamic faith. 
A second obstacle is a lack of loyalty. According to Jain (1990), it is difficult for the 
Japanese operating in Malaysia to instil concepts of work culture such as loyalty and 
identification with the firms in both skilled and unskilled Malaysian workers because the 
latter do not believe that they should be loyal to their company. Perhaps this helps to 
explain why Japanese lifetime employment has never been introduced in full force by the 
Japanese firms operating in Malaysia. 
A third problem has arisen because of the high mobility of workers in Malaysia. Kawabe 
(1991) claims that as a result, it is difficult to implement practices such as job-rotation and 
on-the-job training (OJT) as these require long-term employment. Kawabe also mentions 
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unlike the Japanese, most Malaysian workers did not hesitate to job-hop when they could 
get better wages and salaries. 
Fourthly, communication barriers between Japanese staff and the local workers also hinder 
the successful implementation of the Japanese model in Malaysia (Imaoka, 1985). 
According to Imaoka, the majority of Malaysians working for the Japanese cannot 
understand the Japanese language and vice-versa, and this is not conducive to close 
working relationships. Although understanding each other's language does not guarantee a 
close relationship between people of different cultures, Smith (1983) argues that at least it 
may enhance a better mutual understanding. Smith claims that as a result of the 
subsequent cultural divide, Japanese staff prefer to form a closed and exclusive circle 
among themselves rather than socialising with local workers. Imoaka (1985) also claims 
that unlike the relationship that exists in Japan, there is no personal relationship outside the 
workplace between Japanese staff and local workers. 
Finally, there are obstacles presented by the Japanese model itself. Imaoka (1985) claims 
that serious conflicts are observed in areas such as managerial authority and decision- 
making processes. The local managers, according to Imaoka, are not happy with the 
decision-making processes, which are highly centralised. He also mentions that decisions 
regarding recruitment, dismissal, promotion and training are decided upon by top Japanese 
management without consulting local managers. Similarly, Abdullah (1995) claims that 
even though there is consultation during the decision-making process, meetings are called 
just to agree on decisions that have already been made at the head office in Japan. 
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To sum up, the early works on Japanese firms operating in Malaysia show the problems 
involved in transferring Japanese policies or practices. But it has to be stressed that these 
concern the early stages of the LEP or in other words the period when the LEP was newly 
introduced. What will be interesting to see is whether or not these problems can be 
overcome through sustained government action via the LEP. 
5.4.2 Malaysian Organisations 
As stated earlier, in this subsection the efforts made by Malaysian organisations to 
promote Japanese management systems in Malaysia are highlighted. Following that, we 
will highlight some of the elements of the Japanese management techniques that have been 
adopted by organisations/companies in Malaysia as a result of these promotions. 
As discussed in Section 5.4, the Japanese model of management was not popular in 
Malaysia in the 1970s. However, by early 1980s the mood had changed with the 
launching of the LEP. It is said that Mahathir administration has used the policy to 
encourage Malaysian managers and the public as a whole to learn the values, norms, work 
ethic, management practices and technology of the Japanese and adapt it to the Malaysian 
situation (Lim, 1984). Since the early 1980s, government campaigns have been intensified 
to promote a public understanding of the policy's objectives. 
The first campaign, which began in late 1982, was known as "Mahathir Restoration". 
According to Hamzah (1990), it was launched because the level of punctuality in the 
government agencies and the public sector enterprises (to a lesser extent in the private 
sector) had become a serious problem. To curb this, the government introduced a punch- 
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card system, which requires all public sector employees in particular, including the Prime 
Minister, to clock in before 8: 00 a. m. and clock out after 4: 15 p. m. each working day. At 
the very beginning, this system faced strong resistance from Malaysian workers but 
Mahathir's pace has not slowed (Hamzah, 1990). Following the punch-card system, the 
government promoted a different work ethic based on Japanese principles of discipline and 
loyalty which they believe would create harmony and a family-type atmosphere at the 
work-place. This was carried out through the use of name-tags for all employees with the 
logo of their respective organisations. Morning exercise, as practised by the Japanese, has 
since been introduced. As a result, a number of private firms' have inculcated the habit of 
singing their corporate song before the morning exercise routine. 
Besides promoting value and behaviour changes among Malaysians, the government is 
encouraging quality and productivity based on the Japanese model in the belief that these 
two areas (quality and productivity) have been the major obstacles to the progress of 
Malaysia (Hamid, 1993). On 27`h November 1989, the government officially launched a 
campaign to introduce quality control circles (QCCs) nation-wide. Unlike in Japan, where 
QCCs are mainly promoted by private firms, the scenario in Malaysia is very different as 
this key role is given to the National Productivity Corporation (NPC) and the National 
Institute of Public Administration (INTAN), which are both government agencies. 
The first step undertaken by the NPC to accelerate the growth of QC circles and to widen 
participation in the movement is to form a QCC Secretariat. Included in this body are 
representatives from the universities, Trade Unions, employers' federations, Institute of 
'One notable example is Interfinance Berhad (local finance company). 
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Engineers and Institute of Quality Control of Malaysia. The NPC has also invited a 
number of companies from the private sector who have experience in QCCs to serve on an 
advisory board. These companies include Matsushita Electric, Goodyear, Dunlop, Hewlett 
Packard and Selangor Pewter. 
The key role of the NPC is to initiate and organise QCC activities, train personnel in QCC 
techniques, disseminate information, provide advisory and consultancy services and to 
register QCCs and their members (Torrington and Huat, 1994: 145). However, until the 
1980s, the promotion of QCCs had only been at national level and it was towards the end 
of that decade that the NPC was been formed in each-State to undertake the promotional 
activities at state level. Since then, Quality Day has been officially celebrated annually by 
all firms and government agencies in Malaysia due to the widespread of NPC branches and 
QCC activities. 
Because of the promotional activities carried out by the NPC and INTAN, it has been 
claimed that QCCs have spread all over Malaysia, that they involve various sectors, 
especially government departments/agencies and ministries, and include various categories 
of employees ranging from office boys, typists, clerks to officers (Torrington and Huat, 
1994: 146). Statistics also show that there were between 300-350 QCCs in the government 
agencies by the end of 1982 and about 1,000 quality control circles by 1984. This figure 
has been increasing ever since (Hamid, 1993: 109). 
In the private sector, Selangor Pewter was among the first local companies to introduce QC 
circles. Later, other firms such as Dunlop, Malaysia Packaging, Pernas Daikin, Kilang 
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Wang Kima Sdn Bhd and Yeo Hiap Seng also introduced their own QC circles. Torrington 
and Huat (1994: 146) claim that several supermarkets have also introduced QCC activities 
in their outlets throughout Malaysia. According to Tong (1986: 44-5), the hospitality 
industry such as the Holiday Inn Hotel chain has also introduced QCCs. He further claims 
that the Holiday Inn Hotel chain has involved the majority of its employees from 
housekeeping and coffee-house to front office in QCC activities. A more recent study by 
Abdullah (1995) on the old and new competition and Malaysian manufacturing firms 
reveals that other, smaller Malaysian firms also practise QC circles. 
Besides QCC, other Japanese practices such as the suggestion system, open office system 
and in-house unions have also been introduced and implemented in Malaysia (Abdullah, 
1995). According to Abdullah, most government agencies and private companies have a 
suggestion box where employees as well as the public can drop in suggestions or concerns. 
Hamidb (1993) claims that the government has also introduced different work ethics such 
as team discussion and teamwork based on Japanese practices. He describes how the 
government has also issued a directive to heads of departments and senior managers in 
Malaysia that they should begin to cultivate and maintain good relationships with their 
subordinates. In building such relationships, these managers are encouraged to spend 
non-work time with subordinates in order to establish informal contact and reduce 
6 Hamid was a formal Secretary to the Government of Malaysia. Therefore, in light of his position at that 
time, his claim should be interpreted with caution as obviously he favours the government. Perhaps it would 
also be appropriate to consider this (claims) as an anecdote. 
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communication barriers (Hamid, 1993). To expedite this process, INTAN has been 
directed by the government to conduct courses pertaining to attitudinal development and 
leadership skills. Helping INTAN, another government training arm, the National Civics 
Bureau in the Prime Minister's Department has also been asked to organise a "Nation 
Building Course" with the objective of inculcating positives values, such as hard work, 
loyalty and discipline as displayed by the Japanese. 
The above review demonstrates the extent to which the government in particular, has been 
quite successful in promoting Japanese management systems especially among the public 
sector enterprises and government agencies. But it is also clear that there is a lack of 
research that shows how successful the government has been in promoting Japanese 
management systems, especially in the manufacturing industry in Malaysia. 
The following sections (Sections 5.5 - 5.6) will discuss two other major issues that the 
Malaysian government has been promoting. They are in-house unionism and Malaysian 
sogoshoshas. 
5.5 The Promotion of the In-House Unionism 
Unlike other Japanese practices, in-house unionism has been given a special emphasis by 
the Mahathir administration. The main reason is because the government strongly believes 
that it is a key factor underlying the Japanese "miracle". Hence, the Ministry of Labour 
(now the Ministry of Human Resource Development) has been instructed to take measures 
to restructure the trade union movement. In-house unionism, rather than industrial or 
occupational unionism, is the model held out for workers, especially those who are, as yet, 
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not members of trade unions in the private sector's new export-oriented industries 
(Arudsothy, 1994). 
What is an in-house union? Aminuddin (1996: 81) defines an in-house union as "one 
where members are all employed by the same employer. This immediately suggests that 
members of such unions can and will be involved in different occupations. " 
The Malaysian government's interest in in-house unionism came about as a result of two 
main events. The first was the 1979 dispute between the Malaysia Airline System Berhad 
(MAS) and its employees, which involved lower-grade MAS employees, including ground 
crew, some cabin crew, clerical staff, and technicians, who were negotiating a new 
collective agreement with the management through their union, the Airline Employees' 
Union (AEU). In late 1978, these employees refused to do overtime so as to press their 
claims for a new agreement. Following the dispute's deadlock, MAS referred it to the 
Ministry of Labour, after which the workers resumed their normal duties. The aftermath of 
the MAS-AEU dispute was a disaster for the union movement, and led to its deregistration 
on 14`' April 1979 (Aminuddin, 1996: 73; Jomo and Todd, 1994: 143). Subsequently, its 
members were split into two new unions, namely, the Malaysia Airline System Employees' 
Union, an in-house union registered on 30`h August 1979; and the Foreign Airlines 
Employees' Union, registered on 24" April 1980. It is also claimed that a revised salary 
scale for MAS employees was announced by the government on the day the AEU was 
deregistered (Jomo and Todd, 1994: 143). However, according to Jomo and Todd, the 
immediate consequence was that the workers were denied any rights to negotiate their 
wages and had to accept the government's offer. 
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The second event was a result of wage differentials between enterprises with different 
productivity and profitability. The government argues that an in-house union is more 
conducive to raising productivity and promoting smooth labour-management relations 
within the context of a company, instead of class solidarity (see Wad and Jomo, 1994). 
Enforcing this, Mahathir said: 
"Some of our companies have just set up and are coming up, but if forced to 
pay the same benefits as the more successful ones, will definitely not succeed. 
Hence, it would be more meaningful for these firms, especially the new ones, 
to have in-house unions which have proved to be a big success in Japan. .. by 
having a union within a firm, the union could negotiate with the management 
concerned, while taking into consideration the various circumstances. And 
with workers totally involved in the company, which would result in increased 
productivity and higher profits, all sectors would benefit, including the 
government through revenue. It would therefore be more meaningful for the 
thousands of workers in firms, and not represented by unions, to have in-house 
unions" (New Straits Times, 6 `h March 1983). 
In 1983, the government officially announced that it would encourage the growth of in- 
house unions. In giving his assurance, Mahathir states: 
"The formation and growth of in-house unions would not be carried out at the 
expense of the supposedly Western, mainly national, industry-based trade 
unions in Malaysia inherited from the late British colonial period. These 
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would continue to co-exist with the supposedly Japanese in-house unions for it 
was not the government's intention to negate the work of trade unions as it was 
well aware of the need for trade unions to protect the legitimate rights of 
workers in the country. But what was equally important was the national 
interest and the need for a successful system suited for Malaysia in its 
development efforts" (New Straits Times, 6"' March 1983). 
Mahathir, as cited in Muzaffar (1983), also claims that in-house unions would protect the 
interest of labour, and develop more harmonious employer-employee relations where 
workers, managers and owners alike would feel that they were part of one "big happy 
family". Mahathir believes that as a result, productivity would increase since everyone 
would be working together and the company would look after their welfare. In support of 
the establishment of an in-house union, the Registrar of Trade Unions (RTU) also claimed 
that such unions would produce leaders who would be much more aware of their 
companies' needs, thus facilitating the introduction of improved productivity programmes 
(RTU, 1983). The RTU added that in-house unions would be less able to compare the 
wages and conditions offered by different employers within an industry, thus reducing the 
pressure on companies with a lower capacity-to-pay to match the higher wages and/or 
better conditions provided by other employers. Recognising this advantage to themselves, 
some employers initiated the formation of in-house unions in order to avoid their workers' 
involvement with established and stronger unions (Jomo and Todd, 1994). 
According to Wad and Jomo (1994), in 1983, two in-house unions were registered. One 
was an in-house union for Petronas workers, although the workers could have joined the 
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National Union for Petroleum and Chemical Workers. The other was an in-house union 
for the textile workers at Tanaka Sdn. Bhd. in Penang, who could have joined the Penang 
Textile and Clothing Workers' Union. By 1984 the number of in-house unions had 
reached 177 and further increased to 199 by 1986. Wad and Jomo (1994) claim that during 
the same period (1984 to 1986), in-house union membership increased from 165,956 to 
180,974. They also claim that by the end of 1988, in-house unions formed 47% of the total 
trade unions in Malaysia. 
With regard to the private sector alone, there were 179 in-house unions with 125,266 
members by the end of 1994. By comparison, in 1985 there were only 52 in-house unions 
with a combined membership of 25,000 (Aminuddin, 1996). According to the same 
author, two of the largest in-house unions in Malaysia are the National Union of Telekom 
Employees and Tenaga Nasional Berhad Employees Uriion. 
Aminuddin (1996) claims that the number of in-house unions in Malaysia has been 
increasing rapidly for a number of reasons. Firstly, most new unions being registered are 
in-house unions, as national unions already exist in all the major industries. Secondly, in- 
house union development has been affected by the attitudes of employers and the 
government, both of whom are more amenable to and more co-operative with in-house 
unions. Thirdly, it is believed that an in-house union is more likely to be appreciative of 
the situation in its own place of employment and with its own employer, and be less 
influenced by "outsiders" such as politicians. As a result, there will develop a closer 
relationship between employer and union, which will lead to more peaceful industrial 
relations. The co-operative spirit so developed will lead to higher levels of productivity, 
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and such an atmosphere should encourage more and continued foreign investment in 
Malaysia. Finally, employers prefer their workers to be represented by in-house unions 
rather than industry-wide unions. 
Jomo and Todd (1994), however, give a different view of why there is an increase in the 
number of in-house unions. They argue the increase is because: (i) the expansion of 
industry-wide union has been limited by the Registrar of Trade Unions (RTU) as the RTU 
is in favour of the formation of in-house unions; and (ii) when workers in a particular 
company start to take an interest in becoming members of a national union, the company 
will take steps to encourage the establishment of an in-house union. 
In terms of which type of union can obtain better benefits for its members, Aminuddin 
(1996) argues that this question is still unanswerable as there are no available data on the 
matter. Table 5.4 shows the comparison of benefits for two companies making tyres, one 
with an in-house union and one whose workers are members of a national union. 
Table 5.4 
Comparison of Benefits Obtained by an In-house Union 
and a National Union? 
Benefit In-house Union National Union 
Bonus 2 3/4 months 2 '/4 months 
Public holidays All All 
Shift allowance RM50-75 RM60-72 
Marriage leave 6 days 4 days 
Working hours per week 45 45 
Source: Ammudtim, 199Ö, p. M. 
'Collective agreements between DMIB Bhd and DMIB Employees Union and Goodyear Malaysia Bhd and 
the National Union of Employees in companies manufacturing rubber products. 
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Despite Mahathir's claims, a number of authors (for instance, Mohamed, 1988; 
Aminuddin, 1996) argue that in reality, in-house unionism has a number of disadvantages 
as follows: (i) in-house unions are generally weak because membership is limited and 
confined to workers in one particular company; (ii) since the leadership of an in-house 
union is chosen from the small number of members, this gives rise to the possibility of the 
employer trying to exploit such leaders; (iii) the union's financial strength will not enable 
it to carry out its normal trade union activities; (iv) there is a fear of victimisation among 
union leaders particularly in relation to promotions, termination of employment, transfers 
and assignment of duties which are management prerogatives; and (v) in-house unions 
with a small membership will be unable to provide scholarships and other social benefits 
for their members (Mohamed, 1988). 
Similarly, Aminuddin (1996) mentions that some companies have found that the process of 
collective bargaining is, in fact, more difficult when dealing with an in-house union 
because of the inexperience and poor negotiating skills of the in-house union leaders. The 
same author points out that the in-house union leaders tend to be ignorant of the bargaining 
process, which requires give and take. Moreover, with their better knowledge of the 
company's financial position the in-house union leaders can be quite stubborn in holding 
out better terms and conditions of employment (Aminuddin, 1996). 
5.6 The Establishment of Malaysian Sogoshoshas 
Another facet of the LEP is the establishment of Malaysian sogoshoshas. Mahathir, as 
cited in Soong (1983), believes that the Japanese sogoshoshas merit emulation as they have 
contributed enormously to the growth of Japan's economy. 
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What is a sogoshosha? According to Yoshihara (1982: 10), "A sogoshosha is a large 
trading firm with many products (not concentrating in one product group, such as textiles 
or steel), it engages in both export and import, it has offices in various parts of the world, 
and wields considerable power in the spheres of marketing and finance. " 
What are the common traits of Japanese sogoshoshas? Lim and Gomez (1994) have listed 
what they believe to be the common traits of major Japanese sogoshoshas. They state that 
most major Japanese sogoshoshas have long histories; most of them were established 
during the Meiji era; they have huge paid-up capitals and high turnover rates; and they 
have extensive world-wide branch networks which employ large numbers of staff. Mitsui, 
for instance, is the oldest sogoshosha, and was established in 1874. By the early 1980s, it 
had 181 offices overseas and employed more than 13,000 employees (Yoshihara: 1982: 2- 
3). Sumitomo was incorporated in 1945 and has 130 offices in 80 countries, and employed 
7,500 employees by the end of 1981 (Malaysian Business, April 1982). Marubeni has a 
paid-up capital of US$145 million and has 49 domestic offices, 80 overseas branches and 
offices, 210 subsidiaries and affiliates in Japan, and 516 subsidiaries and affiliates 
overseas. By the end of 1982, the company employed more than 10,000 employees 
(Business Times, 9"' May 1983). 
There are a number of reasons why the Malaysian government has favoured the 
establishment of sogoshoshas. Firstly, by the early 1980s the Malaysian government 
expected to be unable to stave off global recession much longer. Hence, by forming large 
international corporations, it believed that the repercussions of the impeding recession on 
Malaysia's economy could be curtailed or minimised (Malaysian Business, April 1982). 
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Secondly, the Malaysian government argued that the local incorporation of sogoshoshas 
was necessary because they would play a vanguard role for Malaysia's export-led growth 
drive and act as catalysts for the development of manufacturing, especially resource-based 
industries (Lim, 1983). In addition, the government further maintained that sogoshoshas 
could develop efficient marketing organisations to help Malaysian manufacturers penetrate 
overseas markets, as most of the former possessed neither the expertise nor the resources to 
effectively promote their products independently in overseas markets (Lim and Gomez, 
1994). Besides helping Malaysian manufacturers to promote their products in overseas 
markets, the government also believed that sogoshoshas could assist Malaysian 
manufacturers in two ways: (i) by helping to export the products of Malaysian 
manufacturers and at the same time act as overseas sales and purchasing agents for them; 
and (ii) sogoshoshas could concurrently provide the necessary advice and information on 
overseas market requirements in terms of design, quality and packaging. 
Thirdly, the government also argued that sogoshoshas were necessary because they could 
act as consortiums to cope with larger orders from overseas buyers which single 
manufacturers could not meet. The fact that Malaysian manufacturers have been reluctant 
to commit themselves to large single orders is partly because they have a limited capacity 
to do so, according to Lim (1983). Therefore, by acting as trade intermediaries between 
local manufacturers and overseas buyers, it was believed that sogoshoshas could organise 
and execute larger overseas orders, and at the same time spread out the risks among the 
many manufacturers involved (Lim, 1983). 
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Fourthly, the government further argued that the establishment of local sogoshoshas was 
necessary because they could play an effective role in helping local manufacturers to 
penetrate and promote their products in new markets such as in Latin America, the South 
Pacific, Africa and West Asia. According to Mahathir (as cited in Lim and Gomez, 1994), 
such new markets are not only important for manufactured goods, but also for Malaysia's 
primary commodities. 
Finally, the government argued that sogoshoshas could play an important role in counter 
trade. For example, Mahathir (as cited in Lim and Gomez, 1994), stated that counter trade 
was particularly important for Malaysian manufacturers with foreign exchange constraints 
and having problems exporting their products, particularly palm oil. Recognising this 
problem, Mahathir contended that sogoshoshas were well-placed to conduct counter trade 
because such trading companies could buy and sell products all over the world. Enforcing 
this, Mahathir (as cited in Lim and Gomez, 1994), said that part of the reason why 
Malaysia had not entered into counter trade in a big way was because of the absence of 
sogoshoshas to undertake such tasks. 
In light of the above arguments, the government began to positively encourage the 
establishment of Malaysian sogoshoshas based on the Japanese model of sogoshosha. As 
a result, by the mid 1980s there were six Malaysian sogoshoshas formed and these were: 
Sime Darby Pernas Trading Corporation Sdn Bhd (SDP), a joint venture between Sime 
Darby and Pernas; the Multi-Purpose International Trading Corporation, a merger formed 
between Multi-Purpose Holding Bhd and the Luxembourg giant ITM SA International; 
NASTRA, a joint venture between the Malaysian Mining Corporation, Petronas, Felda and 
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Kuok Brothers; MATRA, a joint venture involving Kumpulan FIMA, Kumpulan 
Perangsang Selangor, United Motor Works (UMW) and Palmco Holdings; the Malaysian 
Overseas Investment Corporation (MOIC), which combined ten big corporate names and 
business leaders, including Malayan United Industries (MUI), MAA Holdings Sdn Bhd 
and Sime Darby; and Perdagangan Antarabangsa Malaysia (PAM), a joint venture between 
Mitsui Co., one of the leading Japanese sogoshoshas, investors from Sabah and Sarawak 
and the National Youth Cooperative (KOBENA). PAM was the first local sogoshosha to 
have an established Japanese partner with vast experience in international trading (Lim, 
1983). 
Despite the strong political will of the government, none of the Malaysian sogoshoshas 
have been successful (Lim, 1983; Jomo, 1994; Lim and Gomez, 1994). One example is the 
Sime Darby Pernas Trading Corporation Sdn Bhd (SDP). Even though the SDP is the 
biggest sogoshosha, it is claimed that it might be a very long time before it will reach the 
status of a fully-fledged sogoshosha (Lim and Gomez; 1994; Jomo; 1994). Part of the 
reason is because the SDP has been capitalised at only RM5 million (Ringgit Malaysia), a 
mere pittance compared with the multi-million dollar investments of a Japanese 
sogoshosha such as Marubeni with a paid-up capital of US$145 million (see Lim, 1983). 
Because of the lack of capital investment, expertise and clear function of the local 
sogoshosas, it is not surprising when a political scientist and renowned critic of the 
government, such as Jomo, argues whether Malaysia really needs any sogoshoshas at all. 
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5.7 The Managerial and Economic Ramifications of the Increased Japanese 
Presence in Malaysia 
This section presents some of the more significant managerial and economic ramifications 
of the increased Japanese presence in Malaysia since the advent of the LEP. 
5.7.1 Management Practices 
Before the LEP, the early days of Malaysian management practices were said to be based 
on the British-style since the early managers in Malaysia were British people who were 
then the ruling group in the country (Yasin, 1990). The British administrators ran the 
government machinery while the British managers ran the rubber estates and tin mines. 
When they left in 1957, their managerial traditions were left behind and the Malaysian 
managers, who had been under the guidance of their British masters, continued them. 
Today, the continuity of the British management system is reinforced by the fact that some 
British multinational companies in Malaysia are still headed by British expatriates. The 
tradition continues to dominate present day managers because those who took over from 
the British had been inculcated by the British system and the majority of them had been 
trained and educated in Britain. For example, of the four Prime Ministers since Malaysia 
obtained her independence in 1957, three of them were British-trained lawyers. Therefore, 
it was only natural for them to favour the British style of management during their tenure 
of office. 
Besides the above, other forms of Western styles of management, such as the American 
style, were also introduced in Malaysia when American investors arrived to set up 
companies and joint ventures in the early 1970s. Thus, American managers who were 
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based in Malaysia brought along with them the American management culture. One 
notable example is IBM. When IBM began its operation in Malaysia, it practised the 
American style of management, as the majority of its top management staff comprised 
Americans. When these managers returned to their home office, the Malaysian managers 
who took over continued their predecessors' style of management, largely because they 
were still under the control of their superiors in the main office in the United States. 
Moreover, the popularity of American style of management in the late 1970s was also 
partly due to the efforts made by American-educated Malaysian managers. Around the 
mid-1970s, the government started sending Malaysian students to the United States for 
tertiary education. When these students came back to work in Malaysia they brought with 
them elements of American management system. 
Towards the beginning of the 1980s, another management style began to make its presence 
felt in Malaysia. It was the Japanese style of management, or also known as the Japanese 
model of management or Japanese management techniques. As already mentioned in 
subsection 5.4.1, earlier studies found that the Japanese companies operating in Malaysia 
had encountered a number of problems when they introduced their brand of management. 
On the one hand, as discussed, this was partly because some elements of the Japanese 
model of management were not compatible with Malaysian culture. On the other hand, it 
was difficult for the Japanese managers to introduce their practices because Japanese 
companies started their operations after their Western counterparts had already established 
theirs, and created their own management style in Malaysia (Kawabe, 1991). 
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According to Kawabe (1991), without realising the strong influence of the Western 
management style, many Japanese managers in Malaysia started to employ local managers 
who operated with Western ways of thinking when the Japanese companies moved their 
production bases to Malaysia in the late 1970s. Soon these managers experienced some 
problems because the contract system, the decision-making process, the style of 
communication, the evaluation of employees, the promotion system and human relations in 
Japanese companies were very different from those they were used to (Kawabe, 1991). 
Similarly, Smith (1994) mentions that many Japanese managers in Malaysia also found it 
difficult to apply their practices among their local workers. But the problem was gradually 
resolved and, with support from the Malaysian government, the Japanese companies in 
Malaysia began to hire Malaysian students who had studied in Japan through the auspices 
of two programmes that started under the LEP. One such programme was the dispatch of 
Eastern Technical Trainees. The first group of 132 trainees selected from government 
organisations, business companies and educational and training organisations went to 
Japan in September 1982. After studying the Japanese language for six months, they were 
then sent for on-the-job training (OJT) in a Japanese organisation for another six months. 
By the end of 1990, about 1,600 trainees had completed the programme (Kawabe, 1991). 
The second programme started when the Malaysian government encouraged students to 
study at Japanese universities and vocational schools. The first batch of graduates from 
higher vocational schools returned to Malaysia in March 1986, and the first batch of 
university graduates in March 1987. These graduates were said to have mastered Japanese 
and understood the culture because they had studied with Japanese students (Kawabe, 
225 
1991). It is also said that by employing these graduates the problems caused by the dual 
structure of Japanese companies in Malaysia were solved because the role of Japanese 
expatriates in translating Japanese systems into Malaysia were readily accepted by these 
graduates or recruits (Kawabe, 1991). 
The important question here is how popular has the Japanese model of management been 
in Malaysia or how far has the Japanese model of management influenced the Malaysian 
management system since the LEP was introduced? There are two very different views on 
this. One view that says the Japanese model of management has been quite popular in 
Malaysia is put forward by Yasin (1990). The other view that says the opposite is stated by 
Kawabe (1991). 
Yasin (1990) in a study on the transferability of Japanese model of management to 
Malaysian public sector enterprises claims that since the implementation of the LEP, the 
Japanese model of management has become popular, especially among the younger 
generation of managers in the Malaysian public sector enterprises. He suggests that this is 
partly because more cadres of younger managers are trained either locally or at Eastern 
institutions of Japan and South Korea. In addition, Yasin points out that the LEP has 
brought a whole new evolution in terms of management styles in Malaysia, and as a result 
there is a widespread adoption of techniques, such as QCCs, job-rotation, on-the-job 
training, the suggestion system and the open office system among the Malaysian public 
sector enterprises. 
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A study by Kawabe (1991) on the problems of and perspectives on Japanese management 
in Malaysia since the Look East Policy was introduced, however, found that the Japanese 
style of management was, in fact, not very popular among most Malaysians. According to 
Kawabe, as Malaysia is a kind of "qualification society" much influenced by British 
tradition, university graduates wanted to be treated differently compared with lower- 
educated employees, and to be given privileges such as their own offices rather than having 
to work in an open office system. Kawabe also mentions that since Malaysian graduates 
have trouble with such treatment within the Japanese companies in which they work, they 
often leave these firms to join Western companies where they are better privileges, 
opportunities for promotion and other fringe benefits. The fact that Malaysian graduates 
prefer to join Western companies also indicates that Western companies in Malaysia have a 
more established reputation compared to the more recently arriving Japanese companies 
(Kawabe, 1991). 
Looking at these two very different views, it is in fact Auite difficult to assess how far the 
Japanese model of management has influenced the Malaysian management system. What 
is clear, however, is that there is no one management style that dominates the management 
systems that are currently being practised in Malaysia. Based on the review of the related 
literature, the "spill-over" effects of the Look East Policy in terms of introducing the 
Japanese model of management to Malaysia, especially among the public sector enterprises 
and government agencies to some extent are evident. In fact, in Malaysia to this day, 
Japanese and Western style management systems can now co-exist. Furthermore, bearing 
in mind that, of course, to a large extent, Western management has borrowed techniques 
from Japanese management - so now we have a kind of integration between West and 
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East. As a result of this integration, the present management system in Malaysia is indeed 
a composite of some major management practices, namely, the Western system, the 
Japanese system and more recently the Islamic system, which together formed a mixed- 
style management system in Malaysia. Perhaps, in the long run, there is a strong 
possibility that Malaysia's very own style of management could emerge since the country 
is similar to Japan in that both have experienced the development of industrial and business 
society prior to the transformation of the traditional social system. Therefore, the values of 
the traditional systems may be applied in management. In Malaysia, for example, the 
traditional idea of mutual aid called gotong-royong and the decision-making process called 
mesyuarat, if applied in an adapted form to business systems, would result in the creation 
of a Malaysian style of management. 
5.7.2 Technology Transfer 
Before we proceed with the discussion on technology transfer, it is important to note that in 
this part of the discussion, we are going to examine the situation in the 1980s, as this was 
the high point of the LEP. 
Technology is defined as "the means or capacity to perform a particular activity" (Chew et 
al., 1992). According to Dunning (1982), technology can exist either in the form of 
material capital (embodied in plant, tools, machinery, or other capital equipment items), 
intellectual capital (knowledge of production, marketing, or financial processes sometimes 
encoded in specifications, blueprints, patents, etc. ), or human capital (specialised skills in 
management, marketing, finance, and the use and creation of new information and ideas). 
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Technology transfer is a misleading concept, according to Takeuchi (1991: 200). It gives 
the impression of a whole set of technology that is complete and transferable like a piece of 
baggage accompanied by a bundle of handbook manuals. Takeuchi defines technology 
transfer as (i) the production of a new commodity or adoption of a new manufacturing 
technology in the recipient country; and (ii) such production or technology made possible, 
or realised, through import or direct investment from abroad instead of through invention 
in the recipient country. 
Dunning (1982) mentions that the transfer of technology covers a wide spectrum of 
activity, from simple importation to operation, repair and maintenance, mastery of 
principles, adaptation and further development. Kimbara (1991: 162) has classified the 
technology involved in the transfer process in a range of activities, from operations to 
design of manufacturing equipment, into nine groups: operation technology of the existing 
production process; maintenance; quality control; improvement of production technology 
and introduction of new technology; production management; modification of existing 
products; design and development of new products; mould development; and development 
of manufacturing equipment and facilities. 
It is important to note that we are not going to deal strictly with the above definition. The 
reason is because when the Malaysians were sent to Japan for training or attending courses 
they learnt not only about technology but also about other things such as management 
skills, Japanese history, culture, work ethic etc. Thus, for ease of presentation we will 
cover some of those in this section although, strictly speaking, they are not technology 
transfer. 
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Due to the heterogeneity and great variety of methods in which technology is transferred, it 
is a convention to measure its flow through the different modes of transfer. These include 
foreign direct investment (FDI), licensing agreements, technical assistance, joint ventures, 
technical journals and the importation of specialised capital equipment. While it is beyond 
the scope of this study to discuss all the modes of transfer we are particularly interested in 
discussing in detail two of these, i. e. FDI and technical assistance or co-operation. The 
main reason is because these are the two modes that the Malaysian government has 
emphasised and moreover more information on them is readily available. 
As far as the government is concerned, the objective of acquiring technological know-how 
from Japan is to advance the industrialisation process and economic modernisation as 
rapidly as possible in order to ensure Malaysians the benefits of modern technology. Since 
the Look East Policy was launched in 1982, foreign direct investment (FDI), particularly 
from Japan has increased rapidly. This is discussed in detail in Section 5.7.3. 
With its launch, the Malaysian government has made transfer of technology a condition of 
contract for the Japanese and other foreign investors. One of the requirements of the 
contract is the establishment of training programmes paid for by foreign companies who 
conduct business in Malaysia. The manner and presumed effectiveness of training for local 
workers proposed in the tender is taken into account in awarding contracts. As a result, a 
number of Japanese, South Korean and other foreign companies have accordingly 
established such programmes in Malaysia. For example, South Korea's Hyundai 
Engineering and Construction has agreed to train 1,000 Malaysian construction workers a 
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year at a centre established in Penang as part of the company's successful 1981 tender to 
do the bulk of the work on the Penang bridge (FEER, 27 `h November 1981). 
In 1983,600 Malaysians were trained in Japan under a similar programme, mostly on a 
short-term basis. In 1984, FUDO Construction conducted a six-week training programme 
for construction personnel as a condition of a contract awarded in Malaysia. This included 
a number of all-day lecture sessions on various aspects of construction planning and 
control and technical topics, as well as several construction site, factory and laboratory 
visits. In the same year, 41 Malaysian government officials were sent to South Korea for a 
nine-month course sponsored by the Hyundai group to study its management practices 
(Machado, 1987). r 
Technical assistance or co-operation between Japan and Malaysia has also been 
emphasised, especially with the establishment of Malaysian's first car project, Proton. As 
Proton is a joint venture company between HICOM of Malaysia and Mitsubishi of Japan, 
Mitsubishi has promised her Malaysian partner the following: construction of the plant; 
starting dates; equity shares; training of Malaysian personnel; and new design changes 
every two years, with model changes once every five years (Jomo, 1994: 270). 
In terms of training Malaysian personnel, out of Proton's 1,300 workers in 1988, a total of 
323 persons, including 250 workers, 55 staff members and 18 managers, were trained in 
Japan by the Mitsubishi Motor Corporation between 1983 and 1986. Of the 323 trainees, 
90 percent were Malays, 6 percent were Chinese and 4 percent were Indians. Of the 323 
trainees that were sent to Japan, 138 received financial support from the Malaysian 
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government as part of the LEP, while another 158 received monetary assistance from 
Proton. In Japan, these trainees attended courses on Japanese history and society. Shortly 
after that, they went to the Mitsubishi Motor Corporation's Mizushima Factory for 
practical operations and engineering training, and stayed in Japan for approximately 12 
months before returned to Proton. By 1986,11 groups in all had been sent to Japan for 6 to 
12 months' training. Besides these groups, Proton also sent their managers to Japan for 
training for periods ranging from 34 to 88 days (Jomo, 1994). 
Besides such technical programmes, two others which are more academically oriented 
were also established between Japan and Malaysia. The first programme, which is called 
Pengajian Jepun (Japanese Curriculum), was designed in conformity with Malaysia's 
national education policy, which in turn is clearly geared to support Mahathir's 
development goals and concerns with value change. By the end of 1985, a total of 230 
degree and diploma students and 1220 trainees had gone to Japan, primarily in the high 
priority fields such as engineering and management studies (Malaysian Digest, 15' 
November 1985). 
The second programme is called the government-to-government programme, whereby the 
Malaysian government pay for participants' transportation costs to Japan and a stipend 
while they are there, while the host government pays for the education or training and some 
of the participants' costs. Participants are sent to Japan with the objective of learning 
technology, management and the work ethic of the Japanese first-hand rather than learning 
them in Malaysia (Machado, 1987). There have been four government-to-government 
programmes for degree students, executives, industrial trainees and technical college 
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students since the LEP was launched. In 1982 University Malaya (UM) launched a 
programme to prepare Bumiputra students to enter Japanese universities. In reponse to 
this, the Japanese government financed the construction of a RM4 million Japanese 
Language Centre on the UM campus and sent six language and nine academic instructors 
to the centre. Students studied Japanese intensively for half a year, then, while continuing 
with language, they took science and social science courses taught by the Japanese 
academic instructors for an additional year and a half. On completion, they went to Japan 
and entered universities as third-year degree candidates in scientific and technical fields. 
Based on the information that is available, the first batch of 39 students from the UM 
Centre went in 1984, followed by another 60 in 1985 and 100 more in 1986 (Machado, 
1987). Upon graduation, almost all of these graduates were employed by Japanese 
companies and they were "used" as a channel to facilitate the transfer of technological 
know-how and managerial skills to Malaysia (Machado, 1987). 
To further encourage the transfer of technology as well as managerial skills, the Malaysian 
government has launched two additional programmes based on executive development and 
industrial training. The former is designed primarily for public sector managers while the 
latter is for professionals (such as engineers), technical instructors, technicians, and 
members of the general work force of both the public and private sectors. 
Based on the information that is available, from 1983, several groups per year, each 
consisting of nine or ten managerial personnel, particularly from the government 
departments and statutory bodies, were sent to Japan for a year or less under the executive 
development programme for individual posting with private and public organisations in 
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areas such as managerial skills. These participants were assigned to companies, 
sogoshoshas, public authorities and co-operatives. On the other hand, under the industrial 
training programme, since September 1982, groups of-about 200 to 250 have been sent to 
Japan about every six months, with individuals staying for four to six months, depending 
on the area of study (Machado, 1987). 
A special programme for the development of technical institutions has also been launched. 
The Metal Industry Technology Centre (MITEC), which was established jointly by the 
Malaysian and Japanese governments in Shah Alam in 1981, was the first institution under 
such a programme. The purpose of MITEC is to improve the level of technology in the 
metal industry, particularly in small and medium-scale firms, in order to enable them to 
meet the demand for higher quality metal products. The Centre also provides technical 
advisory services to factories throughout the country as well as helping them with 
managerial problems. By mid-1984 the Centre had provided such services to more than 
300 manufacturing companies and had organised a regional training programme in 
metalworking technology for Malaysians, Indonesians, Thais and Filipinos. According to 
Machado (1987), 42 Japanese experts were assigned to lecture and give practical training at 
the Centre while 32 Malaysians were sent to Japan for three to twelve-month periods to 
prepare them to become technical consultants to the centre. In August 1984 the Japanese 
left, leaving MITEC completely under Malaysian management. 
Because of the close relationship between Malaysia and Japan since the implementation of 
the LEP, several other government agencies such as the Standard Industrial Research 
Institute of Malaysia (SIRIM), the Palm Oil Research Institute of Malaysia (PORIM) and 
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the Forestry Research Institute of Malaysia (FRIM) have also received expert assistance 
from Japan. 
The SIRIM was the first local agency to receive expert assistance from Japan Electric 
Components Testing Institute (JET) as the two organisations had been working closely on 
the technical co-operation regarding the inspection and testing of electric household 
machinery and equipment. Another local agency, PORIM received expert assistance from 
the Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA). JICA had sent their experts to assist 
PORIM personnel in their research regarding various techniques associated with palm oil. 
Also a recipient of JICA assistance was FRIM, who had been working closely with the 
former on a research project regarding techniques for processing lumber into composite 
products and wood-based panel products, and for the drying and preservation of lumber. 
As a result of this working relationship, Japanese joint venture companies with Malaysian 
private firms were set up to produce wood-based panel products. 
Since the inception of the LEP, JICA has also sent- their experts in human resources, 
manufacturing and forestry to Malaysia (Chew et al., 1992). Among the various technical 
co-operation projects between JICA and Malaysia were: 
9 The Sabah Re-afforestation Technical Development and Training Project 
" The Radiation Applications Project 
" The Development of Biotechnology at the Faculty of Food Science and Biotechnology, 
University Pertanian Malaysia or Malaysia Agriculture University (UPM) 
" The Project for Upgrading Accident and Emergency Care Services at Sarawak 
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9 The Project for the Research and Development ön Diagnosis of Selected Tropical 
Diseases 
" Effective Wood Utilisation Research in Sarawak 
" The Project on the Evaluation and Analysis of Hazardous Chemical Substances and 
Biological Treatment of Hazardous Chemicals 
Despite the efforts made by the Malaysian government to encourage such technology and 
managerial skills transfer from Japan to Malaysia, a number of studies (for instance, Fong, 
1992) found that this is still lacking. This is partly because the Japanese did not consider a 
transfer of this nature among their goals when they invested in Malaysia (Fong, 1992). 
Sim (1978) also claims that Japanese companies operating in Malaysia are reluctant to 
transfer their technology and managerial skills because their original objectives for 
establishing their plants in Malaysia were to take advantage of the surplus cheap labour and 
abundant raw materials. Perhaps because of that, most commentators claim that even with 
the "push" from the Malaysian government, most Japanese companies in operation are not 
very keen to transfer their technological know-how and managerial skills to the Malaysians 
(Jomo, 1983; 1994; Soong, 1983; Fong, 1992). 
5.7.3 Investment 
It is appropriate at this juncture to discuss in detail the character of Japanese investments in 
Malaysia and to draw out its implications for the LEP. Japanese investment in Malaysia, 
like that of other industrialised economies, has contributed to and benefited from both the 
import-substitution (IS) and export-orientation (EO) phases of Malaysia's development. 
According to Denker (1994), Japanese investment in Malaysia can be divided into three 
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phases or periods. The first of these ranges from 1957 to 1969. The second period from 
1970 and ends in 1980, and the final period starts from 1981, and ends in 1986. The first 
period coincides with the leadership of the first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman and 
was generally characterised by laissez-faire policies, except for efforts to encourage 
import-substituting industrialisation. The second period coincides with the leadership of 
the second and third Prime Ministers, Tun Abdul Razak and Tun Hussein Onn, and is 
usually associated with an unusual mix of increased state intervention, public sector growth 
and a foreign-led, export-oriented industrialisation. The final period coincides with the 
current Prime Minister, Mahathir, and has often been linked with the peak period of the 
LEP (Denker, 1994). 
Although the third period ends in 1986 (according to Denker, 1994) our discussion will not 
end at that point but will be extended to beyond 1986. The reason is because we want to 
analyse some of the impact of the investment policies that Mahathir has introduced, as well 
as examine the position of Japanese investment in Malaysia in 1988 and beyond. 
Looking at the earlier development of Japanese investment in Malaysia, it appeared to start 
in November 1959, when the Nozawa Asbestos Cement Company established Marex 
Industries as a joint venture with a local partner. Japanese investment during the early 
1960s did not exceed 26 companies (Kawabe, 1991). However, by the end of 1968, there 
were 48 Japanese companies in Malaysia, 40 of which were joint ventures, with four 
holding pioneer status. By the end of the first period (1969), total Japanese investments in 
Malaysia with pioneer status amounted to US$32.2 million (Denker, 1994). Japan was 
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thus listed fifth among the foreign countries investing in Malaysia in 1969. Table 5.5 
shows the number of Japanese investments in Malaysia between 1957 and 1997. 
Table 5.5 
Javanese Investments in Malaysia, 1957-97 
Year Number Percentage Cumulative % 
Manufacturing 
Pre-1957 11 0.9 0.9 
1957-69 33 -2.7 3.6 
1970-80 104 8.4 12.0 
1981-86 37 2.9 14.9 
1987-93 420 33.7 48.6 
1994-97 640 51.4 100.0 
Total 1245 100.0 100.0 
Non-manufacturing 
Pre-1957 32 5.5 5.5 
1957-69 21 3.6 9.1 
1970-80 70 11.9 21.0 
1981-86 111 18.9 39.9 
1987-93 123 20.9 60.8 
1994-97 230 39.2 100.0 
Total 587 100.0 100.0 
Source: Figures for Pre-1957 to 1993 extracted trom Denker, 1994, p. 4J; figures for 1Yy4 
to 1997 extracted from MIDA Report 1998. 
As mentioned earlier, out of the 54 Japanese companies established between 1957 and 
1969,33 were in the manufacturing sector and 21 in the non-manufacturing sector, and of 
the former, there were 8 in petroleum and chemicals, 12 companies in steel and other 
metals, 4 in wood products, 2 in food, 1 in textiles, 3 in electricals and electronics and 3 in 
transport machinery (Denker, 1994). The concentration of Japanese investments in steel 
and other metals, petroleum, chemistry, and wood products suggests that the Japanese were 
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mainly interested in processing natural resources to supply input for Japanese industry at 
home. The fact that about 71%, or 15 out of the 21 companies outside manufacturing were 
dealing only in foreign trade also suggests that the Japanese' basic interest was in 
supplying raw materials like timber, iron-ore and copper required by the Japanese 
economy. 
During the second period (1970-80) Japanese investment was welcomed by the second 
Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, who adopted the pragmatic view that the more money 
you have, the faster you expedite development. After Tun Abdul Razak, the third Prime 
Minister, Tun Hussein Onn, also welcomed Japanese investment. Thus, it was under the 
administration of these two premiers that Malaysia adopted a policy to woo Japanese 
investors to Malaysia, through, for example, participation in the week-long exhibition 
sponsored by the Southeast Asian Promotion Centre for Trade, Investment and Tourism, 
with facilities provided by the Japanese External Trade Organization (JETRO). To further 
attract Japanese investors to Malaysia, on 11 `" July 1972, a Malaysian seminar was held in 
Osaka and at the same time a Malaysian Investment Centre was opened in Tokyo. ' 
Malaysia's new policy of encouraging Japanese investment saw the establishment of 124 
Japanese companies between 1970 and 1974. In 1973 alone, a total of 40 Japanese 
companies were set up, either on a joint venture basis, or totally Japanese-owned. As of 
1975, there were over 200 Japanese companies, with a-total investment of RM625 million 
(Denker, 1994). However, between 1973 and 1974, there was a sharp drop in Japanese 
investments in Malaysia from RM315 million to RM120 million. This drop occurred 
B New Straits Times, 12`h July 1973. 
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partly because the Japanese investors were reluctant to get involved in fresh overseas 
commitments and also because investment regulations in Malaysia were getting stricter 
(Denker, 1994). 
As the Japanese investors started to shy away from Malaysia, a number of trade missions to 
Japan were made, one of which was under the then Deputy Prime Minister, Mahathir 
Mohamad. During the third period (1981-1986), Japanese investment was further 
welcomed by Mahathir when he launched the LEP. During this time, 37 new firms were 
established in the manufacturing sector, with 8 in transport machinery, 5 in steel and other 
metal products, 4 in petrochemicals, 7 in other miscellaneous manufacturing branches and 
13 in product marketing. However, a significant drop in the number of new manufacturing 
firms was observed compared with the earlier periods due to a decrease in investment 
enthusiasm as a result of a severe recession in the Malaysian economy. Despite that, the 
number of non-manufacturing firms increased to 111 compared to 70 in the preceding 
periods (see Table 5.5 on the previous page). Out of the 111 firms, 46 were in 
construction, 24 in foreign trade, 14 in banking and insurance, 13 in services, 8 in 
transport, 5 in other non-manufacturing and 1 in agriculture and forestry. The basic reason 
for the increase in investment in the non-manufacturing sector was the rapid growth of 
profits from the construction and real property sectors in Malaysia, the former of which 
grew fourfold between 1970 and 1984, with its share of national output increasing from 
3.9% to 5.4%. In this period, its annual growth rate was 9.3% in real terms, i. e. higher than 
the gross domestic product (GDP) growth of 7.9% (Denker, 1994). 
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The overall pattern of Japanese investment over the three periods can be classified as 
follows: in the manufacturing sector are steel and other metals, electricals and electronics, 
petro-chemicals, textiles and textiles products; and in the non-manufacturing sector are 
foreign trade, construction, finance and insurance, and services. Comparing the three 
periods mentioned above, it is observed that Japanese investment in the first period was 
generally oriented to raw material acquisition and trade. In the second period, labour- 
intensive industries employing cheap workers as well as raw material processing and trade- 
related investment became more evident. This reflected economic conditions in Japan after 
1970, with Japanese investors seeking opportunities to increase market shares and export 
competitiveness on the basis of the inexpensive labour and favourable investment 
conditions offered by Malaysia. Then, in the third period, the overall pattern seems to 
show strong concentrations in scientific equipment (46%), electrical and electronic 
products (45%), and machinery manufacturing (41 %). The Japanese share of investment is 
relatively small in the soft drink, tobacco, leather products, paper, printing and publishing, 
chemical and chemical products, rubber products, and furniture and fixtures (Table 5.6). 
The strong concentration in the scientific equipment and electrical and electronic products 
was partly because since the launch of the Look East Policy the government has 
encouraged the development of high technology industries and, at the same time, Japanese 
investors feared that tariff protection could exclude them from Malaysian market. 
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Table 5.6 
Japanese Enterprises' Investments in Malaysia, by Industry and 
Their Ratio to Total Investment (RM'000). 
Industry Japanese 
Investment 
(a) 
Total 
Investment 
(b) 
(b) 
% 
Food manufacturing 91,281 4,642,313 2.0 
Beverages and tobacco 24,423 766,559 3.2 
Textiles and textile products 281,466 2,119,100 13.0 
Leather products 0 73,363 0 
Wood and wood products 113,214 2,135,526 5.0 
Furniture and fixtures 20,640 302,194 0 
Paper, printing, and publishing 21,971 1,329,943 2.0 
Chemicals and chemical products 358,296 3,043,274 12.0 
Petroleum and coal 90,240 1,946,379 5.0 
Rubber products 51,704 1,246,625 4.0 
Plastic products 225,978 1,090,186 21.0 
Non-metallic products 285,895 3,015,664 9.0 
Basic metal products 339,696 2,447,872 14.0 
Fabricated metal products 191,799 1,826,726 10.0 
Machinery manufacturing 353,732 871,207 41.0 
Electrical and electronic products 2,425,979 5,397,822 45.0 
Transport equipment 224,603 1,865,461 12.0 
Scientific and measuring equipment 134,800 294,469 46.0 
Miscellaneous 40,344 307,619 13.0 
Total 5,276,061 34,722,302 15.0 
Source: Malaysia Industrial Development Authority (MIDA), p. 16-2U. 
Why have foreign investors, particularly the Japanese been keen to invest in Malaysia? 
There are, in fact, a number of answers to this question. Firstly, it is because, as 
mentioned, the Japanese investors feared that tariff protection imposed by the Malaysian 
government could exclude them from the local market. Therefore, to avoid this they 
moved their plants to Malaysia (Katano, 1981). Secondly, as discussed, it was to take 
advantage of the abundant raw materials as well as cheap labour (Saravanamuttu, 1983). 
Thirdly, it was because of the scarcity of land in Japap (Meng, 1975). Fourthly, because 
the Japanese wanted to move pollution-intensive industries and those industries with low 
skills, e. g. textiles, out of Japan. According to Goley (1983), in the early 1970s Japan's 
242 
most prestigious business council recommended a strategic restructuring of the Japanese 
economy through the decade. This called for the exportation of low value-added and high- 
pollution manufacturing processes while developing "clean" and "high-technology" 
industries in Japan. Fifthly, foreign investors were attracted by Malaysia's political 
stability (Denker, 1994). 
Finally, the most important reason is perhaps because of the LEP. Unlike the preceding 
explanations, this reason requires more discussion because it is considered both pertinent 
and relevant to this study. The economic development during the 1980s of big projects, 
such as iron and steel works, and problems, such as world recession and the decline of 
market prices for primary commodities, e. g. palm oil, rubber and tin, created financial 
problems for the Malaysian government. To solve these problems the government 
borrowed funds from foreign countries but this only further increased Malaysia's external 
debt to RM21.3 billion (27.8% of GNP) in 1985. Under such circumstances the use of 
private capital, particularly foreign private capital that does not bring financial burden to 
the country, became very important. Recognising its benefits, Mahathir included in his 
Look East Policy's campaign two important items: the promotion of industrialisation and 
the wooing of foreign investment, particularly from Japan. In order to attract foreign 
capital, on 8 `h July 1985 the government decided to relax policies on foreign investment, a 
measure that allowed foreign companies to have 100 percent equity capital if they export 
more than 80 percent of their products and 51 percent of equity capital even if they export 
just 20 percent of their products. 
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Because Malaysia experienced a further blow to the economy in 1985, which shows a 
minus growth figure for the first time since independence, the introduction of foreign 
capital became necessary to stimulate the economy. After Mahathir relaxed policies on 
foreign investment as mentioned earlier, on 30`x' September 1986, he further announced a 
new incentive policy aimed at relaxing the control on foreign capital ratios and on 
expatriate postings. During this time, 100 percent foreign capital was allowed on the 
condition that a company did not produce products competitive with local manufacturers. 
Since then the government has allowed 100 percent foreign ownership to those companies 
that export more than 50 percent of their products, employ constantly more than 350 
people and reflect the ethnic population ratios in Malaysia. Regarding expatriate postings, 
with each new foreign investment of more than US$2 million, five ten-year expatriate 
postings, including one key posting, are automatically allowed. 
The policies, particularly investment policies, introduced by Mahathir have attracted large 
number of Japanese investment to Malaysia. For example, by 1988 Japan had become the 
largest foreign investor in Malaysia, with a share of 25% and by 1989 its share had 
increased to 31.1 %. Even though in 1990 its share had decreased to 28.5 % by 1994 Japan 
had become the second largest foreign investor in Malaysia with its share of 25.3 
(Taiwan came first), and in 1995 Japan once again emerged as the largest foreign investor 
in Malaysia with a share of 22.9%. 
A recent report9, however, shows that the United State of America has overtaken Japan 
with its share of RM6.5 billion. Japan is now second with its share of RM1.1 billion, 
9 Mida recorded RM12.6 billion in FDI last year, The Star Online, February 8,1999 [WWW document]. 
URL http: //www. jaring. my/star/current/08snfeat. html. 
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followed by the Netherlands (RM1.1 billion), Singapore (RM805 million), and Britain 
(614.6 million) (Table 5.7). 
Table 5.7 
Top Five Maior Sources of Investment (1998) 
Country 1998 Percentage 
of Total Foreign 
Investments 
USA RM6.5 billion 51.6 
Japan RM1.1 billion 9.0 
Netherlands RM1.1 billion 8.6 
Singapore RM805 million 6.4 
Britain RM614.6 million 4.9 
Source: The Star, 8`" February 1999. 
Based on the above discussion, it is apparent that to some extent the relaxation of 
investment policies during the Look East Policy's period did manage to attract Japanese 
investment to Malaysia. However, towards the 1990s, the number of Japanese new 
projects or investments to Malaysia slowed down. For example, according to the Export 
Import Bank 1998 survey, the decline in Japanese FDI could be mainly attributed to the 
winding down of high-level FDI activities in recent years by Japanese companies due to 
the economic downturn in Japan and mounting concerns over the Asian crisis. Although 
the number of new projects or investments has declined, on a more positive note a report1° 
shows that Japan registered the highest number in terms of expansion and diversification 
projects, with a total of 92 compared to only 18 projects. According to the same report, 
1° Mida recorded RM 12.6 billion in FDI last year, The Star Online; 8`h February 1999 [WWW document]. 
URL http: //www. jaring. my/star/current/08snfeat. html. 
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proposed Japanese investments in the expansion and diversification projects were also 
higher, at RM785 million compared to RM358.9 million in new projects. 
Besides the relaxation of investment policies, the Mahathir administration has also 
provided investment incentives to encourage foreign investors, particularly Japanese 
investors, to invest in Malaysia. Among some of these incentives are pioneer status, 
investment tax credit, labour utilisation relief, without tax incentive, location incentives, 
export incentives and special incentives for agricultural industries. Pioneer status (PS) is 
given to Japanese companies as well as other foreign companies intending to produce 
goods not already manufactured on a commercial scale in Malaysia. Companies enjoying 
PS are exempt from the 40 percent company tax and 5 percent development tax with a tax 
holiday period of 2 to 5 years, which can be extended to a maximum of 8 years. In 
addition to PS, Investment Tax Credit (ITC) up to 25 percent is granted to companies for 
location, priority products and local content, while Labour Utilisation Relief (LUR), which 
is similar to pioneer status, is granted according to the number of employees. Location 
incentives of up to 10 years are given to companies located in the states of Sarawak and 
Sabah and the "Eastern Corridor" of Peninsular Malaysia, while export incentives are given 
to companies that manufacture goods for the export parket. Besides these incentives, 
companies are also given a pioneer certificate, accelerated depreciation allowances, 
deduction for promotion expenses overseas, increased capital allowance and hotel 
incentives. 
A study by Denker (1994) found that out of 184 Japanese firms established in the 
manufacturing sector in 1987,105 firms had pioneer status, 21 firms had investment tax 
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credit, 1 firm had labour utilisation relief, 53 firms had no incentives, while 4 firms had 
unknown incentive status. In terms of the industrial breakdown, Denker's findings reveal 
the following: textiles and textile products, chemical industry, non-metallic mineral and 
basic metal industries have benefited most from these incentives. Denker also points out 
that 63% of firms in the textile industry, 53% of the firms in the chemical industry, 43% of 
firms in non-metallic mineral products industry and 55% of firms in basic metal industry 
have benefited from pioneer status. 
The latest addition to the incentives mentioned earlier is the reinvestment allowance (RA). 
RA is granted to manufacturing companies which incur qualifying capital expenditure for 
the expansion of production capacity, modernisation and upgrading of production facilities, 
and diversification into related products. The RA is in the form of an allowance of 60% of 
the capital expenditure incurred by these companies. The allowance can offset 70% of the 
statutory income in the year of assessment. Any unabsorbed allowance is allowed to be 
carried forward to subsequently years until it is fully utilised. Companies that reinvest in 
promoted areas in the states of Sabah and Sarawak and the "Eastern Corridor" of 
Peninsular Malaysia are allowed to utilise the allowance fully to offset the statutory income 
for the year of assessment. To encourage companies to reinvest in equipment which can 
significantly improve their productivity level, an allowance of 60% can be used fully to 
offset the statutory income, similar to the scheme granted to the "Eastern Corridor" of 
Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak. 
Besides the incentives mentioned above, the government also offers industrial estates and 
free trade zone facilities (FTZ). Industrial estates provide a basic infrastructure such as 
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roads, water, power and telecommunications facilities to manufacturing companies. 
According to the half-yearly survey by the Malaysian Industrial Development Authority 
(MIDA), by 151 July 1996, a total of 206 industrial estates had been established throughout 
the country to cater to the needs of manufacturing companies. These industrial estates 
were developed by government agencies, namely, the States Economic Development 
Corporations (SEDCs), Regional Development Authorities (RDAs), port authorities and 
municipalities. In addition to the existing industrial estates, 59 new ones are being planned 
by the government agencies to meet the increasing demand for industrial land. 
Free trade zones (FTZs) are specifically designed for manufacturing establishments 
producing or assembling products essentially for export. The objective of providing FTZs 
or free zone facilities to export-oriented industries is to enable them to enjoy minimum 
customs control and formalities in their import of raw materials, parts, machinery and 
equipment as well as in the export of their finished products. To date, twelve FTZs have 
been established, namely, Bayan Lepas, Prai, Prai Wharf, Batu Berendam, Tanjung Kling, 
Sungei Way, Ampang Hulu Kelang, Telok Penglima Garang, Johor Port Authority 
Industrial Land, Jelapang, Kinta and Muara Tabuan (MITI, 1997). Manufacturing 
companies to be considered for locations in FTZs are: (i) those whose entire products are 
meant for export (however, in exceptional circumstances companies exporting not less than 
80% of their products can be considered for location in the FTZs); and (ii) those whose raw 
materials or components are mainly imported. Although that is the case, the government 
encourages companies located in FTZs to use local raw materials or components wherever 
possible. Out of 416 Japanese companies investing in Malaysia in 1987,106 were 
established in free trade zones and industrial estates, while 310 firms were located outside 
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them. According to Anazawa (1994), most of the- Japanese companies investing in 
Malaysia in the first half of the 1970s established themselves in the free trade zones, 
mainly in Selangor. By the mid-1970s, other Japanese companies such as the Torey group 
were established in the Prai free trade zone in Penang, while Toyobo was established in 
Perak and Kedah. Because of the concentration of Japanese companies in developed 
regions, such as Selangor and Penang, where a well-developed infrastructure already 
existed, a number of authors have claimed that Japanese investment did not serve to reduce 
regional differences and local poverty (Saravanamuttu, 1983; Denker, 1994). 
Another facility that is quite similar to the FTZs are licensed manufacturing warehouses 
(LMWs). The government has allowed the setting up of a LMW where the establishment 
of a FTZ is neither practical nor desirable. To be eligible for a LMW, a company has to 
meet the following requirements: (i) its entire products are meant for export or no less than 
80% of its production must be intended for export markets; and (ii) its raw materials or 
components must be mainly imported. 
The latest facility provided by the government is the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC), a 
15-by-50 kilometre zone extending south from Malaysia's present national capital and 
business hub, Kuala Lumpur, is a "perfect" environment for companies wanting to create, 
distribute and employ multimedia products and services. The MSC brings together four 
key elements: 
9 The best possible physical infrastructure, including Kuala Lumpur City Centre, a new 
world-class airport and integrated logistics hub, rapid rail links to Kuala Lumpur, a 
`smart' highway, and two new `intelligent' garden cities 
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9 New laws, policies and practices designed to enable and encourage electronic 
commerce, facilitate the development of multimedia applications, and position Malaysia 
as the regional leader in intellectual property protection 
" High-capacity global telecommunications and logistics infrastructure built on the 
MSC's 2.5 gigabit-to-10 gigabit digital optical fibre backbone and using the latest ATM 
switches to provide fibre to the Buildings. This network will have a 5-gigabit 
international gateway with direct links to the US, Europe, and Japan, as well as to other 
nations in ASEAN 
" Fully empowered one-stop shop - the Multimedia Development Corporation (MDC), 
created to manage and market the MSC 
Thus, it can be concluded that besides Malaysia's- sound economic policy, political 
stability, and cheap but educated labour resources, the relaxation of investment policies and 
investment incentives under the LEP remain the major attraction points in attracting 
foreign investors, particularly from Japan. In fact, it can be said that the government, via 
its LEP, has been very generous to the Japanese, so much so that they dominated the 
Malaysian manufacturing sector until the late 1980s. 
Being the major player, Japanese investment in Malaysia has had both its positive and 
negative effects. The positive effects were that Japanese investments contributed to the 
Malaysian economy not only by making linkages among sectors, cultivating human 
resources, and spurring the relaxation of regulations but also by creating new job 
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opportunities. For example, between 1991 and 1995, Japanese investments created a total 
of 129,220 new jobs (Table 5.8), and were also partly responsible for making Malaysia one 
of the leading exporters of electronic products. For example, in 1995 Malaysia exported 
RM82.094 billion worth of electronic products and by 1996 this had reached RM87.805 
billion. " The electronic industry is now a leading contributor to Malaysia's 
manufacturing, employment and exports and has attained a high profile among the 
principle industries in Malaysia. 
Table 5.8 
Javanese Investment in Approved Proiects (1991-1995) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Total 
Number 181 146 133 204 175 839 
Employment 38,305 19,931 20,791 32,952 17,241 129,220 
Investment 
(RM Million) 3,705.9 2,684.2 1,661.2 1,765.2 2,096.3 11,912.8 
Source: MIDA. 
Despite its positive effects, there have also a number of negative implications of Japanese 
investments in Malaysia. It has been argued that these arose from the fact that the Japanese 
shifted their low-valued added and high-pollution industries to Malaysia (Denker, 1994). 
Saravanamuttu (1983) claims that Japanese firms in Malaysia were not noted for liberal 
skill transfer policies as far as Malaysian firms were concerned. According to the same 
author, the fact that most Japanese companies were located in free trade zones of well- 
developed states such as Selangor/KL and Penang did not serve to reduce regional 
differences and local poverty as requested by the Malaysian government. 
" Sarawak Tribune, 16`h September 1997. 
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Similarly, Jomo (1994) mentions that the tendency of the Japanese companies to 
concentrate in developed states and major towns shows that infrastructural facilities and 
other advantages were still generally more important to Japanese companies than were the 
benefits of locational incentives. Thus, a number of authors (Saravanamuttu, 1983; Jomo, 
1994; Denker, 1994) concur that Japanese investments have had a tendency to further 
exacerbate patterns of uneven and unequal regional growth within Malaysia. 
5.8 Problems Associated with the Look East Policy 
Despite the government's deliberate efforts to promote its LEP, a number of problems 
seem to have emerged. Firstly, the policy seems to lack support from older generations, as 
they believe that the LEP favours the Japanese1z (Jomo, 1983; 1990; Saravanamuttu, 1983; 
Rajendran, 1993; Smith, 1994). Besides the lack of support from the older generations, it 
is also claimed that the LEP has little support from non-Malays, particularly the Chinese 
community in Malaysia (Lim, 1984; Jomo, 1994). There are two main reasons for this. 
One is because the LEP is said to contain racial objectives (Lim, 1984). According to Lim, 
because the policy is pro-Bumiputra, out of 373 trainees who were sent to Japan between 
1982 and 1983, none of them were Chinese. The second reason is because the government 
is believed to strongly favour Japanese investors (Lim, 1984). For example, Lim (1984) 
claims that since the LEP, many construction companies which were previously been 
controlled by Chinese, have been rapidly replaced by the Japanese and this factor alone has 
encouraged the Chinese community to disfavour the policy. 
12 As mentioned earlier, many members of the older generation experienced Japanese aggression during 
World War II, which caused not only physical damage but also "moral trauma" and this experience is still 
"fresh" in many Malaysians' minds creating a reluctance to have dealings with their former enemies. 
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Secondly, the LEP seems to have encountered problems over the issue of religion and 
cultural beliefs (Hamzah, 1990). According to Hamzah, most Malaysians believe that the 
policy is unrealistic. This is because being Muslim-dominated country, most Malaysians 
believe that some Japanese management techniques conflict with the Islamic faith. In fact, 
some conservative Islamic Malays have asked "why must we look to the East and does it 
mean we always have to behave like Samurai? "" Hamzah (1990: 89) further argues that 
the LEP is not realistic because of the disparities between Japanese and Malay traditions. 
According to the same author, by emulating Japanese management techniques, work ethic 
and values, Malays must lose some of their traditional characteristics of tolerance and 
compromise and be more ruthless and business-minded. Hamzah further points out that as 
Malays they might be able to do this without risking loss of identity, but could they do it as 
Muslims as well? 
Thirdly, the LEP also seems to have incurred problems with Japanese management 
systems. Since the policy was launched, a number of Japanese company personnel have 
come to Malaysia and introduced their brand of managerial practices as well as work ethic. 
However, a number of authors (for instance, Saravanamuttu, 1983; Jomo, 1983; Hamzah, 
1990; Teik, 1995) argue that these practices are far from exemplary. According to these 
authors, the testimony of several Malaysian workers working for Japanese companies 
reveals some unpleasant aspects of Japanese management practices and work ethic. 
Moreover, a report in a local newspaper mentioned that more than 20 Malaysian workers 
had been unlawfully dismissed by a number of Japanese companies (The Star, 14' August 
1982). The same paper also reported that an engine driver claimed that the Japanese 
" Japan Times International, 4' September 1994. 
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looked down on the locals and it was further reported that some Japanese managers had cut 
the allowance of Malaysian workers who were working for them without giving any good 
reason (The Star, 14"' August 1982). Although these claims have not been verified in 
detail, and may in themselves may be minor, nevertheless, these reports have created a 
perception in the Malaysian media that has led to anti-Japanese feeling. In the light of 
these accusations, Saravanamuttu (1983) suggests that whatever the merits of Japanese 
work ethic, as practised in their own country, there appears to be little of value to emulate 
from Japanese company personnel who operate in Malaysia. The same author also claims 
that the Japanese firms have not provided any impetus for creating the kind of industrial 
relations sustaining the work ethic and attitudes that the LEP seeks to promote. 
Fourthly, problems materialised when in-house unionism was introduced. As mentioned 
earlier, the government claimed that in-house unions would be in the best interest of the 
employee but this has met with criticism. For example, Muzaffar (1983) claims that "if the 
labour situation in Japan is what has inspired the Malaysian government to propose in- 
house unions, then workers in Malaysia have every reason to be concerned. This is 
because the majority of Japanese workers are not as well looked after as it is made out to 
be. " Muzaffar further claims that thousands of Japanese workers are fired every day and 
this is particularly common among (i) female employees who marry and have children; and 
(ii) older employees in firms that are no longer making huge profits. The same author 
points out that to recognise and adopt Japanese in-house unions without looking after the 
welfare of employees would be meaningless. He says what Malaysia needs to do is to 
provide incentives and a good welfare system in order to encourage employees to work 
hard. 
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As stated previously, Mahathir has stated that the LEP would not adversely impinge upon 
the activities of industrial unions. However, it is argued that it has become apparent that 
the objective of the policy is to interfere in the activities of the existing unions as far as 
possible (Muzaffar, 1983). For example, in October 1983, a claim by the National Union 
for Petroleum and Chemical Workers (NUPCW) for recognition on the grounds that it had 
obtained majority support among the four thousand workers at the Petronas plant, was 
rejected out of hand. The NUPCW subsequently accepted this decision without any further 
struggle and decided to direct its organisational effort elsewhere (New Straits Times, 12" 
March 1984). In another example, workers at Tanaka Sdn Bhd had previously been 
organised by the Penang Textile Workers' Union (PTWU), which was then deregistered in 
1979 after its members took part in an illegal strike. A subsequent bid by the PTWU to 
represent the mainly female workforce was turned down, and although the PTWU then 
took this up through three major organisations, namely, the Malaysian Trade Union 
Congress (MTUC); the Textile Workers's Asian Regional Organisation; and the 
International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers' Federation, such action failed to 
secure a reversal of the RTU's decision. Subsequently, plans to amalgamate the five 
regional textile unions in Peninsular Malaysia into a single national union were abandoned 
for a more defensive strategy of maintaining the status quo, though a national federation 
was eventually formed in the late 1980s (AWSL, 1985). 
Fifthly, the LEP has also been criticised with regard to the transfer of technology as well as 
managerial skills. The government claimed that through Japanese investment, advanced 
technology from Japan would be transferred to Malaysia. However, according to the 
former Finance Minister, Tunku Razaleigh Hamzah, the supposed transfer of technology as 
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claimed by the government is illusory. He says: "Foreign companies are still bogies.. . they 
have not transferred their technology to our people, they have not brought in capital, they 
are relying on domestic funds and borrowing from banks here, and they have not trained 
our people. They are still the same. " (FEER, 1983). Fong (1992) shares this view, 
claiming that Japanese investors are not keen to transfer either their managerial skills or 
technology to the Malaysian workers. One example, as reported in a local newspaper, was 
the construction of the RM2 billion Bintulu LNG plants during the second half of 1981. 
One of the requirements in securing the tender was that more locals had to be employed. 
But according to a newspaper report, instead of employing more locals, Japanese 
construction firms hired more than 5,000 or over 45 percent of the total workforce from 
Korea to help them meet their deadlines (New Straits Times, 29th July 1982). 
With Japanese firms virtually monopolising construction tenders in 1981 and 1982, the 
same article inquires "... whether Malaysians have benefited from this huge influx of 
foreign enterprise, has there been any transfer of technology to the Malaysian workers? 
There is nothing written into any of the contracts of the Japanese or Korean companies to 
indicate that there must be a transfer of technology, and as such there is no formal training 
of Malaysian personnel. " Questioned about this, a Japanese director could only offer the 
weak argument that "in the normal course of working side-by-side with foreigners, 
Malaysians have picked up sufficient skills. " (New Straits Times, 29`' July 1982). 
The case of Perwaja Trengganu Sdn. Bhd. was another example. This project involved a 
total capital investment of about RM830 million. Although the Japanese capital 
involvement was only 30 percent of the total investment compared to 70 percent of 
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Malaysian's investment, they were, in fact, running the show. They provided the 
technology, machines, technical expertise and even the administrative know-how, the later 
being rendered only in the company's infant stage (New Straits Times, 28"' July 1982). 
Saravanamuttu (1983) may therefore have been right to argue that such monopolistic 
behaviour on the part of the Japanese could hardly provide opportunities for Malaysian to 
learn. 
In fact, according to Fong (1992), the Japanese and Koreans investors came to Malaysia 
merely because they were attracted by Malaysia's incentives for export and the various 
subsidies provided to the free zones, as well as hoping to take advantage of the cheap 
labour rather than transferring their technology and managerial skills. Because of that, 
such motives resulted in discontentment between local contractors and the government 
(Fong, 1992). 
Besides the dissatisfaction caused by the Japanese investors, their investment patterns also 
caused uneven economic growth in Malaysia (Saravanamuttu, 1983). As mentioned 
earlier, the Japanese companies were concentrated in the developed West coast states and 
major towns in Malaysia rather than the less developed states. Saravanamuttu claims that 
this "stubborn" attitude on the part of the Japanese investors not only shuttered the Look 
East Policy's objective of inculcating loyalty and consensus but also as stated previously, 
the government's objectives of spreading development to the poorest states. 
Finally, the LEP seems to be facing difficulties in terms of its future direction. Because the 
policy is so closely associated with the current Prime Minister, its post-Mahathir future is 
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in question. When a transfer of leadership will occur cannot be predicted. However, it can 
be noted that Mahathir today faces problems on a number of fronts, such as the recession- 
imposed limits on realising the Fifth Malaysian Plan (1986-1990), the continuing problem 
of Islamic fundamentalism, the Mahathir-Anwar conflict, and the recent economic crisis 
that has hit the Malaysian economy. Perhaps, as a consequence of these issues, Mahathir 
has not only toned down the rhetoric of the early LEP and modified its interpretation but he 
has also distanced himself from it. This was evident as early as 1985, when at the same 
time as putting forward the LEP, efforts were made to identify with the distinctiveness of 
Malaysia, including the Islamic policy. It will be interesting to look later on at the extent 
to which these two policies could co-exist. 
From the foregoing review, it is apparent that the state in Malaysia has been quite 
successful in encouraging foreign investors, in particular from Japan, to invest in Malaysia, 
despite the problem of the LEP, because of the strength of the state and its commitment to 
economic policies and development. Hence, on this basis, our general hypothesis would be 
"The Look East Policy might have had some success in promoting Japanese management 
techniques to manufacturing firms in Malaysia, despite the difficulties of transferring 
management practices between different countries, because of the strength of the state in 
Malaysia and its commitment to such a policy. " 
5.9 Conclusion 
Having reviewed the related literature, the following conclusions are drawn. Firstly, it is 
apparent that the state in Malaysia has played two major roles; one as a driving force in 
economic development, the other as a driver in changing culture or people's attitudes in 
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order to encourage the adoption of the Japanese management system. In promoting 
economic development, the literature has shown that the state has adopted a number of 
powerful policies especially to woo foreign investment, and particularly from Japan, to that 
effect, there is evidence that the state has been quite successful. In inspiring a change in 
culture or people's attitudes, the literature has also demonstrated the commitment of state 
in Malaysia. That is, it has strongly involved itself and has taken a number of major steps 
in its effort to promote the Japanese management techniques in Malaysia. Among some of 
the major steps taken by state are the "famous" campaign called "The Mahathir 
Restoration", whereby the state called upon both -Japanese firms in Malaysia and 
Malaysian organisations to get involved in promoting the Japanese management system, 
setting up training institutions for human resource development, and setting up economic 
institutions similar to those in Japan. As a result of this strong state commitment, some 
literature has provided evidence of the state's success in promoting Japanese management 
systems especially among the public sector enterprises and government agencies. 
Secondly, although it is apparent that as a result of state commitment some elements of the 
Japanese management techniques have been adopted, none of the literature has effectively 
argued whether or not the state, via its Look East Policy, has been successful in the 
promoting Japanese management system in the manufacturing industry in Malaysia. 
Finally, because of the lack of in-depth and effective arguments pertaining to how 
successful the Look East Policy has been in terms of encouraging management in 
manufacturing firms in Malaysia to adopt the Japanese management techniques, it is 
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obvious that there is a gap in this field of study that needs to be researched. As a result, 
this study aims to fill this gap. 
In Chapter 6 the background information on Malaysia and its manufacturing sector is 
discussed. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
MALAYSIA: THE BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND 
THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
6.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to discuss two important issues: (i) the multi-racial and 
multi-cultural society in Malaysia; and (ii) the importance of the manufacturing sector in 
the Malaysian economy. This chapter is therefore divided into two parts. Part one 
discusses the profile of Malaysia, and includes details about the country, the people and 
language, and the religion. Part two discusses the issues pertaining to the manufacturing 
sector in Malaysia, among which are the industrialisation process, the manufacturing 
sector's contribution to the economy, types of industries, the principal markets for 
manufactured exports, and employment and investment in the manufacturing sector. 
Part I 
6.2 The Profile of Malaysia 
6.2.1 The Country 
Malaysia is strategically located in the heart of Southeast Asia, with an area of 329,750 sq. 
km (127,581 sq. mile), consisting of two non-contiguous areas: Peninsular Malaysia on the 
Asian mainland, and the states of Sarawak and Sabah, together known as East Malaysia on 
the island of Borneo (see Figure 6.1 at the end of this section). The total boundary length 
of Malaysia is 7,344 km or 4,563 miles. This dynamic young nation is well-serviced by all 
major air and shipping lines. The easy access to the rest of the world has today made 
Malaysia an attractive centre for trade, investment and tourism. In a steadily expanding 
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economy before badly affected by the 1998 crisis, Malaysians have enjoyed a high 
standard of living. Per capita income in 1997 was RM12,142'. 
Before Malaysia (at that time called Malaya) gained independence in 1957, it was ruled by 
the British, then briefly by the Japanese before being taken over by the British again. The 
British influence in Malaya started when they founded the port of Georgetown on the 
Island of Penang in 1786. In 1819, they founded another colony, Singapore, primarily to 
safeguard the safe passage of their trade vessels from China. In 1824, a treaty was drawn- 
up between the Dutch and the British, in which Malacca was handed over to the British 
while the Dutch gained full control of the British settlements in Indonesia. 
Despite controlling Penang, Singapore and Malacca (known as the three Straits 
Settlements) the British began to influence the rulers of other Malayan states to join in as a 
federation with Kuala Lumpur as its capital. The proposal for a federation was initially 
seen as a "protectorate" arrangement whereby the British provided the Malay rulers with 
protection from foreign threats, particularly from the Siamese. However, shortly after the 
agreement was signed in 1895, the British began to take control of the four Malay states, 
namely, Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Pahang. Later, when the Siamese Empire 
was forced to give up its dominance of the northern Malay states, the British colonial 
boundary was enlarged to include Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Terengganu. Later the 
Johor sultanate decided to join as a British colony. On the eve of the First World War, the 
British completed their colonisation of all the Malay States to form the Federation of 
Malaya, which consequently gave Britain control over the Federation's resources. The 
' 1996 figure (1US$ = RM2.50); 1998 figure (1US$ = RM3.80). 
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sultanates of northern Borneo (Brunei, Sabah and Sarawak, the latter ruled by James 
Brooke and his heirs) later became British protectorates, administered from Singapore, but 
without any formal ties with the Federation of Malaya. 
The colonial administration in Malaya set up a three-band education system; each band 
designed specifically for the Malays, Indians and Chinese -a colonial strategy of 
disintegration (Jomo, 1990), and this "divide and rule" policy remain prominent in the 
economy too; the Malays stayed mainly in rural agriculture, while the Chinese worked in 
tin mines and the urban service sectors and the Indians worked on the rubber estates. The 
British administration had openly encouraged Chinese (and to a lesser degree, Indian) 
immigration to the ports along the straits which resulted in large numbers of Chinese 
arriving to work the tin mines and service the urban ports. When rubber cultivation was 
introduced in Malaya in 1877, the British brought in Indian immigrants to work in the 
rubber plantations through what is called the "kanggani system" whereby the 
proletarianised immigrants formed a formidable labour force over which the British had 
direct control. 
The political climate of the colony started to change after the brief Japanese Occupation 
(see Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion on Japanese Occupation) during the Second World 
War when the British failed to subdue the nationalist movements of the Malays as well as 
the movements of the communist guerrillas. Seeking a compromise solution, the British 
then proposed the Malayan Union with equal citizenship for the Bumiputras and the 
immigrants. This proposal however threatened the position of the Malays, and in 
retaliation the Malay nationalists decided to form a new political party known as the United 
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Malay National Organisation (UMNO) in 1946. The Chinese followed suit to form their 
own political party called the Malayan Chinese Association (now called the Malaysian 
Chinese Association) (MCA). In the 1952 municipal elections, the UMNO and the MCA 
formed an alliance and defeated the Malayan Independence Party; a pan-ethnic party which 
was propagated and supported by the British. The alliance was later broadened to include 
the Malayan Indian Congress (now called the Malaysian Indian Congress) (MIC), and 
succeeded in winning elections nation-wide, except in Singapore, where Lee Kuan Yew's 
socialist party was victorious. 
Faced with political pressure from the nationalists as well as the insurgence of the 
communist threat, the British finally decided to negotiate for the colony's own rule, 
resulting in Malayan independence on 3151 August 1'957. Its first Prime Minister was 
Tunku Abdul Rahman. In 1963, the other British colonies of Singapore, Sabah and 
Sarawak obtained their independence and joined Malaya to form a federation of states 
known as Malaysia. However, because of major disagreements over ethnic policies, in 
1965 Singapore broke away from the federation to become an independent republic, while 
Malaysia was left with thirteen states and the federal territories of Kuala Lumpur and 
Labuan. 
In terms of the ruling parties since independence, the National Front, the ruling coalition 
between three major political parties, i. e. United Malay National Organisation (UMNO), 
Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC)z, 
representing the multi-racial composition of the country, commands a two-thirds majority 
2 UMNO mainly represents the Malay community, while MCA and MIC represent the Chinese and Indian 
communities respectively. 
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in Parliament. This has ensured in Malaysia a strong, stable government committed to the 
development of the country. The government's vision for Malaysia to become a fully- 
developed nation by the year 2020 in every sense of the word, i. e. economically, 
politically, socially, spiritually, psychologically and culturally, is currently the country's 
most far-sighted goal. 
Figure 6.1 
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6.2.2 The People 
Malaysia's cosmopolitan population of 21.2 million is a unique mix of two main 
categories: those with cultural affinities indigenous to the region and to one another, who 
are classified as Bumiputra; and those whose cultural affinities lie outside, who are 
classified as non-Bumiputra. ' 
The Bumiputras (meaning the son of soil) are highly differentiated. There are three broad 
categories: Aborigines (Orang Ash); Malays; and Malay-related. The Orang Ash represent 
the oldest element in the population but survive only. in small numbers and in scattered 
groups, mainly in the Malay Peninsula. The Malays form the predominant ethnic group in 
the Malay Peninsula, a substantial minority in Sarawak and a smaller group in Sabah. 
Other ethnic groups regarded for practical purposes as Malays, and most of whom have 
settled in the country (mainly in the Malay Peninsula) since 1850, include the Javanese, 
Banjarese, Boyanese, Bugis and Minangkabau. Into the same category also falls the Bajau 
of Sabah. The quick assimilation of these groups into the Malay community is a result of 
common cultural traits and the bond of Islam. 
The third or non-Malay Bumiputra category consists of ethnic groups found in Sarawak 
and Sabah. In Sarawak, the largest of these are the Iban, while others include the Bidayuh, 
Melanau, Kenyah, Kayan, Kelabit and Bisayah. In Sabah, the Kadazan (Dusun) form the 
largest single ethnic group, with the Murut, Bisaya and Kedayan forming significant 
' Malaysia your profit centre in Asia-The People [WWW document]. URL 
http: //202.185.160.3/profit/people l. html 
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minorities. These groups represent peoples of the same basic stock who entered the 
country during the period of early migration. ' 
The non-Bumiputra groups consist primarily of the Chinese and the Indians, with much 
smaller communities made up of Arabs, Sinhalese, Eurasians and Europeans. The Chinese 
population of Malaysia is derived largely from South China, with the Cantonese and 
Hokkien forming the largest dialect groups. Among the Indians, the largest group are the 
Tamils from South India and Sri Lanka, with significant Sikh and Malayalee minorities. ' 
The indigenous groups form about 54% of the population, with Malays constituting about 
48% of Malaysia's population. The Chinese and the Indians form 34% and 9% of the 
population respectively. The different groups or races in Malaysia differ from each other 
in terms of religion, culture, languages, customs, etc. As can be seen, Malaysia is indeed a 
multi-cultural society. 
Malaysia has a young population, 42% of the country's population falls within the 15 to 39 
age groups, and with most Malaysian youths having at least 11 years of secondary 
education, the nation has the advantage of a young, educated and productive workforce. 
The country's total labour force was about 8.6 million in 1997. The services sector was the 
biggest employer providing 48% of total employment. The second largest sector in terms 
of providing employment is manufacturing with 28%, and is fast catching up with the 
'Information Malaysia 1997 Yearbook, p. 62. 
'Ibid., p. 62. 
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services sector. Other sectors are agriculture 15% and construction 9.1%6 (see Section 
6.3.5 for further details). 
6.2.3 Language and Religion 
The national language of Malaysia is Bahasa Malaysia. Since 1972, Malaysia and 
Indonesia have adopted a single system of spelling, which is in use today and this new 
version is called Bahasa Baku. Bahasa Malaysia and Bahasa Baku are very similar except 
that there are few changes in both the spelling and pronunciation. While Bahasa 
Malaysia/Baku is the national language, English is taught in schools as a second language. 
Other languages taught include Mandarin and Tamil. 
Business communications are normally either in Bahasa Malaysia (in government statutory 
bodies) or in English (in the private sector). Most Malaysians are at least bilingual, and a 
large number of them can both speak and write English. Other major languages spoken 
include various Chinese dialects and Tamil. Each indigenous group also has its own 
dialect. 
Although it is an Islamic state, the Malaysian Constitution guarantees freedom of worship. 
As a result, Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism are the three other main religions in 
multi-racial and multi-cultural Malaysia and it is therefore not uncommon to see many 
mosques, temples and churches throughout the country. 
6 Malaysia your profit centre in Asia-The People [WWW document]. URL 
http: //202.185.160.3 /profit/people I. html 
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In terms of national holidays, there are about 12 of these and governed by the Muslim 
calendar, which varies from year to year in relation to the Western calendar. The main 
holidays of the other religions are also observed. In some states with predominantly large 
Muslim populations, the weekend is on Thursday afternoon and Friday for most public and 
private institutions, except for the larger multi-national business concerns, which have to 
follow the international work-week. 
Part II 
6.3 The Manufacturing Sector - An Overview 
As mentioned earlier in Chapter 5, since independence, the Malaysian economy has relied 
mainly on the agricultural sector. Rubber and tin, the two most important export 
commodities, contributed two-thirds of export earnings in the early 1970s. However, since 
the mid-1970s the prices of these commodities have been very volatile and the Malaysian 
government has realised that it cannot depend on the agricultural sector any longer. Hence, 
in the late 1970s the Malaysian government decided to take firm control of the 
manufacturing sector. 
Since then, a number of policies have been implemented by the government to further 
encourage the growth of the manufacturing sector (Section 6.3.1 discusses some of the 
early legislation prior to the action taken by the Malaysian government). One of the 
policies was the Industrial Master Plan (IMP) completed in 1985. The IMP spelt out the 
overall strategy for industrialisation, and through it the government has emphasised the 
growth of high technology, capital and skill-intensive industries, which include electrical 
and electronics, the textile and apparel and the resource-based sub-sectors where growth 
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was possible due to diversification and forward and backward linkages. Besides promoting 
the development of an indigenous industrial base for long-term sustainable 
industrialisation, the government has also encouraged direct foreign investment with its 
advantages of capital inflow, technology and marketing know-how. 
However, securing the continued presence of first-tier foreign investment has not been easy 
for Malaysia, particularly in the face of strong competition from the NICs (especially Hong 
Kong and Singapore) and from other competing countries like Thailand and Indonesia, 
with their cheaper and more abundant labour forces and sizeable domestic markets. 
Nevertheless, in the past few years Malaysia has proven that it is able to compete 
successfully for foreign direct investment (FDI). Before the 1998 economic crisis, 
Malaysia's success in attracting FDI was due to a number of factors such as a stable 
political environment, free repatriation of profits, a supply of relatively skilled labour, 
favourable macroeconomic policies, supporting infrastructural facilities, and fiscal 
incentives. 
The country's competitiveness has also been noted by a number of international surveys. 
For example, The International Management Development Institute of Switzerland survey 
included Malaysia as one of the ten most competitive countries from among the NICs and 
near-NICs in 1992 (as cited in Kheng, 1994: 129). However, since the economic crisis 
(1998) and the recent monetary control policy imposed by Mahathir, leading economists 
(for instance, Paul Krugman) believes that monetary- controls will do more damage to 
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Malaysia, and this will deter foreign investors. ' Thus, the outcome of Mahathir's monetary 
controls remains to be seen. 
6.3.1 The Industrialisation Process 
In the early years of industrialisation, the most important piece of legislation was the 
Pioneer Industries Ordinance of 1958 (with subsequent revisions in 1965). This Ordinance 
provided generous tax incentives to new industries, especially the resource-based industries 
(see Section 6.3.3). As a result, industries such as food and beverages, plastics and rubber 
products, textiles, bicycles and car assembly emerged. Subsequently, import substitution 
has contributed to more than half of the total growth in manufacturing between 1959 and 
1968, followed by an expansion in domestic demand reflecting income growth (40%) and 
export (less than 10%) (Kheng, 1994: 53). 
The Pioneer Industries Ordinance of 1958 granted exemptions from the prevailing 40% 
company income tax to companies in resource-based industries. Depending on the size of 
the investment, companies were granted between twö to five years of tax relief. The 
pioneer industries, which began operations in the early 1960s, were initially engaged in 
processing agricultural products and the manufacture of consumer and intermediate goods. 
Later the sector expanded to cover a wide range of import-substituting industries through 
the 1960s. 
Superseding the Pioneer Industries Ordinance of 1958, the more liberal Investment 
Incentives Act of 1968 was incorporated. This act, besides incorporating tax holidays to 
Paul Krugman's letter to Malaysia's Prime Minister, Mahathir. 
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companies that were granted pioneer status, gave additional tax holidays depending on the 
nature of the product, the location of the company and the local raw material content. 
Also, a pay-roll tax incentive was offered to companies to encourage more labour-intensive 
technologies. In addition to these incentives, others such as free-trade zones and licensed 
manufacturing warehouses were also made available. As a result, gross investment in the 
manufacturing sector rose sharply from 1974 onwards (Kheng, 1994). 
After decades of export-oriented industrial growth based on labour-intensive production 
processes, Malaysia has gradually shifted towards capital-intensive, high-skilled and high 
technology production structures, especially in the electronics industry (see Chapter 5 
Section 5.7.3 for the discussion on the Multimedia Super Corridor). There are a number of 
reasons for this, among which is the fact that Malaysia has experienced labour shortages, 
particularly in the electronic industry, accompanied by increases in real wages, strong 
export growth, a stock of well-educated labour and strong foreign confidence, as 
demonstrated by sustained FDI since 1987. 
As stated earlier, the main task undertaken by the government in its industrial 
transformation at the time was the setting up of the Industrial Master Plan (IMP). The IMP 
provided detailed information and plans for 12 manufacturing sectors which had been 
divided into resource and non-resource-based, and were then studied to identify the factors 
inhibiting their growth and to make recommendations on policies for their development. 
The major thrust of the IMP was to propel the country into a higher level of 
industrialisation through the creation of a broad-based manufacturing sector with emphasis 
on the development of export-oriented industries, resource-based industries and heavy 
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industries. The IMP adopted an outward-looking strategy and advocated, inter alia, 
incentives for import substitution and the elimination of discrimination against exports. 
The IMP also recognised the need to promote higher value-added upstream and 
downstream products in the non-resource-based sectors, especially in the electronics and 
textiles industries. With the support from the IMP, this has given much impetus for the 
manufacturing sector to continue its expansion and to become a leading growth sector in 
the Malaysian economy. 
After the IMP, the push for industrialisation was further accelerated under the present 
Prime Minister, Mahathir's era. Mahathir initiated a wide range of policies, which vary in 
style and content. There are essentially two types of policies: those which aim to introduce 
some form of psychological dynamism as support elements for the drive towards 
industrialisation; and those which involve a specific programme of action by the 
government. The former includes the Look East Policy (LEP) (discussed in Chapter 5) and 
the aforementioned heavy industrialisation. 
As a result of the NEP, IMP and LEP, the manufacturing sector expanded by 10% per 
annum during the 1970s until 1986 (Jomo, 1990), and by an average of 14% per annum 
from 1987 to 1995 (MITI Annual Report 1995/96). In 1997, its growth was sustained at 
12.5%. 
The overall performance of the manufacturing sector in the first half of 1997 was supported 
mainly by the better-than-expected growth in the chemical, paper products and off-estate 
processing industries. Hence, growth before the onset of the currency crisis in July was 
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driven chiefly by the improved performance of the export-oriented industries (12.2% and 
4.7% in the first half of 1997 and 1996, respectively), supported by a sustained strong 
growth in the domestic-oriented industries (15.2% in the first half of 1997 and 17.9% in 
1996). 8 
The growth of the manufacturing sector in the second half of 1997, however, was partly 
affected by the financial turbulence in the region as well as structural adjustments in the 
construction sector. Despite the unfavourable development as a result of economic crisis, 
the domestic-oriented industries continued to perform well at double-digit growth, riding 
on the back of the rapid growth in selected industries, especially the chemical, paper 
products and tobacco sectors. Other industries that had a notable growth in 1997 are 
electrical machinery, apparatus, appliances and supplies, which accounted for 33% of 
manufacturing output and 66% of total exports of manufactures, expanding by 13.7%. 
This strong growth was stimulated mainly by an improved global demand for semi- 
conductors, particularly from the USA, Europe and the Asia-Pacific countries, but 
excluding Japan. ' 
According to the 1997 survey of 342 manufacturing companies by Bank Negara, the 
overall production in the manufacturing sector increased by 10.1% in 1997. Growth 
emanated mainly from the electronics, textiles, chemicals, transport equipment and basic 
metal industries. This increase, however, was dampened by lower output in wood and 
electrical products industries, according to the same survey. 
8 Bank Negara Malaysia Annual Report, 1997, p. 11. 
9 Ibid. 
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6.3.2 Manufacturing Sector's Contribution to the Economy 
Malaysia has long been a leading producer and exporter of commodities such as natural 
rubber, palm oil, cocoa, timber, pepper and tin, and is a net exporter of petroleum and 
natural gas. Today, Malaysia is recognised as one of the world's leading exporters of 
electronic semiconductors, air-conditioners, audio-visual equipment, products based on the 
country's natural resources such as rubber products (gloves, and threads); palm oil products 
(soaps, and margarine); and timber products (plywood, mouldings, and furniture). " 
Although viewed by many as a slow starter in industrialisation, Malaysia's manufacturing 
sector has grown steadily from the late 1950s and be-came strong from the 1970s. The 
manufacturing sector's share in GDP rose from less than 10% in 1957 to 14% in 1970, 
although still much lower compared to the agriculture sector's share in GDP of 29% in 
1970. By 1990, however, its share had surpassed that of agriculture (27% compared to 
18.7%), and in 1994, the manufacturing sector's contribution to GDP was 31.7% while 
exports of manufactured goods accounted for about 78.2% of the country's total exports. 
By 1995, its share in GDP was 33.1%, whereas the agriculture sector's share was 13.6%. " 
In 1997, its share in GDP was 35.7%, while exports of manufactured goods accounted for 
about 81% of the country's total exports. 12 By the end of the year 2000, the manufacturing 
sector's share in GDP is expected to reach 37.5%, while exports of manufactured goods are 
projected to account for 88.6% of total exports13 (Table 6.1). Hence, looking at the above 
[WWW document]. URL http: //www. mida. gov. my/protit2/countiy. litnil. 
" Bank Negara Malaysia Annual Report 1997. 
'Z Malaysia your profit centre in Asia-The Economy [WWW document]. URL 
http: //202.185.160.3/profit/economi5. html 
" Projection was made before the recent economic crisis and monetary controls imposed by Mahathir in 
September 1998. 
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figures (percentages), it can be concluded that the manufacturing sector has been and will 
remain an important contributor to Malaysia's GDP and export earnings. 
Table 6.1 
Sources of Growth by Industry of Origin & Structure of Production 
(at 1978 prices) 
Structure of Production 
Sources of Growth (%) Share in GDP (%) 
Achieved Target 
Sector OPP1 OPP2 1970 1980 1990 2000* 
Agriculture & Forestry 1.0 0.5 29.0 22.9 18.7 13.4 
Mining & Quarrying 0.6 0.1 13.7 10.1 9.7 5.4 
Manufacturing 2.1 3.3 13.9 19.6 27.0 37.5 
Construction 0.2 0.2 3.8 4.6 3.5 3.5 
Services 3.0 3.4 36.2 40.1 42.3 45.4 
Import duties less -0.2 -0.5 3.4 2.7 -1.2 -5.2 
Imputed bank charges 
GDP at purchasers' 6.7 7.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Value 
Adjusted for imports 
Duties less imputed bank 
Charges 
Primary Sector 1.5 0.6 44.3 33.9 28.1 18.3 
Secondary Sector 2.3 3.3 18.3 24.9 30.2 38.7 
Tertiary Sector 2.9 3.1 37.4 41.2 41.7 43.0 
Source: SOPL (1991-2000), p. 72. 
Note: * Projected figure. OPP 1- First Outline Perspective Plan. OPP2 - Second Outline Perspective Plan. 
The major contributor within the manufacturing sector is the electrical and electronics 
industry, which accounts for more than half of the mänufacturing sector's contribution to 
the nation's gross export earnings (see Section 6.3.4). Besides the manufacturing industry, 
agriculture, the traditional mainstay of the Malaysian economy, is still a major sector 
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accounting for 12.1% of GDP and 10.5% of exports in 1997. Agricultural development is 
now geared towards commercial cultivation, the production of high value food crops, 
floriculture, livestock and fisheries. Another important sector is construction, which 
recorded its ninth year of double-digit growth in 1997 at 10.6%. The year saw the 
continued expansion of the residential and commercial sub-sectors as well as the 
implementation of major infrastructure projects, such as the Kuala Lumpur International 
Airport, the Second Link to Singapore, the Light Rail Transit System and a comprehensive 
network of expressways linking the ports and airports to major towns and industrial areas. 14 
The oil and gas sector has also emerged as the nation's top primary commodity export 
earner. " The country's proven reserves of oil stand at 3.9 billion barrels, while its proven 
gas reserves total 79.8 trillion standard cubic feet. 16 
Despite the unprecedented growth rate experienced by the manufacturing sector for the last 
10 years or so, Malaysia's GDP declined by 6.8% in the second quarter of 1998 from a 
revised first quarter figure of -2.8%. This, according to a more recent newspaper report, 
was primarily due to an across-the-board contraction in all the major sectors as a result of 
the recent economic downturn. " For example, output of the manufacturing sector, the 
largest component of GDP, contracted by 9.2% in the second quarter of 1998 with the 
performance of most industries affected by the depressed conditions in the domestic 
economy and the Asia-Pacific region, as well as by intense global competition. Production 
14 Malaysia your profit centre in Asia-The Economy [WWW document]. URL 
http: //202.185.160.3/profit/economi5. html 
's Bank Negara Malaysia Annual Report 1997, p. 13. 
1b Ibid, p. 13. 
" The Star Online [WWW document]. URL http: //www. jaring. my/star/current/28jabnm5. html, 28`" August 
1998. 
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in the construction sector also fell by 22%, affecting-the residential, non-residential and 
civil engineering sub-sectors. ' 8 
6.3.3 Type of Industries 
There are basically two types of established industries: resource-based and non-resource- 
based. Resource-based industries include the processing of both older (rubber and tin) and 
newer (palm oil, timber and petroleum) commodities. The palm oil processing industry 
expanded fourfold during the 1970s and was the most dynamic industry within the 
resource-based sector. However, the growth of resource-based industries has been 
constrained by the global tariff structure and an industrial structure, which favours the 
export of raw materials over processed products. 
The major growth industries were non-resource-based, which include textiles and clothing, 
electrical and electronic machinery and appliances, and transport equipment, most of which 
had attracted foreign capital and were located in free-trade zones. Transport equipment is a 
special case; its rapid output growth of 12.1 % per year reflects the establishment in the late 
1960s of six assembly plants, which were to be the core activity in the country's second 
stage of import substitution for motor vehicles. Moreover, the motor vehicles industry was 
established behind a wall of high tariffs, stringent import licensing and quantitative 
restrictions. r 
Despite being considered as the major growth industries, the non-resource-based industries 
have failed to meet the target growth rate of 11% per year as set under the Fourth 
'B The Star Online [WWW document]. URL http: //www. jaring. my/star/current/28jabnm5. html, 28`h August 
1998. 
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Malaysian Plan (1981-85). Instead, they have only achieved a growth rate of 5.3%. The 
slow pace of the non-resource-based industries' growth can be attributed to a number of 
factors, such as the 1981-82 recession in the industrialised nations, the deterioration in 
Malaysia's term of trade, excess capacity, and rising interest rates (Jomo, 1990). 
Following the contraction of the Malaysian economy in 1985, however, industrial growth 
was accelerated and was essentially export-and investment-led. Recovery was particularly 
notable in the electrical machinery and rubber products sectors. In the second half of the 
1980s, the former was firmly established as the largest contributor to manufacturing value- 
added products. Output growth exceeded 20% in 1987 and 1988 in response to high export 
orders from the USA, Japan, Europe and Hong Kong, particularly for semiconductors and 
other electronic components (Table 6.2). While the upsurge in end-user demand was a key 
factor in lifting output, the redeployment to Malaysia of manufacturing plants by several 
multinational companies, especially Japanese, was also significant. 
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Table 6.2 
Production of Selected Electronic Products (Mil. Units) 
Year Integrated Circuits Semi-conductors 
Electronic 
Transistors 
1988 4,709 2,182 5,545 
1989 5,071 2,262 5,796 
1990 6,084 2,565 5,956 
1991 6,413 2,689 6,760 
1992 6,730 3,121 7,228 
1993 8,109 3,491 7,738 
1994 9,336 3,410 8,368 
1995 12,277 4,757 9,058 
1996 9,774 5,237 10,410 
1997 12,571 7,432 13,530 
1998# 1,853 1,382 1,999 
Note: #- Jan-Feb 1998 
Source: Statistics Report, Department of Statistics Malaysia. 
6.3.4 Principal Markets for Manufacturing Exports 
As discussed in Section 6.3, rubber and tin were once Malaysia's primary export 
commodities. Today, however, manufactured products form 78.5% of Malaysia's total 
merchandise exports. During the period from 1990 to 1995, for example, the share of 
manufactured exports to total exports increased from 58.8% to 79.6%, respectively. 19 This 
increase was the result of the contribution of three major sectors in manufactured exports, 
namely, electronic components, industrial electronics and consumer electronics, which 
accounted for more than 50% of Malaysia's total export over these few years (Table 6.3). 
19 Seventh Malaysian Plan (1996-2000), p. 266. 
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Table 6.3 
Electronics Export, Malaysia (RM Mil) 
Electronics Electrical & Electronics 
Semi- Electronic Total % of Total % of total 
Year Conductors Equipment Electronics total E&E exports 
& exports 
parts 
1986 5,796.1 529.1 6,325.2 17.9 8,492.4 24.0 
1987 6,909.5 730.5 7,640 16.9 11,000 24.3 
1988 8,716.1 1,219.2 9,935.3 18.0 15,161.6 27.4 
1989 10,175.5 2,176.2 12,351.7 18.2 20,799.5 30.7 
1990 11,685.2 3,670.2 15,355.4 19.3 26,502.4 33.3 
1991 13,051.4 6,440.9 19,492.3 20.6 35,588.7 37.7 
1992 14,357 8,846.9 23,203.9 -22.4 41,578.7 40.1 
1993 18,750.5 12,091.1 30,841.6 25.4 55,128.9 45.5 
1994 24,881.4 17,755.4 42,636.8 27.7 76,367.3 49.6 
1995 33,197 23,583.2 56,780.2 30.7 96,747.8 52.3 
1996 35,241.8 29,387.9 64,629.7 32.8 104,278.9 52.9 
1997 40,820.4 39,987 80,807.4 36.5 119,050 53.8 
1998# 9,146.4 8,337.8 17,484.2 38.8 24,936.8 55.1 
Note: #- Jan-Feb 1998 
Source: Statistics Report, Department of Statistics, Malaysia. 
In 1995, for example, electrical and electronics products became the major source of export 
earnings with a share of 65.7% of total manufactured exports. However, in 1996 and 1997, 
due to world-wide competition, the share of electrical and electronics products in total 
manufactured exports dropped from 48% to 46.2% respectively. 20 Despite this, by world 
m Statistics Report (1998), Department of Statistics, Malaysia. 
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standards Malaysia can still be described as a major exporter of electronics products, 
exporting about 10% globally. 
The principal markets for manufactured exports were the USA, Singapore, the European 
Union and Japan, accounting for 74% of manufactured exports in 1995. Among the 
ASEAN countries, Singapore continued to be the main market for manufactured exports, 
amounting to RM32.8 billion or 80% of the manufactured exports in 1995.21 
According to the Economic Report 97/98, Singapore, Japan, the USA and the European 
Union (EU) continued to be the dominant markets for Malaysia, accounting for over 70% 
of total manufactured exports. During 1997, according to the same report, exports to 
Singapore improved 5.4% with a share of 22.6%, while exports to the EU grew 9.7% with 
a 15.6% share. However, exports to the USA dropped 7.6%, accounting for 21.5% of total 
exports while exports to Japan fell 1.9% (10.9% of total exports). The decrease in exports 
to the USA and Japan was partly due to world-wide competition, according to the same 
report. 
Malaysia's top ten markets for manufactured exports in 1997 were Singapore, the USA, 
Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, the UK, Korea, Germany, the Netherlands, and 
others, with a total export value of RM 196.69 billion. " Other newly established markets 
for Malaysia's manufactured exports include Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, Nigeria and Papua 
New Guinea. Manufactured exports to these countries increased from RM1.4 billion in 
Z' Seventh Malaysian Plan (1996-2000), p. 266. 
22 Matrade[WWW document]. URL http: //www. matrade. gov. my/star97-1. html#tte97. 
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1990 to RM9 billion in 1995, indicating the success of Malaysian exporters in penetrating 
new markets. 23 
6.3.5 Employment in the Manufacturing Sector 
During the colonial economy, i. e. from 1947 to 1957, the manufacturing sector's 
percentage share of employment remained constant at approximately 6% per year, 
implying that the manufacturing sector had hardly expanded. However, from the early 
sixties, it began to expand slowly, and by 1965, it employed about 215,000 people or about 
8.4% of the total workforce. Following this, the manufacturing sector steadily increased its 
share of total employment from 11.4% in 1970 to 19.9% in 1990 or 386,500 and 1.3 
million respectively. By 1995, the manufacturing sector employed about 2.0 million 
workers or 25.9% of the total workforce, and by 1997, it provided employment 
opportunities to about 2.3 million persons or 27.4% of the total national workforce, 
reflecting the sustained expansion in manufacturing activities during the year24 (Table 6.4). 
23 Seventh Malaysian Plan (1996-2000), p. 266. 
24 Bank Negara Malaysia Annual Report, 1997, p. 63. 
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Table 6.4 
Malaysia: Employment Provided by the Manufacturing Sector, 1947-1997 
Year Total workforce employed in 
Manufacturing sector ('000) 
Manufacturing sector's share of 
total employment (%) 
1947 126.2 6.7 
1957 135.7 6.4 
1965 215.0 8.4 
1970 386.5 11.4 
1980 803.1 15.8 
1990 1,333.0 19.9 
1995 2,051.6 25.9 
1997 2,300.0 27.4 
Notes: Figures for 1947,1957 and 1965 refer to Peninsular Malaysia only. 
Source: Figures for 1947 to 1965 extracted from Hoffman and Tan, 1971; 1970-1980 figures 
extracted from the 4`h Malaysian Plan; 1990-1995 figures extracted from the 7`h 
Malaysian Plan; 1997 figure extracted from Bank Negara Malaysia Annual Report 1997. 
In contrast, total employment in the agriculture sector continued to decline by 4.9% to 1.3 
million persons during the year 1997.25 Labour shortages in this sector were further 
exacerbated by the continuous outflow of labour to other sectors, especially the 
manufacturing sector, apparently attracted by better terms and working conditions. Z" 
In tandem with the trends in investment and output in the manufacturing sector, the sub- 
sectors with high rates of employment growth were electrical and electronics products, 
ZS Bank Negara Malaysia Annual Report, 1997, p. 63. 
Z6 Ibid., p. 63. 
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wood and wood products, petroleum refineries, transport equipment, plastic products and 
fabricated metal products, with growth rates ranging from 10% to 23% per annum. 27 
In terms of labour demand in the manufacturing sector, a report shows that the demand was 
highest for unskilled workers, i. e. 33.8% of the demand was for unskilled workers 
compared to only 26% for skilled workers (Table 6.5). The largest proportion of jobs were 
for production workers, particularly to cater for the expansion of activities in the electrical 
and electronic products, wood and wood products, as well as fabricated metal sub-sectors. 
Table 6.5 
Employment in the Manufacturing Sector by Category of Workers, 1990-1995 
Category 1990 Share 
(%) 
1995 Share 
(%) 
Av. Annual 
Growth Rate, 
1991-95 (%) 
Managerial & 
Professional 50,281 3.8 88,219 4.3 11.9 
Technical & 
Supervisory 114,592 8.6 184,644 9.0 10.0 
Clerical 88,840 6.7 129,250 6.3 7.8 
General Workers 53,620 4.0 63,600 3.1 3.5 
Skilled 351,765 26.4 533,416 26.0 8.7 
Semi-skilled 209,698 15.7 359,030 17.5 11.4 
Unskilled 464,034 34.8 693,441 33.8 8.4 
Total 1,332,829 100.0 2,051,600 100.0 9.0 
source: beventn Malaysian Fian (199b-1000), p. 2/1. 
One of the largest employers in the manufacturing sector in Malaysia is the Matsushita 
group of companies (MGC). The group, which has 19 subsidiaries with a consolidated 
27 Bank Negara Malaysia Annual Report, 1997, p. 269. 
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annual turnover of RM12.8 billion, employs about 31,000 employees (The Star, 31" 
August 1998). 
6.3.6 Investment in the Manufacturing Sector 
Private investments in Malaysia are derived from both domestic and foreign investors or 
foreign direct investment (FDI). As a result of a number of incentives given by the 
government (see Chapter 5), such investment has been impressive. According to the Bank 
Negara Annual Report 1997, in 1995, private investments amounted to RM66.6 billion, of 
which 27.2% were in the manufacturing sector. In 1996, this increased by 15.8% to 
RM77.1 billion, however, the share of manufacturing investment decreased to 26.3%. 
Then, in 1997, private investments further increased by 11% to RM85.5 billion. Out of 
RM85.5 billion, 26.5% were investments in the manufacturing sector, a slight increase 
from 1996 (Table 6.6). 
Table 6.6 
Private Investment by Sector 
1995 1996 1997 
- RM billion 
Private investment 66.6 77.1 85.5 
Of which: % share 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Services 
27.2 
9.7 
30.5 
26.3 
10.4 
32.5 
26.5 
11.1 
34.1 
Source: Bank Negara Annual Report, 1997, p. 32. 
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The overall scenario since the Sixth Malaysian Plan (1991-95) shows that private 
investment in the manufacturing sector has been impressive and has amounted to about 
RM84 billion, exceeding the Sixth Malaysian Plan target of RM80 billion. In terms of 
percentage of share, domestic investment accounts for 47% or RM54,565.5 million of the 
total investment in the manufacturing sector during the above period. Foreign direct 
investment (FDI), on the other hand, accounts for 53% or RM61,597.2 million of the total 
investment in the manufacturing sector during the same time. In terms of total capital 
investment (TCI), during the same period TCI from resource-based industry was 
RM67,523.5 million compared with RM48,181.7 million from non-resource-based 
industry. Z" 
In terms of approved investment, in 1991 approved investment in the manufacturing sector 
was at the highest recorded level of RM30.8 billion. " However, in 1992 it declined to 
RM27.8 billion. In 1993 it further declined to RM13.8 billion. The unprecedented high 
level of investment in 1991 was largely due to several capital-intensive projects in the 
petroleum and basic metal product sub-sectors. After the decline in 1993, the proposed 
capital investment rebounded by an increase of 65.9% in 1994, indicating the continued 
attractiveness of the country as a location for foreign and local investments. " 
According to one report, the year 1996 set an unprecedented record with approved 
investments spiralling almost four times those of 1995 with a total project of 782. Out of 
2S Seventh Malaysian Plan (1996-2000), p. 272. 
29 Approved investment means investment or projects that have been given approval by the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI), Malaysia. 
30 Seventh Malaysian Plan (1996-2000), p. 271. 
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that 449 were new projects and 333 were expansion and diversification projects. The total 
value of approved investment was at its record level of RM34.3 billion. " 
In 1997, however, approved investments declined to 759. Of the total number of projects, 
462 were new projects and 297 were expansion and diversification projects. 32 Overall, the 
total value of approved investment in 1997 declined by 24.8% to RM25.8 billion when 
compared to the 1996 figure of RM34.3 billion. " The decline was due largely to fewer 
approvals of big projects (10 big projects worth RM13 billion, compared with 15 projects 
worth RM19.5 billion in 1996). 34 
According to a recent report, Malaysia's Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI) approved 471 manufacturing projects with a total capital investment of RM15.15 
billion for the first seven months of 1998.35 Out of the 471 approvals 240 were new 
projects while 231 were expansion and diversification projects. In addition, of these 
approvals, 104 were in the electrical and electronics sector, 34 in transport and equipment, 
28 in chemical products, 22 in basic metals and 9 in petroleum and petrochemicals. It was 
also reported that RM9.39 billion of the total investments were domestic while the balance 
of RM5.76 billion was derived from foreign direct investments. 
" Major transition needed for industry to move ahead-The Star Online [WWW document]. URL 
http: //wwwjaring. my/star/current/30elec. html. 
32 Ibid. 
" Investment in Approved Projects, 1996-1997 [WWW document]. URL 
http: //miti. gov. my/trdind/app7. html. 
'^ Ibid. 
35 MITI approves RM 15 billion worth of Investments-The Star Online [WWW document]. URL 
http: //www. jaring. my/star/current/28skmiti. htrnl. 
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In terms of applications for manufacturing projects received by states, according to a MITI 
report, in 1996 Selangor was the most favoured with 253 applications received, followed 
by Johor with 209 applications, Penang with 106, Perak with 65, Kedah with 56, Sarawak 
with 50, and Sabah with 39 applications. The least favoured was the Federal Territory of 
Labuan with only 1 application received. In 1997 Selangor was still leading, however, the 
number of applications received had declined to 229, while Johor received 151, Penang had 
104, Kedah had 63, Perak had 56, Sarawak had 52, and Sabah had 45. Again, the Federal 
Territory of Labuan received only 1 application. 
As stated previously, FDI has played an important role in Malaysia's manufacturing sector. 
There have been more than 3,000 international companies from over 40 countries investing 
in Malaysia, attracted by the conducive investment environment which has placed 
Malaysia among the world's top locations for offshore manufacturing operations. Among 
some of these countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hong Kong, India, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Singapore, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the USA. 36 
In 1995, among the top foreign investors in Malaysia were Japan (22.9%), USA (19.7%), 
Taiwan (15.8%), Singapore (11%), Korea (6.6%), and others (23%). However, in 1996 
Singapore became the top investor with a share of 27.9%, Japan (27%), USA (17%), 
Switzerland (11.1%), Taiwan (4.5%), and others (12.5%). " In 1997, Singapore still 
remained the top investor while Japan ranked second. 
36 Malaysia your profit centre in Asia-The Testimonies [WWW document]. URL 
http: //202.185.160.3/profit/testimonies. html. 
" Facts on ASEAN-Japan Economic Relations [WWW document]. URL http: //www. jetro. go. jp/FACTS/AS- 
HANDBOOK/malaysia/06. htm1. 
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However, in the first seven months of 1998, the United States headed the list of major 
foreign investors in Malaysia in terms of capital investment with 24 projects bringing in 
foreign investments totalling RM2.515 billion. Next was Japan with 70 projects totalling 
an investment of RM1.37 billion, followed by Taiwan with 33 projects totalling RM583 
million; Singapore came next with 81 projects amounting to RM385.6 million; and finally 
Switzerland, with six projects totalling RM132 million. 38 
Based on the above discussion, there is no doubt that FDI is very important to the 
Malaysian economy. In fact, it has been partly responsible for transforming Malaysia from 
a poor agricultural country to a highly industrialised nation, producing quality-high-tech 
goods for markets world-wide. However, the capital controls imposed by the government 
at the end of 1998, as some economists believe, will not help to bring back any significant 
amount of capital into the country but may deter new foreign investment in the future. 
Nevertheless, it is premature at this time to disqualify Malaysia as an attractive location for 
foreign investment. In fact, a recent newspaper report has quoted Hisamitsu Arai, the 
Japanese Vice-Minister for International Affairs, as saying "more Japanese companies will 
be coming to invest in Malaysia despite the economic crisis. "39 Despite this, the 
consequences of the so-called Malaysia's "ringgit-wall" on the economy remain to be seen. 
6.4 Conclusion 
Having reviewed the related literature, the following conclusions can be drawn. First, it is 
clear that Malaysia is indeed a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country. Because of this, 
38 MITI approves RM 15 billion worth of Investments-The Star Online [WWW document]. URL 
http: //www. jaring. my/star/cuffent/28skmiti. html. 
39 The Star: Japan to continue investing in Malaysia [WWW document]. URL 
http: //www. jaring. my/star/current/20kyjapan. html. 
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racial tension can be a major problem if the government's policy tends to favour a 
particular group/race or if the government is not fair in terms of distributing wealth among 
the different races in Malaysia. In fact, this happened in the early years of independence 
and it is perhaps as a result of this incidence that racial issues are still a very important 
aspect of politics, and the mitigation of the inequality between races is believed to be a 
major goal of the present government. 
Second, based on our discussion on the strategic importance of the Malay Peninsular to 
international traders, particularly the British, we have learnt that British influence is of 
extreme importance because it has moulded the future of Malaya's social, political as well 
as economic endeavours. Whereas colonial administration was blamed for identifying race 
with economic functions, the New Economic Policy (NEP) and the Look East Policy 
(LEP) were aimed at erasing the demarcation and improving the management system. The 
lack of Bumiputra participation in the commercial and industrial activities was partially 
attributed to the segregation of functions, with the Malays being encouraged to engage in 
agricultural activities, the Chinese in tin mines and other commercial enterprises, and the 
Indians in the rubber plantations. 
Finally, we have learnt that despite a strong focus on agricultural activities during the 
colonial era, since its independence Malaysia has adopted a pragmatic approach in 
managing its economy and has thus been able to transform it into a manufacturing base. 
Until the recent economic crisis, Malaysia was one of the rapidly growing economies in the 
Third World partly because of the enormous support given by foreign investors in terms of 
direct investment in the country. 
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It has also emerged that the unprecedented growth in manufacturing sector has benefited 
the country not only in terms of export earnings but also in terms of creating new jobs for 
the country's young labour force. However, the manufacturing sector was not without its 
problems. In fact, Mahathir was concerned by the fact that the quality of manufactured 
goods produced was not up to par with the Japanese standards, while productivity and 
employees' morale were low. 40 Recognising these problems, as already mentioned in 
Chapter 5, Mahathir officially launched the Look East Policy in February 1982, in which 
he called upon all management and workers in Malaysia to adopt the Japanese management 
techniques and work ethic. In his speech of the same year, Mahathir said: "Our Look East 
Policy is directed not so much at investment from Japan but at acquiring the kind of 
policies, management systems, and work ethic that the Japanese have. We see the Japanese 
have made headway while the West appears to be regressing. So in order for Malaysia to 
progress, we have to learn from the better example - the Japanese example. That is why we 
now want to look East where before we were looking West. " 41 
Because of the importance of the Look East Policy and given the strength of the state in 
Malaysia, the impact of the policy in promoting the Japanese management techniques to 
manufacturing firms in Malaysia requires a thorough investigation. 
In the next chapter (Chapter 7) the research methodology and the rationale for employing it 
in our study is presented. 
ao Mahathir as quoted in his book The Malay Dilemma. 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 11`h June 1982. 
292 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
7.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to present the research methodology and the rationale for 
employing it in this study. With this objective in mind, the first section of this chapter 
begins by defining research and ends with the reasons why we have chosen the survey 
method as the research tool to collect primary data for this study. The second section, 
which is considered very important as it relates directly to this thesis, starts by discussing 
the data collection methods in the survey. The deliberation continues with the sampling 
process, the development of questionnaires, administration of a mail questionnaire and an 
interview checklist, and ends with a description of the methods of data analysis used in this 
study. Finally, the limitations of the research survey are presented. 
7.2 Research's Definition and Types of Research 
Research is defined as "Seeking through methodical processes to add to one's own body of 
knowledge and, hopefully, to that of others, by the discovery of non-trivial facts and 
insights" (Howard and Sharp, 1983: 6). 
The two most common types of research are quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative 
research is typically taken to be exemplified by mail survey and by experimental 
investigations (Bryman, 1988). Bryman (1989) further argues that quantitative methods 
are usually adopted to collect data based on predetermined structured questions. They do 
not, however, necessarily allow the respondents to convey or the researchers to learn about 
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underlying events (Bryman, 1989). Similarly, Reaves (1992) argues that quantitative 
research is an approach that involves measuring the quantity of things, usually in numerical 
quantities. According to Parasuraman (1986), quantitative research is characterised by a 
larger, more structured, and more representative respondent sample. From the above 
arguments, most authors seem to agree that quantitative research involves the collection of 
data based on predetermined structured questions from it large sample of respondents. 
In contrast to quantitative research, qualitative research involves collecting, analysing and 
interpreting data that cannot be meaningfully quantified, i. e. summarised in the form of 
numbers. Qualitative research also typically involves a relatively small number of 
respondents. It tends to be associated with participant observation and unstructured 
interviewing (Bryman, 1988). According to Miles and Huberman (1994), qualitative data 
are typically collected over a sustained period, making them more "powerful" for studying 
processes including history, and more importantly, researchers can go far beyond 
"snapshots" of questions like "What? " or "How many? " in order to ask how and why 
things happen. Unlike quantitative research, qualitative research is less structured and the 
specific procedures followed are often identified during the research rather than prescribed 
in advance. Parasuraman (1986) argues that the less structured and small features of 
qualitative research techniques are intended to provide initial insights, ideas or 
understanding about a situation or a problem. Similarly, Gummession (1991) points out 
that the strengths of qualitative research design are usually associated with the "depth" and 
"richness" of the information that it provides. Also Birns et al. (1990) argue that the 
strength of qualitative research is that not only does it provide the researcher with a deep 
understanding of why and how something is happening, but it also provides "rich" data by 
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probing into people's unconscious attitudes and needs. However, data collected through 
qualitative methods come under heavy criticism for being anecdotal and difficult to analyse 
and generalise to other situations (Bryman, 1989). It is perhaps because of such 
shortcomings that Snow and Thomas (1994) argue that "On the one hand, qualitative 
research methods can be used to uncover complex and dynamic interactions among 
organisational and strategic factors. On the other hand, these methods are more susceptible 
to researcher bias and reliability problems. Quantitative methods provide greater 
objectivity and reliability but often ignore many important, more complex organisational 
realities" (p. 471). 
In order to overcome the shortcomings and to make use of the benefits of both research 
methods, Webb et al. (1966, as cited in Bryman, 1988) have suggested that researchers are 
likely to exhibit greater confidence in their findings when data are collected using both 
quantitative and qualitative methods. Webb et al. (1966) view the two research methods as 
complementary rather than as competitive. Bryman (1988) also argues that by combining 
both research methods, the researcher's claim for validity of his or her conclusions are 
enhanced, moreover qualitative research sometimes facilitates the interpretation of 
quantitative findings suggested by an investigation. 
Having reviewed the related literature, we decided to use both quantitative and qualitative 
research methods in this study. This is because by using the former methods a larger and 
more representative sample can be obtained, and by adopting the latter methods it is 
possible to gain a deep understanding of why the respondents have implemented Japanese 
management techniques. 
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7.3 Research Design 
Research design is defined as "a collection of guides or rules for data collection" (Adams 
and Schvaneveldt, 1985: 103). The two basic purposes of research designs are: (i) to 
control for variations; and (ii) to provide answers (data) to questions being researched 
(Kerlinger, 1964 as cited in Adams and Schvaneveldt, 1985). 
Two common research designs in social science are the exploratory/explanatory and 
descriptive research designs. As the name implies, exploratory/explanatory research seeks 
to explain and discover new relationships or looks for hypothesis and as such, it is more 
flexible in its design (Boyd et al., 1989). According to Adams and Schvaneveldt (1985), 
this type of research is suitable when the researcher wants to (i) satisfy curiosity and/or 
seek out new insights, (ii) build a methodology that might be used in later, more tightly- 
designed research, and (iii) make recommendations regarding the likelihood of continuing 
with additional research on the topic. 
Descriptive research, on the other hand, is designed to describe something, for example, the 
number of viewers who saw a specific television commercial. As such, it is more formal in 
its structure as it attempts to obtain a complete and accurate picture of a situation (Boyd et 
al., 1989). According to a number of authors (Quee, 1993; Crimp, 1985; Baker, 1991), 
descriptive research is suitable when a study intends to produce an accurate description of 
variables relevant to the decision being faced, without demonstrating that some relationship 
exists between variables. 
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In this study, the research design being used is close to the exploratory or explanatory 
model, though still quite structured in its approach. This type of research design is suitable 
for this study because apart from the fact that we want to know how successful the Look 
East Policy has been in encouraging management in manufacturing firms in Malaysia to 
adopt the Japanese management techniques and work ethic, this type of research design 
also gives us the opportunity to demonstrate whether there is a relationship exists between 
the variables that we are looking at. 
In employing this research design, we are presented with two options - the cross-sectional 
method or the longitudinal method (Davis, 1973; Chisnall, 1997). The cross-sectional 
method describes an event at one particular point in time, while the latter gives 
measurements of an event at successive points in time. Naturally, data collected by the 
longitudinal method are able to provide a greater understanding of a particular problem 
since they are being measured repeatedly. However, since this method takes a long time to 
complete, it may not be practical for this study due to constraints on time and financial 
resources. In addition, the sample using this method is smaller compared to the cross- 
sectional studies and as such, the possibility of misrepresentation is higher. Another 
problem relates to obtaining the participation of past respondents, as they may be reluctant 
to co-operate. These drawbacks may account for the fact that previous studies related to 
this area have seldom employed this method. 
Instead, past researchers (Yasin, 1990; Imaoka, 1985; Ek, 1987; Yoshihara, 1985; Putti and 
Chong, 1985; Ito, 1985) employed cross-sectional studies, a method which allows a 
researcher access to a larger number of respondents, thus enabling him or her to produce 
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more representative data. Through this method, data are typically cross-tabulated against 
each other to answer specific questions or issues. For example, in the case of this study, 
we could cross-tabulate variables such as a visit to Japan with respondents' implementing 
Japanese management techniques to find out whether there is any relationship between 
them. This kind of data is meaningful, especially to the Malaysian government, if 
programmes such as sending more trainees as well as managers to Japan are to be 
continued. Building on these arguments and the resource constraints that we are facing, 
cross-sectional methods would be the most efficient in achieving the research objectives as 
spelled out earlier. As such, it will be the method used in this study. 
7.4 Approaches in Data Collection 
The most common approaches to collecting primary data are through experimentation, case 
study, observation and survey (Yin, 1993; Fowler, 1991; Churchill, 1987; Chisnall, 1997). 
In this study, the survey method is chosen because it is considered the most appropriate 
approach for collecting primary data at a shortest possible time and at a reasonable cost 
(see, for example, Aaker and Day, 1986; Fowler, 1991). 
On the other hand, experimentation is preferred or used when the researcher is keen to 
establish the causes and effects of a particular event, especially in scientific fields (Boyd et 
al., 1989). For this reason, this method is not suitable for this study. Likewise, case study 
is also deemed unsuitable for this research because it cannot be used to generalise to a large 
population (Adams and Schvaneveldt, 1985). In fact, generalising to a large population is 
a chief concern in this study because our sample is only limited to manufacturing 
companies in four States in Malaysia. Observation is also unsuitable for this research 
298 
because it is unable to determine the reasons underlying a certain action or behaviour. At 
best, it could allow us only to describe the tangible aspects of action, such as which 
Japanese management techniques have been implemented. To sum up, primary data for 
this research will be collected through cross-sectional studies using the survey method. 
7.5 Data Collection Methods in the Survey 
After deciding to use the cross-sectional survey method, our immediate task is to select 
which data collection methods are to be adopted in this study. However, before any 
decision is made with this regard, it is useful to review the literature in this area. 
The most common data collection methods used in carrying out a survey are mail 
questionnaire and interview. Mail questionnaire is a method whereby questionnaires are 
mailed to a sample of the population to be surveyed and the completed questionnaire is 
returned by mail to the researcher (Tull and Hawkins, 1990). The main advantages of this 
method are: first, it is relatively cheap, it can be accomplished with minimal staff and 
facilities and it can provide access to widely dispersed samples and samples that are 
difficult to reach by telephone or in person for other reasons (Fowler, 1991); second, this 
method is appropriate for study where the research design involves structured questions 
with simple instructions which can be answered easily by the respondents (Kinnear and 
Taylor, 1979); and finally, there is no immediate time pressure for answering questions as 
in telephone interview (Peterson, 1988). 
The main disadvantages, however, are: first, the researcher has little control over who 
actually completes the questionnaire as the researcher or interviewer is not directly 
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involved in data collections (Fowler, 1991) (see Table 7.1 at the end of this chapter for 
other disadvantages as mentioned by Fowler); second, it has a low response rate (Chisnall, 
1997); third, it can create opportunities for inaccurate results because of confusion (Aaker 
and Day, 1986); and finally, the response rate is difficult to forecast and there is a 
substantial risk that an accurate rate cannot be achieved (Kinnear and Taylor, 1979). 
Interview, on the other hand, is a method by which an interviewer asks questions to one or 
more respondents either face-to-face or by telephone. Denzin and Lincoln (1994: 353) 
define interview as "a conversation, the art of asking questions and listening. It is not a 
neutral tool, for the interviewer creates the reality of the interview situation. In this 
situation answers are given. Thus the interview produces situated understandings grounded 
in specific interactional episodes. This method is influenced by the personal characteristics 
of the interviewer, including race, class, ethnicity and gender. " 
Punch (1998: 175) points out that "interview is considered a very good way of accessing 
people's perceptions, meanings, definitions of situation and constructions of reality. It is 
also one of the most powerful ways we have of understanding others. " According to 
Fontana and Frey (1994: 361), "interviewing can be a one-time, brief exchange, say five 
minutes over the telephone, or it can take place over multiple, lengthy sessions, sometimes 
spanning days, as in life-history interviewing. Interviewing also has a wide variety of 
forms and a multiplicity of uses. The most common types are personal or face-to-face 
interviewing and telephone interviewing. " 
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Personal or face-to-face interview is a form of interview in which an interviewer asks 
questions to one or more respondents in a face-to-face situation. Kinnear and Taylor 
(1979) state that an interviewer's task is to contact the respondents, ask questions and 
record answers given by these respondents. Similarly, Churchill (1987) argues that this 
form of interview implies a direct face-to-face conversation between the interviewer and 
the respondent or interviewee, and the recording of answers takes place immediately after 
the respondent answers the question or while the interview is in progress. Peterson (1988) 
sums it up by saying that in a personal interview, data are collected through face-to-face 
communication between an interviewer and the study participants. Like mail 
questionnaire, personal interview has both advantages and disadvantages. 
The main advantage of the personal interview is that it is the most flexible of the three 
methods (mail questionnaire, personal and telephone interviews) since it can be used to 
administer any type of questionnaire (Tull and Hawkins, 1990). The other advantages are: 
it is very flexible, i. e. this method of data collection can probe for more specific answers 
while questions can be repeated when response indicates that respondents misunderstood 
certain questions, and it is probably the most effective method of enlisting cooperation for 
the majority of the population where it is possible to build rapport and confidence with the 
respondents (Fowler, 1991). Finally, the interviewer can probe for clarification, maximise 
respondent understanding and yield complete answers especially to open questions (Aaker 
and Day, 1986) 
However, the disadvantages include the fact that it is time consuming, difficult to 
administer, and can be very costly due to the need to travel between interviews (Aaker and 
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Day, 1986). Moreover, it may cause the respondents to produce biased responses due to 
the desire to please or impress the interviewer (Kinnear and Taylor, 1979). Finally, 
interviewer bias may also occur, especially when a poorly-trained interviewer consciously 
or unconsciously distorts or otherwise influences responses to questions (McGown, 1979). 
Telephone interview is a form of interview whereby an interviewer asks the respondent 
questions by telephone instead of through direct personal contact (Kinnear and Taylor, 
1979). Similarly, Peterson (1988) states that in this form of interview, data are collected 
through telephone communication between an interviewer and the study participants. Like 
in personal interview, telephone interview has benefits and drawbacks. 
The main strengths of telephone interview are that it is the fastest mode of collecting data 
(Kinnear and Taylor, 1979); it has a lower cost compared to personal interview and also it 
can potentially be used for short data collection (Fowler, 1991); and it has a potential to 
dominate personal interview with respect to speed and the absence of administrative 
problems (Aaker and Day, 1986). 
The disadvantages are that the interviewer cannot observe the respondent to ensure that the 
instructions are understood (Tull and Hawkins, 1990); it has the inability to employ visual 
aids or to complete complex tasks (Aaker and Day, 1986); and it also has sampling 
limitations, especially with regard to the omission of those without telephones (Fowler, 
1991). 
_ 
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From the above discussion, it is apparent that interview is a data collection tool of great 
flexibility, which can be adapted to suit a wide variety of research situations (see also 
Punch, 1998). However, different types of interview have different strengths and 
weaknesses, and different purposes in research. Because of that, the type of interview or 
other data collection method selected should be aligned with the strategy, purposes and 
research questions (Punch, 1998). Similarly, a number of other authors (Fowler, 1991; 
Bryman, 1989; Fontana and Frey, 1994) have pointed out that the choice of which methods 
to use in collecting the primary data depends on a number of factors, such as the sample 
frames, research topic, characteristics of the sample, the availability of staff and facilities, 
and probably the most important: time and the cost of the survey. 
7.5.1 Data Collection Methods Used in this Study 
Having reviewed the related literature, it was decided to use both mail questionnaire as 
well as personal or face-to-face interview to collect the primary data. The reasons for 
choosing these two methods over telephone interview are: (i) besides its relatively low 
cost, mail questionnaire was considered appropriate nor only because the aim of this study 
was to acquire data from a large number of respondents in the shortest possible time but 
also because the survey population was highly literate and capable of completing and 
answering complex questions; and (ii) because our aim was to generate ideas and also to 
seek specific answers or explanations to some questions. Therefore personal interview was 
considered one of the appropriate tools due to its ability to probe or clarify answers that 
had been given in the mail questionnaire. On the other hand, although we cannot deny that 
telephone interview can also be used to probe or clarify answers, for the purpose of this 
study it was ruled out as we preferred to talk face-to-face with our respondents. In fact, in 
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Malaysia, this method is preferable compared to talking on the telephone. Besides that, 
telephone interviews can incur excessive costs. 
7.6 The Sampling Process 
Having decided on using both mail questionnaire and personal interview, our next task was 
to select on which sampling frame was to be used, how big the sample size should be and 
which sampling technique should be employed. Before any results of these decisions are 
given, a review of the literature in this area is necessary. 
Our discussion begins with the definition of a sample. A sample is defined as a "finite part 
of a statistical population whose properties are studied to gain information about the 
whole" (Webster English Dictionary, 1985). When dealing with people, a sample can be 
defined as a group of people selected from a larger population to be in the study. 
Similarly, Schofield (1996: 25) defines a sample as a set of elements selected in some way 
from a population. 
What is sampling? Sampling is the act, process, or technique of selecting a suitable 
sample, or a representative part of a population for the purpose of determining parameters 
or characteristics of the whole population. ' What is the purpose of sampling? Its purpose 
is to cut costs, reduce manpower requirements, gather information more quickly, and to 
obtain more comprehensive data by using fewer resources compared to conducting a 
census (Smith, 1975: 106). Besides that, its purpose is to obtain consistent and unbiased 
' Fridah, Mugo W (20`h July 1998) Sampling In Research [WWW document]. URL 
http: //trochim. human. comell. edu/tutorial/mugo/tutorial. html 
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estimates of the population status in terms of whatever is being researched (Schofield, 
1996: 25). 
7.6.1 Sampling Frames 
A sampling frame refers to a list of the sampling units from which the investigator or 
researcher draws the sample. In other words, the listing of the accessible population from 
which the investigator draws the sample is called the sampling frame. For example, if the 
investigators were carrying out a telephone survey and selecting names from the telephone 
book, the book would be called the sampling frame. However, that would not be an 
effective way to sample in general because significant sub-portions of the population either 
do not have a telephone number or have moved in or out of the area since the last book was 
printed. Besides a telephone book, membership lists, organisation directories and privately 
published directories on manufacturing firms, such as the Malaysian Manufacturers and 
Exporters Directory (MMED) can also be used as a sampling frame. 
7.6.2 Sample Size 
The most frequently asked question concerning sampling is "What sample size do I need 
for my research? " As with most decisions relating to research design, there is seldom a 
definite answer as to how big a sample should be for any given study (Fowler, 1991: 43). 
Fowler notes that there are three misconceptions regarding this issue. The first 
misconception is that the adequacy of a sample depends heavily on the fraction of the 
population that is to be included in that sample. The second misconception is to follow a 
"typical" or "appropriate" sample size that is used in some so-called "standard" survey 
studies, while the third misconception is that a researcher should decide how much margin 
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of error that can be tolerated and the degree of precision required of estimates. Once the 
researcher knows the need for precision or appropriate variations, he or she can simply 
calculate the sample size needed to achieve the desired level of precision (Fowler, 1991: 
41). Fowler further added that such sample size decisions, like most other research design 
decisions, must be made on a case-by-case basis. Although some mathematical calculation 
of the sample size may be possible, the selection of it is a matter of judgement (Fowler, 
1991: 41). According to Manu (1988: 222), that matter of judgement is based on (i) what 
is "customary in similar research", and (ii) the resources available for the purpose of 
research. Hoinville et al. (1983: 61) also agree that deciding what sample size to use is 
almost a matter of judgement rather than calculation. 
Kent (1993: 54) stresses that to determine the size of sample that is needed for a particular 
study is a complex issue that needs to take into account a large number of factors. He 
further emphasises that how big or how small a sample is depends on the variability of 
population characteristics and on the purpose of the research. He also points out that if the 
population characteristics being measured vary very little, or if the purpose of the research 
is to generate specific ideas, then a small sample of say 30 or so will suffice. Otherwise, 
for any kind of quantitative analysis a minimum sample of 100 is needed in order to be 
able to calculate straightforward percentages on each variable (Kent, 1993: 54). 
Similarly, Fink (1995) argues that a larger sample is not necessarily better. In fact, she 
warns that when a researcher increases the sample size, not only does the cost increase but 
also the researcher may divert attention from other sampling activities, like following up on 
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eligible people who fail to respond, and this diversion may actually increase the total 
sampling error (Fink, 1995: 34-35). 
Schwenk and Shrader (1993) found that the sample size of firms covered in some 
important studies between 1982 and 1990 were not necessarily big, and in fact, ranged 
between 50 to 188, except for one study (Robinson, 1982) which used a sample of 202 
firms. 
7.6.3 Sampling Techniques 
There are two main categories of sampling techniques: (i) probability sampling techniques; 
and (ii) non-probability sampling techniques. They are discussed below. 
7.6.3.1 Probability sampling techniques 
Probability sampling techniques are techniques or methods of sampling that utilise some 
form of random selection. In order to have a random selection method, a researcher must 
set up some process or procedure that assures that the different units in his or her 
population have equal probabilities of being chosen (Adams and Schvaneveldt, 1985: 180). 
Chisnall (1997: 84) explains what probability sampling is all about as follows: 
"Probability sampling or also known as random sampling, results in every 
sampling unit in a finite population having a calculable and non-zero 
probability of being selected in the sample. This means that the chance of a 
unit being included in a sample can be calculated. For example, if a sample of 
500 people is to be chosen at random from a population of 50,000, each 
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member of the population will have 1 chance in 100 of being selected in the 
sampling process. " 
According to Chisnall (1997: 84), probability sampling has been widely used by leading 
research bodies because of its sound theoretical basis, which allows the legitimate use of 
the mathematics of probability. There are a number of different types of probability 
samples. These include (i) simple random sampling; (ii) systematic sampling; (iii) 
stratified sampling; and (iv) cluster sampling. Before these are discussed in detail, it is 
important to define some basic terms that are normally used in random or probability 
sampling and they are: 
N= the number of cases in the sampling frame 
n= the number of cases in the sample 
NC = the number of combinations (subsets) of n from N 
f= n/N = the sampling fraction 
(1) Simple Random Sampling - This is the most basic and common type of probability 
sample. Simple random sampling can be defined as a sample in which all elements 
or groups of elements have the same chance of being selected. In other words, to 
select n units out of N so that each NCn has an equal chance of being selected. The 
selection can be made by using a table of random numbers, a computer random 
number generator, or by the "lottery method". The main purpose of random selection 
is to avoid subjective bias arising from a personal choice of sampling units. Because 
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simple random sampling is a fair way to select a sample, it is reasonable to generalise 
the results from the sample back to the population. 
(2) Systematic Sampling - This is the second most common type of probability sampling 
method whereby each element in a sample is picked systematically. For example, in 
a survey of a population of 10,000 people, the researcher may decide to take a sample 
of 250. The sampling interval will be 10,000/250 = 40, and the population list will 
be used as a sampling frame. From there, the researcher will select a number 
between 1 and 40, say for example, no. 4 then the series becomes 4,44,84, etc., until 
the sample of 250 is achieved. By doing so, the researcher is carrying out what is 
called a systematic sampling. Why would a researcher want to use systematic 
random sampling? First, it is fairly easy to do, and second, there are situations where 
there is simply no easier way to do random sampling. 
(3) Stratified Sampling - This sampling method is also sometimes called proportional 
random sampling. This method involves dividing the population into homogenous 
subgroups and then taking a simple random sample in each subgroup. A population 
can be divided into different groups and this may be based on some common 
characteristic or variable, like income, education or race. For example, let us say that 
the population of clients in one American company's survey can be divided into three 
groups: Caucasian, African-American and Hispanic-American. ' Let us further 
assume that both the African-Americans and Hispanic-Americans are relatively small 
minorities of the clientele (10% and 5% respectively). If the researchers just did a 
'Refers to an example as illustrated by Israel, Glenn D. (22nd September 1998) Probability Sampling [WWW 
document]. URL http: //trochim. human. comell. edu/kb/sampprob. html 
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simple random sample of n= 100 with a sampling fraction of 10%, they would 
expect by chance alone that they would only get 10 and 5 persons from each of the 
smaller groups, or perhaps even fewer. However, if the researchers stratify, they can 
do much better. To do this, first, the researchers have to determine how many people 
they want to have in each group. Let us say they still want to take a sample of 100 
from the population of 1000 clients over the past year. In order to find out anything 
about subgroups, the researchers will need at least 25 cases in each group. So they 
will sample 50 Caucasians, 25 African-Americans, and 25 Hispanic-Americans. 
They know that 10% of the population, or 100 clients, are African-American. If they 
randomly sample 25 of these, they have a within-stratum sampling fraction of 25/100 
= 25%. Similarly, they know that 5% or 50 clients are Hispanic-American. So their 
within-stratum sampling fraction will be 25/50 = 50%. Finally, by subtraction they 
know that there are 850 Caucasian clients. Their within-stratum sampling fraction 
for them is 50/850 = 5.88%. Because the groups are more homogeneous within the 
group than across the population as a whole, they can expect greater statistical 
precision (less variance), and because they stratified, they know they will have 
enough cases from each group to make meaningful subgroup inferences. One of the 
advantages of this sampling technique is that when compared to simple random 
sampling, stratified sampling has less sampling error because the sample that is being 
used has already been divided into strata having almost the same attributes. Hence, 
sampling errors only come from within strata. 
(4) Cluster Sampling -A method of sampling whereby the population is broken down, 
usually geographically, into a small number of groups or clusters which have been 
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randomly selected. Within these randomly selected areas of clusters, every unit is 
sampled. Chisnall (1997: 91) notes that cluster sampling is very useful where the 
population under study are widely dispersed making it impracticable to take a simple 
random sample. 
7.6.3.2 Non-probability sampling techniques 
Non-probability sampling techniques mean that individual units in the population do not 
have an equal chance of being selected. Unlike probability sampling, non-probability 
sampling does not involve random selection and occurs when the sample is selected based 
on human judgement, and not on the rigorous application of probability theory. Because of 
the dependence on human judgement, the representative nature of such a sample is 
doubtful. In other words, with non-probability samples, we may or may not represent the 
population accurately, and it will often be hard for us to know how well we have done so. 
Because of the way the sample has been selected, it would be unacceptable to regard any 
results from the study as valid bases for making inferences about the general population. It 
must be noted that these are important limitations. Smith (1975) notes that chemistry or 
physics may not need to be concerned about the question of representativeness, but the 
social sciences in general must always consider this carefully. In general, researchers 
prefer probability sampling over non-probability sampling and consider it to be a more 
accurate and rigorous method. However, in applied social research there may be 
circumstances where it is not feasible or practical to do random sampling. Therefore, the 
other alternative available for use is non-probability. The three common types of non- 
probability sampling are: 
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(1) Convenience Sampling - As the names implies, the researcher gathers data from 
anyone who is available. One example is the evaluation of public opinion issues 
based on television news programmes' soliciting opinions from people conveniently 
in camera range. Another example of convenience sampling is the typical use of 
college students in psychological research. However, the major problem in using this 
sampling method is that one is unable to draw objective inferences about a rigorously 
defined universe (Boyd et al., 1989: 407). This_is particularly true with interviews 
conducted frequently by television news programmes in which the opinion being 
reflected is not representative of the whole population. 
(2) Judgement Sampling -A judgement sample is obtained according to the discretion of 
a specialist or someone who is familiar with the relevant characteristics of the 
population. In other words, by using this method a specialist in the subject area of 
the survey chooses what he or she believes to be the best sample for that particular 
study. He or she also assumes the representativeness of his or her sample by virtue 
of the fact that he or she handpicks elements presumed to be typical of the population 
from which they are drawn. The main advantage of this method is that it is less 
costly and it is more convenient to pick the samples as they are more readily 
accessible to the researcher. However, the major disadvantage is that this method 
cannot ensure the true randomness or representativeness of the sample. 
(3) Quota Sampling - may be defined as "a special edition of stratified sampling in 
which one attempts to include the various elements in a population in a final sample" 
(Adams and Schvaneveldt, 1985: 183). There are two types of quota sampling: 
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proportional and non proportional. In proportional quota sampling the researcher 
attempts to represent the major characteristics of the population by sampling a 
proportional amount of each. ' For example, if the researcher knows the population 
has 40% women and 60% men, and that he or she wants a total sample size of 100, 
he or she will continue sampling until he or she obtains those percentages. This type 
of sampling method is sometimes referred to as "the poor man's proportionate 
stratified sample" because such samples are geared to ensure that specific elements 
will be included and represented in their subsequent collection (Black and Champion, 
1976: 302). The major strength of this sampling is that it is less costly. However, 
the major drawbacks are: (i) the findings are not able to be generalised to any 
significant extent because the nature of the population from which the sample was 
obtained remains unknown; and (ii) the researcher has to decide the specific 
characteristics on which he or she will base his or her quota. 
Unlike proportional quota sampling, non-proportional quota sampling is less 
restrictive. In this method, the researcher specifies the minimum number of sampled 
units he or she wants in each category. Here, the researcher is not concerned with 
having numbers that match the proportions in the population, instead, he or she 
simply wants to have enough to ensure that he or she will be able to talk about 
smaller groups in the population. Thus, this method is the non-probabilistic analogue 
' Israel, Glenn D. (22"d September 1998) Probability Sampling [WWW document]. URL 
http: //trochim. human. comell. edu/kb/sampnon. html 
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of stratified random sampling in that it is typically used to ensure that such groups 
are adequately represented in the sample. ' 
7.6.4 The Sampling Process Undertaken in this Study 
Having reviewed the literature on sampling frames, sample size and sampling techniques, 
this subsection deals with the aspect of sample selection in this study. First, the target 
population is identified. Second, the target respondents are identified. Third, the sampling 
frame is established. Fourth, sample size and sampling techniques used in the mail survey 
are laid down and explained. Finally, the sample size for personal interview is determined. 
7.6.4.1 The population identified in this study 
Instead of concentrating on a particular size of company, we aimed at obtaining companies 
of different sizes and structured the population accordingly (i. e. based on the number of 
employees). The reason for doing so was that we wanted to avoid drawing a conclusion 
based on the information received from one particular size of company. This is important 
because in one of the research hypotheses, we intended to find an association/relationship 
between the size of firms and firms implementing the Japanese model of management. 
The companies chosen for this study were from the manufacturing sector and came from 
two major industrial growth areas (states) in West Malaysia and two from industrial growth 
areas (states) in East Malaysia. ' They were Penang and Kuala Lumpur/Selangor in the 
° Ibid. 
5 Companies refer to both Malaysian and Foreign-owned (include joint ventures) and the activities of these 
companies also vary (see Chapter 8 for more details). 
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former; Sabah and Sarawak in the latter. There were two main reasons why these areas 
were chosen. One was because as multinational companies (MNCs) dominate these areas, 
it could be argued that in order to be competitive, firms in these industrial growth areas 
were more likely to adopt Japanese management techniques and work ethic. The other was 
because we were particularly keen to examine the situation which might be most conducive 
to their adoption. 
With regard to the reasons why the manufacturing sector was chosen, they were: firstly, the 
shift in economic activities from agriculture to manufacturing has been prominent since the 
late 1970s, and has increased in prominence since the launch of the Look East Policy 
(LEP) in February 1982, in which the manufacturing sector was the most important 
contributor to Malaysia's GDP and export earnings. As mentioned in Chapter 6, in 1994, 
the manufacturing sector's contribution to GDP and gross export earnings amounted to 
31.7 percent and 78.2 percent respectively, and despite being affected by the financial 
turbulence of 1997-98, the manufacturing sector's contribution to GDP has increased to 
35.5 percent. ' It is obvious that the Malaysian government, through its LEP, has been 
instrumental in promoting industrialisation to achieve economic development. In fact, 
Kholo (1991: 158) argues that industrialisation remains a fundamental objective of 
economic development for a large majority of developing countries, including Malaysia. 
In such economies, according to Kholo (1991: 158), industrial development is considered 
necessary to achieve high rates of economic growth, and the expansion of the 
manufacturing industry offers a much wider scope for the growth of output. 
6 All figures were taken from Bank Negara Malaysia Annual Report (1994 & 1997) 
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Secondly, the manufacturing sector is also the country's major employer, having employed 
1.9 million people in 1994, i. e. about 25 percent of thetotal national workforce. Although 
the employment situation remained tight in 1997, the manufacturing sector employed 2.3 
million people, reflecting the sustained expansion in manufacturing activities during the 
year. 
Thirdly, because of the fact that firms in the manufacturing sector in Malaysia are 
dominated by multinational corporations (MNCs) and operate in a very competitive 
environment where different technology and management style can be applied, by focusing 
on a single sector (the manufacturing sector), the findings will be expected to be more 
focused and reliable for the sector studied. Nevertheless, the same study can also be 
replicated to other sectors if needed in the future. 
Finally, this study challenges the concluding remarks made by the government that the 
Japanese model of management is the "perfect" model for management and workers, and 
particularly in the manufacturing sector, to emulate (Mahathir's speech as cited in Soong, 
1983: 279). Thus, in light of these arguments the manufacturing sector represents the most 
appropriate sector for this study to examine the impact of the Look East Policy or the 
effectiveness of the Look East Policy in encouraging management in Malaysia to adopt 
Japanese management techniques and work ethic. 
' /bid. 
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7.6.4.2 The respondents identified in this study 
The respondents that were identified or requested to complete the questionnaires for this 
study were managing directors, and there were a number of reasons for this choice. As 
managing directors, their opinions are considered important to this study not only because 
they are decision-makers, but also because they are responsible for major functions, such as 
planning and perform other crucial roles (see Glover and Hughes, 1996). Because of their 
important position, in our opinion, they are also the ones who decided whether to adopt and 
apply Japanese management techniques. Moreover, it could be argued that it was they who 
could give "good" views or opinions on whether the government, via its Look East Policy, 
has been successful in terms of encouraging management in Malaysia to adopt Japanese 
management techniques. 
7.6.4.3 The sampling frame used in this study 
The sampling frame for this study was derived from a manufacturing directory called 
Malaysian Manufacturers and Exporters Directory (MMED) which was published in 1997.8 
The reason for using the MMED was that in terms of representativeness, the MMED 
provides an excellent cross-sectional coverage of firms pertaining to their location, 
products and industry classification and year of establishment/incorporation. 
7.6.4.4 Determination of sample size and sampling technique for mail survey 
In this study, 240 companies from the manufacturing sector were identified based on the 
year of establishment/incorporation, i. e. companies had to be incorporated before 1982 
(before the official launch of the Look East Policy in February of that year). Because these 
8 Note: At the time of the field survey the 1998 MMED directory had not been published yet. 
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firms had been in operation for a number of years and were financially established, it could 
be argued that such firms were more likely to adopt Japanese management techniques and 
work ethic in response to the Look East Policy. 
As leading authorities such as Fowler (1991); Manu (1988); Hoinville et al. (1983) and 
Kent (1993) all agree there is seldom a definite answer about how big a sample should be 
for any given research, to ensure a good response rate for this study, we decided to take 
50% or 120 out of the total population of 240 identified as our target for the mail survey. It 
should be noted that we did not carry out the classification of firms selected as the listing 
of firms in the MMED was already classified and stratified according to states, based on 
the International Standard of Industrial Code (ISIC). 
The original distribution of samples in the sampling frame is given in Column I of Table 
7.2. The number of samples from each stratum (states) is determined according to the 
proportion it represents in the population in the sampling frame. After the number of 
required samples from the selected states is determined, simple random sampling technique 
is used to select the firms. For example, for the state of Penang, the original number of 
firms in the sampling frame is 56 (Column 1) representing 23.3% (Column 2) of the 
population in the sampling frame. Since the required sample is only 120, the number of 
firms to be selected from the state of Penang is 23.3% of 120, or 28 firms. These 28 firms 
are then selected at random from the strata of 56 firms, giving a 50% chance for each firm 
to be selected. The same procedure is applied for the other three states (strata). The final 
number of firms selected from each stratum is shown in column 3 of Table 7.2. 
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The reason for using simple random sampling technique to select the firms from the strata 
is that it is considered appropriate for this study. This is because by introducing the 
randomness into the selection of elements for the sample, we minimise the biases and other 
systematic factors that may make the sample different from the population from which it is 
drawn (see Sproull, 1995). This is also in agreement with Fink (1995: 10), who points out 
that because of the equality of opportunity as applied by simple random sampling, random 
samples are considered relatively unbiased. However, it is important to note that although 
random sampling tends to be representative, there is no guarantee of this (see Berger and 
Patchner, 1988). 
Table 7.2 
Sampling Frame and Sample Size 
States selected No. of Proportion No. of No. of usable 
firms in of total selected Questionnaire 
Sampling frame (Column 2) samples Returned & 
(Column 1) (Column 3) Percentage 
(Column 4) 
Penang 56 0.233 28 18 (64.0%) 
KL/Selangor 132 0.550 66 36 (54.5%) 
Sarawak 32 0.133 16 11(68.7%) 
Sabah 20 0.084 10 4 (40.0%) 
Total 240 1.0 120 69 (57.5%) 
Table 7.2 illustrates that a greater proportion of firms selected came from the states of 
Penang and KL/Selangor, indicating that many of the manufacturing industries were 
located in these two industrial areas. However, looking at column 4 of the same table, the 
completed questionnaires that were returned were quite evenly distributed except from the 
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state of Sabah where about 40% response rate is indicated. The reason for the low 
response rate from Sabah was partly because potential respondents could not be contacted 
and partly because a number of our respondents told us that they were too busy and 
therefore failed to return the mail survey questionnaire. 
7.6.4.5 Determination of sample size for personal interview 
With regard to the interviewees and the sample size for personal interview, Peterson's 
(1988) rule of thumb is always to have a minimum sample size of 30. For this study, the 
sample size for personal interview consisted of 32 respondents. How these respondents 
were selected is explained below. 
Our aim in interviewing is to probe for more information only among those respondents 
who stated that they have implemented some elements of Japanese management 
techniques. Having looked at all the 69 completed and usable questionnaires, only 32 
respondents met the above criteria, and thus all of them were immediately contacted for the 
interview. The other 37 respondents were excluded since they did not meet our criteria. 
7.7 Development of the Questionnaire 
Having decided on the sampling frame, sample size and sampling technique, our next task 
was to decide on the questionnaire design, types and sources of questions and scales of 
measurement to be used or applied in this study. To facilitate this, the literature related to 
these issues are reviewed. 
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7.7.1 Questionnaire Design 
As survey, especially mail survey, is generally well known for its low response rate, every 
effort has to be made to ensure that the questionnaire is well-designed and attractive, and 
the questions can be easily understood by the respondents. The question is how to do that? 
Fowler (1991) points out that one of the prerequisites in designing a good questionnaire is 
deciding what is to be measured. Also Hoinville et al. (1983) mention that a good 
questionnaire should be designed to suit the aims of the study and the nature of its 
respondents. Similarly, other leading authorities (for instance, Peterson, 1988; Aaker and 
Day, 1986; Churchill, 1987; Howard and Sharp, 1983) suggest that a good questionnaire 
should consider the flow of the questions, the length of the questionnaire, the size of the 
page, layout, format and the colour of the paper used; respondents anonymity; the use of 
premiums or rewards; return envelopes and stamps; and a deadline for returning the 
completed questionnaires. 
In terms of the flow of the questions, Fowler (1991) points out that it is advisable to lay out 
the questions starting with relatively easy and straightforward questions, as they help "get 
the respondents into" the survey. After that, more in-depth questions which requiring a 
good deal of thought, or those thought to be sensitive should follow (Fowler, 1991). In 
terms of quality of paper, Aaker and Day (1986) suggest that good quality colour paper 
should be used. Also Churchill (1987) suggests that the paper to be used must be of a 
bright colour and of good quality while using mimeographed or photocopied paper should 
be avoided. In terms of the number of pages of the questionnaire, Peterson (1988) advises 
that if a self-administered questionnaire is more than 4 pages long, it should be made into 
booklet form as this looks more professional. Similarly, Churchill (1987) points out that 
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by making the questionnaire into a booklet it not only facilitates handling but also 
reinforces an image of quality. Thus, overall the-design of the questionnaire must 
incorporate all the above criteria in order to, as in the words of Peterson (1988), "facilitate 
its completion. " 
7.7.2 Types of Questions Used in the Survey 
The types of questions used in the survey (both mail survey and personal interview) can be 
either (i) unstructured or opened-ended; or (ii) structured or closed-ended (Chisnall, 1997; 
Fowler, 1991; Fontana and Frey, 1994). What these refer to, particularly in the interview 
survey, is the degree of structure, i. e. how deep the interview tries to go, and the degree to 
which the interview is standardised across different respondents and situations. For 
example, in structured interviewing, questions are planned and standardised in advanced, 
pre-coded categories are used for responses, and the interview itself does not attempt to go 
into any great depth (Fontana and Frey, 1994). In contrast, in unstructured interviewing, 
the questions are not standardised, but instead there are general questions to get the 
interview going and to keep it moving. Specific questions will then emerge as the 
interview unfolds, and the wording of these will depend upon direction the interview takes. 
There are also no pre-established categories for responding (Fontana and Frey, 1994). 
Both types of questions have their strengths and weaknesses. 
With regard to unstructured or opened-ended questions; the advantages are: (i) respondents 
are not influenced by a predetermined set of response alternatives, and as such, they can 
freely express their views, which may differ from the researcher's expectations; (ii) this 
type of question can provide insightful data and valuable comments (Kinnear and Taylor, 
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1979); and (iii) this type of question can also describe or reflect more closely the real views 
of the respondents and can elicit creative and original information (Fowler, 1991; Sproull, 
1995). However, the disadvantages are: (i) the respondents have to spend more time 
answering the questions; they may tend to write more briefly, and there may be a problem 
of illegible handwriting (Kinnear and Taylor, 1979); (ii) it is time consuming especially for 
analysis (coding and tabulation of data) (Sproull, 1995); (iii) by adopting this approach, 
categorisation is quite difficult and might be arbitrary depending on the researcher's own 
preposition; and (iv) this type of question has a high potential for interviewer bias since the 
interviewer rarely records the respondents' answers in exactly the same words, especially 
when time is a constraint (Peterson, 1988). 
With respect to structured or closed-ended questions the advantages are: (i) they are 
convenient for respondents in terms of time and ease of responding (Parasuraman, 1986); 
(ii) answers are directly comparable from each respondent, assuming that each one 
interprets the words in the same way (Aaker and Day, 1986); and (iii) it is normally 
cheaper since interviewer time and skill levels required to record and interpret data are 
usually lower than in unstructured or opened-ended questions. On the other hand, the 
disadvantages of structured or closed-ended questions are: (i) more time is needed to 
design structured questions unless the researcher has a clear idea of the questions to ask 
and the specific responses to anticipate (Parasuraman, 1986); and (ii) structured questions 
are difficult to develop and good exploratory work is necessary to ensure that all 
potentially important response alternatives are included (Aaker and Day, 1986). 
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7.7.3 Scale of Measurements 
The scales or types of measurement that are commonly used in questionnaires are nominal, 
ordinal, interval and ratio (Churchill, 1987; Peterson, 1988; Tull and Hawkins, 1990; 
Fowler, 1991; Sproull, 1995). 
A nominal scale is defined as numbers assigned to events which can be placed into 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories (Sproull, 1995). Nominal scales can be 
divided into two types. One is categorical - where objects sharing certain characteristics 
are assigned the same identifying symbol and placed in the same category (Peterson, 
1988). The other is binary - where respondents can tick as many answers as are applicable 
to them. In terms of data/statistical analysis, while modes, frequency, percentages and chi- 
square can be calculated from nominal data, a mean or median cannot (Peterson, 1988). 
An ordinal scale is defined as numbers assigned to events which can be placed into 
mutually exclusive categories and can be ordered into a greater than or less than scale 
(Sproull, 1995). According to Peterson (1988), only statements of greater than or less than 
are permitted in an ordinal scale of measurements. With regard to data/statistical analysis, 
modes or medians can be used or calculated but not a mean. Besides that, the percentage 
of the total appearing in each rank can also be calculated (Tull and Hawkins, 1990). 
An interval scale is defined as numbers assigned to events which can be categorised, 
ordered and assumed to have an equal distance between scale values (Sproull, 1995). With 
respect to data/statistical analysis, almost the entire range of statistical analysis or 
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techniques such as mean, median, mode, range, standard deviation, t-test etc., can be 
applied to interval scale data (Peterson, 1988; Tull and Hawkins, 1990). 
A ratio scale is defined as numbers that ranks items such that numerically equal distances 
on the scale represent equal distances in the property being measured and that the number 
zero has an absolute empirical meaning (Tull and Hawkins, 1990). According to Peterson 
(1988), a ratio scale of measurement provides information about the equality of objects, 
their rank order, and the absolute extent of differences between them. With regard to 
statistical techniques to be used for ratio scale data, all descriptive measures and inferential 
techniques are applicable (Tull and Hawkins, 1990). 
7.7.4 Questionnaire Design, Types and Sources of Questions, and Scale of 
Measurements for Mail Survey 
In this study, the design of a mail survey questionnaire was made following the 
recommendation of a number of leading authorities in the field, including Fowler (1991); 
Hoinville et al. (1983); Aaker and Day (1986); Peterson (1988); Churchill (1987) and 
Dillman (1978). As suggested by Peterson (1988), the mail survey questionnaire in this 
study was made into a booklet form with a step-by-step instruction. Also, following 
Churchill's (1987) recommendation, light green, high-quality paper was used to print the 
questionnaire. In addition, as advised by Fowler (1991), the questions were laid out in 
order of difficulty, i. e. starting with the straightforward questions, followed by the 
questions which are more "difficult" and which required a good deal of thought. As 
suggested by McGown (1979), the length of each individual question was kept as short as 
possible in order to avoid confusion. 
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The final questionnaire was divided into four sections and consisted of sixty-one questions, 
and a blank space at the end of the last section for the respondents to write down some 
suggestions or comments. Section A had twenty-two questions and the aim of this section 
was to find out about the respondent's profile and his or her knowledge of the Japanese 
language. Section B had three questions asking about the respondent's organisation. 
Section C had six questions and this was where the questions pertaining to the Look East 
Policy were asked, while Section D had thirty questions asking about the Japanese model 
of management or Japanese management techniques. All but four questions were closed- 
ended and required the respondent to either tick or circle the appropriate boxes (see 
Appendix 7.2 for a sample copy of the mail survey questionnaire). 
With regard to the types of question used for mail survey in this study, they were very 
structured and mostly closed-ended. The reasons for using this type of question were 
because, as mentioned earlier, they were convenient to respondents in terms of time and 
ease of responding. Besides that, they were convenient for our analysis because the 
answers were directly comparable from each respondent assuming that each one interpreted 
the words in the same way. 
With regard to the sources of questions for this study, they were adopted and developed (i) 
from earlier studies that had been conducted by other researchers (Yasin, 1990; Gill and 
Wong, 1998); (ii) as a result of pretesting; and (iii) after rigorous discussion with the 
supervisor to identify any further potential problems. Following the earlier studies the 
wording of some questions had to be slightly changed to accommodate the research 
objectives and also the different context (i. e. to accommodate the Malaysian context). 
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Some of the questions that were not relevant to this study were dropped, while as a result 
of the discussion with the supervisor 12 new questions; numbers 26,28,29,30,31,43,44, 
45,52,55,58 and 61, were added. 
One of the advantages of using questions from previous studies was that the validity and 
reliability of the questions had been measured. Validity refers to how well a survey item 
measures what it sets out to measure (Litwin, 1995: 33). On the other hand, reliability is a 
statistical measure of how reproducible the survey instrument's data are (Litwin, 1995: 6). 
Gill and Wong (1998) tested the reliability of their questions using test-retest reliability and 
it was reported at 0.66, which according to Muchinsky (1983, as cited in Gill and Wong, 
1998), may be accepted, while the content validity was 0.74. To increase the reliability of 
the questions in this study, they were carefully developed through two pre-tests and 
checked rigorously by the supervisor. 
In terms of the scale of measurement, the questionnaire is designed with two scales in 
mind; nominal and ordinal. However, several demographic questions are also made up of a 
continuous scale. 
In this study both types of nominal scales are used. The categorical type is used mostly in 
Section A of our mail survey questionnaire to extract answers regarding race, religion and 
category of jobs. The binary type is used mostly in Section D, although it is also used in 
some parts of Section C. This type of scale allows the respondents to tick a number of 
answers, and is thus deemed the most suitable because it does not restrict the respondents 
to only one answer. As such, the results will give a better picture with regard to which 
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elements of Japanese management techniques have been implemented in the respondents' 
firms. 
In contrast, ordinal scales are used mostly in Section D. Finally, some continuous scales 
are used throughout all the sections. For example, in Section A continuous scales are used 
to extract answers regarding age, how long the respondent has been in the present and last 
position (job), etc. 
7.7.5 Questionnaire Design, Types and Sources of Questions, and Scale of 
Measurements for Personal Interview 
Our aim in using personal interview in this study is basically to obtain an explanation from 
the respondents as to why they have or have not done things as they indicated in the mail 
survey questionnaires. ' This explanation, we believe, will be better got through personal 
interview rather than mail survey, as the respondents are encouraged to express their views 
freely. 
With regard to the design of the personal interview questionnaire, types and sources of 
questions and scale of measurements, we do not adopt any formal design or any scales of 
measurement. This is because our objective is to gain a more in-depth insight, and 
therefore a checklist approach is more appropriate, and within it there is a list of issues to 
be investigated. It is important to note that this checklist is fairly loosely-based because 
besides allowing flexibility in terms of responses, its other function, as mentioned earlier is 
to get the interview going and to keep it moving as this will allow us to cover key issues 
' For example, we want to know why the respondents have said that they have adopted suggestion system but 
not lifetime employment, etc. 
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that we want to investigate (see Fontana and Frey, 1994). A sample of an interview 
checklist is shown in Appendix 7.3. 
7.8 Administration of Mail Questionnaire and Interview Checklist 
Having the questions and the appropriate scales attached to them, our next task is to do a 
pretest or a pilot study. Before we present the manner in which the pilot study is conducted 
and its advantages for this study, it is useful to review some of the literature in this area. 
7.8.1 A Pilot Study 
A pilot study is a small-scale trial before the main investigation or study. According to 
Fowler (1991), every questionnaire (mail survey as well as personal interview) should be 
pretested in order to assess the adequacy of the research designs and the instruments to be 
used for data collection. Wilson (1996: 103) points out that a pilot study is both important 
and highly recommended, even if it is only a small one because of time and money 
constraints. However, it is important to point out that the pilot study does not attempt to 
represent, in the statistical sense, the correct proportions of different types of individuals in 
the population. This is because the purpose is not to estimate the true proportions of such 
types, but to cover the entire range of replies which might be given to any of the possible 
questions in the first draft of a questionnaire (Wilson, 1996: 103). Wilson further suggests 
that by covering the full range of replies, the researcher is then in a position to work out a 
set of codes or response categories which embrace the entire range of responses that might 
be given. This is a counsel of perfection and no matter how good the pilot, responses may 
turn up in the main study that have not been anticipated in the pilot results (Wilson, 1996: 
103). Thus, in addition to the above reasons we intend to use the pilot study to ascertain 
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the likelihood of certain unanticipated constraints or events which, if not eliminated early 
on, could pose greater problems when the actual research survey is carried out. 
7.8.2 Advantages of Conducting the Pilot Study 
There are a number of valid reasons why piloting is important. According to Wilson 
(1996: 103-014), they are: 
(i) To find out roughly how long the questionnaire takes to answer and if there are any 
features of it that are likely to put people off and so reduce the likely response rates. 
It is important to note that the law of diminishing returns appears to operate with 
questionnaires after a certain amount of time and effort has been expended. Thus, by 
conducting the pilot study, the length of the questionnaires can be checked before the 
final version is sent out in order to avoid fatigue among respondents; 
(ii) To "de-bug" the questions, i. e. is the wording clear? Do people see the questions as 
important and interpret them as expected; 
(iii) To ensure that it is easy for the respondents to express their answers to their 
satisfaction, and for the researcher to interpret them correctly. 
Wilson (1996: 103) also stresses that the other important purpose of a pilot study is to 
devise a set of codes or response categories for each question that will cover, as 
comprehensively as possible, the full range of responses which may be given in reply to the 
questions in the main investigation. 
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7.8.3 How the Pilot Study was Conducted and its Advantages for this Study 
Before the pilot study was conducted in Malaysia, the drafts of both mail and personal 
interview questionnaires were pretested with the help of some senior Malaysian Ph. D. 
students at Stirling University. These students were asked to complete the questionnaires 
and to return them with some comments, especially with regard to the questions and the 
structure of the mail survey questionnaire. Based on the comments received, some changes 
were made1° before the amended copy was extended to the supervisor for further 
discussion. Later, when everything had been finalised, i. e. the questions and the structure, 
the researcher was ready to conduct the pilot study in Malaysia using mail survey 
questionnaires and actual respondents from the private sector. Pretesting of the interview 
checklist was not carried out with actual respondents because it was considered 
unnecessary since we had full control of obtaining the responses during the interviewing 
process. 
For the purpose of the pilot study, 20 mail survey questionnaires were sent out to managing 
directors of 20 private companies in Malaysia in February 1998. Of these 10 mail survey 
questionnaires were sent to managing directors of banks and finance companies and the 
other 10 were sent out to managing directors of manufacturing companies. The names of 
companies were taken randomly from the list of companies listed in the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange First Board (KLSE). This was because it is a rule in the conduct of a pilot 
study that the respondents who fill in the questionnaire forms for the pilot study must not 
1° For example, the researcher had to redraft the structure in the mail survey questionnaire by putting a "box" 
for each answer. Ambiguous and difficult terms and words were clarified and reworded and questions that 
were inadvertently omitted were added. 
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be included in the final survey (Black and Champion, 1976). By the end of February 1998, 
eight managing directors replied, giving a response rates of 40%. Three completed mail 
survey questionnaires were received from bank and finance companies and five from 
manufacturing companies. A further investigation revealed that the main reason why there 
was a poor response from the banking and finance companies was because during the time 
of the pilot study, such companies were under enormous pressure from the government and 
central bank (Bank Negara Malaysia) to either merge or cease operations due to high non- 
performing loans and other financial issues arising from the economic downturn. " 
Again, in early March 1998 and with the help of the researcher's brother who is the Senior 
Assistant Secretary for the Kuching Council, the same questionnaires were distributed to 
15 managing directors who are very "close" to the researcher's brother and whose 
companies are mainly based in Sarawak. By the middle of March, 5 questionnaires were 
received after numerous reminders12 -a response rate of 33.3%. 
Whatever the reasons were, as mentioned by Wilson (1-996), the main objective of the pilot 
study being undertaken for this research was to ensure that the actual survey to be carried 
out later would be as smooth as it could be. Indeed the advantages referred to in the books 
and cited above were reflected in the pilot study conducted for this research. First, the pilot 
study proved that the response rates were very low when the respondents had no direct 
interest in the research itself (see Gardner, 1987: 98). Second, sensitive questions should 
be avoided, i. e. questions that have political connotations or are too personal to some 
people. 
"Slippery Slope: Malaysian banks", The Economist, 7`h March 1998, Vol. 346, pp. 81. 
'Z Average of four reminders before respondents returned the questionnaires. 
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The feedback from the pilot study also provided some constructive insight regarding the 
usage of words, the structure of the questions and their sensitivity, leading to small changes 
to some questions. To make the mail survey questionnaire look more official and 
professional, we designed the cover by putting the University of Stirling Department of 
Management and Organisation's logo and, as mentioned earlier, presented the final 
questionnaire in booklet form. 
From the responses received, it was indeed very difficult to encourage the managing 
directors to co-operate in the mail survey, especially when most of the companies were 
facing serious financial problems in the aftermath of East Asia's financial crisis. It seems 
that inducements like a stamped, addressed envelope, a Stirling University pen or even 
close personal contact, in this case the researcher's brother who was very "close" to some 
managing directors, could not guarantee that the respondents would return the completed 
questionnaires. The pilot study proved that obtaining the co-operation of managing 
directors in Malaysia was not only exceedingly difficult but also expensive13 as an 
enormous amount of effort had to be made in order to get the respondents to reply. 
7.8.4 The Actual Survey 
This subsection deals with how the actual mail survey as well as personal interview survey 
were conducted. With regard to the mail survey, first, we explained the process involved 
in carrying it out; and second, we discussed the problem of non-response and highlighted 
how we had dealt with it. With respect to personal interview, first, we highlighted the 
steps required to overcome its drawbacks. Second, we reviewed the literature on managing 
" Cost has been relatively high because of telephone calls and fax charges to remind the respondents. 
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the interviews and shortly after that we mentioned the steps taken in conducting the 
interviews for this study. Finally, we highlighted how the interview data were recorded. 
7.8.4.1 The Mail Survey 
7.8.4.1.1 The process involved in conducting mail survey 
The actual fieldwork was undertaken in Malaysia for a period of three months starting on 
V April 1998 and ending 30"' June 1998. All 120 mail survey questionnaires and 
interview checklists were sent on the 1t April 1998 and the closing date was the 15`h April 
1998. The first reminder to the respondents who had not returned the completed mail 
survey questionnaires was sent by fax immediately after the closing date and the 
respondents were asked to return the completed mail survey questionnaires before the 30`h 
April 1998 (see Appendix 7.4 for the sample of the first reminder letter). Soon after this 
closing date, a second reminder was faxed to the respondents. By the 30`h May 1998 there 
were 69 fully completed and usable mail survey questionnaires received (this excluded 
questionnaires that were returned uncompleted due to unreachable address). We had made 
further efforts to contact some respondents by telephone as well as fax, but there was no 
sign of any more questionnaires coming. Hence, the total of completed and usable mail 
survey questionnaires received was 69, giving a response rate of 57.5% (Table 7.3). 
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Table 7.3 
Fieldwork Response 
Items Frequency Percent 
Total number of questionnaire sent out 120 100.0 
Total number of questionnaire returned 86 71.7 
Total number of questionnaires not returned (non-response) 34 28.3 
Total number of questionnaires returned uncompleted* 17 14.2 
Total number of completed/usable questionnaires received 69 57.5 
Note: * Due to unreachable address or have recently moved location. Returned envelopes were stamped 
with instructions such as "sudah pindah" or moved; or "tidak dapat dihubungi" or could not be 
reached. 
Looking at Table 7.3, it is quite clear that one of the major problems encountered during 
the fieldwork was the unreliability of the addresses in the directory being used. As shown 
in the table, there were 17 uncompleted questionnaires returned which had been stamped 
"Sudah Pindah" (moved) by the postal authority, clearly indicating that the directory had 
not been updated before its publication. 
7.8.4.1.2 The problem of non-response and how it was dealt with 
Based on the experience gained from the fieldwork and the reviewed literature, one major 
problem with mail questionnaires is the issue of non-response. Moser and Kalton (1979; 
166) point out that non-response is a universal problem that no human investigator can 
avoid. Black and Champion (1976: 389) also state that although estimates of non-response 
to a mailed questionnaire vary, it appears to be a normal expectation that nearly 70% of the 
questionnaires mailed will not be returned. Generally, there are two types of non-response. 
The first type relates to the incompleteness of the returned mail questionnaires, which this 
study did not have any problem with. The second type of non-response relates to the 
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inability of the researcher to get any response at all from the sampled population (even 
though questionnaires and follow-up letters have been sent out) due to a number of 
reasons, such as respondents have declined to answer the questions in the mail 
questionnaires or simply did not bother to return the mail questionnaires. This type of non- 
response concerns the researcher as it usually creates biased estimates in any study because 
the characteristics of non-response stratum could be different from those who have 
responded to the survey. Black and Champion (1976) suggest that the best way to reduce 
the non-response bias is to increase the response rate by sending a follow-up letter to non- 
respondents. However, it could be argued that this could never guarantee any reply and 
moreover certain constraints, such as time and finapcial resources, might prevent the 
researcher from doing so. 
Because the problem of non-response cannot be avoided, we have to deal with it and to 
find out whether the non-response did create a significant bias to render the sample 
estimate inadequate. One commonly used method of dealing with non-response, as 
recommended by leading authorities (Fowler, 1991; Hoinville et al., 1978; Moser and 
Kalton, 1979), is to try to get some information pertaining to the characteristics of the non- 
response stratum. By applying this method and to ensure a good response, we randomly 
selected twenty-five out of thirty-four non-respondents to participate in the telephone 
interview. Rather than using the original version of the mail survey questionnaire, which is 
very lengthy and detailed, we came up with a simplified version designed for telephone 
interview purposes and specifically geared to find out about the profile of the non- 
respondents and their opinions pertaining to the Look East Policy as well as the Japanese 
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model of management or Japanese management techniques (Appendix 7.5 shows a sample 
of the simplified version of the interview schedule). 
The ten key questions in the simplified version of the interview schedule are as follows: Q1 
- asks about the background of respondents (race, age, religion and level of education); Q2 
- asks about the characteristics/ownership of firms and number of employees; Q3 - asks 
about the respondents' knowledge of the Japanese language; Q4 - asks about the 
respondents' opinions pertaining to the Look East Policy; Q5 - asks about the respondents' 
familiarity with the Japanese model of management; Q6 - asks whether respondents 
implement the Japanese model of management or not; Q7 - asks about the problems 
respondents faced (if any) pertaining to the elements of the Japanese model of management 
they had implemented; Q8 - asks about the respondents' opinions pertaining to the 
Japanese' willingness to transfer their technological know-how and expertise to the 
Malaysians; Q9 - asks whether respondents recognise trade unions and the types of union 
they choose to recognise; and Q10 - asks the respondents' opinions as to whether the 
government via its Look East Policy has been successful or effective in encouraging 
management in Malaysia to adopt the Japanese model of management. 
Out of the twenty-five non-respondents, we managed to interview fifteen, a response rate 
of 60% (the high response rate could be due to simple and brief questions being asked as 
well as continuous and direct contact by telephone). The responses were then analysed and 
compared with the original replies from the 69 respondents. From the findings, it was 
found that the characteristics of the non-respondents (e. g. race, religion, education, 
knowledge of the Look East Policy, been to Japan, and familiarity with Japanese 
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management practices) and the characteristics of their company (e. g. size of firms/the 
number of employees they employed, and ownership structure) do not differ significantly 
from those of the original respondents. All fifteen respondents were familiar with the 
Japanese model of management, and of these, only six firms had adopted Japanese 
management techniques and all of them said that they had faced a number of problems 
when implementing them. 14 
Although by making such a comparison, we could never guarantee the absence of bias, the 
findings from non-respondents certainly boosted our confidence and reassured us that the 
final sample was valid for further analysis. 
7.8.4.2 Personal Interview 
7.8.4.2.1 Steps to overcome the drawbacks of personal interview 
As mentioned earlier, personal interview also has its strengths as well as weaknesses. One 
of the major drawbacks that we were concerned with in this study was the cancellation of 
interview appointments, as we did not have ample time left to carry out the fieldwork. 
Therefore to overcome this drawback the following steps were taken. 
(i) In order to facilitate the setting up of appointments and to avoid interrupted 
interviews or the cancellation of interview appointments, letters requesting access 
and co-operation were sent in advance, i. e. sent together with the mail survey 
questionnaire. 
14 Elements that were said to have been implemented by 6 respondents were identical with the elements that 
were said to have been implemented by the 32 respondents. 
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(ii) Telephone calls were then made to all 32 respondents to set up a tentative 
appointment date for the interview to be held in the respondent's office. After that, 
a copy of the interview checklist was sent by fax to all 32 respondents (although 
this was sent earlier together with the questionnaires) not only to make sure that 
they had a copy of the interview checklist but also to remind them of the interview 
appointment as well as to give them ample time to prepare some answers before the 
actual interview was held. 
(iii) Finally, telephone calls were made to reconfirm the interview date. 
It is important to note that all 32 respondents were successfully interviewed. The main 
reason could be because these were the respondents that had already indicated their 
willingness to take part in the research when they originally filled in the questionnaires. 
7.8.4.2.2 Managing the interview 
After arrangements had been made, i. e. the appointment date and the interviewees (in this 
case - 32 managing directors) the next task was managing the interview. A number of 
authors (for instance, Punch, 1998: 180-181) mention that managing an interview involves 
a number of steps which include establishing rapport (beginning the interview); asking 
questions - the sequence and types of questions; and closing the interview. These steps are 
discussed below. 
In the first step, i. e. establishing rapport, Punch (1998) argues that to interview 
successfully, it is important to establish rapport at the beginning of the interview. 
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Similarly, Chisnall (1997: 168) warns that people's co-operation should not be taken for 
granted and it is very important to formally introduce ourselves. He then adds that 
interviewers should endeavour to build up empathy, i. e. the ability of one individual to 
respond sensitively and imaginatively to another's feelings. 
The second step involves asking questions. Punch (1998) argues that question-asking is at 
the centre of interviewing and is important in deciding how successful the interview will 
be. Therefore, he warns, as far as possible, a researcher should try to avoid asking 
sensitive questions or questions that have political connotations. 
The final step involves closing the interview. Minichiello et al. (1990) state that ways of 
closing the interview may also require attention. Similarly, Punch (1998: 181) maintains 
that closing the interview may involve certain strategies such as giving an 
acknowledgement letter at the end of the interview process, giving a souvenir, etc. 
However, Punch also points out that the applicability of the strategies used depends very 
much on the perspective, on the approach taken to interviewing in a particular subject, and 
on the type of interview selected. 
In managing the interviews for this study, the following steps were taken: 
(i) In establishing rapport for the interviews in this study, the researcher formally and 
briefly introduced himself by showing a letter from the supervisor asking for the 
respondents' co-operation. Then the researcher outlined the nature of the survey, 
the reasons why it was being conducted, and the reason why the respondents had 
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been selected. This is particularly important because very often people are curious 
to know why they, in particular, have been selected for interview (see Chisnall, 
1997). The researcher also assured the respondents that their personal details would 
remain confidential in the final analysis. 
(ii) As far as step two was concerned, i. e. question-asking we tried to avoid asking 
sensitive questions or questions that had political connotations. In doing so, we 
used a checklist, which was a fairly loosely-based discussion approach, whereby 
not only were we giving the respondents a chance to amplify or qualify his or her 
responses, but most importantly, we were also encouraging the respondents to 
explain in some detail certain issues that were raised as very often such 
explanations were unobtainable from the mail survey questionnaire. Also, by using 
this approach, we encouraged the respondents to give their valued opinions on 
issues that were important to this study. 
(iii) Finally, in closing the interview, we expressed our gratitude to the participants or 
respondents for their involvement, time, the use of their office facilities, and the 
information that they had given us. Besides that, we also gave them a souvenir 
which, we believed, they could treasure and remember. 
7.8.4.2.3 Recording 
How the interview data are recorded needs to be considered in planning the research. For 
structured interviews, which normally use pre-coded response categories, recording of 
responses is probably a simple matter of checkmarks on a response sheet (Richardson et 
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al., 1965). For more opened-ended interviews, however, the possibilities include tape- 
recording, video-recording, and/or note-taking (Punch, 1998). However, there is a problem 
with tape-recording resulting from the reluctance of some people to be recorded. 
Moreover, because some company's information is very confidential, the respondents 
might be less candid and unforthcoming. 
Since the interviews for this study were conducted using an opened-ended discussion 
approach, the best means of recording interview data is by tape-recording whereby accurate 
information can be recorded as opposed to recording the responses by note-taking. All the 
32 respondents had agreed to be tape-recorded after we assured them that their names and 
the names of their company were not going to be mentioned in the data analysis. With 
regard to languages used in the interview, both Bahasa Malaysia and English were spoken. 
Where the responses were in Bahasa Malaysia, we made the best effort to translate it into 
English without losing its intended meaning. 
7.9 Data Analysis 
Our final task is the analysis of data. The main purpose of data analysis is to produce 
meaning from the primary data that were collected. According to Robson (1995), there are 
two types of data analysis. One is qualitative analysis - which is normally used for words 
or data which come in a non-numerical form. The other is quantitative analysis - which is 
normally used for numbers or data that can be transformed into numbers. 
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7.9.1 Methods of Data Analysis in this Study 
Both methods, i. e. qualitative and quantitative analyses were employed in this study to 
analyse the data collected from the personal interviews and that collected from the mail 
survey. In qualitative analysis, data were extracted and interpreted from tape-recordings 
made during the interviews. Most of these data are presented in the form of quotations. 
On the other hand, for the mail survey, the immediate task was to organise and process the 
raw data. The purpose of organising this was to reduce its mass to a form suitable for 
statistical analysis. When this was done, the raw data were coded and were ready to be fed 
into the computer. After consultation with some colleagues as well as computer personnel 
regarding which statistical package is advisable for use to compute and analyse the data, 
the researcher settled on the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS®) which is 
available through the University network. The SPSS® used for this analysis is version 8.0 
for windows TM (SPSS®WIN8M). However, there was one major problem to be overcome: 
the researcher had no previous knowledge of SPSS®. Moreover, SPSS® is difficult to 
master and needs a considerable amount of time to learn the whole procedure of running 
the software. To solve this problem, the researcher was determined to learn SPSS® and at 
the same time had approached the University of Stirling's statistical consultant15 to seek 
advice. 
Following the recommendations made by both the University of Stirling's statistical 
consultant and the supervisor, data were tested using non-parametric test, as most of the 
15 Kate Howie, Department of Computing Science and Mathematics University of Stirling. 
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data were nominal data. 16 This is also in agreement with the recommendation given by 
Wimmer and Dominick's (1987: 261), who assert that non-parametric tests are more 
appropriate for nominal or ordinal data, whereas parametric tests are appropriate for 
interval and ratio data. Other authors such as Roscoe (1975, as cited in Wimmer and 
Dominick, 1987: 261), however, no longer consider the two categories to be distinctly 
different and both methods can be used successfully with any type of data. 
In the data analysis, cross-tabulation, chi-square and frequency analyses were used because 
(i) they are the techniques most frequently used in previous studies, for example, Imoaka 
(1985), Ito (1985), Thong and Jain (1988), Tamara et al. (1990), and Yasin (1990) (see 
Table 7.4 at the end of this chapter); (ii) they were recommended by both the supervisor 
and the University of Stirling's statistical consultant; and (iii) they were the most 
appropriate methods given the type of data in this study. 
7.10 Limitations to the Research Survey 
Despite the best possible efforts made by the researcher, this study is constrained by a 
number of shortcomings which include the sample size, a limited amount of time and 
resources available, economic problems and respondent bias. Besides that, the attitude of 
Malaysian managers also posed a barrier, as some of them were reluctant to respond to 
academic questionnaires. Mansor and Ali (1998) warn that it has become a major obstacle 
for researchers to carry out studies in Malaysia because of the unwillingness of some senior 
managers to participate. The limitations faced by this study are discussed below. 
16 Nominal data are also called categorical data because the questions used in nominal data categorised the 
responses, for example, male or female (Fink, 1995: 5). 
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7.10.1 Sample Size - In terms of sample size, it was relatively small and only four states 
were covered, which clearly indicated that this was not a representative sample of all of the 
private firms in Malaysia. As such, the findings and conclusion of this study must be 
interpreted with caution. Although at the early stage of the fieldwork we intended to 
increase the sample size and cover more states, after taking into consideration the financial 
limitations we had to be satisfied with the sample of 120 companies from four states, i. e. 
two states from West Malaysia or Peninsula Malaysia and the other two states from East 
Malaysia. Even then, the cost of conducting and administering the personal interviews and 
mail survey questionnaires was exceeding the allocated budget and some financial 
borrowings were made to solve the problem. 
7.10.2 Time - This was another limitation. Even though three years seemed to be a 
considerable length of time doing a piece of research, for a researcher working alone there 
is a limit to what he or she can actually do or achieve. Indeed, practical considerations 
certainly made it difficult to do anymore than has been done. But as far as this research is 
concerned and given the fact that it was indeed very difficult to get the managing directors 
to complete the mail survey questionnaires, the number of responses was reasonably high. 
This could be because of our persistence in contacting the respondents. In fact, Lin (1976: 
241) points out that for a survey of the general public, a response rate of 50% or higher is 
reasonably good, while a response rate of more than 70% is very good. 
7.10.3 Research Expenses - is one of the major limitations to this study, and has greatly 
affected the selection of sample size. As the field research adopted by the researcher 
required extensive travelling or the heavy use of the telephone in order to reach the 
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respondents, lack of funding, personal transport facilities, and telephone facilities posed a 
major problem. The only source of funding was from a scholarship. However, the limited 
allowance was used to cover monthly expenses, books and clothing and nothing was spared 
for research expenses. As far as the scholarship was concerned, there were no funds 
available for travelling, postage, etc., and the only source was a loan. To solve the problem 
the researcher had to rely on the goodwill of a close friend who lent his car, and the 
researcher's brother who allowed access to his office telephone to make telephone contact. 
This, however, made it problematic to carry out research when the target samples were 
from both East and West Malaysia. 
7.10.4 Economic Problems - Another limitation to this study is the problem of the 
economic crisis. It was quite unfortunate that the researcher had to conduct the fieldwork 
in a time of economic crisis. The business environment during this time was different 
compared to when Malaysia was proclaiming itself as the next "Asian Tiger". The 
economic crisis caused a number of problems, such as political instability, massive 
unemployment, low purchasing power, bankruptcy of companies and banks as well as 
escalating inflation (Sunday Tribune 7"' June 1998). These problems had a direct impact 
on this study because most of managing directors were too busy dealing with their internal 
problems and had very little time to spare for matters of academic interest like the one 
carried out by the researcher. 
7.10.5 Respondent Bias - This is another limitation as the names of respondents cannot 
be mentioned in order to maintain confidentiality, as agreed upon earlier. In light of this, 
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the researcher made no attempt to mention the respondent's company name and neither did 
the researcher mention specifically whose comments were included in the analysis. 
Despite the above limitations, the findings from this study will certainly contribute to the 
body of knowledge, particularly in the role of the state and also in the field of management 
in Malaysia, and will shed some new insights as to the direction of future research in this 
particular area. 
7.11 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have described the research methods adopted for this study, which were 
mail survey questionnaire and personal interview. We have also discussed a number of 
related issues, such as the sampling process (sampling frame, size and techniques), questionnaire 
design, types of questions, scale of measurements, the advantages of doing the pilot study and how 
the actual survey was conducted. In addition, we have presented the reasons and arguments for 
choosing companies from the manufacturing sector as a sample. Looking at what we have 
discussed in this chapter, it can be said that the choice of the research methods and other 
procedures selected for this study were made for their appropriateness and the ease that 
they provided the researcher in order to meet the objectives of this study, as spelled out 
earlier. 
There are, however, a few things to be noted from our discussion. One is that it is 
important to remember that we took the sample from only 4 geographical areas in Malaysia 
and we covered only the manufacturing industry. Since the sample size was rather small 
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and confined to a single industry, the findings of this study must be interpreted with 
caution and not be generalised to all the private sectors in Malaysia. 
The other thing to note is that we had some problems with non-response, though, in fact, 
less than one might expect in this area. Nevertheless, they still have to be taken into 
account when evaluating the data. 
In Chapter 8, descriptive statistics (frequency analysis) as well as the test on research 
hypothesis are presented. 
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Table 7.1 
Summary of the Advantages and Disadvantages of Different Data Collection Methods in 
Data collection 
method 
Personal interview 
the Survey Appr( 
Potential advantages 
(1) There are some sample designs that 
can be implemented best by 
personal interview (e. g., area 
probability samples) 
(2) Probably the most effective way of 
enlisting cooperation for most 
populations 
(3) Advantages of interviewer 
administration - answering 
respondent questions, probing for 
adequate answers, accurately 
following complex instructions or 
sequences - are realised 
(4) Multimethod data collection - 
including observations, visual cues, 
and self-administered sections - are 
feasible 
(5) Rapport and confidence building 
are possible 
Potential disadvantages 
(1) It is likely to be more costly 
than the alternatives 
(2) A trained staff of interviewers 
that is geographically near the 
sample is needed 
(3) Total data collection period is 
likely to be longer than 
telephone procedures 
(4) Some samples (those in high- 
rise buildings or high-crime 
areas, elites, employees, 
students) may be more 
accessible by some other mode 
Telephone interview 
Mail questionnaire 
(1) Lower cost (compare to personal 
interviews) 
(2) Random-digit dialling sampling of 
general populations 
(3) Access to certain populations 
(compare especially personal 
interviews) - 
(4) Potential for short data collection 
period 
(5) Likelihood of better response rate 
from a list sample (compare mail 
only) 
(1) Relatively low cost 
(2) Can be accomplished with minimal 
staff and facilities 
(3) Provides access to widely 
dispersed samples and samples that 
are difficult to reach by telephone 
or in person for other reasons 
(4) Respondents have time to give 
thoughtful answers, to look up 
records, or consult with others 
(1) Sampling limitations, especially 
problem of omitting those 
without telephones 
(2) Non-response associated with 
random-digit dialling sampling 
(compare personal) 
(3) Questionnaire or measurement 
constraints, including limits on 
response alternatives, 
impossibility of visual aids, and 
interviewer observations 
(4) Possibly less appropriate for 
personal or sensitive questions 
if no prior contact 
(1) Ineffectiveness of mail as way 
of enlisting cooperation 
(depending on group to be 
studied) 
(2) Various disadvantages of not 
having interviewer involved in 
data collections 
(3) Need for good mailing 
addresses for sample 
Source: Fowler, F. J. (1991) Survey Research Methods, Sage Publications, Inc. Newbury Park, 
pp. 70-72. 
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Table 7.4 
Some Previous Studies that Used Frequency Analysis to Analyse Data 
Researcher (s) Research Topic Respondents & No. Response Data 
Of Questionnaire Rate (%) Analysis 
Technique 
Imaoka, H. (1985) Japanese Management in Japanese top managers Not stated Frequency 
Malaysia and Malaysian middle analysis 
managers 
(no. of questionnaires 
- not stated) 
Ito, S. (1985) Japanese Management in Japanese top managers 28.3% and Frequency 
Taiwan and local middle 24.0% analysis 
managers respectively 
(300 questionnaires) 
Thong and Jain Human Resource Senior managers from Not stated Frequency 
(1988) Practices of Japanese and fifteen companies" analysis 
Malaysian Companies 
Taman et al. Management Vogue, Managers/supervisors 67.0% and Descriptive 
(1990) Job Satisfaction and and workers of 23 40.0% And 
Correlates of companies respectively inferential 
Organisational Loyalty (231 questionnaires for statistics 
in Bumiputra, Western managers/supervisors 
and Japanese and 464 questionnaires 
Manufacturing for workers) 
Companies in Malaysia 
Yasin, M. T. The Transferability of Senior managers and 69.0% and Frequency 
(1990) Japanese-Style employees 74.7% analysis 
Management Practices: (150 for senior respectively 
A Case Study of the managers and 112 for 
Malaysian Public employees) 
Enterprise Sector 
Source: Complied from various sources, i. e. Imaoka, H. (1985); Ito, S. (1985); Thong, T. S. G. and Jain, H. 
C. (1988); Tamam, E., Yassin, S. M. and Kamsah. M. F. (1990); and Yasin, M. T. (1990). 
" Five sets of company (comprising in each set the Japanese parent company, the Japanese subsidiary 
company in Malaysia and the local company). 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE SURVEY FINDINGS 
8.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to present the survey findings. As outlined earlier in 
Chapter 5, the general hypothesis of this study would be: "The Look East Policy might 
have had some success in promoting Japanese management techniques to manufacturing 
firms in Malaysia, despite the difficulties of transferring management practices between 
different countries, because of the strength of the state in Malaysia and its commitment to 
such a policy. " To be able to test this hypothesis, we need to address two key issues: (i) 
the extent to which Japanese management techniques have been transferred to 
manufacturing firms in Malaysia; and (ii) the reasons why manufacturing firms in Malaysia 
implemented these techniques. 
It is important to remember that this chapter only presents the findings from the mail 
survey questionnaire, while the findings from personal interview are discussed/presented in 
more detail in Chapter 9. This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first, which is 
relatively descriptive, the aim is to identify the extent to which Japanese management 
techniques have been adopted by manufacturing firms in Malaysia, and to discuss the 
proportion of the respondents who say that they have adopted the techniques because they 
have been influenced by the Look East Policy. In the second part, we will deal with the 
testing of the research hypotheses. The reason why the hypotheses came about is because 
it is believed that they will produce findings that will support the objectives of the study, as 
outlined in Chapter 1. In order to do this, we will cross-tabulate five independent 
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variables, three of which are associated with the characteristics of managing 
directors/respondents and they are knowledge of the Look East Policy, familiarity with the 
Japanese model of management and visit to Japan. The other two are associated with the 
characteristics of firms and they are size of firms (in terms of the number of employees) 
and ownership of firms. We will then investigate the possibility of a relationship between 
these variables and firms' implementing the Japanese management techniques. Following 
this, we will draw inferences from the test results. 
As mentioned in Chapter 7, data for this study were collected using both mail survey 
questionnaires and personal interviews. The mail survey questionnaires were posted to 120 
manufacturing companies operating in Malaysia, the names and addresses of which were 
obtained from the Malaysian Manufacturers and Exports Directory (MMED), published in 
1997. The cover letter accompanying the questionnaire was addressed to the managing 
director of each company. The objectives were to obtain his/her opinions pertaining to the 
research questions. A total of sixty-nine companies took part in the survey, giving a 
response rate of 57.5%. All questionnaires received were correctly and fully completed. 
This could be attributed firstly, to the comprehensibility of the questionnaires, and 
secondly to the fact that the respondents were managing directors and therefore thoroughly 
familiar with the questionnaire topics which concern problems faced by their companies. 
Although every effort was made to ensure that the maximum number of companies could 
participate in this research, experience revealed that this was not possible, especially in 
Malaysia, where the fieldwork was conducted. Hence, the total percentage of 
questionnaires returned uncompleted due to unreachable address was 14.2%, while the 
non-response rate was 28.3%. With regard to personal interviews, all 32 respondents who 
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said that they had implemented some elements of the Japanese model of management were 
contacted and successfully interviewed. 
Part I 
The discussion in this part starts from the profile of respondents (Section 8.2) and ends 
with the management style preferred by them (Section 8.10). 
8.2 Profile of Respondents 
This section presents the characteristics of the respondents. The respondents in this study 
are managing directors of manufacturing companies Operating in four Malaysian states: 
Penang and KL/Selangor in the West Malaysia and Sabah and Sarawak in East Malaysia. 
As stated in Chapter 7 (see Table 7.2), the number of completed and usable questionnaires 
that were returned are (18) 64.0% from Penang; (36) 54.5% from KL/Selangor; (11) 68.7% 
from Sarawak; and (4) 40.0% from Sabah. In terms of percentage, the questionnaires that 
were received from the first three states are quite evenly distributed; except for Sabah 
where the response rate is comparatively quite low. ' The managing directors were chosen 
because being the key informants in their organisations, we believed that they would be 
able to provide the information on firms that was required by this study. 
We acknowledge that in the case of mail questionnaires there is a possibility that the 
respondents might have passed the questionnaires on to others to fill-in, but as far as we are 
aware, the responses relate to the characteristics of managing directors. 
' The respondents have been contacted but they declined to participate in our survey. 
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8.2.1 The Respondents' Race 
The respondents were asked to state their race. Table 8.1 shows the breakdown of 
respondents by race. The results indicate that a relatively large percentage of respondents 
in this survey are Chinese (31) 45%, while the respofidents who are Bumiputra are (25) 
36%; Indian (4) 6%; and "others" (9) 13%. This latter category comprise Japanese, 
American and British nationalities. When the two largest race groups in our survey, i. e. 
Chinese and Bumiputra, are compared the results show that the Chinese are predominant. 
It could therefore be argued that the majority of the Chinese still dominate the private 
sector. In fact, according to Kheng (1994), a large number of Chinese have been involved 
in the private sector since the late 1960s, while the Bumiputra only became actively 
involved in the private sector, particularly the manufacturing sector, in the late 1970s when 
the New Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced. Before the introduction of the NEP, the 
Bumputra were highly concentrated in the public sector, traditional agriculture sector and 
in low-income job categories, while the non-Bumiputra, particularly the Chinese, were 
more favourably represented in the manufacturing sector, as well as in the professional and 
technical fields where productivity and incomes were higher (SOPL, 1991-2000: 32). 
With the NEP, the government has made numerous efforts to help the Bumiputra engage in 
the manufacturing sector. The first of such efforts was the creation of the Bumiputra 
Commercial and Industrial Community (BCIC). Through BCIC the government has 
allocated more contracts, quotas and licenses to Bumiputra businesses and joint ventures. 
In addition, government agencies, such as Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA), Perbadanan 
Nasional Berhad (PERNAS) and the State Economic Development Corporations (SEDCs) 
were actively involved in setting up commercial enterprises to assist the Bumiputra. Other 
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efforts included the provision of education and training scholarships, credit facilities and 
advisory assistance. These measures have led to an increase in the number of 
establishments owned and operated by Bumiputra and the creation of a new pool of 
Bumiputra entrepreneurs, especially the Malays. However, relative to the Chinese 
communities, the Bumiputra share is still small, particularly in the manufacturing sector. 
Table 8.1 
_ 
Breakdown of Respondents by Race 
Race No. % 
Bumiputra 25 36.0 
Chinese 31 45.0 
Indian 4 6.0 
Others 9 13.0 
Total 69 100.0 
8.2.2 The Respondents' Religion 
The respondents were asked to state their religion. Our survey reveals that (25) 36% are 
Muslim, (18) 26% Buddhist, (17) 25% Christian, (5) 7% Hindu and (4) 6% "Other" (Table 
8.2). This study also revealed that all Bumiputra are of the Muslim faith, which probably 
means that they are all Malays. Being Malay, their religion, by birth, is Islam. Buddhism, 
on the other hand, is largely identified with the Chinese, and in this study about 26% of 
respondents are Buddhist while 19% are Christian. All the Indians in this study are Hindu. 
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Table 8.2 
Breakdown of Respondents by Religion 
Religion No. % 
Islam 25 36.0 
Christian 17 25.0 
Buddhism 18 26.0 
Hinduism 5 7.0 
Others 4 6.0 
Total 69 100.0 
8.2.3 The Respondents' Age 
The respondents were asked to state their age. As seen in Table 8.3, the majority of the 
respondents (42) 60.8% in this research are relatively young, i. e. between the age of 30-45. 
Out of 42 respondents within the 30-45 year old age bracket, (35) 50.7% are aged between 
36-45 years old. The respondents in the 46-55 year old age bracket are (26) 37.7%. On the 
contrary, only about (1) 1.4% of the respondents are older than 55. 
Table 8.3 
Breakdown of Respondents by Age Group 
Age Group No. % 
30-35 years 7 10.1 
36-45 years 35 50.7 
46-55 years 26 37.7 
Above 55 years 1 1.4 
Total 69 100.0 
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8.2.4 The Respondents' Level of Education 
The respondents were asked to indicate their level of education. Our findings show that 
(59) 85.5% of the respondents have completed either a college or university education, 
while (10) 14.5% indicated that they have completed their secondary education. Those 
with a university degree are substantially higher, i. e. (48) 69.6% (Table 8.4). This suggests 
that the majority of the respondents are well-educated compared to the rest of the 
population. This is not surprising, firstly, because they are the key personnel in their 
respective organisations, and secondly, because in Malaysia, it is quite common for key 
personnel to be well-educated, as this has been the trend for many years. 
Table 8.4 
Breakdown of Respondents by Educational Background 
Educational Background No. % 
Completed secondary education 10 14.5 
Completed technical/commercial 
College education 
11 15.9 
Completed university education 48 69.6 
Total 69 100.0 
The respondents were also asked to indicate whether they have undertaken any 
postgraduate training/education. Table 8.5 shows that out of the 48 respondents who have 
completed a university degree, (24) 50% indicated that they have completed a postgraduate 
degree. In terms of their postgraduate qualifications, our findings reveal that of the 24 
respondents who said that they have completed postgraduate degree, (14) 58.3% stated that 
they have undertaken postgraduate training in the field of management, i. e. a Masters in 
Business Administration (MBA); (2) 8.3% stated that they have both an MBA and a Ph. D.; 
(1) 4.2% indicated that they have a postgraduate degree in science (MSc); and (7) 29.2% 
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said that they have a different postgraduate degree with specialisation in finance, 
accounting or law. 
Table 8.5 
Breakdown of Respondents' Type of Postgraduate Degree 
Type of Degree No. % 
MBA 14 58.3 
M. Sc. 1 4.2 
MBA & Ph. D. 2 8.3 
Others 7 29.2 
Total 24 100.0 
In terms of place of study, of the 48 respondents who completed a university education, 
48% received their tertiary education in Western institutions. This conforms to a tradition 
in Malaysia, whereby many people study outside the country, and particularly at Western 
institutions. In fact, with the exception of Mahathir, all the former Prime Ministers studied 
at Western institutions, and especially in the UK. The remaining respondents stated that 
they have studied either in local institutions (39.6%), or in Japan and Korea (8.3%), or in 
Singapore and India (4.1%). Based on these findings, one of the issues that we want to 
examine in the latter part of the discussion is whether or not the respondents' place of study 
and the educational system that they have received influenced their preference regarding 
management style. 
8.2.5 The Respondents' Knowledge of Japanese Language and Visits to Japan 
The respondents were asked to indicate whether they could speak, read or write in 
Japanese. Our findings reveal that of the 69 respondents who participated in our study, 
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only 6% can speak Japanese, while only 4% can read and write in it. With regard to 
whether or not they have visited Japan, our findings show that of the 69 respondents, (29) 
42% said that they have visited the country. As to the purpose of visit, of the 29 
respondents, more than 50% stated that they went there for business purposes, while only 
3% mentioned that they went for the purpose of obtaining qualifications (Table 8.6). 
Regarding their stay in Japan, of the 29 respondents who stated that they have visited 
Japan, more than one-third (42%) said they stayed there between 1 and 4 weeks. This is 
not entirely surprising given the fact that, as indicated earlier, the majority of them went to 
Japan for business purposes and normally each trip seldom lasts for more than a month. 
On the contrary, only about 7% of our respondents indicated that they stayed in Japan for 
more than 25 weeks and this would account for the relatively small number of our 
respondents who said they went there for the purpose of obtaining qualifications. The fact 
that our findings show that about 7% of the respondents stated that they stayed in Japan for 
more than 25 weeks could also suggest that they are Japanese nationals who have 
participated in this study. 
Table 8.6 
Visits to Japan 
Purpose of Visit No. % 
Business trip 15 52.0 
Undergoing training/work 
attachment 
-5 17.0 
Attending conference/ 
seminar 
4 14.0 
Holiday 4 14.0 
Obtaining qualifications 1 3.0 
Total 29 100.0 
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8.3 The Characteristics of the Respondents' Firms 
This section presents the characteristics of the firms of the respondents who participated in 
this study. The two main characteristics discussed here are (i) the ownership of the firms; 
and (ii) the size of the firms (number of employees). 
8.3.1 The Ownership of the Firms 
The respondents were asked to give details of both the ownership and the activities of their 
firms. Table 8.7 shows that the majority of the respondents' firms that participated in our 
study are locally-owned. In contrast, of the 17.4% of the firms that are classified as joint 
ventures, only (2) 2.9% are British joint ventures. This suggests that locally-owned firms 
dominate this study. This reflects the fact that a large number of foreign-owned firms and 
joint ventures did not want to participate in our study. Upon investigation, one of the 
reasons why they failed to return our survey questionnaire was that their managing 
directors were not available at the time this study was conducted. In terms of business 
activity, locally-owned firms' activities vary from timber production, to electrical and 
electronics, to steel manufacturing, while both the Japanese and American joint ventures 
are in electrical and electronics products, which could indicate that the Malaysian 
government has paid greater attention to the development of the electrical and electronics 
industries. On the other hand, the business activities of the British joint ventures revolve 
around consumer products, while the respondents' firms that fall under "others" category 
are concerned with food-processing and various types of consumer products. 
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Table 8.7 
Ownership of Firms 
Ownership No. % 
Locally-owned 44 63.8 
JV with Japanese 6 8.7 
JV with British 2 2.9 
JV with American 4 5.8 
Others 13 18.8 
Total 69 100.0 
8.3.2 The Size of Respondents' Firms by the Number of Employees 
The respondents were also asked to indicate the number of employees with the firm. Our 
survey reveals two interesting findings. The first is that almost the same number of the 
respondents' firms employed 100 or fewer as employed 500 or more workers. The other 
interesting finding is that only 2.9% of our respondents' firms employed more than 400 but 
fewer than 500 employees (Table 8.8). 
In terms of the number of workers employed by locally-owned firms, of the 44 firms that 
are classified as such, 50% employed fewer than 100 employees; 9.1% employed more 
than 100 but fewer than 200 employees; 4.5% employed more than 200 but fewer than 300 
employees; 9.1% employed more than 300 but fewer than 400 employees; 2.3% employed 
more than 400 but fewer than 500 employees; and 25% employed more than 500 
employees. The findings show that the majority of locally-owned firms employed not 
more than 100 employees. An explanation for this might be that the Malaysian 
government has encouraged the development of small and medium-sized industries 
(SMIs). For example, under the Sixth Malaysian Plan (1990-95), the government allocated 
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RM54.9 million for this purpose and the money was channelled to the Malaysian Industrial 
Estates Sdn Bhd (MIEL) to implement the SMI infrastructure development programme and 
to help boost the development of the SMIs (MITI, 1998). 
Pertaining to the joint ventures, the majority of the Japanese joint ventures (67%) 
employed more than 500 employees; half (50%) of the American joint ventures employed 
more than 300 but fewer than 400 employees; and half (50%) of the British joint ventures 
employed more than 400 but fewer than 500 employees, while another half (50%) 
employed more than 500 employees. One interesting finding from this study is that joint 
ventures employed a larger number of employees compared to locally-owned firms. 
Table 8.8 
Number of Employees Employed by Firms 
Number of Employees No. % 
100 employees or less 25 36.2 
More than 100 but less than 200 7 10.1 
More than 200 but less than 300 4 5.8 
More than 300 but less than 400 7 10.1 
More than 400 but less than 500 2 2.9 
More than 500 24 34.8 
Total 69 100.0 
8.4 The Look East Policy (LEP) 
This section presents the findings from the research into the Look East Policy (LEP). In 
this section the respondents were asked whether they have heard of the LEP, and if so, 
what do they know about it. The respondents were also asked whether they believed that 
the LEP has resulted in changes in attitudes and behaviour among their employees. 
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Finally, the respondents were asked whether they believe the policy has had any effect on 
their firms, particularly in encouraging them to adopt the Japanese management techniques 
and work ethic. 
8.4.1 Respondents' Awareness and Knowledge of the Look East Policy 
The survey findings show that of the 69 respondents who participated in this study, (67) 
97% said that they had heard of the LEP, while only (2) 3% said that they had not. Of the 
67 respondents, (50) 74% indicated that they knew what the policy was all about, while 
(17) 26% said that they knew nothing about the policy. A larger number of respondents 
who said that they knew about the LEP suggest that they are aware of what the Malaysian 
government has been trying to promote through its LEP. Looking at Table 8.9, it seems 
that the majority of the respondents who said they knew about the LEP, and those who 
indicated that they did not know anything about such policy, are local managing directors. 
This, however, is not entirely surprising because of the fact that a high proportion of the 
respondents are Malaysian. 
Table 8.9 
Respondents' Awareness of the Look East Policy 
Nationality Knew about 
the LEP 
Did not know 
about the LEP 
Malaysians 45 15 
Japanese 4 1 
American - 1 
British I - 
Total 50 17 
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The respondents were also asked to state their opinions pertaining to the LEP. Of the 69 
respondents, 56.6% stated that the LEP is just a "window-dressing" policy; 26.1% said that 
it is the kind of policy that they need; 7.2 % stated that it is not the kind of policy they 
need; and 4.3% indicated that the policy favours only the Japanese and Koreans. The 
remaining 5.8% of the respondents have expressed different opinions pertaining to the 
LEP, for example, that it is politically motivated and that it is nothing more than a political 
strategy to strengthen the Mahathir administration. From these responses, one may 
presume that there are more people who think that the policy is not really intended to 
promote the Japanese management techniques but is rather a form of political rhetoric. 
8.4.2 Respondents' Opinions as to whether the Look East Policy has Resulted in 
Changes in Attitudes and Behaviour 
The respondents were asked to state their opinions as to whether the LEP has resulted in 
changes in attitudes and behaviour in terms of loyalty and hard work among their 
employees. Our findings show that of the 69 respondents, (29) 42.0% stated that they do 
not agree that the LEP has resulted in changes in attitudes and behaviour in terms of loyalty 
and hard work among their employees. The others (26) 37.7% indicated that they neither 
agree nor disagree, while the remaining (14) 20.3% stated that they agree that the LEP has 
made their employees more hard-working and loyal (Table 8.10). There could be two main 
reasons why there is a higher percentage of respondents who stated that they "do not 
agree". The first reason could be because the government has popularised the policy 
among the public sector rather than the private sector (see Yasin, 1990), while the other 
reason could be because the majority of the respondents believe that the LEP is just a 
"window-dressing" policy. 
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Table 8.10 
Breakdown of Respondents' Opinions Pertaining to Whether the LEP 
has Resulted in Changes in Attitudes and Behaviour in Terms of 
Loyalty and Hard Work among their Employees 
Response category No. % 
Yes, I agree 14 20.3 
No, I don't agree 29 42.0 
Neither agree nor disagree 26 37.7 
Total 69 100.0 
8.4.3 Opinion Pertaining to the Look East Policy's Effect on Manufacturing Firms 
The respondents were asked to state their opinions pertaining to the LEP's effect on their 
organisations. Table 8.11 shows that more than half (42) 60.9% of the respondents (mainly 
Malaysian, American and British) stated that the policy has had no effect on their firms in 
terms of encouraging the transfer of the Japanese management techniques. On the other 
hand, (8) 11.6% of the respondents (mainly Japanese) indicated that the policy has made it 
easier to implement the Japanese model of management in their firms (see Appendix 8.1). 
This suggests that the respondents who are of Japanese nationality are more likely to claim 
that the LEP has had some effect on them, while the respondents of other nationalities 
seem to say the LEP did not affect them at all. 
As illustrated in Table 8.11, although we cannot deny that the LEP has had some effect on 
some firms, looking at the higher percentage of the respondents (60.9%) who said that the 
policy has had no effect on their organisations in terms of encouraging the transfer of 
Japanese management techniques, it could be argued that the government has not been very 
successful in this area. Perhaps there could be a number of actions that the government 
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could have taken to ensure that its policy worked. This will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 9. 
Table 8.11 
Breakdown of the Effect the LEP has had on Manufacturing 
Companies in Malaysia 
Effect of the LEP No. ' % 
Facilitated business deals between the Japanese 14 20.3 
and the Koreans 
Helped to promote our firm and its product in 2 2.9 
Malaysia and in the international market 
Facilitated the implementation of the Japanese 8 11.6 
model of management in our firm 
Helped our firm to acquire technological know- 10 14.5 
how from Japan 
The policy has had no effect on our firm in terms 42 60.9 
of encouraging the transfer of the Japanese 
model of management 
Note: '- Since the multiple answer system is used in the questionnaire, total answers 
are more than the number of respondents. 
8.5 The Japanese Model of Management or Japanese Management Techniques 
This section reports the findings on the respondents' familiarity with the Japanese model of 
management or Japanese management techniques; the source of acquiring their knowledge; 
their comments; and the possibility of implementing the techniques. 
8.5.1 Familiarity with the Elements of the Japanese Model of Management 
The respondents were asked to indicate their degree of familiarity with the elements of the 
Japanese model of management. Our findings reveal that the majority of the respondents 
are familiar with practices such as quality control circles, total quality control, on-the-job 
training and suggestion systems, while a relatively small number of them are familiar with 
the ringgi system and in-house unionism (Table 8.12). These results suggest that most of 
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our respondents seem to be familiar with the Japanese management techniques that are 
considered easy to implement and/or low-cost practices, and that have been widely-adopted 
by firms in other countries, particularly Western firms. This also suggests that the 
respondents' familiarity with these techniques could be due to the fact that they have been 
influenced by the multinational companies in Malaysia that have adopted these techniques. 
Table 8.12 
Breakdown of Respondents' Familiarity with Elements of JMM 
Elements of JMM No. ' % 
Lifetime employment 31 44.9 
Seniority-wage system 24 34.8 
Seniority-promotion system 25 36.2 
Quality control circles 43 62.3 
Total quality control 41 59.4 
Job-rotation 31 44.9 
On-the-job training (OJT) 40 58.0 
Just-in-time (JIT) 32 46.4 
Suggestion systems 41 59.4 
Open office system 32 46.4 
Group responsibility 34 49.3 
Loyalty to company 39 56.5 
Paternal leadership style - 30 43.5 
Ringgi system 9 13.0 
Hiring of fresh graduates 19 27.5 
In-house unionism 17 24.6 
Note: - Since the multiple answer system is used in the questionnaire, total 
answers are more than the number of respondents. 
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8.5.2 Source of Knowledge of the Japanese Model of Management 
The respondents were also asked to indicate the sources of their knowledge of the elements 
of the Japanese model of management with which they were familiar. Among the most 
popular sources of knowledge are books and journals, while the least popular is from the 
Look East Policy (Table 8.13). These responses suggest two interesting points. The first is 
that the majority of our respondents have not had the opportunity to attend industrial 
training with Japanese firms in Japan. The other point is that, clearly, the LEP is not a 
major source of knowledge of the Japanese management techniques. However, it is 
important to note that although this might be the case, the LEP might have some indirect 
effect. For example, the policy has influenced the organisation of workshops and seminars 
on Japanese management techniques through which, as some respondents claimed, 
knowledge of the JMM has been disseminated. It could also be argued that partly because 
of the LEP, some respondents have been to Japan for industrial training. Clearly, this can 
be considered as one of the indirect effects of the policy. 
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Table 8.13 
Breakdown of the Sources of Knowledge of JMM 
Source of Knowledge %' 
From workshop/seminar/course 34.7 
From supervisor/mentor/colleagues 9.5 
From previous employer 29.9 
From attachment/industrial training in 
Japanese firms in Japan 
11.4 
From books/journals 88.0 
From workshop/attachment/books 7.1 
From the Look East Policy 5.9 
From other sources 13.7 
Note: '- the multiple answer method is used in the questionnaire. 
8.5.3 Respondents' Comments Pertaining to the Japanese Model of Management 
The respondents were asked to state their comments pertaining to the elements of the 
Japanese model of management with which they claimed to be familiar. Table 8.14 shows 
three categories of responses. First, it shows that the majority of the respondents said that 
they would recommend certain techniques such as on-the-job training, total quality control, 
quality control circles, suggestion systems, group responsibility and job rotation. Second, 
it reveals that a large percentage of the respondents would not recommend other practices 
such as seniority-wage and promotion systems and lifetime employment. Finally, it 
highlights that the majority of our respondents have no comment regarding practices such 
as the ringgi system, the hiring of fresh graduates and in-house unionism. Based on these 
responses, one may say that the respondents in this study are more likely to recommend 
techniques that are considered low-cost or easy to implement, while the ones which are 
expensive or difficult to implement are less likely to be recommended. 
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Table 8.14 
Breakdown of Respondents' Comments Regarding the JMM 
(N = 68), Missing Cases =I 
Elements of JMM Would 
Recommend 
(%) 
Would not 
Recommend 
(%) 
No 
Comment 
(%) 
Lifetime employment 22.1 50.0 27.9 
Seniority-wage system 7.4 66.2 26.4 
Seniority-promotion 7.4 61.8 30.8 
Quality control circle 80.9 2.9 16.2 
Total quality control 82.4 1.5 16.1 
Job-rotation 66.2 1.5 32.3 
On-the-job training (OJT) 82.4 
-- 
17.6 
Just-in-time (JIT) 47.1 7.4 45.5 
Suggestion systems 70.6 2.9 26.5 
Open office system 38.2 5.9 55.9 
Group responsibility 67.6 1.5 30.9 
Loyalty to company 61.8 4.4 33.8 
Paternal leadership style 20.6 11.8 67.6 
Ringgi system 5.9 11.9 82.2 
Hiring of fresh graduates 23.5 2.9 73.6 
In-house unionism 14.7 10.3 75.0 
8.5.4 The Possibility of Implementing the JMM and the Reasons for its 
Implementation 
Having enquired into their familiarity with and comments pertaining to the JMM, the 
respondents were then asked whether the JMM has been implemented in their respective 
organisations, and if so, what were the reasons for implementing it. The survey findings 
show that of the 69 respondents who participated in the survey, (32) 46.4% stated that 
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some elements of the JMM have been implemented in their firms, while (37) 53.6% stated 
that no element of the JMM has been implemented in their firms. 
The important question here is which category of firm is more likely to implement 
Japanese management techniques? Looking at Table 8.15, it is obvious that the Japanese 
joint ventures are more likely, i. e. 5 or 83% out of 6, to implement Japanese management 
techniques when compared to firms owned by other nationalities, including Malaysian 
ones. But this is not entirely surprising given the fact that a Japanese national heads almost 
all of the Japanese joint ventures that have participated in our study. In fact, our findings 
are consistent with an earlier study by Imaoka (1985) which states that Japanese top 
executives seem to consciously apply the Japanese style of management to their Malaysian 
subsidiaries or joint ventures within the sphere of their authority. 
Table 8.15 
Implementation of JMM by Respondents' Firms 
Types of Ownership Implementing Not Implementing Total 
No. % No. % No. 
Locally-owned Firms 25 56.0 19 44.0 44 
Joint venture with Japanese 5 83.0 1 17.0 6 
Joint venture with British - - 2 100.0 2 
Joint venture with American 1 25.0 3 75.0 4 
Others 3 23.0 10 77.0 13 
Total 32 37 69 
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The breakdown of reasons for implementing the JMM is shown in Table 8.16, which 
illustrates that out of 32 respondents who said that they have implemented some elements 
of the JMM, (14) 43.7% stated that they were implemented in their firms because they are 
considered less expensive and could be implemented piecemeal; (6) 18.8% stated that they 
were implemented in their firms because of economic consideration; (7) 21.9% said that it 
was because of management's response to specific problems; and (2) 6.3% indicated that 
there were other reasons, including: (i) the fact that some elements of the JMM are 
practical to use; and (ii) such elements do not conflict with the local cultural, traditional 
and religious beliefs. On the contrary, only (3) 9.3% of the respondents stated that some 
elements of the JMM were implemented in their firms because of the LEP. These 
responses suggest that the direct effect of the LEP is minimal. However, despite this, one 
may argue that the LEP has had some indirect effect. For example, some respondents said 
that they have implemented certain elements of the JMM because of economic 
considerations (in fact, the economic impact of the LEP as discussed earlier has been 
strongly emphasised by the Malaysian government). 
Table 8.16 
Breakdown of Reasons for Implementing the 
Japanese Model of Management (JMM) 
Reasons No. % 
Because of the Look East Policy 3 9.3 
Because they are less expensive 
and can be implemented piecemeal 
14 43.7 
Because of economic considerations 6 18.8 
Because of management's response 
to specific problems 
7 21.9 
Other 2 6.3 
Total 32 100.0 
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8.6 Respondents who said they have Implemented the JMM 
This section reports the findings from research into which elements of the JMM are said to 
have been implemented by 32 respondents. It also reports the problems and the nature of 
the problems that these respondents faced while trying to implement the JMM. 
8.6.1 Elements of the JMM that are Said to have been Implemented by Respondents 
The respondents were asked to indicate which elements of the JMM have been 
implemented in their firms. Of the 32 respondents, the majority stated that they have 
implemented certain techniques such as quality control circles, on-the-job training, 
suggestion systems and total quality control. On the other hand, a substantially large 
percentage of the same respondents indicated that they have not implemented certain 
practices such as in-house unionism, the ringgi system, lifetime employment and seniority- 
wage and promotion systems (Table 8.17). 
On the whole, the survey results show that the elements that the respondents have rated 
highly and have said that they would recommend have been implemented in their 
respective organisations. On the other hand, the elements that they believe are not practical 
or are less transferable have been rated lower and, consequently, have not been 
implemented by the majority of our respondents. This finding is consistent with that of 
Abdullah (1995), who found that most of the Malaysian firms in his study have favoured 
certain practices, such as QCCs, TQC, suggestion systems and job-rotation more highly 
and as a result, have implemented them. 
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Table 8.17 
Breakdown of the Elements of JMM that have 
been Implemented by Respondents 
(N=32), 
Elements of JMM Yes 
- (%) 
No 
(%) 
Lifetime employment 9.4 90.6 
Seniority-wage system 9.4 90.6 
Seniority-promotion system 9.4 90.6 
Quality control circles 87.5 12.5 
Total quality control 75.0 25.0 
Job-rotation 59.4 40.6 
On-the-job training (OJT) 87.5 12.5 
Just-in-time (JIT) 34.4 65.6 
Suggestion systems 84.4 15.6 
Open office system 56.3 43.7 
Group responsibility 68.8 31.2 
Loyalty to company 59.4 40.6 
Paternal leadership style 21.9 78.1 
Ringgi system 9.4 90.6 
Hiring of fresh graduates 18.8 81.2 
In-house unionism 3.1 96.9 
Note: '- Since the multiple answer system is used in the questionnaire, 
total answers (%) are more than the number of respondents. 
8.6.2 The Problem and the Nature of Problem Faced by Respondents 
The survey findings reveal that out of 32 respondents, 78.3% said that they have faced 
some problems in the implementation of the JMM. The nature of the problems vary 
among respondents (Table 8.18). There are two interesting points emerging from this 
table. One is that a large number of our respondents state that their workers prefer the 
existing management practices. The other interesting point is that more than 70% of our 
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respondents indicate that certain elements of the JMM are not compatible with their 
workers' cultural and religious beliefs. These responses suggest that not only are the 
majority of workers in Malaysia comfortable with the existing management practices, but, 
at the same time, they seem to avoid new practices that they believe conflict with their 
cultural and religious beliefs. The higher percentage of respondents who state that some 
elements of the JMM are not compatible with their workers' cultural and religious beliefs 
may further suggest that these elements are deeply embedded in the Japanese culture and, 
as a result, are difficult to transfer to the manufacturing firms in Malaysia. 
Table 8.18 
Breakdown of the Nature of Problems 
Nature of problems No. %' 
Workers' preference for existing 12 48.0 
management practices 
Resistance or impact of Western- 5 20.0 
educated managers 
Lack of commitment from top 4 16.0 
management 
Some elements of the JMM are not 18 72.0 
compatible with workers' cultural 
and religious beliefs 
Other problems 2 8.0 
Note: '- Since the multiple answer system is used in the questionnaire, 
total answers (%) are more than the number of respondents. 
8.7 Respondents who have Indicated that they have not Implemented any 
Elements of the JMM 
This section presents the findings from our 37 respondents who have indicated that they 
have not implemented any elements of the JMM at all. Unlike the 32 respondents 
mentioned earlier, these are the respondents that did not tick any elements of the JMM 
when they are asked to do so in the survey questionnaire. However, when they were asked 
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whether they believed some elements of the JMM could be implemented in their firms, the 
majority of them said that in their opinion, it could be possible to do so. The discussions in 
this section are presented in the following sequence: - 
(i) The respondents who believed that some elements of the JMM could be 
implemented in their firms; 
(ii) The elements the respondents believed could be implemented in their firms; 
(iii) The reasons why the respondents believed these elements could be 
implemented in their firms; and 
(iv) The elements of the JMM the respondents believed could not be 
implemented in their firms 
8.7.1 The Respondents who Believed that some Elements of the JMM could be 
Implemented in their Firms 
The respondents were asked whether the JMM could be implemented in their firms (as 
mentioned earlier, these are the 37 respondents that did not tick any elements of Japanese 
management techniques at all). The research findings, as shown in Table 8.19, reveal that 
of the 37 respondents, (26) 70.3% indicated that they believed that some elements of the 
JMM could be implemented in their firms, while (11) 29.7% said that they did not believe 
so. One interesting point revealed here is that of the 26 respondents, 65.4% indicated 
earlier that they are quite familiar, and indeed, have some knowledge of the JMM, and this 
may underpin their belief that some elements of the JMM could be implemented in their 
firms. More detailed discussions are presented in sub-section 8.7.3. 
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Table 8.19 
Breakdown of Respondents' Opinion on Whether 
JMM could be Implemented 
Implementing JMM No. % 
No elements can be 
Implemented 
11 29.7 
Yes, but only some elements 
can be implemented 
26 70.3 
Total 37 100.0 
8.7.2 The Elements of the JMM that the Respondents Believed could be 
Implemented in their Firms 
The respondents were asked to indicate which elements of the JMM they believed could be 
implemented in their firms. Our findings reveal that the majority of the respondents 
indicated that they believed they could implement practices such as quality control circles, 
total quality control, on-the-job training, suggestion systems, loyalty to company and group 
responsibility. On the other hand, the majority of the same respondents did not believe that 
they could implement techniques such as lifetime employment, seniority promotion 
system, paternal leadership style, seniority-wage system and the hiring of fresh graduates. 
Moreover, none of them believed that they could implement the ringgi system (Table 
8.20). 
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Table 8.20 
Breakdown of the Elements of JMM that the 
Respondents Believed could be Implemented 
(N = 26) 
Elements of JMM Yes 
(%) 
No 
(%) 
Lifetime employment 3.8 96.2 
Seniority-wage system 7.7 92.3 
Seniority-promotion system 3.8 96.2 
Quality control circles 76.9 23.1 
Total quality control 76.9 23.1 
Job-rotation 42.3 57.7 
On-the-job training (OJT) 61.5 38.5 
Just-in-time (JIT) 30.8 69.2 
Suggestion systems 61.5 38.5 
Open office system 42.3 57.7 
Group responsibility 57.7 42.3 
Loyalty to company 61.5 38.5 
Paternal leadership style 3.8 96.2 
Ringgi system - 100.0 
Hiring of fresh graduates 7.7 92.3 
Others - 100.0 
Over all, the above findings show that the elements adopted by the 32 respondents 
(respondents who said that they have implemented some elements of the JMM) are also 
highly-favoured by the 26 respondents who believe that some elements of the JMM could 
be implemented in their firms, although they did not indicate that they have actually done 
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so. This suggests that there are no significant differences between these 2 groups of 
respondents' with regard to which elements they favoured. 
8.7.3 The Reasons why the Respondents Believe that some Elements of the JMM 
could be Implemented in their Firms 
The respondents were asked to state the reasons why they believe some elements of the 
JMM (as already shown in Table 8.20) could be implemented in their firms, although they 
have not done so. Table 8.21 shows the breakdown of their reasons, and illustrates that 23 
out of the 26 respondents believe that some elements of the JMM could be implemented 
because they do not conflict with their workers' cultural, traditional and religious beliefs. 
This table also shows that the majority of the same jespondents stated that they could 
implement some elements of the JMM because they are practical to use, and moreover, 
they believe that both their management and workers also accept these elements. Based on 
these responses, it is obvious that the Japanese management techniques that the 
respondents believe could be implemented in their firms are the easy to implement and 
useful ones and those that are more likely to be accepted by most of their workers. 
Although in the beginning we expected that some respondents would mention the Look 
East Policy as one of the main reasons why they believe that some elements of the JMM 
could be implemented in their firms, clearly that is not the case here. In fact, looking at the 
responses given in "other reasons", none of the 26 respondents have mentioned the LEP as 
Z One group consists of 32 respondents who have actually implemented the JMM, while the other group is 
made up of 26 respondents who have not implemented the JMM but believe it could be implemented in their 
firms. 
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one of the reasons. We believe that this is another interesting point to discuss in the 
analysis of the survey findings (Chapter 9). 
Table 8.21 
Breakdown of Reasons why the Respondents Believe that some 
Elements of the JMM could be Implemented 
Reasons No. % 
They can be easily adapted into the existing 12 46.2 
system 
They are practical to use and easy to implement 22 84.6 
They do not conflict with the cultural, traditional 23 88.5 
and religious beliefs of the majority of the 
workers 
They are readily accepted by both management 22 84.6 
and workers 
Other reasons 2 7.7 
8.7.4 The Elements of the JMM that the Respondents Believe could not be 
Implemented in their Firms 
The respondents were asked to state which elements of the JMM they believe could not be 
implemented in their firms and the reasons why they believe this. Our findings reveal that 
all 26 respondents believe that they could not implement the ringgi system, while more 
than 90% believe that they could not implement lifetime employment, seniority-based 
wage and promotion systems, paternal leadership style and the hiring of fresh graduates 
(see Table 8.20 on previous page). These responses show that there are, indeed, no 
significant differences between the two groups of respondents in terms of which elements 
of the JMM they believe they could not implement. 
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With regard to the reasons, of the 26 respondents', 85% stated that their existing 
management system is not compatible with certain practices such as the ringgi system and 
just-in-time; 58% indicated that they are keen to promote employees based on merit and 
performance rather than on a seniority-based system; 88% mentioned that their employees 
value job-mobility more than lifetime employment; and 55% indicated that they have 
insufficient financial resources to train new recruits if they are to hire fresh graduates. 
8.8 Trade Union 
This section presents the findings pertaining to the 23 respondents who said that they 
recognised trade union, the type of trade union they said they chose to recognise and the 
reason for recognising a particular trade union. 
8.8.1 Respondents' Recognition of Trade Union 
The respondents were asked whether or not they recognised trade union and, if so, the type 
of trade union they chose to recognise. Of the 69 respondents that participated in the 
survey, a little over 33% (23) said that they recognised trade unions, and about 66% (46) 
mentioned that they do not recognise trade unions. Out of 23 respondents, (13) 56% 
indicated that they recognised industry-wide union,. while (10) 44% stated that they 
recognised in-house union. Our findings show that none of the 23 respondents indicated 
that they recognise craft union, perhaps because craft union is not recognised in Malaysia. 
' Since the multiple answer system is used, total answers (%) are more than the number of respondents. 
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8.8.2 Respondents' Reasons for Recognising a Particular Union 
The respondents were asked to state the reasons why they chose to recognise industry-wide 
union. The two main reasons that the majority of the respondents have given are: (i) most 
firms in Malaysia recognise this type of union, and so they follow it; and (ii) it is the trade 
union policy that they should recognise this type of union (Table 8.22). The reasons 
indicated by the respondents suggest that they are more likely to follow what their 
counterparts do and are more likely to abide by the trade union policy. 
Table 8.22 
Breakdown of Respondents' Reasons for Choosing 
to Recognise Industry-wide Union 
Reasons No. % 
Most firms in Malaysia recognise this. 6 46.2 
type of union, so we followed 
Management and employees favour this 1 7.7 
type of union 
It is the trade union policy that we should 5 38.5 
recognise this type of union 
We recognise this type of union 1 7.7 
because we follow what the 
government has instructed us to do 
Total 13 100.0 
The respondents' reasons for choosing to recognise in-house union differ from those given 
by respondents who chose to recognise industry-wide union. Of the 10 respondents who 
said that they have chosen to recognise in-house union, (5) 50.0% have stated the fact that 
management and employees favour in-house union äss the main reason why they have 
chosen to recognise it; (3) 30.0% stated that the reason is because of trade union policy; 
and (2) 20.0% mentioned other reasons. Based on the survey findings, none of the 
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respondents specifically mentioned that their recognition of in-house union is a result of 
being directly influenced by the Look East Policy. 
8.9 Transferability of the Japanese Model of Management (JMM) 
This section presents the findings on the following issues: (i) respondents' opinions 
pertaining to the transferability of the JMM to Malaysia; (ii) the reasons why the 
respondents believe that only some elements of the JMM could be transferred to Malaysia; 
(iii) respondents' opinions regarding the willingness of the Japanese to transfer their 
technological know-how and expertise to the Malaysians; and (iv) respondents' opinions as 
to whether the LEP has been effective or successful in encouraging management in 
Malaysia, particularly in the manufacturing firms in this study, to adopt Japanese 
management techniques and work ethic. 
8.9.1 Respondents' Opinions Pertaining to the Transferability of the JMM 
The respondents were asked to state their opinions pertaining to the transferability of the 
JMM to Malaysia. In Table 8.23, the responses are broken down into three categories: (i) 
all elements; (ii) only some elements; and (iii) no elements. Looking at the responses, it is 
clear that the majority of our respondents are of the opinion that only certain elements of 
the JMM can be transferred to Malaysia. However, before such elements can be used or 
implemented in their respective organisations, they have to be modified to suit the 
Malaysian environment. This suggests that the Japanese management techniques that have 
been adopted by firms in Malaysia are of a hybrid type. 
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Table 8.23 
Breakdown of the Respondents' Opinions on the Transferability of the JMM 
Transferability of the JMM No. % 
All elements can be transferred in their pure form 2 2.9 
Only some or certain elements can be transferred but 
have to be modified to suit the local environment 
64 92.8 
No elements can be transferred either in a pure or 
a modified form 
3 4.3 
Total 69 100.0 
8.9.2 The Reasons why the Respondents Believe that only some or certain Elements 
of the JMM could be Transferred to Malaysia 
The respondents were then asked to state the reasons why they believe that only some or 
certain elements of the JMM could be transferred to Malaysia. The major point emerging 
from this question is that more than two-thirds or 79.7% of the respondents believe that 
only certain elements of the JMM could be transferred to Malaysia because of the fact that 
some Japanese practices are culture-bound, and therefore are not compatible with local 
cultural, traditional and religious beliefs. The other important point is that most of our 
respondents seem to agree that only certain elements of the JMM are easy to adopt and 
practical in use. Besides these two major reasons, most of the respondents seem to agree 
that only some Japanese practices could be transferred because of the fact that not only are 
Malaysia and Japan at different stages of technological development, but also many firms 
in Malaysia have been structured according to the Western style of management (Table 
8.24). 
Based on our findings, it is believed that it would not be possible to transfer all the 
elements of the JMM, and in particular the culture-bound policies or ideas, to a 
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heterogeneous society like Malaysia, not only because Malaysia has different cultural and 
religious beliefs compared to Japan, but also, clearly, the majority of the firms and workers 
in Malaysia have operated alongside the Western style of management, and therefore it 
might be difficult to change their hearts and minds. to accept Japanese practices and 
ideology. 
Table 8.24 
The Reasons why the Respondents Believe that only some or certain Elements 
of the JMM can be Transferred to Malaysia 
Reasons No. %' 
Malaysia and Japan are at different stages of technological 42 60.9 
development 
Many firms have been structured according to the Western style 42 60.9 
of management 
The top management in many firms are Western-trained and 37 53.6 
therefore are not in favour of all the elements of the JMM 
Not all workers are in favour of all the elements of the JMM 45 65.2 
Trade unions in many firms do not favour some elements of the 12 17.4 
JMM 
Some elements of the JMM are culture-bound and are not 55 79.7 
compatible with local cultural, traditional and religious beliefs 
Some elements of the JMM bring more problems than benefits 18 26.1 
Only some elements of the JMM are practical to use and easy to 45 65.2 
implement 
Note: '- Since the multiple answer system is used in the questionnaire, total answers ("/o) are more 
than the number of respondents. 
8.9.3 Respondents' Opinions Pertaining to the Japanese Willingness to Transfer 
their Technological Know-how and Expertise to the Malaysians 
The respondents were asked to state their opinions pertaining to the Japanese willingness to 
transfer their technological know-how and expertise to the Malaysians. Our findings reveal 
that of the 69 respondents, (31) 44.9% thought that only some Japanese are willing to 
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transfer their technological know-how and expertise to the Malaysians, while others teach 
only what the Malaysians already know. The other (29) 42% are of the opinion that the 
Japanese are not willing to transfer their technological know-how and expertise to the 
Malaysians at all. On the contrary, only (9) 13% of our respondents thought that the 
Japanese are willing to transfer their expertise to the Malaysians. 
There are a number of interesting points that have emerged from our findings. One, is that 
of the 29 respondents who said that the Japanese are not willing to transfer their 
technological know-how and expertise to the Malaysians, the majority are local managing 
directors. The next interesting point is that 5 out of the 9 respondents who thought the 
Japanese are willing to transfer their technology and expertise to the Malaysians are of 
Japanese nationality (Table 8.25). These responses show that the respondents who are of 
Malaysian nationality tend to believe that the Japanese are not willing to transfer their 
technology and skills to the Malaysians, while the respondents who are of Japanese 
nationality tend to think that the Japanese are willing to do so. Our finding is consistent 
with an earlier study by Yasin (1990) whose research suggests that most of the Japanese 
are not willing to transfer their technological know-how and expertise to the Malaysians. 
A possible explanation for this could be because the Japanese are looking for markets, 
prefer to take advantage of the investment benefits given to them under the auspices of the 
Look East Policy rather than transferring their technology and expertise to the Malaysians. 
After all, as explained in Chapter 5, there is nothing written into any of the contracts of the 
Japanese companies to indicate that there must be a transfer of technology and that 
Malaysian personnel must be formally trained. 
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Table 8.25 - 
The Breakdown of the Respondents' Opinion based on Nationalities 
Nationality 
No, they are 
not willing 
to transfer 
Only some are 
willing to 
transfer 
Yes, they are 
willing to 
transfer 
Malaysians 28 29 3 
British 1 1 - 
American - I I 
Japanese - - 5 
Total 29 31 9 
8.9.4 Respondents' Opinions Regarding the Succe$s of the LEP in Encouraging the 
Adoption of the Japanese Management Techniques and Work Ethic. 
With regard to this question, our findings reveal that of the 69 respondents, (45) 65.2% 
thought that the LEP has not been very effective or successful in encouraging management 
in Malaysia, particularly in this study, to adopt the Japanese management techniques and 
work ethic, while only (2) 2.9% think that the policy has been very successful (Table 8.26). 
An explanation for this may be because of the fact that the majority of our respondents 
thought that the LEP is just a "window-dressing" policy. 
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Table 8.26 
Breakdown of Respondents' Opinion on Whether the LEP has been 
Successful in Terms of Encouraging Management in Malaysia 
to Adopt Japanese Management Techniques and Work Ethic 
Response category No. % 
Yes, the LEP has been very successful 2 2.9 
No, the LEP has not been very successful 45 65.2 
Not sure 22 31.9 
Total 69 100.0 
8.10 Management Style 
This section presents the findings relating to the respondents' preference for management 
styles. The respondents were asked to state their preference pertaining to the management 
style they chose in running their organisations. Our findings show that of the 69 
respondents, over 72% indicated that they would prefer a mixture of various management 
styles which is pro-West, while only about 3% stated that they would prefer the Japanese 
style of management (Table 8.27). 
A number of interesting points can be seen in Table 8.27. For example, although, as 
revealed earlier, 46.4% of the respondents have actually implemented some elements of the 
JMM, only 2.9% of the 69 respondents actually stated that they would prefer the Japanese 
style of management in running their organisations. In addition, even though the 
government rigorously promotes Islamic principles, again of the 69 respondents, only 2.9% 
indicated that they would prefer the Islamic style of management. 
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Thus, referring to the question raised earlier in Section 8.2.4, i. e. whether or not the 
respondents' place of study and the educational system that they have been through have 
influenced the management style that they claimed to prefer, based on the survey findings, 
they do, indeed, have some influence. But it could also be argued that there are other 
influences, such as the firms' internal policies. However, it is beyond the scope of this 
study to discuss this in further detail. 
Table 8.27 
Breakdown of Management Style 
Management style No. % 
Japanese-style management 2 2.9 
American-style management 4 5.8 
A mixture of various styles which is pro-West 50 72.5 
Islamic-style management 2 2.9 
No preference 11 15.9 
Total 69 100.0 
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Part II 
8.11 Testing of Research Hypotheses 
This section deals with hypotheses testing. Hypothesis testing, alternatively called 
significance testing (Lucey, 1979: 65), is the process by which a hypothesis is tested by 
statistical means. In order to avoid a mountain of computer print-out, much of which 
would yield little useful information, McCormack and Hill (1997: 131) suggest that the 
researcher should only test and cross-tabulate variables that he or she believes could (i) 
produce findings that support the objective(s) of his or her study; and (ii) if the frequency 
tables for some variables show interesting or unexpected profiles. 
For the purpose of this study, a chi-square test is performed to determine the relationship 
between 5 independent variables (3 of which are associated with the characteristics of 
managing directors/respondents while the other 2 are associated with the characteristics of 
firms) and firms' implementing the Japanese model of management. In summary, these 
variables are as follows: 
A. Variables associated with the characteristics of managing directors (respondents) are: 
(i) knowledge of the Look East Policy 
(ii) familiarity with the Japanese model of management 
(iii) visits to Japan 
B. Variables associated with the characteristics of firms are: 
(i) size of firms 
(ii) ownership of firms 
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Although there are a number of variables that can be tested, one might ask why these 
particular variables have been chosen. The reason is because they are directly related to the 
objectives of this study as outlined earlier. By testing them, we believe that they could 
produce useful information that could support those objectives. 
The reason why a chi-square test is used is because our variables are of a nominal type. 
Following the recommendations of leading authorities (for example, Reynolds, 1984) a 
chi-square test is one of the most recommended statistical measures for this type of 
variable. If a relationship is found to exist and to be significant, further tests using phi 
coefficient (for variables with two categories) and Cramer's V (for variables with more 
than two categories) are among the non-parametric tests used in this study. Again, the 
reason for choosing these tests is because they are the most recommended statistical 
measures of strength of association for nominal data (Kinnear and Gray, 1995; Reynolds, 
1984). The chosen level of significance is 0.05, following a recommendation by Everitt 
(1977). For a chi-square test to be effective, leading authorities have proscribed its use 
when: (i) in 2X2 tables, any of the expected frequencies is less than 5; and (ii) in larger 
tables, any of the expected frequencies is less than 1, or more than 20% are less than 5 
(McCormack and Hill, 1997). Although, it has been recommended that all expected 
frequencies are at least 5 (Bailey, 1978), some earlier studies indicate that this requirement 
is probably too stringent and can be relaxed (Everitt, 1977). 
Each of the research hypotheses is tested independently and structured according to the 
following sections: 
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A. Statement of the hypothesis: where the description of the null hypothesis (Ho) and 
alternative hypothesis (H, ) are stated. 
B. Test results: where the test results are reported and whether or not the null hypotheses 
are rejected. 
C. Discussion of the test results: where the test results are elaborated. It is important to 
note that our explanation often extends beyond the context of the original hypothesis, 
but this is necessary in order to provide clarity. 
8.11.1 Hypothesis 1.1 
Hypothesis 1.1 looks into the possibility of a relationship between the respondents' 
knowledge of the Look East Policy (LEP) and their firms' implementation of the Japanese 
model of management (JMM). It is hypothesised that those respondents who have said that 
they have knowledge of the LEP will be more likely to implement the JMM. We will now 
see whether there is a relationship (positive) between these variables. But if there is none, 
we will explain why that is the case. 
A) Statement of Hypothesis 1.1 
Ho - There is no relationship between respondents' knowledge of the Look East 
Policy and their firms' implementation of the Japanese model of 
management 
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H, - There is a relationship between respondents' knowledge of the Look East 
Policy and their firms' implementation of the Japanese model of 
management 
B) Test Results 
To determine whether there is sufficient information to reject H. and conclude that there is 
a relationship between the respondents' knowledge of the LEP and their firms' 
implementation of the JMM, a chi-square test is carried out. The result of the chi-square 
test (Table 8.28) shows that there is no relationship between the respondents' knowledge of 
the LEP and their firms' implementation of the JMM, as the calculated value of chi-square 
(2.611) is less than the critical value (x2,10,0.05 = 3.84). Based on this test at the 5% level 
of significance, we cannot reject the null hypothesis (H0). 
C) Discussion of the Test Results 
As the chi-square is not statistically significant, we cannot conclude that there is a 
relationship between the respondents' knowledge of the LEP and their firms' 
implementation of the JMM. Why that is the case? One possible reason could be because 
the LEP and the JMM are two different things altogether. We described earlier how the 
LEP was launched by the Malaysian government to promote the JMM in Malaysia, but 
clearly, this has nothing to do with the origin and/or the success of the JMM. Because of 
this, the LEP per se might be able to introduce the JMM to the Malaysians, but for the 
successful implementation of the JMM, clearly it is not sufficient just to have knowledge 
of the LEP. It could be argued that something more is needed, such as classroom and on- 
the-job-training in the JMM. Indeed, we have learnt from the earlier literature that among 
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some Western firms that have successfully implemented Japanese management techniques 
are those whose top management have been trained in these areas, or have worked side-by- 
side with Japanese managers (see Chapter 3). 
Another possible reason could be because the majority of our respondents perceived the 
Look East Policy as nothing more than a "window-dressing" policy. It can be argued that 
because of this perception, it could be very difficult for the government to persuade the 
respondents to implement Japanese management techniques and work ethic. 
8.11.2 Hypothesis 1.2 
Hypothesis 1.2 looks into the possibility of a relationship between the respondents' 
familiarity with the JMM and their firms' implementation of the JMM. We hypothesise 
here that those respondents who have said that they are familiar with the JMM will 
strongly favour implementing it in their firms. 
A) Statement of Hypothesis 1.2 
Ha - There is no relationship between the respondents' familiarity with the Japanese 
model of management and their firms' implementation of the Japanese model 
of management 
H, - There is a relationship between the respondents' familiarity with the Japanese 
model of management and their firms' implementation of the Japanese model 
of management 
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B) Test Results 
To determine whether there is sufficient information to reject H. and to conclude that there 
is a relationship between the respondents' familiarity with the JMM and their firms' 
implementing it, a chi-square test is performed. The result of the chi-square test (Table 
8.28) reveals that there is no relationship between the respondents' familiarity with the 
JMM and their firms' implementation of the Japanese management techniques as the 
calculated value of chi-square (1.051) is less than the critical value (x2,1°, 0.05 = 3.84). 
Thus, based on this test at the 5% level of significance, we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
(H0)" 
C) Discussion of the Test Results 
As the chi-square is not statistically significant, we cannot conclude that there is a 
relationship between the respondents' familiarity with the JMM and their firms' 
implementation of the Japanese management techniques. One possible explanation for this 
is that even though the majority of our respondents have stated that they are familiar with 
the JMM, we might argue that it does not necessarily mean that they know all about the 
Japanese management practices because the term "familiar" is a broad category and it 
could mean different things to different respondents. - We might further argue that, as a 
result, their familiarity does not necessarily lead to the implementation of the JMM. 
Another possible explanation for this is that although the majority of our respondents have 
indicated that they are familiar with the JMM, it could be argued that they do not 
necessarily have in-depth knowledge of it as most of them have not been trained in this 
area. In fact, our findings show that the majority of our respondents have become familiar 
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with the JMM not through industrial training in Japan but by reading books and journals 
that are related to this area (Table 8.13). 
While, on the one hand, there are obvious benefits to be gained from extracting information 
in this way, it could also be asserted that it is not as effective when compared to acquiring 
knowledge from the experts or "gurus". In fact, some earlier studies have revealed that to 
successfully implement the JMM outside the Japanese cultural setting experienced 
managers who have been rigorously trained by experts in the Japanese practices are 
required. A number of earlier studies (see Chapter 3) also claim that some Western firms 
have, in fact, hired Japanese experts to train their managers while helping them to 
implement the Japanese techniques. Even then, there is no guarantee that these firms are 
100 percent successful. Thus, we can say that becaus&of a lack of exposure or training in 
this area, management in manufacturing firms in Malaysia are less inclined to adopt 
Japanese management techniques. However, we may argue that in order to effectively 
transfer Japanese management techniques to the manufacturing firms in Malaysia, it is not 
sufficient just to be familiar with these techniques. Perhaps what these managers need is 
an in-depth knowledge of Japanese management techniques and we believe that this could 
be gained through industrial training in large Japanese firms in Japan. 
8.11.3 Hypothesis 1.3 
Hypothesis 1.3 looks into the possibility of a relationship between the respondents' visits 
to Japan and their firms' implementation of the JMM. It is hypothesised that those 
respondents who said that they have visited Japan are more likely to have implemented the 
JMM in their firms. 
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A) Statement of Hypothesis 1.3 
Ho- There is no relationship between the respondents' visits to Japan and their 
firms' implementation of the Japanese model of management 
H, - There is a relationship between the respondents' visits to Japan and their 
firms' implementation of the Japanese model of management 
B) Test Results 
In order to determine whether there is sufficient information to reject H. and conclude that 
there is a relationship between the respondents' visits to Japan and their firms' 
implementation of the JMM, chi-square test is done. The result of the chi-square test, as 
shown in Table 8.28, reveals that there is a relationship between the respondents' visits to 
Japan and their firms' implementation of the JMM as the calculated value of chi-square 
(4.953) is greater than the critical value (x2,1°, 0.05 = 3.84). Based on this test at the 5% 
level of significance, we can reject the null hypothesis-(H0). To determine the strength of 
the relationship, a further test using phi coefficient is done. The test result shows that there 
is a weak correlation as the phi coefficient value is only 0.268. According to Kinnear and 
Gray (1995), a value of 1 would be a perfect association. 
C) Discussion of the Test Results 
Although there is a relationship between the respondents' visits to Japan and their firms' 
implementation of the JMM, one may argue that it is not sufficient to support a conclusion 
that the JMM has been implemented in some firms as a result of their managing directors 
or top management having visited Japan. In fact, the phi coefficient test shows that the 
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relationship is fairly weak. However, given the opposite, i. e. the relationship is very 
strong, one may also argue that it will never be possible to adopt certain elements of the 
JMM, particularly those elements which are culture-bond, solely on the basis of having 
visited Japan. 
Not only is it difficult to transfer some elements of the JMM to a heterogeneous society 
like Malaysia, but it can also be argued that the respondents' visits to Japan have not 
significantly helped firms in this study to adopt all the elements of the Japanese 
management techniques because: (i) the majority of the respondents (52%) who stated that 
they have visited Japan said that it was not for the purpose of undergoing training in 
Japanese management techniques, but for business purposes; (ii) their stay in Japan was 
also rather short, i. e. between I and 4 weeks; (iii) they have little or no knowledge of the 
Japanese language, i. e. out of the 69 respondents that participated in our survey, only 6% 
can speak and 4% can write in Japanese. Hence, it might be argued that because their stay 
was relatively short and as a result of their lack of knowledge of the Japanese language, it 
is understandable that they did not pick up sufficient information or knowledge pertaining 
to the JMM, or they might have difficulties in understanding the idea of the Japanese 
practices being communicated to them. One may argue that it could be because of these 
"handicaps" that these respondents have not had the confidence to implement most of the 
elements of the Japanese management techniques, even after they have completed their 
training in Japan. 
398 
Table 8.28 
Chi-Square Test Results 
(N = 69) 
Hypo. Independent Chi-square DF P-Value Results 
No. Variables Value 
1.1 Knowledge of the 2.611 1 0.106 NR 
Look East Policy 
1.2 Familiarity with 
the Japanese model 1.051 1 0.305 NR 
of management 
1.3 Visits to Japan 4.953 1 0.026 R* 
Note: * Significant at 5% level 
R- There is relationship (Reject Null Hypothesis) 
NR - There is no relationship (Cannot Reject Null Hypothesis) 
8.11.4 Hypothesis 2.1 
Hypothesis 2.1 looks at the possibility of a relationship between the size of a firm and its 
implementation of the JMM. It is hypothesised here ! hat firms of a larger size are more 
likely to implement the Japanese model of management. 
A) Statement of Hypothesis 2.1 
Ho - There is no relationship between the size of a firm and its implementation of the 
Japanese model of management 
H, - There is a relationship between the size of a firm and its implementation of the 
Japanese model of management 
B) Test Results 
To determine whether there is sufficient information to reject H. and conclude that there is 
a relationship between the size of a firm and its implementation of the JMM, a chi-square 
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test is performed. The result of the test, as shown in Table 8.29, shows that there is no 
relationship between the size of a firm and its implementation of the JMM as the calculated 
value of chi-square (3.563) is less than the critical value (x2.2°, 0.05 = 5.99). As a result, 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis (Ho) because chi-square is not statistically significant 
at 5% level of significance. Therefore, we cannot conclude a relationship between the size 
of a firm and its implementation of the JMM. - 
C) Discussion of the Test Results 
In hypothesis 2.1, there were a number of reasons to believe that firms of larger size are 
more likely to implement the Japanese model of management. However, it has not shown 
to be the case. The explanation for this may be because larger firms do not necessarily 
have their top management trained in the Japanese management techniques. As a result, 
they might not have the confidence to implement the JMM because to successfully do so 
requires someone who has been trained in this area. Another possibility may be due to the 
fact that top management favour a Western style of management as the majority have had 
their earlier training in Western institutions. The other possible reason may be because 
most of their employees oppose the adoption of the JMM. We believe that when this 
happens, there is little that top management can do. As a result of all these factors it 
appears that the hypothesis does not seem to be supported. 
8.11.5 Hypothesis 2.2 
Hypothesis 2.2 looks at the possibility of a relationship between the ownership of the firms 
and their implementation of the JMM. What we expect here is that the Japanese joint 
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ventures are more likely to implement the JMM, while firms that are owned by other 
nationalities, including Malaysians, are unlikely to implement it. 
A) Statement of Hypothesis 2.2 
Ho - There is no relationship between the ownership of the firms and their 
implementation of the Japanese model of management 
H, - There is a relationship between the ownership of firms and their 
implementation the Japanese model of management 
B) Test Results 
To determine whether there is sufficient information to reject Ho and conclude that there is 
a relationship between the ownership of the firms and their implementation of the JMM, a 
chi-square test is carried out. The result of the chi-square test (Table 8.29) reveals that 
there is no relationship between the ownership of firms and their implementation of the 
JMM as the calculated value of chi-square (1.722) is less than the critical value (x2,1°, 0.05 
= 3.84). As a result, we cannot reject the null hypothesis (Ho) because chi-square is not 
statistically significant at 5% level of significance. We therefore cannot conclude a 
relationship between the ownership of the firms and their implementation of the JMM. 
C) Discussion of the Test Results 
Although the statistical tests did not show that there is a relationship between the 
ownership of the firms and their implementation of the JMM, looking at the individual 
firms, particularly the Japanese-owned firms or joint ventures, out of 6 Japanese joint 
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ventures, (5) 83% indicated that they have implemented some elements of the JMM, 
although in a modified form. This suggests that there is a relationship between the 
ownership of the firms and their implementation of the JMM. 
The question here is why did the chi-square test not show that there is a relationship 
between the ownership of the firms and their implementation of the JMM? The reason 
may be because of the small number involved, i. e. only 6 Japanese joint ventures compared 
to 44 locally-owned firms. Because of that, it does not significantly influence the 
statistical test. 
Table 8.29 
Chi-Square Test Results 
(N = 69) - 
Hypo. Independent Chi-square DF P-Value Results 
No. Variables Value 
2.1 Size of firms 3.563 2 0.168 NR 
2.2 Ownership of 1.722 1 0.189 NR 
Firms 
Note: K -There is relationship (Reject Null Hypothesis) 
NR - There is no relationship (Cannot Reject Null Hypothesis) 
To sum up, did the 5 independent variables have any influence on the firms to implement 
the Japanese model of management? Based on the statistical tests, we can statistically say 
that 4 out of 5 independent variables have no significant influence on the firms to 
implement the JMM. However, we must recognise that a variable, such as the ownership 
of the firms has some kind of relationship with the firms' implementation of the JMM, 
although it did not show up in the statistical test. As mentioned earlier, the reason is 
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probably because the number of Japanese joint ventures is relatively small to be 
statistically significant. 
Although the statistical tests did not show that there is a relationship between respondents' 
knowledge of the LEP and their firms' implementation of the JMM, we could not deny the 
indirect effect of the LEP. In fact, our survey finding shows that out of the 69 respondents 
who participated in our study, (52) 75.4% indicated that they knew what the Look East 
Policy was all about. It could then be hypothesised that perhaps this knowledge of the LEP 
has encouraged some of them (i) to attend seminars on the JMM in order to further their 
knowledge in that area; (ii) to be sent for industrial training/attachment to Japan; and (iii) 
to selectively implement some elements of the JMM which they believed suitable for their 
firm's use. Hence, it could be further argued that all these have taken place possibly 
because the respondents' awareness is raised by the government's LEP. Perhaps, if there 
were no LEP and no government encouragement, it could be doubtful that a firm would 
send its top management for industrial training in Japan, but because of the LEP, the 
opposite has happened. r 
With regard to the respondents' visits to Japan and their firms' implementation of the 
JMM, the test shows that there is a relatively weak relationship. In statistical terms, this 
means that visits to Japan have no significant influence on the firms to implement the 
JMM. Although, that may be the case we cannot rule out absolutely that visits to Japan 
will not influence the firms to implement the JMM. In fact, some respondents that we have 
interviewed claim that subsequent to a visit to Japan, particularly for training purposes, 
they have implemented some elements of the JMM. This suggests that there is a 
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relationship between respondents who have visited Japan for training purposes and their 
firms' implementation of the JMM. 
Since there is a clear indication that there exists a positive relationship between visits to 
Japan, particularly among our respondents who did so for training purposes, and their 
firms' implementation of the JMM, it could be argued that in order to successfully promote 
the Japanese management system in the manufacturing firms in Malaysia, the Malaysian 
government should send more people (both management and workers) to Japan for a longer 
duration to learn, at first hand, Japanese management techniques. At this stage we can say 
that the government has not done enough to successfully encourage management, in 
Malaysia in general and in this study in particular, to adopt even the low-cost Japanese 
practices (see Chapter 9 for the definition of low-cost practices). 
8.12 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented both the survey findings and the results from the statistical tests. 
The findings reported above are generally consistent with those reported earlier in previous 
studies. Given the usual reservations about generalising from survey data, it is possible to 
draw the following conclusions. 
First, the survey findings indicate that some elements of the Japanese model of 
management or Japanese management techniques can be implemented in manufacturing 
firms operating in Malaysia. However, it is not the whole system being implemented but 
only the easy or low-cost practices. Even then, these have to be modified to suit the 
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Malaysian heterogeneous society. This suggests that what has been transferred are 
significantly diluted/partial or easy versions of the Japanese model of management. 
Second, our findings reveal that most respondents/firms in this study have encountered 
problems while implementing the JMM. These problems arise partly because Japan and 
Malaysia are two different countries with many differences in terms of culture, religion, 
economy, politics, educational systems and management systems. Thus, the socio-cultural 
values in Malaysia seem to play a far more significant role in management practice policy 
choices than the political will of the government. Perhaps because of that, the survey 
findings reveal that the Japanese techniques that are deeply embedded in its culture, for 
example, lifetime employment, seniority-based systems and the ringgi system have not 
been implemented by the majority of the respondents in this study. Although in-house 
union is the model held out for workers in Malaysia, our findings show that the majority of 
the respondents in this study did not indicate that they recognise it. Instead, most of our 
respondents stated that they recognised industry-wide union. This suggests that the LEP 
has not been successful in influencing the respondents in this study to recognise in-house 
union. 
Third, the survey results reveal that the majority of the respondents have implemented 
techniques, such as QCCs, TQC, job-rotation, on-the-job training, suggestion systems, 
group responsibility and loyalty to the company. However, there is little evidence to 
suggest that these have been implemented because of_the Look East Policy. As already 
mentioned, although we can statistically argue that the respondents' knowledge of the LEP 
has no direct influence on the firms to implement the JMM, we cannot deny the fact that 
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the LEP has some indirect effect. For example, it could be argued that if there had not 
been a LEP, perhaps there would not have been as much use of the JMM among the 
manufacturing firms in Malaysia. It could also be argued that without a LEP, visits to 
Japan, technology transfers, the establishment of the first Malaysian car company, Proton, 
and student exchanges between Malaysia and Japan, etc. would not have happened. 
Fourth, our findings show that the majority of the respondents are of the opinion that the 
LEP has not been very successful in changing the attitudes and behaviour of Malaysian 
workers in terms of loyalty and hard work in accordance with Japanese philosophy. This 
suggests that the socio-cultural values in Malaysia, which are pro-West, play a far more 
significant role than the LEP. 
Finally, based on our survey findings it is argued that the LEP has not been very effective 
in encouraging management in Malaysia, particularly in the manufacturing firms in this 
study, to adopt Japanese management techniques and work ethic. However, it could also 
be maintained that if there had not been a LEP, some respondents might have been less 
keen to attend industrial training in Japan as they said they did when answering our survey 
questions; or perhaps the majority of the respondents would not have been interested in 
learning more about Japanese management techniques at all. But, in fact, there is some 
evidence to show that some respondents have attended seminars on Japanese management 
techniques to further their understanding in that area - suggesting that the LEP has had 
some indirect effect. Also, there is statistical evidence to show that visits to Japan have 
actually had a direct effect on firms to implement the JMM. 
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It could be suggested that if the government set aside adequate funding to sponsor more 
Malaysians, particularly from the manufacturing sector, to go to Japan, and allowed these 
people to spend a longer time there to learn more about Japanese management techniques, 
culture and so on, it might be able to overcome the cultural barriers that have impeded the 
transfer of certain elements of the Japanese management techniques to Malaysia. 
Chapter 9 presents the analysis of the survey findings. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
ANALYSIS OF THE SURVEY FINDINGS 
9.1 Introduction 
The objectives of this chapter are twofold. First, it provides an analysis of the mail survey 
questionnaire findings, as tabulated earlier in Chapter 8, and discusses the findings gained 
from the interview. The main reason for doing this is to determine the extent of the Look 
East Policy's influence on the management of the manufacturing firms in this study to 
adopt Japanese management techniques and work ethic. To facilitate this we need to (i) 
examine the elements of the Japanese management techniques that the respondents said 
they have adopted; (ii) compare those elements with the elements that have been adopted 
by firms in other countries as covered in our study; (iii) analyse the reasons why the 
respondents have implemented the Japanese management techniques; and (iv) discuss the 
problems that the respondents said they have encountered while implementing Japanese 
management practices. Second, it provides more detailed discussion on whether or not the 
Look East Policy has been effective in encouraging management in Malaysia in general, 
and in this study in particular, to adopt Japanese management techniques and work ethic. 
9.2 Analysis and Discussion of the Findings from the Mail Survey Questionnaire 
and Personal Interview 
In this section, a detailed discussion of the findings from the mail survey questionnaire (see 
Chapter 8) is presented. In addition, the findings gained from the interview are also 
discussed. As mentioned earlier, we interviewed 32 respondents who said they have 
implemented some elements of the Japanese model of management (JMM) or Japanese 
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management techniques. The aim of conducting the interview was to find out some of the 
reasons behind the respondents' replies in the mail survey questionnaire. As a result, at 
this point we are going to apply that information to exemplify points, or to try to 
understand in more depth some of the issues to be discussed. For this reason, sometimes 
we will summarise what our respondents said, and occasionally, we will quote verbatim 
from these interviews/discussions, though we should be clear that some of these materials 
have been translated from Bahasa Malaysia. 
As stated in Chapter 1, one of the aims of this study is to examine the impact or 
effectiveness of the Look East Policy in encouraging management in Malaysia, and 
particularly in the manufacturing firms in this study, to adopt Japanese management 
techniques and work ethic. Therefore, to enable this, first, we will determine the extent of 
Japanisation effects in Malaysia, which is important because Japanisation is a key part of 
the Look East Policy. That being the case, most of the discussion in this section is in 
accordance with some earlier studies, but we must point out that this is not a replication of 
other studies on Japanisation. Instead, in Section 9.3 we will discuss more specifically the 
Look East Policy. The discussions in this section are presented in the following sequence: 
9.2.1 What has been transferred/adopted? 
9.2.2 Reasons for implementing Japanese management techniques. 
9.2.3 Why problems have been encountered in the application of the Japanese 
management techniques. 
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9.2.1 What has been Transferred/Adopted? 
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to take a step back in our discussion to 
remind ourselves why the transferability of the Japanese management techniques is a 
matter of importance in the first place. As highlighted in this study, the transferability of 
Japanese management techniques is important to the government of Malaysia, and in 
particular to Mahathir, because he aims to change people's attitudes as well as the way in 
which the Malaysian industry operates in order to further the nation's industrial 
development. As mentioned in Chapter 5, towards this goal, in February 1982, Mahathir 
officially launched the Look East Policy, through which he aimed to encourage 
management in Malaysia to adopt Japanese management systems by specifically 
campaigning to promote the Japanese work ethic and managerial techniques. 
However, despite the strong "push" by the government to promote Japanese management 
techniques in Malaysia, our survey findings reveal three interesting results. First, less than 
50% of the respondents who participated in our survey indicated that they have 
implemented certain elements of the Japanese management techniques. Second, of those 
respondents, the techniques that they said they have implemented are limited to what 
Dedoussis (1995) calls low-cost techniques or practices. ' Core or high-cost techniques or 
practices have generally not been implemented by most of the respondents' in this study 
(see Table 9.1). 
' Dedoussis (1995) defines low-cost techniques or practices as those that can be adopted piecemeal by firms 
in other countries because of economic considerations. On the other hand, he defines high-cost techniques or 
practices as those that have to be adopted as a package. 
Z Out of the 69 respondents that participated in the survey, 32 said that they have implemented some 
elements of the Japanese management techniques. 
410 
Table 9.1 
Javanese Management Techniques Implemented by Respondents' 
Types Management Techniques Remarks 
Low-cost practices QCC, TQC, Suggestion system, Group Highly favoured and 
Responsibility, Job rotation, On-the-job implemented by most of 
training, Loyalty to company, Open- the respondents 
office system, Paternal leadership style, 
Just-in-time 
High-cost practices Lifetime employment, seniority systems, Less favoured by most 
Hiring of fresh graduates, Enterprise respondents and 
Unionism, Ringgi system generally not 
implemented by 
respondents 
Note: refers to the 32 out of the 69 respondents that said that they have implemented the 
Japanese management techniques. 
Finally, looking at the techniques that the respondents said they have implemented, they 
are not all that different to those techniques adopted by firms in other countries, such as the 
UK, the USA, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea (see, for example, Putti 
and Chong, 1985; Fukuda, 1988; Rodgers and Wong, 1996; Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992). 
Hence, even at this stage, this kind of evidence suggests that the Look East Policy might 
have a limited impact or influence in terms of encouraging the respondents in this study to 
implement the Japanese management techniques. The discussions in the next section will 
reveal some of the reasons as to why the respondents in this study said that they have 
adopted some elements of the Japanese management techniques. 
9.2.2 Reasons for Implementing Japanese Management Techniques 
Based on the findings presented in Chapter 8, in this section we will discuss in more detail 
the reasons why the respondents' in this study said that they have adopted some elements 
' Refers to the 32 respondents who said that they have implemented some elements of the Japanese 
management techniques. 
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of the Japanese management techniques. The three most important reasons that have been 
identified, according to our survey are: 
1. Some elements of the Japanese management techniques are less expensive to 
implement; 
2. Some elements of the Japanese management techniques are adopted because of 
economic considerations; and 
3. Some elements of the Japanese management techniques are adopted because of 
management's response to specific problems. 
9.2.2.1 Implementation of Less Expensive Elements 
As shown in Table 9.1 on the previous page, out of the 69 respondents who participated in 
this study, 32 said that they have implemented some elements of the Japanese management 
techniques. Of these 32 respondents, more than 80% said that they have implemented 
techniques such as quality control circle, on-the-job training and suggestion systems. 
When these respondents were asked why they had chosen to implement these techniques, 
their responses were: "Because they are practical, not interrelated, less expensive and can 
be implemented piecemeal. " On the other hand, when the same respondents were asked 
why the Japanese management techniques, such as lifetime employment, seniority-based 
wage and promotion systems, the ringgi system, hiring of fresh graduates and enterprise 
unionism had not been implemented in their firms, their explanations were: "These 
techniques are not practical for our use given the fact that our management system is quite 
different from Japan's. In fact, we believe that techniques such as lifetime employment, 
seniority-based systems, the ringgi system and enterprise unionism are strongly attached to 
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Japanese culture, thus, to transfer such techniques to Malaysia, where there exists different 
cultural values, will be quite difficult. " To illustrate this point, let us examine the situation 
in some large Japanese firms in Japan. When one looks at these firms, it is obvious that 
lifetime employment is highly-favoured where seniority systems and ringgi or consensual 
decision-making are present. This could be explained by the fact that there exist two 
psychological needs that can be met through this association. First, seniority systems in 
the context of lifetime employment provide a high degree of structure and certainty; and 
second, consensual decision-making may symbolise a company's respect for employees, as 
well as trust and a sense of communal responsibility, which in turn lead to a desire for 
lifetime employment with the company. This suggests that there is an interrelationship 
between some of these techniques, and it could be possible that it has existed for many 
decades. Perhaps, the absence of this kind of interrelationship in Malaysia makes it 
difficult for the country's firms to successfully implement Japanese management 
techniques. 
Thus, based on the above arguments, it could be posited that no matter how strong the 
government "push" to encourage management in Malaysia to adopt Japanese management 
techniques, particularly the high-cost or "hard" practices, most of the respondents are not 
keen to do so. As one respondent explains: "It is difficult to implement the Japanese hard 
practices not only because they are expensive to implement as a package, but also they 
impracticable and inapplicable in Malaysia as we have different cultural and religious 
beliefs compared to Japan. " 
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9.2.2.2 Economic Considerations 
Out of 32 respondents who indicated that they have adopted some elements of the Japanese 
management techniques, 65.2% said that they did so because some elements of the 
Japanese management techniques are practical and economically beneficial for their use. 
As one respondent explains: "Being a manufacturing concern, we have to be productive 
and competitive, not only in terms of workers' productivity but also in terms of product 
and service quality. As such, we believe that we can achieve all of these not only by 
working very hard but also by systematically incorporating some Japanese management 
techniques, such as QCCs, TQC, and suggestion systems into our existing system because 
these techniques are economically beneficial to us. " 
Experiences might have taught top managements that maximum quality services and 
products can be achieved through well-planned QCC implementation. Hence, it might be 
argued that because of the concern for product and service quality, it is necessary for the 
respondents to adopt techniques such as QCCs and TQC. Furthermore, it could be argued 
that the LEP is probably not the main reason why our respondents said that they have 
implemented some elements of the Japanese management techniques, but it could be an 
important factor that reinforces some of the techniques. What the LEP does, is therefore, 
highlight some of these issues. Of course, there are other ways to learn about Japanese 
business practices, but the LEP gives them an added impetus. 
9.2.2.3 Management's Response to Specific Problems 
Besides the two reasons mentioned above, the other reason given by some of the 32 
respondents is that certain elements of the Japanese management techniques are adopted 
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because of management's response to specific problems. With regard to this reason, three 
specific problems have been identified in this study, as discussed below. 
With regard to the problem of competition for market and raw materials, the information 
gathered from both the interview and mail survey questionnaire reveals that some 
respondents stated that they have implemented elements of the Japanese management 
techniques, such as QCCs, TQC, suggestion systems and on-the-job training because they 
strongly believe that these techniques can help them to be competitive. In fact, according 
to the interviewees, it is partly because of the need to be competitive that they find it less 
difficult to persuade their workers to accept the techniques mentioned above. 
Based on the information from both the interview and mail survey questionnaire, it can be 
argued that the role of top management is more powerful when compared to the role played 
by state in persuading management as well as workers to accept Japanese management 
techniques, such as QCCs, TQC, suggestion systems and on-the-job training. In fact, 
according to Abdullah (1995), local management has played a stronger role in persuading 
workers to accept such techniques because they have been partly influenced by 
multinational firms in Malaysia. In addition, by adopting QCCs, TQC, and suggestion 
systems local management or firms believe that they could become more competitive 
(Abdullah, 1995). 
The important questions here are how could multinational corporations (MNCs), and 
particularly Japanese MNCs, influence local management to adopt some of their 
management techniques and how could they indirectly influence local firms to be 
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competitive? In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to take a step back and 
recall the events of the late 1970s. In Chapters 5 and 6 we learnt that Japanese investors 
are motivated to invest in Malaysia partly because of the availability of local markets, 
cheap labour, and the abundance of raw materials, and also partly because of investment 
incentives offered by the Malaysian government under the premiers Tun Abdul Razak and 
Tun Hussein Onn (second and third Prime Ministers, respectively). 
For instance, since 1972 the production of manufactured products in Malaysia, and 
particularly from the electronics industry, has grown at an average of 46.9% per year, and 
by 1989 Malaysia had become the world's largest producer of semiconductors and the 
world's largest exporter of electronic products. This performance was achieved by 115 
multinational electronics companies, the majority of which were Japanese who were 
attracted to Malaysia following the introduction of the 1968 Investment Incentive Act. 
These Japanese investors have not only used up the raw materials and taken advantage of 
the cheap labour but also their products have also flooded local markets. Moreover, the 
strong performance of multinational companies (MNCs), and particularly the Japanese 
companies, have indirectly forced local firms to compete for raw materials as well as 
markets. Thus, arguably the experience gained from observing the performance of these 
MNCs has in some way influenced local managers to adopt some elements of the Japanese 
management techniques that are deemed suitable for local firms to overcome 
management's problems. 
Bearing the above in mind, it is therefore reasonable to suggest that the implementation of 
techniques, such as TQC, QCCs and suggestion systems by respondents in this study might 
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be the result of their concern to produce high quality products and to build up a team spirit 
with the intention to be competitive. It might also be maintained that if local firms did not 
adopt such techniques, they would be probably left behind and the government's intention 
to encourage the establishment of local manufacturing companies would be undermined. 
The second problem faced by management is the shortage of skilled labour and workers' 
mobility. Previous studies report that the shortage of skilled labour in the manufacturing 
sector in the mid 1980s forced employers to provide not only better terms of employment 
and better working conditions for workers but also internal training programmes, such as 
job rotation and on-the-job training for the existing workers (Abdullah, 1995). Besides the 
shortage of skilled labour, job-hopping is also a major problem in Malaysia (Thong, 1991). 
Because job-mobility is highly valued by the majority-of Malaysian workers, a number of 
respondents have raised doubts as to whether there is any sense of loyalty left among their 
workers. As one respondent says: "In our company, to discourage job-mobility among 
workers we have provided them with better working conditions, better pay schemes, 
encouraged team work and elicited new ideas from workers. We have also encouraged 
management and workers to socialise in order to narrow the management-worker gap, but 
suffice to say, there is very little sense of loyalty among some of our workers.... some of 
them are more motivated by money than anything else and if they can get a better offer 
somewhere else, they will move. " 
Therefore, to solve the problem of the shortage of skilled workers and worker mobility, a 
number of policies are said to have been adopted by the respondents in this study. Based 
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on our survey findings, of the 324 respondents that indicated that they have adopted 
Japanese management techniques, 90.6% stated that they have introduced incentives such 
as continuous training schemes; 78.1 % said that they have introduced awards for long 
service; 71.9% indicated that they have introduced internal promotion schemes; 59.4% 
stated that they have introduced workers' welfare facilities and wage incentive schemes; 
and 56.3% said that they have introduced measures such as the reconciliation of human 
relations between management and workers. When our respondents were asked why they 
had introduced these techniques, they explained that it was partly because of the shortage 
of skilled workers and partly to reduce worker mobility. Thus, looking at these responses, 
it is possible to argue that the above techniques have not necessarily been implemented 
because of the strong "push" from the Malaysian government. 
A third problem faced by management is the self-centred and individualistic nature of the 
Malaysians. Previous studies (for instance, Kawabe, 1991) report that some Malaysians, 
regardless of whether they are managers or ordinary workers, are self-centred and too 
individualistic when compared to their Asian counterparts such as the Koreans, the 
Taiwanese, and, in particular, the Japanese. Kawabe (1991) also argues that individualism 
and self-centredness among some Malaysians could have been a legacy of their colonial 
master. 
As mentioned in Chapter 6, even in the economy, the British "divide and rule" policy, in 
which the Malays stayed in rural agriculture while the Chinese worked in tin mines and 
urban service sectors and the Indians worked in rubber estates remained prominent. This 
° Since the multiple answer system is used in the questionnaire, total percentages (answers) are more than the 
number of respondents. 
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may have contributed to the individualistic nature of the Malaysians, where the Malays, 
Chinese, and Indians were confined to their own communities. Even the educational 
system in the country's higher institutions is still patterned along the Western curriculum, 
as are most of the educational backgrounds of the majority of the respondents in this study. 
This could explain why the present organisation structures in most Malaysian firms are still 
very westernised. 
However, a number of respondents in this study have indicated that they have tried very 
hard to solve the problem of self-centredness and individualism among their workers. In 
fact, one respondent stated during the interview: "In our firm we implemented techniques 
such as group responsibility, company loyalty, suggestion systems and the reconciling of 
human relations between management and workers and all these were aimed at 
encouraging workers to mix freely with management and make them feel that they were 
part of a team. " 
Our findings (interview data) show that even before the launch of the LEP in February 
1982, certain elements of the Japanese management techniques, such as QCCs, TQC, 
suggestion systems, job-rotation, on-the-job training, company loyalty and group 
responsibility had been implemented by a number of our respondents. ' Although it is not 
possible to generalise the whole population based on the information collected from the 
interview, we can infer from what has been reported to us that some elements of the 
Japanese management techniques were implemented by firms in Malaysia prior to the 
launch of the LEP (see Lim and Ping, 1979). It could therefore be suggested that it is 
'Interviews with some respondents revealed that they had implemented some elements of the Japanese 
practices long before the LEP. 
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unlikely that the respondents implemented some elements of the Japanese management 
techniques solely because of the strong "push" from the government via its LEP. 
Although, we are not arguing that the LEP alone led to the introduction of the Japanese 
management techniques in many firms, that in itself does not imply that the LEP has had 
no effect, but it may have had an indirect influence. In fact, according to a number of 
respondents that we talked to, the LEP has had a number of indirect effects and in some 
areas it has actually achieved some success. For example, one respondent says: "I believe 
we need the Look East Policy because with this policy it is much easier to change our 
employees' work attitude. " Another respondent explains: "With the Look East Policy, it 
is much easier to do business with the Japanese because this policy gives us 
ideas/perceptions to understand how the Japanese systems work. " Looking at the above 
claims, it is therefore possible to argue that to some extent the LEP has had some indirect 
effects. 
9.2.3 Reasons for Problems Encountered in the Application of the Japanese 
Management Techniques 
Based on the earlier discussion, there is no doubt that a number of elements of the Japanese 
management techniques have been implemented in manufacturing firms operating in 
Malaysia as far as the respondents in this study are concerned. However, when compared 
to other countries, for example, the UK, the USA, Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea or 
Taiwan, it seems that Malaysia has never been more successful than any of the above 
countries, despite the fact that the Malaysian government has strongly "pushed" towards 
this direction. This is reflected by the fact that of the 32 respondents who stated they have 
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adopted some elements of the Japanese management techniques, more than 78% said that 
they have encountered some problems. These problems can be categorised as follows: 
1. Differences in culture, tradition, religious beliefs and management systems; 
2. Impact of Western-educated managers; 
3. Respondents/Management's lack enthusiasm, and workers' preference for 
existing management practices; and 
4. Lack of commitment from top management. 
9.2.3.1 Differences in Culture, Tradition, Religious Beliefs and Management Systems 
As described in Chapter 6, Malaysia is a unique mix of two main ethnic categories, 
Bumiputra and non-Bumiputra. Under the former we have Malays and many other ethnic 
groups, whereas under the latter we have Chinese and Indians. Because of the diversity in 
terms of race in Malaysia there exist different religions, customs, cultures, languages, 
values, etc. In contrast, because of Japan's unity and relative homogeneity the existence of 
different customs, religions, values, etc. may not be very obvious. Moreover, when the 
different religions, customs, cultures, etc. that are found in Malaysia are compared with 
those found in Japan, they are quite different. Therefore, it could be argued that such 
differences between Malaysia and Japan have made it difficult to transfer certain elements 
of the Japanese management techniques to Malaysia. 
Indeed, our survey findings do seem to support this conjecture, since, of the 32 respondents 
who stated they have implemented some elements of the Japanese management techniques, 
more than 70% said that it is very difficult to transfer techniques, such as lifetime 
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employment, consensus decision making, seniority-based wage system, paternalism and 
company loyalty because they are not compatible with the existing Malaysian management 
system, nor with the country's prevailing culture, values, traditions and religious beliefs. 
Based on this information and from our findings, we might argue that since the majority of 
Malaysian workers are Muslim, ' this could have made it even more difficult to transfer the 
Japanese management techniques mentioned above (each of these and their associated 
problem(s) will be discussed shortly). It could also be suggested that since the majority of 
the respondents in this study are Muslim, and the fact that the present government has 
strongly encouraged Muslim managers to incorporate Islamic values in their firms, it is 
therefore natural for them to make every effort to promote Islamic values when and where 
possible and at the same time, implement only the elements of the Japanese management 
techniques that they believe are acceptable to the majority of their workers who are 
Muslim. It could also be argued that even if the respondents are not themselves Muslims, 
elements of the Japanese management techniques that are deemed contrary to Islamic 
religion would be avoided as the majority of workers who are of Bumiputra origin practise 
the Islamic faith. Hence, it can be inferred that certain aspects of culture and religion seem 
to play an important role in determining which elements of the Japanese management 
techniques are transferable and which are not transferable to manufacturing firms in 
Malaysia. 
Below, we present a brief discussion on certain elements of the Japanese management 
techniques, including lifetime employment, seniority-based wage system, paternalism, 
6 Labour Department Malaysia - Statistical data, 1997. 
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company loyalty and quality control circles, and the problem(s) associated with each of 
them. 
Lifetime Employment 
We have learnt from earlier studies that lifetime employment in Japan is developed to 
encourage a worker to stay where he or she is trained, thus, ensuring that a company's 
investment in training a worker will not be lost or wasted. The company could feel secure 
in the knowledge that workers trained at its expense will remain to repay these investment 
costs (Alston, 1986). In this study, however, the interviewees argue that the average 
Malaysian worker prefers a high salary and quick promotion to the job security offered by 
a lifetime employment system. They also state that many good, skilled employees left 
their companies for more highly paid jobs after acquiring the necessary skills. In fact, one 
respondent stated: "Since many of our skilled employees left our company for a better 
salary, this makes lifetime employment unrealistic and wastes the company's investment in 
training employees. " In Japan, however, it is argued that many large organisations do, in 
fact, operate the system or, in other words, the reason for the success of lifetime 
employment in Japan is because of widespread adoption, and because of this, a worker who 
leaves his or her company has to settle for a job with a lower salary and status and possibly 
in a smaller company (Alston, 1986). 
In contrast, as each individual company in Malaysia has its own system, a skilled worker 
will normally obtain a better job with a higher salary and better fringe benefits on leaving 
his or her company. This might suggest that it can be difficult for an individual company 
in Malaysia to implement the Japanese management systems, and particularly the lifetime 
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employment system unless other companies do the same. Moreover, with the present 
performance-based reward system in Malaysia, indigenous workers are less likely to see 
how lifetime employment will benefit them. On the other hand, it can be maintained that it 
would be expensive for an employer to retain a so-called "unproductive" worker under the 
lifetime employment system (a recent local newspaper reports that there is strong evidence 
to show that the Malaysian employment system is based on principles of "hiring and 
firing"). ' Thus, it can be concluded that as long as the government fails to address this 
issue (hiring and firing) and as long as there is no development of the kind of structural 
factors similar to those in Japan, for instance, reward systems that sustain lifetime 
employment or other Japanese management techniques that the government hopes to 
transfer to Malaysia, it will be difficult for the government to see its LEP achieve any 
significant success in this area. 
Seniority-based Wage System 
We have learnt from Chapter 2 that under the seniority-based wage system that is being 
practised in Japan, the remuneration of a worker is determined primarily on the basis of the 
number of years he has spent with the company, subject to age and level of education at the 
time of entry. However, according to a number of respondents that we have talked to, the 
average Malaysian worker would not work hard if remuneration and promotion were to be 
based on seniority. This suggests that this feature of the Japanese management techniques 
would not be very popular in Malaysia (most of the respondents interviewed claimed that 
remuneration and promotion in their firms are based on performance). But even if there 
are firms that have adopted this technique, it is possible that they have faced some 
' Berita Harian Online, 13`h July 1998. 
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difficulties. In fact, of the 69 respondents that participated in our survey, more than 60% 
would not recommend a seniority-based wage system as they perceive that it could be very 
difficult to transfer to Malaysia where the current practice is based on performance and 
merits. 
Paternalism 
The paternalistic treatment given to employees by managers in Japan has its origin in the 
feudal master-servant relationship. Although the modern Japanese State is a self-sufficient 
feudalistic society, some roots still remain from the distant past (Adams and Kobayashi, 
1969). It is common for a Japanese manager to feel obliged to know every employee's 
name, to greet him or her every morning, and to protect him or her. In return, the 
employee is expected to respect his or her manager, work hard for him, and give him his or 
her complete loyalty. The information gathered from the interviews, however, reveals that 
this feature is not well accepted by the majority of Malaysian workers because it is 
believed that they have nothing to gain from being loyal to their employer. In fact, one 
respondent explains: "It is difficult for us as management to ask our workers to be loyal to 
our company because if it is found that a worker has tried to be loyal and do his or her best 
to please his or her manager his or her colleagues will dub him or her as playing a `dirty 
game' "" - 
Another respondent that we talked to stated: "Although we believe that paternalism 
requires that managers or supervisors should socialise, since the majority of our workers 
are Muslim, it is very difficult to encourage them to socialise because the majority of them 
do not mix work with family life. " In fact, in some states in Malaysia, for example, 
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Kelantan and Trengganu there are office rules that forbid Muslim men and women from 
sharing canteen facilities, and in most premises, such as banks and post-offices, there are 
different queues for men and women. This suggests that the working environment that 
exists in some states in Malaysia is totally different when compared to that in Japan. In 
this kind of working environment, where the majority of workers do not mix work with 
family life and where men and women are not encouraged to socialise, it would be difficult 
to envisage a higher degree of job involvement between supervisor and workers in and 
after work being successfully implemented in Malaysia. 
Company Lo aýlty_ 
As mentioned earlier, in Japan, company loyalty requires an employee to work for the firm 
for a lifetime, and his or her priority is his or her company rather than his or her family. In 
return for his or her loyalty, the company will provide Prim or her with good fringe benefits, 
it will guarantee his or her promotion to a senior post after he or she has served the 
company for some time and it will look after his or her family. However, despite the 
Malaysian government's drive to promote diligence and discipline in the work place, 
loyalty to the business enterprise where the worker is employed, and to emphasise priority 
to group over individual interests, etc., our findings suggest that company loyalty is a 
difficult concept to try to advance in Malaysia. This could be due to the fact that the 
majority of Malaysians are believed to be self-centred and individualistic, and are said to 
value job-mobility. 
In addition, as the majority of Malaysian workers are Bumiputra and of the Islamic faith, it 
might be argued that as Muslims, their family comes first, rather than their company. 
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Therefore, it might be argued that to introduce company loyalty among Malaysian workers, 
the majority of whom are Muslim, could be very difficult. Moreover, in Malaysia, 
remaining in the same job for a long time can be perceived as the result of an employee's 
inefficiency or incapability. It might be argued, therefore, that pledging one's loyalty to a 
single company for life is inconceivable for most Malaysian workers, as no one wants to 
lose face by being labelled an inefficient employee. It is also possible that he or she would 
rather resign or apply for another position in different company than be seen as inefficient 
or lazy. This is consistent with our respondents' view that the LEP has not been very 
successful in changing workers' attitudes in terms of loyalty and hard work based on the 
Japanese philosophy. For example, of the 69 respondents that participated in the survey, 
29 or 42% did not agree that the LEP has resulted in changes in attitudes and behaviour in 
terms of loyalty and hard work among their workers, while 26 or 37.7% stated that they 
neither agree nor disagree compared to 14 or 20.3% of respondents who indicated that the 
LEP has been responsible for changing the attitude and behaviour of their workers in this 
respect. 
Quality Control Circles 
As discussed in Japan, since most raw materials are imported and paid for by hard-earned 
exports, the Japanese cannot afford to waste these imported resources. It is therefore 
necessary for every worker to ensure quality by having each operator him/herself inspect 
the output and devise methods for preventing errors. Hence, QCCs are implemented, 
where every circle member is required to apply his or her creativity and experience to solve 
common problems. Because QCCs have to be carried out together with their peers, this 
directly provides an opportunity for socialising in a constructive way (Ishikawa, 1990). 
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Our findings reveal that of the 69 respondents who participated in the survey, 32 stated that 
their firms have QCC activities. However, at this point we cannot statistically prove how 
successful they have been with their QCCs and to assess this, further research needs to be 
conducted. Nevertheless, what is clear is that, according to some respondents that we have 
interviewed, a number of problems have been encountered while implementing QCCs (see 
the discussion below for details of some of these problems). 
One of the barriers to the implementation of QCCs, as mentioned earlier, is that unlike the 
Japanese, the majority of Malaysian workers tend to be more self-centred and 
individualistic and it could be these characteristics that have influenced the interview's 
respondents to reply this way (see below) when they were asked to describe some of the 
problems they had faced when introducing QCCs. 
"Since we normally have QCC activities after office hours, we have attendance problems 
because most of our workers decline to participate in it as they would prefer to go straight 
back home to their families or do other activities that are more economically beneficial to 
them. " 
The fact that more than 60% of the 32 respondents' indicated that they believed their 
workers are not keen to participate in QCC activities suggests that many Malaysian 
workers give priority to their family, or do something that earns them an income, rather 
than staying late in the office and participating in unpaid company activities such as QCCs. 
In fact, our findings seem to concur with the findings of Smith (1994) who suggests that 
$ Respondents that have indicated that they have implemented the JMM including QCC. 
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most Malaysian workers are less enthusiastic to participate in QCC activities as they have 
little to gain in monetary terms. According to Smith (1994), he or she can make more 
money by leaving work at the end of the shift, for instance, to help a relative run a small 
street stall, instead of participating in unpaid QCC activities after office hours. 
Although it is found that QCCs are overwhelmingly recommended by our respondents, it 
could be argued here that because of the failure of many Malaysian workers to voluntarily 
involve themselves in QCC activities, this has not only eliminated the advantages offered 
by QCCs, but has also undermined the Look East Policy's campaign for "quality" 
employees. 
9.2.3.2 Impact of Western-educated Managers 
Besides the differences in culture, tradition, religious beliefs and management systems, the 
impact of Western-educated managers is also believed to have posed problems to the 
implementation of certain Japanese management techniques. For example, out of 32 
respondents who said they have implemented Japanese management techniques, 20% 
stated that they have faced problems because of the impact of Western-educated managers. 
It is important to note that although this is not a very high percentage, its impact is quite 
significant. This is because, according to our questionnaire survey, attempts to introduce 
techniques, such as in-house unions, the ringgi system and open-office system (each of 
these will be discussed shortly) often fail as a result of a resistance from Western-educated 
managers. This suggests that the impact of Western influence may still be very strong 
among some respondents in this study. This could be due to their educational background, 
whereby out of 48 respondents who indicated they have degree, 48% said they were 
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educated at Western institutions compared to only 8.3% who mentioned they were 
educated in Japan or South Korea. 
Hence, it might be argued that because their earlier education and subsequent training are 
based on a Western curriculum, the majority of the respondents cannot easily accept 
Japanese management techniques, such as in-house unions, the ringgi system and open- 
office systems even though they are being formally instructed by the Malaysian 
government via the Look East Policy to do things "the Japanese way". 
Moreover, even if the respondents choose to adopt some elements of the Japanese 
management techniques, they are in fact indirectly looking to the West. This is because 
even before the government of Malaysia decided to take a strong lead to Japanise, some 
companies in the West had actually adopted management ideas from Japan - albeit a 
slightly weaker version of Japanisation (see Chapter 3). In fact, Jomo (1994: 4) was right 
in saying, "In geographical terms, the very idea of `Looking East' is necessarily defined 
from a Western perspective. In this sense then, `Looking East' during this historical 
conjuncture has ironically become quite fashionably Western. " 
Below is a brief discussion on in-house unions, the ringgi system and open-office systems, 
and the problem(s) associated with each of them. 
In-house Unions 
Despite the government's Look East Policy, which encourages the recognition of in-house 
unions (Smith, 1994), it might be argued that because of the strong impact of Western 
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influence, out of 23 respondents who indicated that they recognised trade union, only 
43.5% stated that they have chosen to recognise in-house unions. Even then, according to 
some respondents that we have interviewed, a number of problems have been encountered 
while implementing in-house union. One respondent claims that the formation of such a 
union in his firm has been strongly opposed by certain quarters in industrial relations as 
they fear that the workers will be exploited by an unscrupulous employer. Some other 
respondents also claim that the industrial scene in Malaysia is still pro-British and therefore 
it is difficult to introduce in-house union. Thus, based on the above claims, it might be 
argued that the effort by the British could have continued to exert a profound and direct 
influence on trade unionism in Malaysia, where most workers have chosen to recognise 
industry-wide union. This might suggest that the government has also failed to recognise 
the extent of the British influence. It could also be suggested until the "Western mentality" 
among Malaysians is "wiped out" completely, it is unlikely that the LEP will be successful 
in its endeavours to promote work attitudes and discipline based on the Japanese 
philosophy. 
The Ringo System (Consensus Decision Making) 
Japanese management values highly the spirit of harmony for goal achievement. The 
Japanese method of reaching decisions is designed to avoid pinpointing responsibility for 
mistakes (Matsuda and Morohoshi, 1973-74). In the ringgi system, consensus is stressed 
as the way of making decisions, while close attention is paid to the personal well-being of 
employees (Sethi et al., 1984; Yoshino, 1979). A number of respondents that we talked to 
said: "The more capable Malaysian worker prefers to be given the authority to make 
decisions instead of following the Japanese way of decision-making by consensus. " This 
431 
could explain why a number of our respondents claim that this feature of the Japanese 
management system is not popular, particularly among Western-educated Malaysian 
workers as well as managers. 
Thus, despite the government's efforts to narrow differentials and gaps between executives 
and workers through consensus building (the ringgi system), it seems that attempts to 
adopt this system by 9.4% of the respondents' have been accompanied by a number of 
problems. Our findings reveal that problems arise not only because the social and cultural 
environment in Malaysia is not conducive towards the application of this system, but also 
because of the impact of Western influence. For example, some respondents explain it this 
way: "Since the majority of our top management are Western trained or have been working 
for Western companies before, they are more comfortable making decisions alone, rather 
than through consensus. " 
Indeed, our findings concur with those of Abdullah (1995) who suggests that since the 
majority of top management in Malaysia have been educated in Western institutions, like 
most Western managers they prefer to make decisions alone. Because of that, the ringgi 
system is, in fact, not being practised among most Malaysian companies whose top 
management are Western-trained. 
Our findings also agree with those of Thong and Jain (1988), who report that the Malaysian 
companies in their study have not adopted the ringgi system, but it has been adopted by the 
Japanese subsidiary companies in Malaysia. However, the application is not as elaborate 
9 Out of 32 respondents that have implemented Japanese management practices only 9.4% have adopted 
ringgi system. 
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as that practised in the parent company in Japan because of the incompatible social and 
cultural environment in Malaysia, which still has a strong Western influence. 
Open Office System 
Despite the strong government drive to promote open office systems with the intention of 
narrowing the gap between managers and ordinary workers, it is very clear that not many 
respondents in this study have adopted the open-plan office concept, which might suggest 
that most of them are not strongly in favour of such a system. This is shown by the 
feedback from the survey whereby out of 32 respondents who indicated they have 
implemented some elements of the Japanese management techniques, slightly more than 
50% said that they have adopted the open-plan office concept. Even then, an open-plan 
office often means open-plan for only the non-managerial workers. 
Having this concept of an open-plan office also means that managerial staff are isolated 
from non-managerial staff. It could therefore be argued that the government cannot expect 
to narrow the gap between managers and ordinary workers when the managerial staff are 
cut off from non-managerial staff. The findings from the interview also reveal that most of 
the latter have complained to their superiors about the open office system. For example, 
one respondent says: "One of the common complaints we receive from non-managerial 
staff with respect to an open-plan office is that the non-managerial staff often feel 
distracted by their colleagues and by the office noise. " This might suggest that the 
adoption of the concept of an open-office plan by some of our respondents has not only 
failed to narrow the gap between managers and ordinary workers but has also disrupted the 
workers' performance. 
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Our findings are consistent with some earlier studies (Boyce, 1974; Keighley and Parkin, 
1981; Klitzman and Stellman, 1989, Banbury and Berry, 1998) suggesting that an open 
office system brings more problems than it solves because background noise can, in fact, 
disrupt workers' performance. It is clear that many people in Malaysia conceive this as a 
problem probably because of the fact that people are being too individualistic. It could 
then be maintained that by being individualistic there is no element of community among 
them and that could be the reason why they do not like this system. Moreover, since the 
majority of our respondents have been educated in Western institutions or have worked for 
Western companies (as mentioned during the interview) they are more comfortable having 
private offices and the idea of losing such a privilege is unimaginable. The Japanese, on 
the other hand, focus on the community elements of the open office system and therefore 
are willing to not only tolerate it, but, in fact, to see it as a benefit to both individual and 
organisational growth and achievement. 
9.2.3.3 Respondents/Management's Lack of Enthusiasm, and Workers' Preference 
for Existing Management Practices 
The lack of enthusiasm on the part of respondents towards Japanese management 
techniques, and the workers' preference for existing management techniques or practices is 
believed to be another cause of the problems encountered in implementing the JMM. It 
could be argued that the former problem could be due to: (i) the lack of training in Japanese 
management techniques; (ii) the inability of the vast majority of respondents to converse or 
write in the Japanese language; and (iii) their limited exposure to the Japanese culture, as 
indicated by the small number of visits to Japan. The weakness is obvious for only 6% of 
our respondents can speak Japanese; 4% can read and write in Japanese and slightly more 
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than 40% have been to Japan. Of those who have been to Japan, only about 17% were 
there for training purposes. Such a background on the part of our respondents would 
certainly not help to boost their interest in the JMM and certainly would not help much 
towards the realisation of adopting the Japanese management techniques and work ethic. 
As mentioned earlier, of the 42% of the respondents who indicated that they have visited 
Japan, more than one-third or 42% said that they stayed there for more than one week but 
less than a month. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that these respondents would not 
absorb much of the Japanese culture and values in general, and the Japanese management 
techniques in particular, given the type of exposure and short duration of their stay in 
Japan. 
Although some elements of the Japanese management techniques have been introduced in 
our respondents' firms, 12 or 48% of our respondents stated that they have faced problems 
because their workers prefer the existing management practices, which are pro-West (see 
Chapter 8). This could be explained by looking back at the historical development of the 
management system in Malaysia. History tells us that it is the by-product of four different 
eras; British, American, Japanese, and finally Islamic. Comparing the four different eras, 
the longest was the British and this obviously had a stronger influence on most Malaysians. 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the British influence in Malaya started in 1786. From then on 
administration in Malaysia (during that time known as Malaya and Northern Borneo) was 
based on the British system, and encompassed not only one area but spread to include the 
school curriculum, information networks, academic training, books, architecture, leisure, 
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business culture and consumer culture. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that doing 
things the "British way" is deeply entrenched in most Malaysians' minds because this is 
not just an overnight transformation but the result of 161 years of being told to do things in 
this manner. 
Thus, in one way or another, even after the British had left, their influence is still strongly 
reinforced by local managers who have been educated in British universities. This became 
apparent when, under premiers Tun Abdul Razak and Tun Hussein Onn, large numbers of 
Malaysian students were sent to Western institutions of higher education, and notably to 
the UK. The fact that these two premiers preferred to send students to Western institutions 
was because they themselves were educated at British universities. It therefore follows that 
when these students came back to Malaysia to work as executives and managers in local 
firms, it was natural for them to favour the Western style of management. 
Having said that and looking at our findings from the mail survey questionnaire, it can be 
argued that because of their inclination towards the Western management style coupled 
with their other experiences, the majority of our respondents, i. e. 37 out 69, indicated that 
they have not implemented any elements of the Japanese management techniques in their 
firms. 
Based on the evidence presented above, one might ask how the government via its Look 
East Policy could expect to see a great deal of success in its transformation of the 
management system in Malaysia overnight when it is so difficult to change the hearts and 
minds of people who have been influenced by the West, and particularly the British, for 
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161 years. Our findings, to some extent, have provided evidence that it is indeed difficult, 
but not impossible, to encourage management in Malaysia in general and in this study in 
particular, to adopt the Japanese management techniques and work ethic, partly because of 
the strong influence of the West, and the British in particular. 
9.2.3.4 Lack of Commitment from Top Management 
It is revealed that the majority of the respondents we interviewed thought that top 
management (including themselves) lack commitment in terms of adopting Japanese 
management techniques, despite being told by the government via the Look East Policy to 
do so. The important question here is why is top management not committed to adopting 
certain elements of the Japanese management techniques? There are a number of possible 
explanations for this. One is that top management do not believe that the Look East Policy 
is intended purely for the purpose of promoting Japanese management techniques. This is 
shown by the fact that out of the 69 respondents who participated in the survey, 56.6% 
stated that the Look East Policy is just a "window-dressing" policy compared to 26.1% 
who said that it is the kind of policy they need. Even then, there is no statistical evidence 
to support the notion that the Look East Policy has been very successful in encouraging our 
respondents to adopt Japanese management techniques because there is no association 
between the respondents' knowledge of the Look East Policy and their firms implementing 
Japanese management techniques as revealed by the chi-square test (see Chapter 8, Section 
8.11.1) r 
The other possible explanation could be the fact that the majority of top management are 
Chinese. The survey findings show that of the 69 respondents who participated in the 
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survey, 33 or 47.8% are Chinese. Thus, it might be argued that being Chinese they are less 
committed to the government policy which they think is not beneficial to them. It is 
important to note that this does not imply that the Chinese are against the government's 
policy, but the truth of the matter can be traced back to shortly after the launch of the Look 
East Policy. A study by Lim (1984) reports that since the LEP has encouraged Japanese 
investors to co-operate with the Bumiputras in the implementation of the New Economic 
Policy, this has altered the existing structure of ownership and control of certain sectors of 
the Malaysian economy. For instance, in the construction sector, large construction 
companies that were being overwhelmingly controlled by Chinese have been rapidly taken 
over by the Japanese. Therefore, it is understandable that the Chinese community does not 
support the Look East Policy (Lim, 1984). 
Besides the four main causes of the problems encountered in the implementation of the 
JMM mentioned above, this study also reports other problems that we believe could have 
made it more difficult to promote or transfer some elements of the Japanese management 
techniques to Malaysia, and particularly to manufacturing firms in this study, despite the 
government's drive in this direction. These include the fact that Malaysia and Japan are at 
different stages of technological development. In addition, trade unions in many firms do 
not favour certain elements of the Japanese management techniques. Moreover, the 
unwillingness of the Japanese to assist their Malaysian counterparts in the process of 
transferring/implementing the Japanese management techniques constitutes another barrier. 
Finally, some elements of the Japanese management techniques are perceived as bringing 
more problems than benefits to the respondents' firms (see Chapter 8, Table 8.24). 
438 
Thus, to this point we might argue that despite the strong "push" from a powerful 
government to encourage management in Malaysia, particularly in manufacturing firms in 
this study, to adopt Japanese management techniques, it is clear that the Look East Policy 
has not been very successful. This perception of its lack of achievement is reinforced by 
the fact that of the 69 respondents who participated in the survey, only 2 or 2.9% stated 
that strict enforcement of the Look East Policy is one of the best ways to ensure that the 
Japanese management techniques will be successfully transferred to firms in Malaysia. 
Even then, the results of the chi-square test show that there is no association between the 
respondents' knowledge of the Look East Policy and their firms implementing the Japanese 
model of management - suggesting that the Look East Policy has had no direct influence 
on our respondents to adopt Japanese management techniques. 
The following discussion is intended to assess in more detail the impact or effectiveness of 
the Look East Policy in encouraging management in Malaysia in general, and in this study 
in particular, to adopt the Japanese management techniques and work ethic. 
9.3 The Look East Policy - How Effective it is? 
Following the above discussion, our main objective in this section is to examine the impact 
or effectiveness of the Look East Policy in more detail in terms of encouraging 
management in Malaysia, and particularly in manufacturing firms in this study, to adopt 
the Japanese management techniques and work ethic. In order to do so, we will discuss 
some of the "weapons" that the Malaysian government have used and assess whether these 
weapons are effective or not. Towards the end of this section, we will look at the area(s) to 
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which the Malaysian government should pay attention if the "weapons" they use or if the 
Look East Policy are not effective in achieving its objective. 
As pointed out, the Malaysian government arguably has displayed strong initiative in 
attempting to enforce its policy, and this has manifested in a number of ways. For 
example, the government has taken a very strong lead in economic development and there 
is a much more co-operative feel about it than in many Western nations, for example, 
Britain, America, Germany, etc. When we look at these nations, it appears that to some 
extent their development is the result of companies "looking East" themselves and picking 
up management ideas, to another extent it has been a result of emulation. While 
government encouragement can be seen to have played a role, it has not in any way had as 
strong a role in the economy, particularly in promoting new management ideas, as it has in 
Malaysia. This is partly because of the relative political situations and also because of the 
differences in stages of economic development. But, as mentioned, in the case of 
Malaysia, the policy has been reinforced by a powerful government that took a number of 
measures to ensure that its policy would work, such as employ the use of certain 
"weapons". The following discussion looks at some of these "weapons" and assesses 
whether or not these "weapons" have been effective. 
The first of these "weapons" has taken the form of a nation-wide campaign, which has 
been used to promote the Japanese management techniques and work ethic. In this 
campaign, Mahathir himself has made several important speeches related to the Look East 
Policy. In these speeches, which are usually broadcasted through mass media (television 
and newspapers), Mahathir emphasises East Asian values, and in particular the Japanese 
440 
values, and has called upon all Malaysians to adopt the Japanese management techniques 
and work ethic. Although, on the one hand, Mahathir has been effective in terms of 
promoting his "punch-card" ideas (see discussion in Chapter 5), on the other hand, he has 
failed to assure Malaysians workers that they would have a reward system similar to the 
Japanese. Not surprisingly, one consequence of his LEP has been the stimulation of a 
variety of critiques in Malaysia. 
Some criticise the notion of hard work. For example, Muzaffar (1983) argues that "hard 
work is not everything. Neither is discipline, nor is efficiency. It is wrong to suggest that 
hard work is a cure-all, a panacea, for all our ills. No nation will be able to resolve all its 
economic problems through hard work and discipline alone. This is why it is fallacious to 
argue that Japan's economic prosperity is due entirely to the hard work and discipline of its 
people. It follows that by emulating Japanese work ethics, we will not be able to guarantee 
the success of our nation. " 
Others raise somewhat narrower but nonetheless fundamental issues, such as, "more hard- 
working in whose interest? "" With respect to values and behavioural changes, it has been 
asked whether or not the Bumiputra will or should be willing and able to behave more like 
the Japanese and Koreans, or subject themselves to the kind of industrial discipline that 
South Koreans have had to in recent years (Machado, 1987). Some British-educated 
politicians in Mahathir's government (as quoted in Jomo, 1994) also ask "why are Islamic 
values not emphasised instead of East Asian ones, even though Mahathir has consistently 
stressed the connections between discipline, industriousness, and Islamic values? " 
"Tan Chee Beng (1983) "Work Productivity and Ethics", Aliran, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 23. 
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According to Machando (1987), "such criticism takes place within narrow confines in 
Malaysia. Nevertheless, dislocating consequences of economic policies said to be inspired 
by the Japanese `model' might, at some point, provoke sharper protests, perhaps cast in 
Islamic terms. " 
The above accounts suggest that the way in which the first "weapon" has been used by 
Mahathir is indeed not entirely effective in changing the attitudes of the people, nor does it 
encourage management in Malaysia to adopt the Japanese management techniques and 
work ethic. Instead, Mahathir has surrounded himself with criticisms from both 
academicians and British-educated politicians in his government. 
The second "weapon" takes the form of a policy to send people to Japan. We have learnt 
from the literature on the Look East Policy that only Malays have been sent to Japan for 
training. For example, according to one report, " the Malaysian government sent 135 
Malay technical trainees to Japan in September 1982, followed by 238 more in April 1983. 
It is also reported that the majority of these trainees were from government agencies. From 
the information given in this report and a number of others, it is reasonable to suggest that 
the Look East Policy is racially motivated where higher priority is given to the Malays, 
while the Chinese, Indian, and other indigenous groups from the states of Sarawak and 
Sabah, which include Bidayuh, Iban, Kelabit, Kayan, Kadazan, etc., are not given equal 
chance to go for training in Japan (see Lim, 1984). 
" Perbadanan Persatuan Jepun/Malaysia, April 1983. 
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Based on the above accounts, the way in which the second "weapon" has been used by 
Mahathir also seems to be ineffective for a number of reasons: (i) it seems that the Look 
East Policy contains racial sentiments, which might make non-Malays, particularly the 
Chinese, less enthusiastic towards the policy. Since the Chinese are particularly important 
in the business community, their resistance to the LEP could be a significant problem if the 
government tries to influence the business community by excluding non-Malays, and in 
particular the Chinese; (ii) the duration of training in Japan is normally very short, i. e., 
between one week and a few months (see Chapter 8). It is highly likely that this is not 
enough time to provide the trainees with sufficient exposure to Japanese culture and 
managerial practices. This could present problems if the government try to persuade these 
trainees to adopt Japanese management techniques when they (the trainees) are not ready to 
do so because of their limited knowledge of both- Japanese culture and managerial 
practices; (iii) most trainees have no prior knowledge of the Japanese language and this 
could make it difficult for them to communicate effectively with their Japanese 
counterparts; (iv) courses undertaken by the trainees are normally related to the general 
background of Japan rather than to specific management techniques (Jomo, 1983); (v) most 
of the trainees are from government agencies rather than from the private sector (Lim, 
1984). Moreover, according to Lim, being the government employees, there is little 
initiative on their part to implement Japanese management techniques; and (vi) most 
importantly, Malaysia's businesses and people in general have already been strongly 
influenced by the West, which could make it difficult for Malaysia to follow effectively the 
Japanese model of management (Jomo, 1994). 
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Thus, based on the above arguments it is understandable that it would be difficult to 
persuade/influence the Malaysians, and particularly the non-Malays, to believe that they 
should change their approach and adopt the Japanese approach instead. In fact, from the 
above discussion it can clearly be argued that it is a difficult task to perform because 
people's views vary according to the educational background and other experiences 
derived from exposure to Western approaches. Therefore, perhaps the only area in which 
the policy works is actually where management itself is "looking West" and adopting the 
Japanese techniques that are already being practised by Western companies. Even then, the 
techniques that management decides to adopt are only the minor or low-cost ones, as they 
could be implemented piecemeal and have to be further modified to suit Malaysian cultural 
settings. 
The third and last "weapon" that the government has used is its encouragement of Japanese 
companies to invest in Malaysia. As already discussed in Chapter 5, the Malaysian 
government's attitude towards Japanese investment became more indulgent with 
Mahathir's Look East Policy. As a result, Japanese investment in Malaysia increased in 
larger numbers than ever seen before (see Chapter 5). The government has argued that by 
encouraging the Japanese to invest in Malaysia, they would transfer their management 
techniques and technology, and at the same time, would reduce regional differences and 
locational poverty in Malaysia. However, a more detailed examination of Japanese 
investment in Malaysia in the 1980s indicates that the Japanese interests lie in wood and 
wood products and in basic metal products (Saravanamuttu, 1983). According to the same 
author, this shows that in the former case they are interested not in transferring their 
management techniques and technology but in taking advantage of Malaysia's abundant 
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timber resources, while in the latter case it shows that their intention is to shift a highly 
polluting steel industry from Japan to Malaysia. 
On the other hand, a detailed examination of Japanese investment locations in Malaysia 
further indicates that most companies are established in free trade zones (FTZs) and 
industrial estates, such as Penang and Selangor, where well-developed infrastructures 
already exist (Saravanamuttu, 1983). Since Japanese enterprises are concentrated in the 
industrialised areas they could have spread their management ideas, but our findings show 
that they have not done so. Thus, based on the above-accounts it can be claimed that the 
use of this "weapon" has had little effect for the following reasons: 
1. It is believed that the Japanese firms in Malaysia are involved in purely profit-seeking 
activities rather than transferring their management techniques/expertise and 
technology and this could be one of the reasons why, according to Lim (1984) 
"Japanese `over presence' in Malaysia has long been criticised by the various local 
communities. This has created several economic trade frictions between the two 
parties, i. e. the Malaysian and Japanese. For instance, at the end of April 1983, about 
two weeks before the Japanese Premier Nakasone (former Premier) visited Malaysia, 
the mass media in Malaysia criticised Japanese commercial practices and business 
behaviour in the country" (p. 235). According to the Straits Times (as quoted in Lim, 
1984), "since the start of the Look East Policy, Japanese companies had won over RM3 
billion worth of contracts in Malaysia but Malaysian had gained `practically nothing' in 
terms of invisible trade with Japanese contractors. All shipping, insurance, and other 
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invisibles were exclusively handled by the Japanese companies themselves, shutting 
out the opportunities for local companies. " 
2. Although the Japanese are very good at learning from others, some authors argue that 
they are not as good at introducing their own experiences to others. For example, Lim 
(1984) points out that Japan does not have the social equipment or a policy to transfer 
knowledge and technology to other countries. Hence, some Japanese academicians (as 
quoted in Lim, 1984) have expressed that "There are some serious impediments in the 
implementation of the Look East Policy. In theory, it is possible for Malaysia to learn 
from Japan; in practice, however, it is necessary for Malaysia to look into social costs 
incurred by Japan in its industrialisation and modernisation process. " According to 
Lim (1984), "the Japanese academicians also warned that the distortions emerging from 
the Japanese economic development process, for instance, environmental pollution, the 
neglect of human aspects in factories, housing shortages, and capitalistic expansion, 
must particularly be avoided if Malaysia wants to learn from Japanese experience. " 
Besides the ineffectiveness with which the "weapons" discussed above have been used, 
there are other reasons to qualify the opinion that the Look East Policy is not very 
effective. The first reason that can be used to substantiate our argument is the fact that the 
LEP has been used not only to accomplish the New Economic Policy (NEP) goal, but also 
as a tactic to stabilise the Mahathir administration during the general election of March 
1982 (Lim, 1984). In fact, when the respondents were asked to give their opinions of the 
Look East Policy, the majority of them stated that it is politically-motivated. This is 
supported by the fact that Mahathir launched the Look East Policy in 1982, when he was 
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fighting for the most powerful post during the general election of that year, which implies 
that a policy of this magnitude was of great importance to him and his party. 
Moreover, according to some critics (for instance, Jomo, 1994), being a so-called Malay 
nationalist, Mahathir has always tried to improve the Bumiputras' discipline and work 
ethic in order to narrow the economic gaps between the Malays and other races in 
Malaysia. Although in principle this seems quite noble to the Malays, it is also clear that 
the Look East Policy has racial objectives. 
Because of the fact that the policy is closely related to a pro-Bumiputra policy, some critics 
argue that this makes it unlikely that full co-operation will be gained from the Malaysian 
Chinese (Muzaffar, 1983; Lim, 1984; Jomo, 1994). It is further argued that other non- 
Muslims in Malaysia are less enthusiastic towards the policy as Mahathir has concentrated 
most of his efforts in combining the Look East Policy with Islamic doctrine (Soong, 1983). 
In addition, because of the religious sentiments, it is said that Malaysians of different 
religious beliefs are also quite sceptical towards the Look East Policy since the mass media 
further reported that the implementation of the policy is expected to strengthen Islamic 
ideology in Malaysia (see Muzaffar, 1983). 
The second and last reason for the ineffectiveness of the LEP is perhaps due to the fact that 
some people believe that it is "short-lived", even though there has been no official 
statement from the Mahathir administration that has officially ended the policy. However, 
the fact that Mahathir has made the Islamic policy the dominant policy barely five years 
after introducing the LEP might suggest that the original objective of the LEP is perhaps 
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not economic but political. This could explain why Mahathir drastically changed the Look 
East Policy's direction following the Japanese government's refusal to give Malaysia 
Airlines System Berhad (MAS)-Northwest Airlines joint flight-service traffic rights 
through Tokyo's Narita Airport (Jomo, 1994). Subsequent to this disagreement, in 
Mahathir's 1984 speech, "The Second Opening of Japan" which was delivered by his 
cabinet colleague, Tunku Razaleigh Hamzah -a different, critical and almost threatening 
tone emerged (Jomo, 1994). Bartu (1992: 63) claims that this 1984 speech marked the end 
of Mahathir's infatuation with Japan. 
From the above discussion it can be inferred that the Look East Policy seems not only 
ineffective but also, ultimately, unrealistic due to Malaysia being a heterogeneous society 
and Japan, a homogenous one. In fact, when the interview's respondents were asked for 
their opinion with respect to the effectiveness of the Look East Policy, their responses 
included the following: 
"The Look East Policy is not effective and it does not work anymore, now people are 
looking back to the West. " 
"The Look East Policy is not very effective, and in fact, it is very difficult to sustain in our 
culture. " 
"How could the Look East Policy be effective when the cultural backgrounds of a lot of 
Malaysian workers are not geared towards industrialisation. In fact, most of them are more 
suited to an agricultural sector. The Japanese model that the Look East Policy tries to 
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introduce might be good, but it will take time, and to transfer it completely will really be 
not only a disaster but will scare away a lot of local workers who already have problems 
coming to work daily. " 
In addition, it is also important to remember that, as described, Malaysia and Japan are 
totally different in culture, social values and historical background, and this will 
undoubtedly create serious impediments for Malaysia to "Look East". As discussed earlier 
in this chapter, the ways in which the "weapons" have been used by Mahathir also seem to 
have had their limitations. This might be due to the fact that: (i) although the policy aims 
at upgrading work ethic and improving skills, only the Malays seem to have been 
purposely mobilised (in terms of sending Malaysian students and trainees to Japan)"; and 
(ii) the government has tried to achieve significant results but in a short time (i. e., less then 
five years after introducing the Look East Policy, the government introduced the Islamic 
Policy). In fact, it could be maintained that in order for the government to achieve some 
success it would require more time, for example, at least 10 to 20 years or perhaps longer, 
just to change the attitudes and behaviour of the Malaysians, especially when they have 
been heavily influenced by the British for over 100 years. 
What is apparent, however, is that Malaysia's efforts to learn from Japan through the 
introduction of technology, managerial systems, work ethic and economic development 
experiences - is, in fact, a painstaking task which needs years to formulate and implement 
before some success can be achieved. Presently, it appears that economic co-operation in 
trade and investment has received the most attention in Malaysian-Japanese relations, 
"The Malaysian government started sending 135 Malay technical trainees to Japan in September 1982 and 
238 in April 1983 (Malaysia, no. 38[Tokyo: Perbadanan Persatuan Jepun/Malaysia, April 1983]). 
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while cultural exchange seems to have been of less significance or given inadequate 
attention. 
Generally, although cultural exchange does not directly contribute to economic co- 
operation, it does form a necessary basis for the deeper understanding of the Japanese 
systems and also of a nation's overall developmental achievements. Because of that, 
perhaps it is essential for the government of Malaysia to have a thorough appreciation of 
the Japanese social and cultural values, institutions and practices, at a time when Malaysia 
is attempting to learn from Japanese business and economic performance. 
As it has been argued that the LEP is not been very effective, the important question here is 
to which area should the government pay attention? Based on what we have learnt from 
the literature on the Look East Policy and our findings, it is suggested that if the Malaysian 
government wanted to do this again, it would have to concentrate on a number of areas that 
seem to have been overlooked. For example, the government has to take into account the 
importance of why and how the Japanese management system links itself to the Japanese 
social and cultural values, institutions, practices and most importantly, history. Although it 
might be argued that the understanding of these would not guarantee the success of the 
Look East Policy, they could become important principles in order to prevent the blind 
emulation of Japanese management practices. For example, by understanding Japanese 
history, perhaps, the Malaysian government would realise that Japan is one of the very few 
Asian countries that has remained free from colonial rule. 
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Following this the Malaysian government would be able to make the sensible inference 
that because Japan has stayed free from colonial powers, they have been able to achieve 
goals that Malaysia could not. For example, they could utilise traditional economic skills 
and activities which are expressed through a whole network of small and medium-sized 
industries that have helped to launch its industrialisation programme. Moreover, because 
its cultural base is almost intact, traditional values of co-operation and group solidarity 
could provide a framework for its modernisation. However, unlike Japan, Malaysia has 
been colonised for over 100 years, and such a long period of colonisation could possibly 
de-stabilise its cultural base, making people become more westernised, self-centred and 
individualistic. 
Because of being influenced by Western views and culture, it is reasonable to argue that it 
would not be possible for the Look East Policy to influence the mentality of the people 
overnight, but some success could be achieved, particularly in altering the attitudes of the 
Malaysians, if only the Look East Policy were longer-term (say about 20 years or more) 
and emphasised a cultural theme as opposed to being just a political rhetoric. 
The next thing that we believe the government should focus on is to reduce the racial and 
political motivations underpinning the policy. It is believed that if the policy were racially 
inclined it could win greater support from the non-Malays, and particularly from the 
Chinese. In that sense then, the government should try to mobilise other races in terms of 
sending them to Japan for training. It might also be argued that by doing so, the 
government could easily win the support of most Malaysians, and particularly the Chinese, 
the majority of whom dominate the business or private sector. 
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The other important thing that we believe the present government should approach more 
seriously is an understanding of local management culture and systems. In fact, this was 
what the Japanese did, i. e. they learned and understood as much as possible about their 
own culture and systems before copying ideas from the West, although this did lead to a 
longer and more painstaking process than Malaysia experienced. 
Last but not least, we also believe that the government should consciously put more effort 
into the development of local human resources. Japanese success in the nineteenth century 
can be partly attributed to the fact that they chose consciously to develop through their own 
human resources, with appropriate knowledge and technology from outside13 but without 
foreign investments, aid and consultants (see Muzaffar, 1983). Moreover, at present some 
Japanese factories and even the bureaucracy provide security of tenure to their workers, 
and this reflects the dedication and discipline of their-leaders (managers and politicians). 
Besides that, most occupations in Japanese firms carry with them a variety of material 
incentives, including paid holidays for productive workers. Needless to say, Japanese 
workers are relatively well-paid compared to Malaysian workers (Muzaffar, 1983). All 
this shows that there are some connections between Japanese management techniques, 
working conditions and work ethic. Hence, it is argued here that no one - not even a 
Japanese would be prepared to work hard for a long period of time unless he or she is given 
material and non-material rewards which can satisfy him or her to some extent, and which 
will make his or her work more gratifying. 
" Mainly Western technology. 
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Based on the above discussion, it is argued that if Malaysian leaders had a more balanced 
view of Japan, we believe that they would be able to understand the limitations of the 
Japanese management system, work ethic and hard work as a "cure-all" theory in Malaysia. 
Indeed, if the work ethic/hard work theory is inapplicable in Japan, we also believe that it 
is even more inappropriate for Malaysia. This is because in countries like Malaysia, there 
are large numbers of people who are poor and disadvantaged through no fault of their own. 
It could be argued that no matter how hard they work they will probably remain poor 
because they are being exploited by the social and economic systems in the country. In 
fact, Muzaffar (1983) points out that "a padi farmer or a trishaw-pedlar in the city will not 
be able to alleviate his or her misery by being disciplined and by working twice as hard or 
thrice as long. His poor income is linked to the technological level of our society, 
educational opportunities, the employment pattern, the rate of social mobility and labour- 
capital relationships. The trishaw-pedlar on his own can do very little about any of these 
issues. The resolution of each of them requires a thorough examination of the entire social 
system. " 
Based on the above discussion, we might sum up that they are a number of lessons that the 
government should learn and they are: 
I. The Look East Policy was never properly thought through in terms of the difficulty 
of transferring a system from one culture to a very different one. It is doubtful if 
the policy could ever have worked as such. 
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II. A more limited objective, of learning from the Japanese might have been 
successful. But this would have demanded (a) a long term-commitment; and (b) 
more involvement of Chinese community. 
III. The policy was always partly a political as well as an economic one, thus it can be 
argued that its success should be judged not on a basis of whether it was adopted 
but on whether it achieved its political objectives. 
9.4 Conclusion 
Having discussed and analysed the survey findings we arrived at the following 
conclusions. First, there is no doubt that some Japanese management techniques, 
especially the low-cost ones such as QCCs, TQC, suggestion systems, job rotation, on-the- 
job training, etc., have been transferred to manufacturing firms in this study. But even then 
a number of problems have been encountered in the transplanting process and one of the 
reasons is because some of these practices are incompatible not only with Malaysia's 
present management system but also with the culture, values, traditions and religious 
beliefs found in Malaysia. 
Second, it can be inferred that because of managerial as well as socio-cultural constraints, 
our findings suggest that despite a great deal of effort by the Malaysian government in 
trying to promote or transfer Japanese management techniques, and despite its strong push 
to encourage management and employees in Malaysia to adopt the Japanese work ethic, it 
has not succeeded much more than it has in other countries where there has been less 
government pressure. 
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Thirdly, it can be concluded that the extent to which the Malaysian government can 
promote Japanese management techniques in Malaysia may be limited by the cultural 
differences between Malaysia and Japan; by the strong influence of the West; the 
individualistic tendencies of the people and the lack 6f an element of community among 
them; the workers' preference for existing management practices; and finally, by a lack of 
commitment from top management to support the government campaign. 
Lastly, as a whole, it can be said that the Look East Policy has not been effective because 
not only was it believed to be unsuitable for a heterogeneous society such as Malaysia, but 
also it was because the policy was perceived as racially motivated. Moreover, some 
believe that it was launched more as a political strategy to achieve Mahathir's political 
ambitions than to further economic development in the country. 
The research implications and conclusion are presented in Chapter 10, which also forms 
the final chapter. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
10.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, strands from earlier research are highlighted. Following this, we present a 
summary of the research findings. Next, the research implications and the contribution of 
this thesis are presented. Finally, suggestions for future research are made and the 
conclusion is presented. 
10.2 Strands from Earlier Research 
The purpose of our discussion in this section is to recap what has been discussed in the 
preceding chapters. The literature that was initially reviewed was based on three themes: 
the internationalisation or globalisation of business; culture and cross-cultural 
management; and the role of the state, in this case, whether or not a strong state in 
Malaysia can influence a change in people's attitudes. 
In the first theme, two aspects were analysed. They were the globalisation of business 
and/or as part of that, the spread of management techniques or ideas. When talking about 
globalisation, a number of commentators (for instance, Hirst and Thompson, 1996) suggest 
that it has become a fashionable concept in the social sciences, a core dictum in the 
prescriptions of management gurus, as well as a catch phrase for journalists and politicians 
of every stripe. It is widely asserted that we live in an era in which the greater part of 
social life is determined by global processes, in which national cultures, economies and 
borders are dissolving (see Frenkel and Peetz, 1998). 
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As already mentioned in Chapter 3, the globalisation of business was not a new 
phenomenon. In fact, the history of the globalisation of business is a long one and not 
something confined just to the period since 1960 (Hirst and Thompson, 1996). The same 
authors claim that although trading activities dated from the earliest civilisations, it was the 
European Middle Ages that saw the initiation of systematic, cross-border trading 
operations carried out by institutions of a private corporate nature, though often with strong 
state backing and support. 
Having said this, the important question here is why do businesses globalise? A number of 
authors (Kish and Vasconcellos, 1993; Barlett and Ghoshal, 1995; Joynt and Warner, 1996; 
Yip et al., 1997; Schell and Solomon, 1997; Doney et al., 1998) argue that there are a 
number of reasons why businesses cross national boundaries. These reasons can be 
divided into three broad categories: 
(i) Because of two traditional motives, i. e. a resource-seeking motive and a market- 
seeking motive. 
(ii) As a result of the different stages of economic development in different parts of the 
world as well as because of unevenly distributed global resources. 
(iii) Due to the international division of labour, and anti-monopoly legislation, the local 
market becomes saturated while cost pressures and trade friction increase. 
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The globalisation of business thesis states that as businesses cross national borders, they 
bring along a number of important aspects, such as the rapidly expanding international 
trade and financial flows (Frenkel and Peetz, 1998), as well as the spread of management 
ideas or techniques (Xing, 1995; Hendry, 1996; Schell and Solomon, 1997; Wasti, 1998). 
Even though the globalisation of business thesis claims that internationalisation permits the 
spread of management ideas, a number of authors (for instance, Xing, 1995; Hendry, 1996) 
argue that only part of the home country's management ideas are transferred when 
businesses cross national boundaries. Why is this the case? To answer this question, we 
need to look back at what is revealed by the second theme, i. e. culture and cross-cultural 
management. 
Although the globalisation of business thesis seems to agree that management ideas do 
spread to some extent as a result of businesses crossing national boundaries, the culture 
thesis, however, argues that it is difficult to successfully transfer wholesale management 
ideas from home to host countries, partly because of the cultural variations between one 
country and another (Ichimura, 1981; Francesco, 1981; Hamzah et al., 1989; Hodgetts and 
Luthans, 1990; Hofstede, 1991,1993; DiBella, 1993; Tung, 1996; Clark and Mallory, 
1996; Hu and Warner, 1996; Wasti, 1998; Frenkel and Peetz, 1998). 
The above discussion suggests that while a number of authors have carried out research 
into culture and its impact on the transfer of management ideas across national borders, 
unlike other studies, those of Hofstede (1980; 1984; 1989; 1991; 1993) were more 
extensive because of the fact that he "successfully ties- cultural orientation and observable 
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institutional differences between countries in a parsimonious framework" (McGrath et al., 
1992). As such, it is worth reinstating or reviewing some of his works. 
In his two important studies Cultures and Organisations: Software of the Mind (1991) and 
Cultural Constraints in Management Theories (1993), Hofstede points out that national 
culture has an impact not only on employees' work-related attitudes, but also on the spread 
of management ideas. In his studies, he compares employees of large multinational 
business organisations in forty nations. Based on his data, he highlights four dimensions of 
culture which he considers as having a major impact on both employees' work-related 
attitudes as well as on the spread of management ideas. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 3, 
they were "power distance", "uncertainty avoidance", "individualism/collectivism", and 
"femininity/masculinity". 
Hofstede argues that "power distance" represents the way a society handles inequality, a 
factor that he considers inevitable in every society. "Uncertainty avoidance", on the other 
hand, relates to the amount of tolerance that the members of a society have for ambiguity 
and uncertainty. He states that "individualism" exists in societies in which the ties between 
individuals are loose, whereas in "collectivist" societies, people are born into and maintain 
with great loyalty strong and cohesive in-groups throughout their lives. Finally, he 
contends that the masculinity/femininity dimension relates to work goals. 
Hofstede (1993) argues that not only are there four dimensions of culture which make one 
society different from the other, but also that "there is something in all countries called 
`management', but its meaning differs to a larger or smaller extent from one country to the 
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other, and it takes considerable historical and cultural insight into local conditions to 
understand its processes, philosophies, and problems. . . if already the word `management' 
may mean so many different things, how can we _ expect one country's theories of 
management to apply abroad? " 
Because of that, Hofstede (1993: 89) says, "One should be extremely careful in making this 
assumption, and test it before considering it proven. Management is not a phenomenon 
that can be isolated from other processes taking place in a society.... it interacts with what 
happens in the family, at school, in politics, and government. It is obviously also related to 
religion and beliefs about science. Theories of management always had to be 
interdisciplinary, but if we cross national borders they should become more 
interdisciplinary than ever. " 
As discussed in Chapter 3, although Hofstede's studies (including those conducted in the 
1980s) have been popular and aroused intense interest, they are not free from criticisms. 
For example, Hunt (1981) questions the generalisations that could be drawn from 
Hofstede's sample, which was collected from one multinational company. He argues that 
the results from Hofstede's study could be contaminated through selection processes that 
sought individuals with predetermined personalities and values. Similarly, Watson (1987) 
points out that the result from Hofstede's study could also be distorted as a result of 
subsequent acculturation, formal development and training that might lead to a typical set 
of norms and values in every respect of the corporate culture. Likewise, Hollinshead and 
Leat (1995) criticise Hofstede's study by arguing that his model is methodologically 
imperfect. The same authors argue that his sample was not only limited, but the four 
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dimensions that he included in his study were too heavily drawn from Western concepts 
rather than from Eastern experiences. 
Despite such criticisms, a number of authors (for instance, Triandis, 1982; Kirkbride et al., 
1990) argue that Hofstede's study will no doubt stand as one of the major landmarks of 
cross-cultural research for many years to come. In addition, some authors (for example, 
Smith et al., 1995; Wasti, 1998) do seem to agree with Hofstede's findings and, in fact, 
there is widespread acceptance that there are difficulties in simply transferring management 
ideas across national boundaries. 
However, some commentators (for instance, Sayer, 1983; Kim, 1983; Terrill, 1993; 
Whiting, 1996) believe that if transfers are to take place then the state has to play its role 
effectively, especially in terms of influencing a change in people's attitudes. This leads us 
to our third theme, i. e. the role of the state, and particularly whether or not a strong state 
can have a significant impact in changing people's attitudes and mind-sets. Unlike the two 
previous themes, this one is different because it neither talks about the spread of 
management ideas per se, nor does it talks about culture in detail. Instead, it argues that 
unlike in developed countries where the role of state is less important, in developing ones 
the state is often seen as playing some important roles, especially as a driving force in 
changing culture and/or people's attitudes. 
With regard to the role of state in stimulating economic development, some commentators 
(Soon, 1994; Okuku, 1997) claim that state intervention is necessary because there is the 
need: (i) to create domestic supplies of factors of production when the private sector is 
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unable or unwilling to create them; (ii) to preserve a competitive market structure through 
the regulation of large private enterprises; (iii) to adjust for the failure of markets to 
achieve a desired allocation of resources; and (iv) to achieve a more desirable distribution 
of income. 
The related literature asserts that unlike the private sectors, which are profit-oriented 
enterprises, the state being instrumental in both economic and social change has different 
priorities. For example, as an agent of economic change, its priorities include setting legal 
rules; implementing policies, such as political and economic ones; buying goods and 
services; producing services; making payments, etc. On the other hand, as a force in social 
or behavioural change, its focus is to implement policies directed towards that. Some of 
the more powerful policies, as already mentioned in Chapter 4, were Singapore's "Look 
East" campaign, South Korea's Saemaul Undong Movement, and the Cultural Revolution 
in China. These policies or campaigns were intended not only for economic purposes but 
also for the purpose of changing people's mind-sets and behaviour. 
To sum up, three different views have emerged from the above discussion. One view that 
clearly favours the notion that management ideas do spread when businesses cross national 
borders, is the globalisation/intemationalisation thesis. Another view is linked to the 
culture thesis, which, although it does not necessarily reject the former view, states that it is 
difficult to successfully transfer wholesale management ideas across national boundaries 
because of the cultural variations between home and host countries. The final view relates 
to the role of the state, especially as a driving force in changing people's attitudes. 
Although it is argued that it is difficult to scientifically measure the degree of success 
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achieved by the state in terms of influencing a shift in attitudes, some commentators 
believe that it is not impossible for the state, especially in developing economies, to do so, 
partly because the state in these countries is both determined and powerful, and is able to 
impose policies and laws which outsiders may conceive as draconian. Another reason is 
that power is much more all-embracing and involves control over the media, and by using 
that as a channel for its campaigns, the state is able to affect more radical changes. 
10.3 A Summary of the Research Findings 
A review of the related literature suggests that the state in Malaysia has a great deal of 
power and it has been instrumental in instigating economic development as well as 
behavioural change. Based on this, we would expect the Malaysian government to achieve 
a great deal of success with its Look East Policy. Therefore, given this scenario our 
general hypothesis, as spelled out in Chapter 5, would be as follows: 
The Look East Policy might have had some success in promoting 
Japanese management techniques to manufacturing firms in 
Malaysia, despite the difficulties of transferring management 
practices between different countries, because of the strength of the 
state in Malaysia and its commitment to such a policy. 
Based on our findings, clearly some Japanese management techniques, such as QCCs, 
TQC, job-rotation, on-the-job training (OJT) and suggestion systems have been transferred 
to manufacturing firms in our study. But the question here is to what extent has this 
happened because of the Look East Policy? Firstly, of the 32 respondents who said that 
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they have implemented the above practices, only 3 or 9.3% stated that they have done so 
because of the LEP and it is therefore apparent that the implementation of the above 
techniques has not happened solely because of the government's policy drive. This clearly 
indicates that it has not been successful in this direction. Secondly, the view that the Look 
East Policy is not the major impetus for the transplanting of the above techniques to 
manufacturing firms in this study is further reinforced by the fact that only 2 of the 69 
respondents who participated in our study indicated that the strict enforcement of the Look 
East Policy is one of the best ways to ensure that Japanese management techniques are 
successfully transferred to firms in Malaysia. Finally, looking at the practices mentioned 
above, they tend to be the same techniques as those adopted by firms in other countries, 
such as the UK, the USA, Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan even though 
there is less pressure to do so from these governments, except in the case of Singapore 
where it has a "Look East" campaign, but then it was also nothing comparable to 
Malaysia's Look East Policy. 
The above discussion clearly suggests that while the adoption of such techniques by some 
of our respondents is not necessarily the result of a direct push from the government, it 
could be attributed to the influence of multinational 'corporations (MNCs) operating in 
Malaysia, or because of the fact that they have been educated and trained abroad, especially 
in Japanese institutions and organisations. 
Based on the above argument, it can be said that, as a whole, the Look East Policy has not 
been successful, as it has not achieved as much success as the government expected. The 
question then is why is this so? First, it could be because of the barrier imposed by culture, 
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i. e. Malaysia is a multi-cultural and multi-religious country and therefore obviously it is 
different from Japan. As a result, the Japanese management techniques, and particularly 
the ones that are deeply embedded in its culture, such as lifetime employment, seniority- 
based systems and the ringgi system are not easily transferable to manufacturing firms in 
Malaysia, despite strong encouragement from the Malaysian government. Hence, it could 
be argued that the religious beliefs and socio-cultural values in Malaysia might play a far 
more significant role in management practices policy choices than the political will of the 
government. 
The second reason relates to the dominance of Islam that has caused great difficulties in the 
transfer of Japanese management techniques to Malaysia, and the fact that Mahathir seems 
to have shifted his focus from the Look East Policy-to promote the Islamic policy has 
further reinforced the problem. As discussed in the previous chapter, in fact, Mahathir has 
made the Islamic policy dominant in less than five years after introducing the Look East 
Policy. It could be because of this that Malaysians of different religious beliefs are 
sceptical of Mahathir's main objective in introducing such a policy. 
The third reason could be because Mahathir has failed to address the Chinese community, 
yet, they are the most significant ethnic group in the business sector. In fact, the Look East 
Policy is perceived by some as anti-Chinese on the one hand, and pro-Bumiputra on the 
other. The reason as described in Chapter 5 could be because when the government started 
to send trainees to Japan in the early 1980s, it seemed to favour Bumiputra workers, 
especially the Malays. In fact, it is argued that other races, especially the Chinese, are not 
given an equal chance to go for training in Japan (Lim, 1984). Thus, being perceived as a 
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racially motivated policy it can be argued that it does not have a great appeal, particularly 
among the Chinese community. 
The fourth reason for the policy's failure to succeed could be due to the fact that Mahathir 
did not pursue it systematically and fully, i. e. some of its aspects that were working, for 
example, a long-term visit to Japan, especially for training purposes, are not followed 
through. Despite the costs incurred in this area, it was one that seemed to have a positive 
impact. It could therefore be further argued that by not following through this programme, 
there might be a real problem for the government if it tries to persuade trainees to adopt 
Japanese management techniques, if these trainees are not ready to do what is expected of 
them due to their limited knowledge of both the Japanese culture and managerial 
techniques. Moreover, it might take a long time for these trainees to learn what is required 
as most of them have no prior knowledge of the Japanese language and therefore cannot 
communicate effectively with their Japanese counterparts. This suggests that learning from 
Japan requires commitment and it should be a long-term strategy which demands both 
systematic and continuous backing from the government. 
Finally, the policy's lack of success could be due to Mahathir's personality and political 
ambition. With regard to the former, it has been suggested that because of his non-western 
educational background, even before he became Prime Minister he wanted to disassociate 
himself from the West. By the time he became Prime Minister his relationship with the 
West, and particularly with Britain was at its lowest ebb (Jomo, 1990). As discussed in 
Chapter 5, taking advantage of these strained relations which were caused by a series of 
events, including the British media's and the London Stock Exchange's hostile reception to 
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the Malaysian government's take-over of the Guthrie Corporation; the severe financial 
losses suffered by the Malaysian government when the London Metal Exchange abruptly 
amended its rule to limit the premiums payable by short-sellers who were unable to deliver 
on tin futures at a time when the Malaysian government quietly but actively supported tin 
prices; the issue of landing rights where Britain refused to give two additional landing slots 
at Heathrow airport for Malaysia Airlines System Berhad (MAS) despite the fact that 
Malaysia purchased four additional units of Boeing 747 as requested by Britain; a dramatic 
increase in student tuition fees for all foreign students in Britain, where there were more 
than 50,000 Malaysians studying in Britain at that time, including Mahathir's son; 
Mahathir finally announced the "Buy British Last" directive, and by the end of 1981 there 
was a total boycott of British goods. In terms of his political ambition, some 
commentators (for instance, Lim, 1984; Muzaffar, 1983; Jomo, 1990) allege that the LEP 
is being used to accomplish Mahathir's political goals rather than his economic objectives. 
This can be inferred from the fact that he launched the LEP in the same year as when he 
was fighting for the most powerful post during the general election in 1982. This suggests 
therefore a political rather than just an economic objective of the policy. As mentioned in 
Chapter 9, if that should be the case, perhaps one should consider examining how 
successful has the LEP been in terms of achieving its political objective. 
Despite the fact that the Look East Policy did not achieve much success, we should not 
abandon altogether the notion of globalisation and the role of the state, especially in terms 
of influencing a change in people's attitudes in order to facilitate the transfer of 
management ideas. This is because the spread of ideas in Malaysia does happen and some 
Japanese practices have actually being adopted, as revealed by our findings. As such, we 
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cannot conclude that the Look East Policy has completely failed. Moreover, there might be 
some indirect effects of the Look East Policy. A number of commentators (for instance, 
Hamid, 1993) argue that if there had not been a Look East Policy, perhaps there would be 
no technology and managerial skills transfer from Japan. But the fact that there is such a 
policy has resulted in the establishment of Malaysia's first car company, Proton, where 
technological and managerial skills are said to have been transferred. It is also argued that 
without a Look East Policy, perhaps there would be no Japanese department in the 
University of Malaya (Malaysia's oldest university) headed by a Japanese professor who 
could have helped to spread Japanese culture and ideas; or perhaps there would be no 
student exchange between Malaysia and Japan (Lim, 1984). 
With regard to our findings, it can be said that without a Look East Policy, perhaps some 
respondents in this study would not have been keen to undertake industrial training in 
Japan; or perhaps the majority of the respondents would not be interested to learn more 
about Japanese management techniques at all. However, there is some evidence to show 
that some respondents have said that they have attended seminars on Japanese management 
techniques as a way to further their understanding on the subject, which might suggest that 
the Look East Policy has had some impact, particularly in this area. Moreover, there is 
statistical evidence to suggest that a "visit to Japan", particularly for training purposes, 
actually has a direct effect on the respondents to implement some elements of the Japanese 
management techniques. To some extent, this suggests that the Look East Policy has 
succeeded in this area. 
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To sum up, it is apparent that the Look East Policy has not been successful, particularly in 
instigating the transfer of Japanese management techniques to manufacturing firms in 
Malaysia because: (i) it fails to recognise the barriers imposed by culture; (ii) it was short- 
lived as it was quickly replaced by the Islamic policy, and in fact this shift of policy simply 
reinforces the problems that already existed; (iii) it is believed to be racially motivated; (iv) 
it was not followed through as a long-term strategy nor systematically; and (v) it is 
believed to have been launched because of Mahathir's personality and to fulfil his political 
ambition. Despite it's failure to achieve significant success, one cannot conclude that it 
was a total failure, as some evidence suggests that it has had an indirect effect. 
The above discussions lead us to ask what implications does this have for the general 
literature. Some of the research implications and the contributions of this thesis will be 
discussed in the following section. 
10.4 The Research Implications and the Contribution of this Thesis 
The aim of this section is to relate the findings of this study to the general literature with 
which we commenced. To facilitate this, we will refer to the globalisation thesis and we 
will provide some argument based on the understanding of our findings. The same 
procedure will be applied when examining the culture thesis and the role of the state, 
particularly in terms of influencing a change in people's attitudes. Towards the end of this 
section, the contribution of this thesis is presented. 
First, there is a view that globalisation permits the spread of management ideas. As far as 
our findings are concerned, clearly some management ideas from Japan have spread to 
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Malaysia. But, as already mentioned, when examined these techniques it was apparent that 
only the easy ones have spread and these seem to be the same techniques that have been 
adopted by firms in some other countries, while the techniques that our respondents 
believed to be culture-bound are not easily transferable. One of the reasons why this 
happened is because of the problem of Malaysian culture. Therefore, the fact that the 
cultural differences exist between Japan and Malaysia undermines the assumption that 
what works in the former country will work in the latter. 
Second, some authors allege that management ideas cannot easily spread because of 
cultural barriers. Indeed, our findings have drawn attention to some of these difficulties. 
One example is that despite the Look East Policy, through which the Malaysians called for 
the adoption of Japanese management techniques, such as open office systems, seniority- 
based systems, loyalty to the company, the ringgi system, etc., these practices have not 
been adopted by the majority of our respondents, who claimed that it is because they are 
not compatible with Malaysian culture. But given that this is the case, are we then able to 
conclude that such techniques are not adopted solely because of the cultural variations? In 
other words, has this happened because authors like Hofstede are right in saying that 
management theory and practices cannot be easily transferred across national boundaries 
because of culture, or is it because in this case the government has not tried hard enough to 
push this idea forward and to persuade management to adopt it as they did in Singapore 
and South Korea, because clearly in these countriesr the governments have been quite 
successful in this area. Obviously, this is a contentious issue as far as the Malaysian 
experience is concerned. 
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In fact, based on our findings, it can be argued that Japanese management techniques did 
not spread as much as one might have imagined they could because the government never 
really tried hard enough. This could be due to the fact that the Look East Policy is claimed 
to be not only politically motivated, i. e. a strategy that a political leader has used to achieve 
his political ambition, but also racially motivated, and the fact that it was abandoned so 
quickly in favour of the Islamic policy suggests that the government probably was not 
committed to the economic objective of the LEP. Given that this might be the case, it 
would probably be incorrect to conclude that management ideas did not spread as much 
because of the existence of the cultural barrier. Moreover, based on the Malaysian 
experience, where politics seems to be a dominant factor, and the fact that the Look East 
Policy was short-lived, one should be wary of generalising that management ideas cannot 
be easily spread to developing countries because of the cultural differences. 
It could also be argued that apart from the fact that the government did not try harder, there 
are a number of other possible factors that have inhibited the transfer of management ideas 
from Japan to Malaysia, such as the role of the Chinese, historical events between Malaysia 
and Japan, the influence of the West in Malaysia, a lack of commitment from top 
management, lack of support infrastructure, etc. As already mentioned in Chapter 2, 
besides the fact that its culture is said to be unique, the other reason why Japanese 
management practices work so well in Japan is because of the support of a strong 
infrastructure, for example, the establishment of networked alliances that encompass 
suppliers, buyers, fellow manufacturers, banks and even the government. Hence, taking 
the above factors into account, clearly we cannot infer that our findings must support the 
view that the spread of management ideas are limited by culture. In fact, a number of 
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authors (for instance, Frenkel and Peetz, 1998) argue that there are other influences, such 
as limited contact between subsidiaries, product and labour market differences, and heavy 
administrative costs associated with diffusion which can also limit the spread of 
management practices. Nevertheless, there is direct evidence from our findings to suggest 
that culture limits the transfer of such ideas to Malaysia. 
Finally, there is another view that indicates that the state has a powerful role in developing 
economies and that it can achieve a lot more in terms of influencing people's attitudes than 
can be done in the industrialised countries. However, there seems to be little evidence to 
support this from the case of the development of the Look East Policy in Malaysia. In fact, 
our findings have drawn attention to the difficulties any government faces in trying to 
introduce policies which do not match with the local environment. This implies that the 
view that a strong state in Malaysia can have a significant impact in changing people's 
attitudes is not consistent with the claims made by some commentators. But there could be 
a number of reasons why the state in Malaysia has not had a strong impact in this area. As 
already mentioned, one of the reasons could be because the Malaysian government did not 
push the idea quite as dramatically and systematically as we might have imagined. But 
then this could be due to the fact that the Look East Policy might have more to do with 
politics than economics and it might have been more concerned with rhetoric than reality. 
Another reason could be because Malaysia has industrialised quickly and maybe to 
characterise it as an industrialising country with a strong state does not make up on the 
recent development. Maybe we should not expect the state to have a bigger effect because 
Malaysia has gone quite a long way down the industrialising road and it is no longer a pre- 
industrial country. Perhaps that is why the role of the state in this case is less important. 
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Based on the above, it could then be argued that it might be quite difficult for the 
government to successfully influence a change in people's attitudes although it can 
probably achieve a little more (see, for example, Singapore and South Korea) compared to 
countries in the West because, as mentioned in Chapter 4, it is able to introduce and impose 
policies and laws which, for example, a more Western attitude might consider as stringent. 
Moreover, unlike in the West, it has greater control and influence over the media to the 
extent that it can do more compared to the states in the West. 
To sum up, obviously there is no straightforward answer as to which theme should be 
supported or rejected. This is because the area is a complex one and it was never going to 
be a simple question of whether globalisation or culture limitations were going to be 
important, but of how the two forces or pressures interact. Moreover, one of the key 
characteristics of Malaysia is that not only is the culture different to the Japanese but it is 
also more complex, i. e. with various cultures co-existing within Malaysia itself. Having 
said this, it is possible to provide a number of commentaries based on our understanding of 
the literature, the findings of this study and the current situation in Malaysia. First, it can 
be argued that one thing that can be learned from the outcome of this research is that the 
barriers that have been imposed by factors such as culture variations, religious beliefs, legal 
systems, product and labour market differences, and a number of others including the role 
of the Chinese, should not be ignored in this area of research, especially in the case of 
Malaysia. 
Second, there is no doubt that management practices can and in fact have spread across 
national borders (see, for example, the USA, the UK, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, 
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Hong Kong and Malaysia). But one must be wary of generalising that this has happened 
solely because of the effect of globalisation, especially through MNCs, when it has been 
suggested in a number of studies that management ideas can also spread either directly or 
indirectly through political influence, education, industrial or vocational training abroad, 
etc (Gopinath, 1998; Fong, 1992). 
Third, it seems that similarities in culture and geographical closeness to some extent could 
have influenced the spread of management ideas. For example, according to a number of 
authors (for instance, Ito, 1985), in countries such as Taiwan the spread of Japanese 
management practices has been more substantial compared to their dissemination in 
Malaysia (see Imaoka, 1985) partly because Taiwan and Japan are said to share a common 
culture and history, and the fact that Taiwan is geographically close to Japan. This has 
aided the ease of transfer of Japanese management techniques, as many people, especially 
the older generation, can read and write in Japanese and these are the people who seem to 
favour such practices. 
Finally, to conclude that one technique is likely to be more transferable than another is not 
a straightforward argument. In fact, a number of determining factors as to which technique 
is transferable and which is not, such as the technological superiority of the technique 
itself, might more likely influence its spread, while a practice that is believed to increase 
social and financial burdens is less likely to be adopted. As an example of the former, lean 
production methods, which give the Japanese auto industry many advantages (see Womack 
et al., 1990), are easily transferable to other countries, such as the USA and the UK, despite 
the difficulties involved in changing their work culture in order to meet the requirements of 
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the technique. With regard to the latter, the practices that practitioners see as creating 
additional financial burden, for instance lifetime employment, have not been highly 
recommended by firms outside Japan. Moreover, when one looks at the situation in 
Malaysia, it would be unrealistic to implement techniques such as lifetime employment or 
seniority-based systems because job-hopping is a common phenomenon and promotion is 
normally based on performance as opposed to length of service. 
The above might suggest that while on the one hand the willingness to adapt oneself to a 
new technology because of its technological superiority could ultimately influence a 
change in one's attitudes, on the other hand, this change is probably unwelcome if it is 
foreseen that a particular practice could incur social and financial costs. In fact, some 
commentators claim that this is now happening in Malaysia, where adjustment in culture, 
especially with regard to work attitudes, has to be made because of technology 
advancement. Although it is difficult to influence a change in people's viewpoints 
overnight the above reasons indicate that some progress is being made. As a result, it is 
now possible for the Islamic, Japanese and Western management practices to co-exist in 
Malaysia. 
With regard to the contribution of this thesis, firstly, it presents significant information 
regarding the impact of an important policy area that-has not been previously looked at. 
Secondly, it has identified some of the factors that have inhibited the success of the Look 
East Policy and such analysis might have some practical benefits. Finally, it feeds into the 
general debate about globalisation and about the limitations imposed by culture as well as 
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the role of the state. We recognise that this is a complex debate and therefore we are not 
going to foreclose it but what we have done is contribute further to this debate. 
10.5 Suggestions for Future Research 
The suggestions for future research can be divided into two categories, and they are: (i) 
from the point of view of the Look East Policy; and (ii) from the perspective of Japanese 
management techniques. As is often the case, a study gives many new answers and raises a 
number of questions. With regard to the LEP, one of the recurring questions was "given 
the fact that it is difficult to transfer management ideas from one country to another, why, 
particularly in this case, is the government willing to use a large amount of resources 
(money, manpower, etc. ) to promote its policy knowing that it probably has a limited 
chance of economic success? " Indeed, our findings reveal that the LEP has not been very 
successful as far as its economic objective is concerned, but, as stated, perhaps one should 
look into the political objectives of the policy rather than its economic objective when 
assessing its success. This is because, as mentioned in Chapter 9, among the major reasons 
why Mahathir introduced the policy were: (i) to distance himself from the West; and (ii) as 
a tactic to stabilise his administration during the general election in 1982. This could 
imply that the government launched the Look East Policy with a strong political 
motivation. 
With respect to the techniques themselves, although our findings reveal that some firms in 
this study have adopted some elements of the Japanese management practices, such as the 
suggestion system, QCCs, etc. we do not have the answers to a number of questions. In 
terms of the suggestion system, for example, we have learnt from the related literature that 
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firms in Japan strongly encourage their employees to make suggestions and in turn award 
between 100 and 300 yen for each one. If the suggestion is considered to have potential, it 
is written up in more detail, then evaluated by the section manager and can qualify for an 
award of 1,000 to 10,000 yen and up to 20,000 yen if the suggestion is considered of 
special merit. Moreover, it is also claimed that an average of 28 suggestions per employee 
are adopted each year in Japan and these have resulted in a substantial amount of savings. 
In fact, comparatively, the average savings from suggestions on per-employee basis are 
nearly 10 times higher in Japan than in the USA, i. e. US$3,612 versus US$398 (Verespej, 
1992). Given the fact that the majority of our respondents said they have adopted this 
technique, it would be interesting to know (i) how many suggestions there are per 
employee, for example, per month and year; (ii) the type of reward that is given to a worker 
who makes a suggestion; (iii) how the suggestions are evaluated and by whom; (iv) the 
percentage of the suggestions that are actually implemented; and (v) how much the 
company saves as a result of implementing such suggestions. This is part of the general 
question on whether or not the implementation of the suggestion system has had some 
economic impact in Malaysia. As we are not been able to answer, it might be worth 
researching or investigating in the future. 
10.6 Conclusion 
Having reviewed the related literature and the findings of this study, it is possible to make 
the following conclusions: first, despite the fact that our findings recognise that 
management ideas, particularly from Japan, have spread to Malaysia through Japanese 
multinational corporations, one should be wary of generalising from the Malaysian 
experience because of the fact that ideas can also spread through political influence, 
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training and education, etc. In fact, it has been suggested that the place of study or training 
seems to have a positive influence in terms of which management ideas should be adopted. 
For example, some commentators allege that the three former Western-educated Prime 
Ministers of Malaysia have strongly favoured Western management practices, while the 
present Eastern-educated Prime Minister is said to favour Eastern management techniques. 
Second, our findings seem to support the literature which argues that culture inhibits the 
transfer of management ideas because some elements of the Japanese management 
techniques, such as seniority-based wage and promotion systems and the ringgi system, 
which our respondents believed to be culture-bound are not easily transferred to 
manufacturing firms in Malaysia. However, it should be noted that the transferability of 
management practices can be inhibited by other factors such as labour market, trade 
unions, administrative costs associated with the transfer, the legal system, organisational 
structure and policy, etc. 
Finally, although we were expecting the Malaysian state to be able to influence people's 
attitudes and to overcome the barriers that culture imposes, there was not a great deal of 
evidence from this thesis to support that view. There could be a number of reasons as to 
why this has happened and these might include the influence of Western education, the 
spread of Western management philosophy among management, and the current stage of 
economic development which means that Malaysia is no longer a pre-industrial country, 
etc. It is clear that these have been influential factors, as has the Malaysian government's 
failure to push the Look East Policy more as an economic policy as well as its lack of 
success in engaging the Chinese community. This could be the fundamental flaw of the 
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Look East Policy. Until the time when such a formidable task is accomplished, the Look 
East Policy will remain to a larger extent another political rhetoric. 
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1S` April 1998 
Dear Mr/Ms 
Department of Management & Organization 
The Faculty of Management 
University of Stirling 
Stirling, FK9 4LA, Scotland 
Tel: 01786 467310/467311 
Fax: 01786 467329 
International Fax: +44 1786 467329 
e-mail: manorg@stir. ac. uk 
I am conducting a survey for my thesis on the impact/effectiveness of the Look East Policy 
on management practices in manufacturing firms in Malaysia with regard to the Japanese 
model of management. 
Your company has been carefully selected to participate in this survey. Only a small 
number of manufacturing firms have been selected to participate, so your experiences and 
thoughts on the subject are very important. In addition, you will be representing a number 
of managers, therefore your responses are very important as this research can provide 
insights into some of the issues regarding the applicability of the Japanese model of 
management to Malaysia. 
Enclosed is a copy of the questionnaire that includes questions about: 
" The Look East Policy 
" The major features, strengths and weaknesses of the Japanese model of management 
" The feasibility of implementing and adopting the Japanese model of management and 
work ethics and their implications 
" The prospects, problems and other issues related to the transferability of the Japanese 
management techniques to manufacturing firms in Malaysia 
Please take the time to complete the questionnaire and return it in the enclosed self- 
addressed stamped envelope. It would be very helpful to have your completed 
questionnaire returned to me by 15 `h April 1998. 
Your responses are confidential. No organisation names or individual information 
will be used or released to a third party. 
Thank you very much for your time and co-operation. 
Yours sincerely, 
................... 
Frank Kiong 
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Professor Rob Ball 
Head of Department 
Appendix 7.2 
Mail Survey Questionnaire 
SECTION A: RESPONDENT'S PROFILE 
1. Name of your company: 
2. Your job title: 
3. Your race: 
1Q Bumiputra 
2Q Chinese 
3Q Indian 
4Q Others, please specify: 
4. Your religion: 
10 Islam 
2Q Christian 
3Q Buddhism 
413 Hinduism 
5Q Others, please specify: 
5. Your age group: 
10 Below 30 years 
2Q 30-35 years old 
3Q 36-45 years old 
4Q 46-55 years old 
5Q Above 55 years old 
6. How long you have been in your present post? 
113 Less than 1 year 
20 1 year but less than 2 years 
3Q2 years but less than 3 years 
413 3 years but less than 4 years 
5Q4 years but less than 5 years 
60 5 years and above 
7. How would you classify your job category? - 
10 Senior management 
2Q Middle management 
3Q Supervisory/Lower management 
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8. If you have had a previous managerial position, how long were you in your last position? 
10 Less than 1 year 
2Q1 year but less than 2 years 
3Q2 years but less than 3 years 
4Q3 years but less than 4 years 
5Q4 years but less than 5 years 
60 5 years and above 
70 Not applicable 
9. What is the highest level of education you have achieved? 
10 Have completed primary education only 
2Q Have completed secondary education 
3Q Have completed technical/commercial college education 
4Q Have completed university education 
10. If you have completed college/university education, can you list your diplomas and 
degrees and areas of specialisation. 
Name of Diploma/Degree Areas of Specialisation 
2 
3 
11. Where did you study for your diploma/degree? 
1Q Local institution 
2Q United States of America 
3Q United Kingdom 
4Q Japan 
5Q South Korea 
60 Others, please specify: 
12. Have you undergone any postgraduate training/education? 
10 Yes 
2Q No (please go to Q. 14) 
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13. If you have answered "Yes" to Q. 12, please mention the type7of postgraduate training/education. 
111 Master in Business Administration (MBA) 
20 Master in Science (MSc) 
3Q Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) 
4Q Others, please specify: 
14. Please list your professional qualifications, if any. 
1 
2 
3 
ATTENTION: QUESTIONS 15 to 18 ASK YOU ABOUT YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE 
JAPANESE LANGUAGE 
15. Can you speak the Japanese language? 
1Q Not at all 
2QA little 
3Q Reasonably well 
4Q Extremely well 
16. Can you read and write in Japanese? 
10 Not at all 
2QA little 
3Q Reasonably well 
40 Extremely well 
ATTENTION: IF YOU ANSWERED "Not at all" TO BOTH Q. 15 & Q. 16, PLEASE GO TO Q. 20 
17. If you have chosen no. "2", "3" or "4" as your answer to either Q. 15 or Q. 16, why did you 
learn Japanese? 
1Q It was required before I could be sent to Japan for training/course 
2Q It helps me communicate better with my Japanese counterparts 
3Q My interest in Japanese language 
4Q Other reason, please specify: 
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18. If you have chosen no. "2", "3" or "4" as your answer to either Q. 15 or Q. 16, where did you 
learn Japanese? 
1Q At school/college/university 
2Q At an intensive course programme 
3Q At a language correspondence course 
40 Through local private tuition 
50 At a foreign language class at local institution 
60 Others, please specify: 
19. If you have chosen no. "1" or "2" as your answer to Q. 18, in which country did you learn Japanese? 
I0 In Malaysia 
2Q In Japan 
3Q In United States 
4QIn United Kingdom 
5Q Others, please specify: 
20. Have you been to Japan? 
10 Yes (please answer Q. 21 & Q. 22 ) 
2Q No (please go to Q. 23 ) 
21. What was the purpose of the trip? 
("i " ALL THAT APPLY) 
1Q Undergoing training/work attachment 
2Q Attending conference/seminar 
3Q Attending short course 
4Q Obtaining qualification 
5Q Business trip 
6Q Others, please specify: 
22. What was the longest duration of any visit you have made? 
113 Less than 1 week 
2Q1 to 4 weeks 
3Q5 to 8 weeks 
413 9 to 16 weeks 
5Q 17 to 24 weeks 
60 25 weeks and more 
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SECTION B: YOUR ORGANISATION/FIRM 
23. What is the type of your organisation/firm? 
10 Locally-owned 
2QA joint venture with Japanese 
3QA joint venture with Korean 
4QA joint venture with British 
5QA joint venture with American 
6Q Others, please specify: 
24. What is the size of your organisation/firm? 
10 100 employees or less 
2Q More than 100 but less than 200 employees 
31: 1 More than 200 but less than 300 employees 
40 More than 300 but less than 400 employees 
513 More than 400 but less than 500 employees 
60 More than 500 employees 
25, What is your organisation/firm's core business activity? 
11: 1 Manufacturing 
2Q Others, please specify: 
SECTION C: THE LOOK EAST POLICY 
26. Have you heard of the Look East Policy? 
10 Yes 
20 No 
27. If you answered "yes" to Q. 26, do you know what the Look East Policy is all about? 
10 Yes 
20 No 
28. What is your opinion of the Look East Policy? 
10 It is the kind of policy that we need 
2Q It is not the kind of policy that we need 
3Q It is a policy that only favoured the Japanese and Koreans contractors 
4Q It is just a `window-dressing' kind of policy 
5Q Other opinion, please specify: 
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29. Why do you think the Government introduced the Look East Policy? 
(" ý" ALL THAT APPLY) 
10 The Government wanted to bring Malaysians into close association 
with Japanese and Korean work ethic and management styles 
20 The Government wanted to encourage technology transfer from Japan 
3Q The Government wanted to encourage investment from Japan 
4Q The Government wanted Malaysians to learn from the economic/ 
technological success of Japan/South Korea 
5Q Other reason, please specify: 
30. In your opinion, what effect does the Look East Policy have on your firm? 
(" 4" ALL THAT APPLY) 
1Q It facilitates business deals between the Japanese and the Korean 
2Q It helps to promote our firm and its products in Malaysia and in the international market 
3Q It facilitates the implementation of the Japanese model of management in my firm 
4Q It helps our firm to acquire technological know-how from Japan 
5Q The policy has had no effect on my firm in terms of encouraging the transfer of the JMM 
31. In your opinion, do you agree that the Look East Policy has resulted in changes in attitudes and 
behaviour in terms of loyalty and hard work among employees in your firm? 
10 Yes, I agree 
2Q No, I do not agree 
3Q Neither agree nor disagree 
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SECTION D: JAPANESE MODEL OF MANAGEMENT 
32. Please indicate your degree of familiarity with the elements of the Japanese model of management 
listed below by placing a 11 si " to the column provided after each answer. 
Elements of the Japanese 
model of management 
Not familiar 
at all 
A little bit 
Familiar 
Reasonably 
familiar 
Very 
familiar 
1. Lifetime employment 
2. Seniority-wage system 
3. Seniority-promotion system 
4. Quality control circle 
5. Total quality control 
6. Job-rotation 
7. On-the-job training (OJT) 
8. Just-in-time (JIT) 
9. Suggestion system 
10. Open office system 
11. Group responsibility 
12. Loyalty to company 
13. Paternal leadership style 
14. Ringgi system 
15. Hiring of fresh graduates 
16. In-house unionism 
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33. Please indicate by placing a"4" to the appropriate column in each case, as to how 
you acquired the knowledge of the Japanese model of management (If you don't have 
the knowledge of the Japanese model of management, please leave blank). 
Elements of the Learned Learned Learned Learned Learned Learned O 
Japanese model of from from my from my While on from from t 
Management workshop/ immediate previous Attachment/ books/ LEP h 
seminar/ supervisor/ employer Secondment journals e 
course mentor/ Industrial r 
colleagues training in s 
Japanese firms 
in Japan 
1. Lifetime 
employment 
2. Seniority-wage 
system 
3. Seniority- 
promotion 
4. Quality control 
circles 
5. Total quality 
control 
6. Job-rotation 
7. On-the-job 
training 
8. Just-in-time 
(JIT) 
9. Suggestion 
systems 
10. Open office 
system 
11. Group 
responsibility 
12. Loyalty to 
company 
13. Paternal 
leadership 
style 
14. Ringgi 
system 
15. Hiring of 
fresh 
graduates 
16. In-house 
unionism 
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34. With regard to those elements with which you are familiar with, would you recommend them 
to your firm? 
(Please "I" the column that represents the most appropriate answer for each element below) 
(If you don't have the knowledge of the Japanese model of management, please leave blank) 
Elements of the Japanese 
Model of management 
I would recommend 
to my firm 
I would not 
Recommend to 
my firm 
No comment 
1. Lifetime employment 
2. Seniority-wage system 
3. Seniority-promotion system 
4. Quality control circle (QCC) 
5. Total quality control (TQC) 
6. Job-rotation 
7. On-the-job training (OJT) 
8. Just-in-time (JIT) 
9. Suggestion system 
10. Open office system 
11. Group responsibility 
12. Loyalty to company 
13. Paternal leadership style 
14. Ringgi system 
15. Hiring of fresh graduates 
16. In-house unionism 
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35. Using a range from one (1) to five (5), where "1" stands for "strongly disagree" and "5" stands for 
"strongly agree", please indicate by circling the appropriate number in each case, your 
agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements: 
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly 
Statements disagree agree nor agree 
disagree 
1. Employees do not like 
lifetime employment as 1 2 3 4 5 
it restricts career change 
2. Seniority-wage system 
increases productivity 1 2 3 4 5 
among employees 
3. Seniority system is the 
best way to determine 1 2 3 4 5 
promotion 
4. The strong support from 
the government has 1 2 3 4 5 
made it more easier to 
implement QCCs 
5. Employees are keen to 
participate in QCC 1 2 3 4 5 
activities 
6. A suggestion system is 
beneficial in cutting costs 1 2 3 4 5 
and increasing 
productivity 
7. Co-operation between 
manufacturers and 1 2 3 4 5 
suppliers is the most 
important factor for the 
success of JIT 
implementation 
8. Consensus decision- 
making/Ringgi system 1 2 3 4 5 
can not be applied in 
Malaysia because of the 
different cultural 
environment compared to 
Japan 
36. To your knowledge, has your firm implemented the Japanese management techniques? 
10 Yes (please go to Q. 37 to Q. 47) 
2Q No (please go to Q. 48) 
37. Why did your firm implement them? 
10 Because of the Look East Policy 
2Q Because they are less expensive and can be implemented piecemeal 
3Q Because of economic considerations 
4Q Because of management's response to specific problems 
5Q Others, please specify: 
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38. Which elements of the Japanese management techniques have been implemented in your firm? 
( °° ý" ALL THAT APPLY) 
10 Lifetime employment 
2Q Seniority-wage system 
3Q Seniority-promotion 
4Q Quality control circle (QCC) 
5Q Total quality control (TQC) 
60 Job-rotation 
7Q On-the-job training (OJT) 
8Q Just-in-time (JIT) 
9Q Suggestion systems 
10 Q Open office system 
11 Q Group responsibility 
12 Q Loyalty to company 
13 Q Paternal leadership style 
14 Q Ringgi system 
15 Q Hiring of fresh graduates 
16 Q Others, please specify: 
39. Please "I" the appropriate column to indicate whether those elements were implemented in pure 
or modified form. 
Elements of the Japanese 
Model of management 
Pure form Modified form 
1. Lifetime employment 
2. Seniority-wage system 
3. Seniority-promotion 
4. Quality control circles 
5. Total quality control 
6. Job-rotation 
7. On-the-job training (OJT) 
8. Just-in-time (JIT) 
9. Suggestion systems 
10. Open office system 
It. Group responsibility 
12. Loyalty to company 
13. Paternal leadership style 
14. Ringgi system 
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40. Who was responsible for introducing those elements in your firm? 
10 The Chief Executive Officer of the company 
2Q The other senior managers of the company 
3Q Shop-floor workers of the company 
4Q The external consultant that the company engaged 
5Q Others, please specify: 
41. Did your firm have any problems in trying to implement those elements? 
10 Yes 
2Q No (please go to Q. 43) 
42. If there were problems, what were they? 
11: 1 Worker's preference for existing management practices 
2Q Strong resistance or impact of Western-educated managers 
3Q Lack of commitment from top management to implement the Japanese model of management 
41: 1 Some elements of the Japanese model of management are not compatible with workers' 
cultural and religious beliefs 
5Q Others, please specify: 
43. As a measure of employment stabilisation, which of the following measures have your firm adopted? 
(°° 4" ALL THAT APPLY) 
1Q Improvement and expansion of welfare facilities 
2Q Pension Scheme 
3Q Seniority-promotion system 
4Q Internal promotion system 
5Q Job-rotation 
6Q Commendations/Award for long service 
7Q Small group activities 
8Q Continuous training system 
9Q Wage incentive scheme 
10 Q Reconciling human relations between the management and workers 
1113 Others, please specify: 
44. In an effort to increase productivity, which of the following measures have your firm adopted? 
1Q Suggestion system 
2Q Quality control circle 
3Q Zero-defect movement 
4Q Others, please specify: 
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45. What is the prime variable that your firm used in determining the salaries of the employees? 
10 Job category 
20 Merit/performance 
3Q Seniority 
40 Employee skill and efficiency 
5Q Loyalty to the organisation 
60 Others, please specify: 
46. To your knowledge, have any Japanese personnel been attached to your firm specialising in 
transferring Japanese practices and technological know-how under the Look East Policy? 
10 Yes (Please go to Q. 47) 
2Q No (If you answered "No" or "Do not know", 
3Q Do not know go to Q. 51) 
47. How many of them have been seconded to your firm? 
10 5 or less 
2Q More than 5 but less than 10 persons 
3Q More than 10 but less than 20 persons 
40 More than 20 but less than 30 persons 
5Q More than 30 but less than 40 persons 
60 50 persons and more 
ATTENTION: ANSWER Q. 48 TO Q. 50 IF YOUR FIRM HAS NOT ADOPTED/ 
IMPLEMENTED THE JAPANESE MODEL OF MANAGEMENT 
48. In your personal opinion, can the Japanese model of management be implemented in your firm? 
1Q No elements can be implemented 
2Q Yes, but only some elements can be implemented 
3Q Yes, all elements can be implemented 
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49. If you picked no. "2" as your response to Q. 48, which elements can be implemented? 
(" v" ALL THAT APPLY) 
10 Lifetime employment 
20 Seniority-wage system 
3Q Seniority-promotion 
4Q Quality control circles 
5Q Total quality control 
60 Job-rotation 
7Q On-the-job training (OJT) 
8Q Just-in-time (JIT) 
9Q Suggestion systems 
1013 Open office system 
110 Group responsibility 
12 Q Loyalty to company 
13 Q Paternal leadership style 
14 Q Ringgi system 
15 Q Hiring of fresh graduates 
16 Q Others, please specify: 
50. Why would you think they can be implemented in your firm? 
1Q They can be easily adapted into the existing system 
2Q They are practical to use and easy to implement 
3Q They do not conflict with the cultural, traditional and religious beliefs of the majority of the workers 
4Q They are readily accepted by both management and workers because of the enormous 
benefits they provided 
5Q Others, please specify: 
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ATTENTION: Q. 51 TO Q. 61 APPLIES TO EVERYBODY 
51. If the Japanese model of management is to be successfully transferred to the Malaysian private 
firms in general and to your firm in particular, what are some of the best ways to achieve this objective? 
10 Strict enforcement of the Look East Policy 
2Q Appointment of Chief Executive Officer and top management group who are adequately 
trained in Japanese model of management as well as highly committed to implementing it 
3QA regular, systematic training for all employees regarding the Japanese model of management 
4Q Introduction of only those elements that are compatible with Malaysian cultural and religious beliefs 
5Q Secondment of Japanese personnel to the private firms for a certain period of time to speed 
up the transfer process 
6Q Others, please specify: 
52. Some people argue that only certain elements of the Japanese management techniques can be 
transferred to Malaysia. Some of the reasons they give are listed below. 
(" 4" ALL THAT APPLY) 
10 Malaysia and Japan are at different stages of technological development 
2Q Many firms have been structured according to the Western style of management 
3Q The top management in many firms are Western-trained and therefore are not 
in favour of all the elements of the Japanese model of management 
4Q Not all workers are in favour of all the elements of the Japanese model of management 
5Q Trade unions in many firms do not favour some elements of the Japanese model of management 
6Q Some elements of the Japanese model of management are culture-bound and are 
not compatible with local cultural, traditional and religious beliefs 
7Q Some elements of the Japanese model of management bring more problems than benefits 
8Q Only some elements of the Japanese model of management are practical to use and easy to implement 
53. With regard to management style, what is your preference in running your organisation? 
10 The Japanese-style management 
20 The British-style management 
3Q The American-style management 
40 The Islamic-style management 
5QA mixture of various styles which is pro-West 
60 No preference 
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53. What is your opinion regarding the transferability of Japanese management techniques to 
Malaysia in general? 
10 All elements can be transferred in their pure form 
20 Only some or certain elements can be transferred but have to be modified to suit the local 
environment 
3Q No elements can be transferred either in a pure or a modified form 
55. Do you believe that Malaysian workers have willingly accepted the Japanese work ethic? 
10 Yes 
2QNo 
3Q Not sure 
56. Do you recognise a trade union in your firm? 
10 Yes (please go to Q. 57 & Q. 58) 
2Q No (please go to Q. 59) 
57. What type of union does your firm recognise? 
10 Industry-wide union 
2Q Craft union 
3Q In-house union 
58. Why did your firm choose to recognise this particular union? 
10 Since most firms in Malaysia recognise this type of union, so we followed 
2Q Management and employees favour this type of union 
3Q It is the trade union policy that we should recognise this type of union 
4Q We recognise this type of union because we follow what the government has instructed us to do 
5Q Other reason, please specify: 
59. If you are a member of trade union, has it been beneficial to you in safe-guarding your interests? 
10 Very beneficial 
2Q Reasonably beneficial 
3QA bit beneficial 
4Q Not beneficial at all 
60. In general, do you think that the Japanese are willing to transfer their technological expertise or know- 
how to the Malaysians? 
1Q No, they are not willing to transfer their technological know-how and expertise to the Malaysians 
2Q Only some are willing; others only teach what Malaysians already know or those that are not 
relevant to Malaysia's needs 
313 Yes, they are willing to transfer their expertise to the Malaysians 
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61. In your opinion, has the Look East Policy been successful in transferring the 
Japanese model of management to private firms in Malaysia? 
10 Yes 
2Q No 
3Q Not sure 
Note: If you have any other suggestions or comments, please write down in the space below. 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME AND CO-OPERATION 
WISH YOU ALL THE BEST! 
DON'T FORGET 
TO RETURN YOUR COMPLETED QUESTIONNAIRE TODAY 
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Appendix 7.3 
Interview Checklist 
1. Which elements of the Japanese management techniques have been implemented in 
your firms and which have not? 
2. State the reason(s) why you have implemented them/why you have not implemented 
them? 
3. What is your opinion of lifetime employment, seniority-based systems, paternalism, 
company loyalty, quality control circles, in-house unions, the ringgi system (consensus 
decision making), and open office systems? - 
4. Would it be possible to implement these techniques/practices in your firms? 
5. What are some of the problems you have faced in implementing these 
practices/techniques and why? 
6. State the reason(s) why you think it is very difficult to implement/transfer Japanese 
management techniques which are considered "hard" and/or culture-bound? 
7. How would you solve problems such as lack of loyalty, self-centredness and 
individualistic employees/workers? 
8. What are the techniques you have implemented to solve these problems? 
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9. In your opinion what are the impacts/effects of the Look East Policy? 
10. What are your comments on some of the "weapons" that have been used by the 
government in attempting to achieve its Look East Policy's objective(s)? 
11. Do you think the Look East Policy has been effective, especially in terms of 
encouraging management in Malaysia to adopt the Japanese management techniques? 
12. Your general opinion on the Look East Policy? 
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Appendix 7.4 
First Reminder 
16th April 1998 
Dear Mr/Ms , 
Department of Management & Organization 
The Faculty of Management 
University of Stirling 
Stirling, FK9 4LA, Scotland 
Tel: 01786 467310/467311 
Fax: 01786 467329 
International Fax: +44 1786 467329 
e-mail: manorg@stir. ac. uk 
About four weeks ago I sent you a questionnaire pertaining to the effectiveness of the Look 
East Policy with regard to the Japanese model of management. As of today, I have not 
received your completed questionnaire. 
I appreciate the fact that you may be busy but please take a few minutes of your time to 
complete the questionnaire because of the importance each questionnaire has to the study. 
I need your completed questionnaire. If, by chance, you did not receive the questionnaire 
or it has been misplaced, please let me know soon. Otherwise, it would be very helpful to 
have your completed questionnaire returned to me before 30th April 1998. 
Once again, rest assured that your responses will be treated with the utmost confidentiality. 
If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to contact me at 082-461561. 
Yours sincerely, 
..................... 
Frank Kiong 
fk/q/reml 
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Professor Rob Ball 
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Appendix 7.5 
Simplified Version of the Interview Schedule 
Q1: BACKGROUND OF RESPONDENTS 
1.1 Your race: 
1.2 Your age: 
1.3 Your religion: 
1.4 Your level of education: 
I Q2: CHARACTERISTICS OF FIRMS 
2.1 What is the type/ownership of your firm? 
2.2 How many employees do your firm employed? 
Q3: KNOWLEDGE OF THE JAPANESE LANGUAGE AND VISIT TO JAPAN 
3.1 Can you speak the Japanese language? Yes Q No O 
12 Can you read and write in Jananese? Yes Q No Q 
3.3 (If `YES') Where and Why did you learn Japanese? 
3.4 Have you been to Japan? Yes Q No Q 
3.5 (If `YES') what was the purpose of the trip? 
3.6 What was the longest duration of any visit you have made? 
Q4: THE LOOK EAST POLICY 
4.1 Do you know what the Look East Policy is all about? Yes 0 No 13 
4.2 What is your opinion of the Look East Policy? 
4.3 Why do you think the Government introduced the Look East Policy? 
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4.4 In your opinion, what effect does the Look East Policy have on your firm? 
Q5: FAMILIARITY WITH THE JAPANESE MODEL OF MANAGEMENT 
5.1 Are you familiar with the Japanese model of management? Yes Q No Q 
5.2 Could you tell me which elements of the Japanese model of management are you 
familiar with? 
Elements of the Japanese management 
techniques 
Not familiar Familiar 
a. Lifetime employment 
b. Seniority-wage system 
c. Seniority-promotion system 
d. Quality control circles 
e. Total quality control - 
f. Job-rotation 
g. On-the-job training (OJT) 
h. Just-in-time (JIT) 
1. Suggestion systems 
j. Open office system 
k. Group responsibility 
1. Loyalty to company 
in. Paternal leadership style 
n. Ringgi system 
o. Hiring of fresh graduates 
p. In-house unionism 
5.3 How did you acquire the knowledge of the Japanese model of management that you 
are familiar with? 
Q6: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JAPANESE MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES 
6.1 To your knowledge, has your firm implemented the Japanese management techniques? 
Yes 13 No Q 
6.2 (If `YES') Why did your firm implement the JMM? 
6.3 Which elements of the JMM have been implemented in your firm? 
6.4 Were they implemented in pure or modified form? 
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6.5 Who was responsible for introducing those elements in your firm? 
Q7: PROBLEM WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JMM 
7.1 Did your firm have any problems in trying to implement those elements? 
Yes Q No Q 
7.2 (If `YES') what were the problems? 
7.3 In your personal opinion, could the Japanese management techniques be successfully 
implemented in your firm? Yes Q No Q 
7.4 (If `YES') which elements could be successfully implemented in your firm? 
Q8: THE JAPANESE WILLINGNESS TO TRANSFER THEIR TECHNOLOGY 
8.1 Do you believe that the Japanese are willing to transfer their technological expertise 
to the Malaysians? Yes 13 No 13 
Q9: TRADE UNION 
9.1 Do you recognise a trade union in your firm? Yes Q No Q 
9.2 What type of union does your firm recognise? 
9.3 Why did your firm choose to recognise this particular union? 
9.4 What is your opinion regarding in-house unions? 
9.5 Are you are a member of a trade union? Yes Q No Q 
Q10: HAS THE LOOK EAST POLICY BEEN SUCCESSFUL 
10.1 In your opinion has the Look East Policy been successful in terms of encouraging 
management in Malaysia to adopt the Japanese model of management? Yes 13 No 13 
10.2 (If `YES') what is the basis for your opinion? 
10.3 Do you have any other comments regarding the Look East Policy? 
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Appendix 7.6 
List of Respondents/Firms 
Globalmas Sdn Bhd 
Acer Technologies 
Isuta Sdn Bhd 
Mariwasa Kraftanga Sdn Bhd 
Motorola (M) Sdn Bhd 
Amalgamated Metal Corp (M) Sdn Bhd 
Associated Koalin Industries Bhd 
Albright & Wilson (M) Sdn Bhd 
Malaysian Tobacco Company 
RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co. 
Amrich Styroform Mfg. (M) Sdn Bhd 
S. E. H. Malaysia Sdn Bhd 
Chong Lee Hong Seng Ent. (M) Sdn Bhd 
Gamuda Bhd 
CCM Fertilizers Sdn Bhd 
Gula Padang Terap Berhad 
Coilcraft (M) Sdn Bhd 
Aluminium Industries Sdn Bhd 
Cradu Enterprise Sdn Bhd 
Ever Advertising Sdn Bhd 
Trans Resources Corporation Sdn Bhd 
Adaptive Micro Systems (M) Sdn Bhd 
BIG Industries Sdn Bhd 
Malinet Research & Engineering S/B 
Lasme Enterprise Sdn Bhd 
KKB Engineering Berhad 
Kubaru Sdn Bhd 
Tang Teck Ong Manufacturing 
MCSB 
Arab-Malaysian Development Bhd 
Antah Oiltools Sdn Bhd 
Alps Electric (M) Sdn Bhd 
Pioneer Concrete (M) Sdn Bhd 
Saujana Jaya Sdn Bhd 
Perodua Manufacturing S/B 
Advanced Micro Devices Sdn Bhd 
Sri Muar Enterprise 
Safeskin Corporation (M) Sdn Bhd 
Black and Daker 
F&N Dairies (M) Sdn Bhd 
Besimega Sdn Bhd 
Amisan Products (M) Sdn Bhd 
Guocera Marketing Sdn Bhd 
BP Malaysia Sdn Bhd 
APMC 
AIC Corporation Berhad 
Esso Malaysia Berhad 
Best Tiles Works Sdn Bhd 
DMIB Berhad 
Advance Industries Sdn Bhd 
Asia Chinon Precision Sdn Bhd 
Antara Steel Mills Sdn Bhd 
Fico Asia Sdn Bhd 
Syn Plastic Industries 
MA Sdn Bhd 
CMS Cement Sdn Bhd 
Flexiwood 
Techtronic company 
Pawada Food Industries Sdn Bhd 
Borneo Plastic Factory 
Petronas 
Kim Hin Industry Berhad 
Sarcargo Sdn Bhd 
Carlsberg Brewery (M) Bhd 
Ajinomoto (M) Bhd 
Autojack Sdn Bhd 
Cold Storage (M) Bhd 
Today's Plastic Industries Sdn Bhd 
CH Steel Sdn Bhd 
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Appendix 8.1 
Breakdown of Respondents who said that the 
LEP has had no and some Effect on their Firms 
Nationality No effect Some effect 
Malaysians 38 3 
Japanese - 5 
American 2 - 
British 2 - 
Total 42 8 
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